

Involvement without insight is like judgement without prospect

A study of the relation between NLD DISS and the Dutch policymakers



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Preface

This thesis marks the end of my time as a Military Strategic Studies student. I have gained a lot of knowledge and insights over the past two highly intense years. I enjoyed most lectures and discussions we had. And while Sun Tzu considered war a necessary evil, Von Clausewitz mentioned it is also the continuation of politics by different means. The different lectures touched on these interesting topics and we studied war. Von Clausewitz also had the opinion that in the fog of war intelligence was mostly wrong. During the intelligence lectures we indeed looked into intelligence failures but also into intelligence successes. All of which provided valuable insights of my recent education. A big compliment to the Netherlands Defence Academy for designing this interesting masters program.

In this preface I also want to thank a few people. First, I would like to thank the director of the Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (NLD DISS) together with the former head of the Intelligence Analyses Department for giving me the opportunity to attend this masters program. Also a big thank you to Janneke and Martin for giving me permission to spend numerous hours on this masters over the past years. Also I want to thank the NLD DISS Director for granting me permission to conduct my research at the service. Furthermore, my supervisor Bob de Graaff deserves my gratitude. He provided fruitful insights in my queeste for an interesting thesis topic. On top of that his positive support during the rest of my research and thesis process was unvaluable. A word of gratitude also to the interviewees, who all were more than willing to cooperate. Without exception they were very open during their interviews. Their cooperation and open attitude were highly pleasurable and provided very interesting insights in both the NLD DISS's management and its policy environment. Another word of thank goes to Thialda, who was a positive critical reader of my drafts. My last and most special word of gratitude is for my wife, Angela. During the masters program we welcomed two new editions to our family and I was deployed abroad twice. Still, she supported me and took care of our kids by herself and made it possible for me to prepare and attend the lectures and conduct my research as well as I possibly could. *"It is our women who make us men do great things"*¹.

¹ Quote of USMC General during a private conversation while I was deployed to Kandahar.

Abstract

Since the threat in the world is evolving and new threats are rising, the policymakers ask more and different questions to the intelligence services. It is therefore interesting to look into the relation policymakers have with intelligence services.

In the American literature two approaches are described. First the traditional approach and second the activist approach. In the British literature the joint approach is described. In this research the three approaches are broken down in indicators with which will be explored

What relation does the Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (NLD DISS) has with the Dutch policymakers?

The fitting case study approach was chosen as general research design. The data was gathered by theoretical research and a semi-structured in depth interview. All data that has become available was of a qualitative nature and was coded in an overview.

Of the traditional approach five indicators do apply to the relation NLD DISS has with the Dutch policymakers. The other three indicators out of eight are not applicable to the case study. Of the activist approach five out of eight indicators are more or less applicable to the relation of NLD DISS with the Dutch policymakers. The other three out of the eight are not applicable. Out of the three indicators identified to the joint approach only one is applicable to the relation between NLD DISS and the Dutch policymakers but to a certain degree that indicator is also applicable to other approaches.

None of the approaches is solely applicable to the case study of NLD DISS and the Dutch policymakers. However the alteration of the traditional approach by Sherman Kent seems the most applicable to this case study. However the findings are likely not generally applicable. Since this research had a rather narrow focus it would be interesting to conduct the same research on the shop floor level of NLD DISS and to conduct research into the relation of the AIVD and the Dutch policymakers. Based on this research it is recommended that NLD DISS and the policymakers should intensify their relation by for instance placing liaison officers at the ministries. Furthermore several interviewees mentioned that more attention should be paid to feedbackloops working both ways.

Samenvatting

De dreiging in de wereld is aan het veranderen, er doemen geregeld nieuwe dreigingen op. Daardoor worden door beleidsmakers meer en andere vragen gesteld aan de inlichtingen diensten. Het is mede daarom interessant om onderzoek te doen naar de relatie tussen beleidsmakers en inlichtingendiensten.

In de Amerikaanse literatuur worden twee benaderingen beschreven voor deze relatie. De traditionele benadering en de activistische benadering. Daarnaast wordt in de Britse literatuur een derde benadering beschreven, de gezamenlijke benadering. In dit onderzoek worden de drie benaderingen beschreven en aan de hand daarvan worden indicatoren vastgesteld om te onderzoeken **Wat de relatie is tussen de Militaire Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst (MIVD) en de Nederlandse beleidsmakers.**

Als onderzoeksontwerp is gekozen voor een casestudy. De data zijn verzameld door middel van theoretisch onderzoek en een aantal semi-gestructureerde diepte interviews. Alle data die hieruit is voortgekomen was van kwalitatief karakter en is gecodeerd in een overzicht gebruikt.

Uit de interviews blijkt dat van de acht indicatoren van de traditionele benadering er vijf van toepassing zijn op de casestudy. Van de activistische benadering zijn er eveneens vijf van de acht indicatoren van toepassing. Van de drie indicatoren van de gezamenlijke benadering is er slechts één van toepassing. Deze indicator is echter slechts beperkt discriminerend, aangezien deze ook deels van toepassing is op de overige benaderingen.

Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat geen van de drie benaderingen zuiver van toepassing is op de relatie tussen de MIVD en de Nederlandse beleidsmakers. Op basis van de bevindingen kan worden gesteld dat de visie van Kent op de zuiver traditionele benadering het meest van toepassing is. Het is echter waarschijnlijk dat de uitkomst van het onderzoek niet generaliseerbaar is voor de Nederlandse inlichtingengemeenschap. Het onderzoek had een nauwe focus en het is dan ook waarschijnlijk interessant om een soortgelijk onderzoek op de werkvloer uit te voeren, en bij de Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD). Op basis van dit onderzoek kan worden aanbevolen dat de MIVD de relatie met de beleidsmakers moet intensiveren door bijvoorbeeld liaisons te plaatsen bij de ministeries . Daarnaast komt naar voren dat de feedback beter moet worden georganiseerd.

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1. Introduction

1.1. Problem statement

In her blog of December 2014 the Netherlands Minister of Defence, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, mentions the security situation in the world has changed. The Netherlands defence forces must focus on crises east and south of NATO-soil and she expects that new crises will appear in the world. And accordingly the Netherlands Defence Forces must be deployed today and in the future.²

The world is evolving at the moment. Only years ago the western military was looking to the great enemy in the east. Intelligence services were focused on the Russian army and the communist movements in their homeland or the communist movements posing a threat to their national army. Policymakers did not ask for much more at that time. Then the Cold War ended and intelligence had to find a new reason of existence. This appeared on 9/11, whereafter all nations were mainly focused on terrorism and intelligence services were first and foremost interested in non state actors like the Taliban and Al Qaida. So the world just a year ago was mainly looking into the terrorist threat. Again policy was mainly focused on the areas in which operations were going on.

Just recently a state actor re-appeared on the scene. Russia annexed a part of the Ukraine, and is possibly posing a threat to the NATO and the European Union. An old topic has been put back on the agenda. Also ISIS has become a new opponent to the West. Policymakers start asking more complex and more diffuse questions to the intelligence services on all these topics and defence forces are being deployed to more areas for which intelligence support is needed.³ According to the blog of Hennis-Plasschaert the Dutch forces are currently deployed in nearly twenty different areas.⁴

To answer the questions of the policymakers, intelligence services are often working according to the process as shown in the intelligence cycle (see figure 1). The first step of the intelligence cycle is asking and tasking of intelligence services by policy makers. Likely more

² Hennis-Plasschaert, J. (2014, December 19). Ingrijpend, heftig en hevig. Retrieved January 5, 2015, from <http://www.defensie.nl/actueel/weblog/minister/2014/ingrijpend-heftig-en-hevig>

³ The Netherlands, Ministry of Defense (2013). *MIVD Jaarverslag 2013*. Retrieved January 7, 2015, from <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/jaarverslagen/2014/04/23/jaarverslag-militaire-inlichtingen-en-veiligheidsdienst-2013/jaarverslag-militaire-inlichtingen-en-veiligheidsdienst-2013.pdf>

⁴ Hennis-Plasschaert, J. (2014, December 19). Ingrijpend, heftig en hevig. Retrieved January 5, 2015, from <http://www.defensie.nl/actueel/weblog/minister/2014/ingrijpend-heftig-en-hevig>

issues are on the agenda of the policymakers so more questions are asked. This first phase, which starts the rest of the intelligence cycle for the services, is possibly becoming over(t)asked since more questions are asked after a time of several budget cuts. The other phase in which intelligence services have contact with the policymakers is the last phase, the dissemination phase.⁵ This last phase is according to Michael A. Turner, a former senior CIA officer, "*the most fragile link in the intelligence process*".⁶

Analysts are then confronted with getting the message the right way to the right policymakers. At this stage intelligence indeed meets the policy and both Turner and Arthur S. Hulnick, a veteran of the intelligence community,⁷ identify several issues in the relationship between intelligence and policy during this phase of the intelligence cycle. However the feedback of this last phase could be used in a new first phase of the intelligence cycle.



Figure 1; the intelligence cycle⁸

The relationship between intelligence and policymaking has been a point of debate for several scholars. Within the American intelligence literature the debate started in the late 1940's

⁵ Turner, M. (2005). Getting Intelligence to the Right People. In *Why secret intelligence fails* (pp. 124-131). Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books.

⁶ *ibid*

⁷ Cimballa, S., & Hulnick, A. (1987). Relations Between Intelligence Producers and Policy Customers: A New Way of Looking at and Old Problem. In *Intelligence and intelligence policy in a democratic society* (pp. 129-144). Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Transnational.

⁸ " Intelligence cycle. (n.d.). Retrieved January 5, 2015, from [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/additional-publications/the-work-of-a-nation/images/intel cycle-2.jpg/image.jpg](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/additional-publications/the-work-of-a-nation/images/intel-cycle-2.jpg/image.jpg)

known as the Kent-Kendall debate.⁹ The debate consists of two main streams with regard to the relation between policymakers and intelligence services. First the traditionalists and second the activists. The traditionalists are of the opinion that intelligence services must collect their secrets and produce intelligence accordingly. Policymakers must draw implications from these products. The activists advocate a closer working relationship between policymakers and intelligence services. Activists want dialogue regarding information and feedback.¹⁰ Furthermore in the British literature the joint intelligence approach is clarified. Within this approach intelligence professionals and policy practitioners write assessments together. These joint assessments are used to inform the policymakers. By doing so they deliver integrated solutions to the policymakers.¹¹

According to some authors several services were traditionalists and are now closing the gap between the policy and intelligence services. To come closer to each other James A. Barry et al., a former deputy director of the CIA's center for study of intelligence, are giving several indicators to both policy and intelligence services.¹² Also according to Mark M. Lowenthal, adjunct professor at the Krieger school of arts and sciences at John Hopkins university after a career in the intelligence community, intelligence products are worthless if for instance they are not read in time or do not serve a purpose for policymakers. However he also suggests that bureaucratic cultures often form a significant barrier between them.¹³ So possibly there is a discrepancy between literature and practice.

In 2000 NLD DISS was founded out of the intelligence services of the three parts of the armed forces. This was the end of a long, political and bureaucratic process. When the Dutch law on intelligence services started to work in 2002 the name became official and the tasks were clearly described. NLD DISS is part of the ministry of Defense (MOD) and reports

⁹ Davis, J. (1992). The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949. *Studies in Intelligence*, 35(2), 91-103. Retrieved January 10, 2015, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol35no2/pdf/v35i2a06p.pdf>

¹⁰ Brammer, D., & Hulnick, A. (1980). Intelligence And Policy-The On-Going Debate. *Studies in Intelligence*, 9-16. Retrieved December 8, 2014, from <http://media.nara.gov/dc-metro/rg-263/6922330/Box-7-88-2/263-a1-27-box-7-88-2.pdf>

¹¹ Davies, P. (2012). The Whitehall Village Market for Intelligence: The JIC System Prior to 2001, Great Shows of Reform, 2005-10. In *Intelligence and government in Britain and the United States a comparative perspective* (Vol. 2, pp. 13-73, 292-313). Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger Security International.

¹² Barry, J., Davis, J., Gries, D., & Sullivan, J. (1993). Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide. *Studies in Intelligence*, 37(3), 1-16. Retrieved March 15, 2015, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol37no3/pdf/v37i3a02p.pdf>

¹³ Lowenthal, M. (2004). Tribal Toggles: Intelligence Consumers, Intelligence Producers. In L. Johnson & J. Wirtz (Eds.), *Strategic Intelligence: Windows into a Secret World: An Anthology* (pp. 234-241). Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Company.

directly to the minister. NLD DISS has thus a more or less independent position within the MOD. The direct control is being done by the secretary general, consequently NLD DISS has no command relation with the Commander of the Armed forces. The commander however has the most requirements. Besides him the ministry of foreign affairs and of General Affairs also have requirements.¹⁴

It will be interesting to explore how the relation between intelligence services and policymakers is arranged in the Netherlands. So what relation the Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (NLD DISS) has with the Dutch policymakers. In the Netherlands originally there are several policy institutions able to either ask or task NLD DISS. These questions are gathered in the tasking by the prime minister (AWB) and in the Defense tasking (IVD), and since this year in the integrated requirements (GAWB). According to the annual report of NLD DISS, the service converts these requirements into a year plan. In this year plan NLD DISS also looks into the depth of research and by Weighing and Prioritizing NLD DISS apportions its capacities.¹⁵ According to the annual report the policymakers who have made the requirements have a prominent role in the process of planning. Also NLD DISS evaluates regularly with these policymakers, which could lead to readjusting of the priorities by means of the weighing and prioritizing method.¹⁶ In short the method should assign or deny scarce intelligence gathering resources to the right topics. This decision is based on the priority of the intelligence requirements and the capacities available.¹⁷

This seems a rather bureaucratic process and relation. Therefore it is interesting to look into this relation between policy and NLD DISS in more depth and in practice. I want to look into the process of asking and tasking in the contemporary context. The Dutch policymakers are likely reacting to all the before mentioned new conflicts. Can NLD DISS manage all these questions, and how do they manage the questions and can they disseminate enough products

¹⁴ Sielaff, R. (2013). *Van Prioriteren Naar Positioneren* (Executive Master Bestuur En Beleid, Utrechtse School Voor Bestuurs- En Organisationswetenschap (USBO)). Retrieved December 13, 2014, from author.

¹⁵ The Netherlands, Ministry of Defense (2013). *MIVD Jaarverslag 2013*. Retrieved January 7, 2015, from <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/jaarverslagen/2014/04/23/jaarverslag-militaire-inlichtingen-en-veiligheidsdienst-2013/jaarverslag-militaire-inlichtingen-en-veiligheidsdienst-2013.pdf>

¹⁶ *ibid*

¹⁷ Sielaff, R. (2013). *Van Prioriteren Naar Positioneren* (Executive Master Bestuur En Beleid, Utrechtse School Voor Bestuurs- En Organisationswetenschap (USBO)). Retrieved December 13, 2014, from author.

to answer the questions? It will be interesting to conclude how these phases of the intelligence cycle of NLD DISS influence the policy-intelligence relationship.

In this thesis I want to further explore how and to what extent NLD DISS interacts with the Dutch policymakers, and see whether the indicators of the activist, traditional of joint approach are met by NLD DISS.

Therefore the research question of this thesis will be:

What relation does the Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (NLD DISS) has with the Dutch policymakers?

1.2. Purpose

With this research I have the intention to contribute to the contemporary debate on the relation between intelligence services and policymakers. Several articles have been written on the relation between American intelligence services and their policymakers after so called intelligence failures such as 9/11 and the Iraq War. Also in the UK there is some literature regarding the joint approach and some best practices with regard to British intelligence processes. The Dutch intelligence services have not had such a intelligence failure, but did experience some effects. For instance a commission has looked into the role of NLD DISS with regards to the Dutch contribution to the Iraq War. However there is no scientific literature on the actual relation between NLD DISS and the policymakers.

Furthermore, as will be described in chapter four, NLD DISS is a relative young intelligence service in its current form. There is some literature on the Dutch intelligence services before 2000, however the recent developments might have resulted in a change in the relation. For both reasons it will be interesting to look into the contemporary relation between NLD DISS and the Dutch policymakers.

Besides that, I intend to fill a piece of the void on literature regarding Dutch intelligence services. After all, a lot has been written on intelligence services especially from the USA or the UK, only very little has been written on intelligence services from the Netherlands, including NLD DISS. With this research I intend to give a small insight into some aspects of NLD DISS.

1.3. Research design

This deductive qualitative research with likely an inductive outcome will look into the relation between Dutch policymakers and Dutch intelligence services. The focus of this research will

be on NLD DISS and its relation with the ministries of defence (MOD), foreign affairs and general affairs. The aim is to explore whether NLD DISS has a more activist relation with the Dutch policymakers, NLD DISS is having a more traditional approach or that NLD DISS works with the policymakers in a joint approach.

To explore this question a Fitting Case Study approach is chosen. By means of recent and somewhat older openly available publications, mainly from the United Kingdom and the United States, a framework will be described on what kind of relations are possible between an intelligence service and policymakers. From this framework a set of indicators of the traditional intelligence-policy relation¹⁸, a set of indicators of the activist intelligence-policy relation¹⁹ and a set of indicators of the joint approach²⁰ will be developed. These sets of indicators will be used to design a semi-structured interview in order to explore the type of relation NLD DISS has with their related policymakers.

In depth interviews are the best way to collect these data since explanation is needed in order to be able to understand the relation of NLD DISS and the Dutch policymakers. The interviews are held one-on-one. The interviewees are (based on functionality) Director and deputy director NLD DISS, head of the policy advice and devils advocate (BADA) NLD DISS, Head analysis branch NLD DISS, Head counter intelligence branch NLD DISS, head

¹⁸ The eight indicators of the traditional approach are: strict separation between intelligence and policy; policy is a process, intelligence feeds input, policy decides; Intelligence professionals have no direct contact with policymakers; Intelligence does not formulate objectives; Intelligence does not draft policy; Intelligence does not make or carry out operations; Intelligence informs policymakers and serve them; Intelligence must be guided by the policymakers to be relevant. These indicators will be further explained in chapter 3.

¹⁹ The eight indicators of the activist approach are: Intelligence must help policy by showing how to influence the situation; Intelligence should not build knowledge about current and potential enemies; Mention driving factors and the way they can be influenced; Intelligence must have a direct relation with the top-level policymakers; Intelligence and policy must have a symbiotic relationship; Intelligence professionals should understand the policy process and the effect of intelligence inputs; Intelligence should devote its resources to those issues that are meaningful to policymakers; A feedback mechanism is needed between intelligence and policymakers. These indicators will be further explained in chapter 3.

²⁰ The three indicators of the joint approach are: Intelligence produces joint products with the policymakers; Intelligence is an essential partner of the policymakers in the day-to-day business of government; Intelligence adds value by improving the quality of decision making. These indicators will be further explained in chapter 3.

of the intelligence branch within the operations department (J2 NLD MOD (J2 DOPS)), Director security policy of the ministry of Foreign Affairs, Head of the counter-terrorism and national security branch of the ministry of Foreign Affairs, Director strategy policy development and innovation of the MOD Policy (HDB) and the foreign policy and defence advisor of the ministry of General Affairs.

This design will result in answering the subquestions

- what kind of relations are possible between an intelligence service and policymakers?
- How is NLD DISS positioned in the policy structure?
- How is the relation between NLD DISS and Dutch policymakers arranged, and what kind of interactions do they have?
- Which indicators of the possible relations are applicable to the relation between NLD DISS and NLD policymakers?

All data that has become available was of a qualitative nature. So after the collection the data has been coded in order to reduce the amount of data and to be able to see whether the data collected from the interviewees matches the criteria which are set in the theoretical framework. So the indicators from the literature study have been set in a matrix against the answers of the interviews.

1.4. Thesis outline

This thesis has six chapters, of which the first chapter is the introduction. Chapter two will give an overview of the methods that have been used to conduct this research, both the theoretical part as well as the gathering of data and the processing of this data. In chapter three the theory used will be described. This will consist of a description of the traditional approach, the activist approach and the British Joint approach. In chapter four the position of NLD DISS in regard to the Dutch policymakers is briefly described. The fifth chapter will show the results of the interviews that have been done. Each method will be discussed based on the answers of the interviewees. The last chapter will conclude what relation between NLD DISS and the Dutch policymakers is most applicable. It will also make some recommendations. After the last chapter several appendices are attached to the thesis. Chapter seven contains the appendices.

2. Method

The fitting case study approach is chosen as general research design. This chapter offers a brief explanation as to what methods have been used to conduct this research. First the theoretical part of the research will be discussed, followed by the phase in which the data was gathered. Finally the processing of the data is described.

2.1. Theoretical research

The theoretical part of the research should answer the question which relations are possible between NLD DISS and Dutch policymakers. It should also answer what these relations look like. For these purposes extensive theoretical research has been done on recent and somewhat older American and British intelligence literature. This resulted in qualitative information with regard to the two American approaches and the British approach. These results have been presented in chapter two of this thesis.

Based on the different approaches and points of view several indicators have been identified for each approach. These indicators are shown in appendix 7.1.

Since several articles are from American and British scholars, it is important to judge whether these articles are applicable to the Dutch setting. Therefore, chapter three described the Dutch context.

2.2. Interviews

After the indicators had been identified, several questions were drawn up which incorporated these indicators. This resulted in a semi-structured in-depth interview. All the interviewees had the opportunity to elaborate more on questions of their own choosing, but all the questions had to be answered. This way all interviewees gave their opinion on all the indicators. The full interview outline has been included in the thesis in appendix 7.3. During the interviews none of the interviewees was given insight in answers of the others nor were they asked to react on statements from other interviews.

All interviews were held in a one-on-one setting. The interviewees were selected by purposive sampling. After all, it was a requirement that all interviewees were in a position where they had a relationship with policymakers or, in the case of the policymakers, with NLD DISS. On

the NLD DISS side five interviewees were requested to cooperate. All of them are members of the NLD DISS management team. For security reasons all interviewees will remain anonymous, apart from their position. They are the Director and Deputy Director, the Head of the Policy Advisory Bureau and Devils Advocate (BADA), the Head of the Intelligence Analysis Division and the Head of the Counter Intelligence Division. On the side of the policymakers another five interviewees from different ministries were asked to cooperate. They are the Head of the Intelligence Division within the Operations Department (J2 NLD MOD (J2 DOPS)), the Director Security Policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Head of the Counter-Terrorism and National Security Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Director Strategy Policy Development and Innovation of the MOD Policy (HDB) and the Foreign Policy and Defence Advisor of the Ministry of General Affairs (list of interviewees also included in appendix 7.2).

The interviews were not electronically recorded since several interviews were held in areas where recording devices are prohibited. This thesis was ex-post reviewed by the interviewees to check whether their opinion has been represented correctly. This was also done to diminish the possibility of wishful and less truthful answers since all interviewees would read the final results.

2.3. Data analysis

All researched data was of a qualitative nature. After the collection the data was coded in order to reduce its amount and to be able to see whether the data collected from the interviewees matched the criteria set in the theoretical framework. To make this visual, the indicators from the literature study have been set in a matrix against the answers of the interviews. This matrix is included in chapter five. Since the coded answers lack nuance, and the conclusions are simplified, all the qualitative answers are used in chapter five to describe how the different interviewees score the different indicators. In the conclusion in chapter six both the qualitative data and the matrix are used to conclude what approach describes the relation between NLD DISS and the Dutch policymakers best.

In light of the sensitivity of the research and the environment the research deals with, all the answers are anonymous. This includes quotes and the coded list of answers versus the indicators.

3. Theoretical framework on the relation between intelligence services and policymakers

In this chapter I will introduce the two most extreme possible forms of the relationship between an intelligence service and the policy makers from American Scholars and I will introduce the Joint approach from the United Kingdom. I will first describe the traditional approach, which in theory strictly separates the intelligence services from the policy makers. This is followed by the first adaptation, a more practical approach by Sherman Kent, who wrote his book *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* in 1949 which is still known by intelligence professionals today. I will then briefly describe the activist approach, which advocates that intelligence should actively support policymakers. From the activist approach I look into one of the reactions on Kent, given by Willmoore Kendall who was a coeval of Kent and who was known for his intellectual charisma. His book, in which he explained his view on Kent, is still relevant in a policy debate in the US in the early '90s. This paragraph will be followed by an introduction on the English approach which was discussed by Denis Capel-Dunn, a secretary of the Joint Intelligence Committee. I will end with some general findings why the relation between intelligence services and policymakers is problematic. This illustrates that several choices have to be made when building the relation.

3.1. Introduction

Much has been written on the relation between intelligence services and policymakers. Accordingly the relation between the two is complex and frequently difficult to understand. Therefore several scholars and intelligence professionals have explored what this relation should be like.²¹ The relation is assessed as very important, since the key customer to intelligence services are policymakers.²² And reportedly intelligence has become of more importance to policymakers in the last years.²³

²¹ Cimbala, S., & Hulnick, A. (1987). Relations Between Intelligence Producers and Policy Customers: A New Way of Looking at an Old Problem. In *Intelligence and intelligence policy in a democratic society* (pp. 129-144). Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Transnational.

²² Brammer, D., & Hulnick, A. (1980). Intelligence And Policy-The On-Going Debate. *Studies in Intelligence*, 9-16. Retrieved December 8, 2014, from <http://media.nara.gov/dc-metro/rg-263/6922330/Box-7-88-2/263-a1-27-box-7-88-2.pdf>

²³ Gookins, A. (2008). The Role of Intelligence in Policy Making. *SAIS Review*, 28(1), 65-73. doi:10.1353/sais.2008.0025

Miller, P. (2010). Lessons for Intelligence Support to Policymaking during Crises. *Studies in Intelligence*, 54(2), 1-8. Retrieved March 7, 2015, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol.-54-no.-2/lessons-for-intelligence-support-to-policymaking.html>

Just after the Second World War several American intelligence professionals stated that intelligence services must be independent of their customers. There should be a strict separation between intelligence and policy.²⁴ For instance Major General William J. Donovan, who is known as the *Father of American Intelligence*, stated in 1946 "*Experience has shown the only kind of a system for us to have is a centralized, impartial independent agency reporting directly to the President . . . intelligence must be independent of the people it serves so that the material it obtains will not be slanted or distorted by the views of the people directing operations*".²⁵

This approach, however, led to dissatisfaction amongst the intelligence practitioners, and Sherman Kent was the first to re-evaluate the traditional approach. In 1949 he published his book *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*. This book is referred to as probably the most influential book ever written on US intelligence analysis.²⁶ However not every intelligence scholar agreed, and one of the contemporary reactions on the book was by an activist named Willmoore Kendall.

3.2. Traditional approach

The traditional approach, which was the main stream during and just after the second World War, advocates a strict separation between intelligence services and policymakers. Intelligence professionals will otherwise become participant in the policy debate. Therefore the policy process is seen as a sequence of events in which the intelligence professional can feed isolated input after which it is to the policymaker to draw implications.²⁷ Moreover the traditional approach tells that intelligence producers should not have direct interaction with the policymakers.²⁸ Hans Heymann, former RAND analyst and senior CIA officer, even calls this separation axiomatic and compares it to the separation of church and state which is written in the US constitution. This separation makes that intelligence services make their

²⁴ Brammer, D., & Hulnick, A. (1980). Intelligence And Policy-The On-Going Debate. *Studies in Intelligence*, 9-16. Retrieved December 8, 2014, from <http://media.nara.gov/dc-metro/rg-263/6922330/Box-7-88-2/263-a1-27-box-7-88-2.pdf>

²⁵ *ibid*

²⁶ Davis, J. (1992). The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949. *Studies in Intelligence*, 35(2), 91-103. Retrieved January 10, 2015, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol35no2/pdf/v35i2a06p.pdf>

²⁷ Brammer, D., & Hulnick, A. (1980). Intelligence And Policy-The On-Going Debate. *Studies in Intelligence*, 9-16. Retrieved December 8, 2014, from <http://media.nara.gov/dc-metro/rg-263/6922330/Box-7-88-2/263-a1-27-box-7-88-2.pdf>

²⁸ Hulnick, A. (1985). The intelligence producer – policy consumer linkage. *Studies in Intelligence*, 71-85. Retrieved March 13, 2015, from <http://media.nara.gov/dc-metro/rg-263/6922330/Box-9-108-7/263-a1-27-box-9-108-7.pdf>

products in splendid isolation which made that most of the products were irrelevant.²⁹ This caused the re-evaluation of the traditional approach by Kent, who attempted to fit the traditionalist theory to practice.³⁰

3.2.1. *Point of view Kent*

Sherman Kent's views are still influential in contemporary intelligence. Some authors refer to him as *the father of intelligence analysis*. In his book Kent is of the opinion that the relationship between intelligence services and policymakers is one of utmost importance but also of utmost delicacy.³¹ *"There is no phase of the intelligence business which is more important than the proper relationship between intelligence itself and the people who use its product. Oddly enough, this relationship, which one would expect to establish itself automatically, does not do this. It is established as a result of a great deal of persistent conscious effort, and is likely to disappear when the effort is relaxed."*³²

One of the reasons for this problematic relationship is, according to Kent, that policymakers do not automatically trust the quality of intelligence products. This hampers the utility of intelligence, since it is the function of intelligence to *"provide expert knowledge of the external world, on the basis of which sound policy would then be made"*. However *'Intelligence is not the formulator of objectives ... drafter of policy ... maker of plans ... carrier out of operations. Intelligence is ancillary to these: ... it performs a service function. Its job is to see that the doers are well informed ... to stand behind them with the book open at the right page, to call their attention to the stubborn fact that they may be neglecting, and - at their request- to analyze alternative courses without indicating choice.'*³³

Kent does not take distance from the traditional point of view, he alters several issues in the pure traditional approach. Kent has the opinion that intelligence must serve the policymakers. In order to be able to serve them, intelligence professionals must know what is

²⁹ Heymann jr., H. (1984). The Intelligence-policy Relationship. *Studies in Intelligence*, (Winter), 57-66. Retrieved March 13, 2015.

³⁰ Hulnick, A. (1985). The intelligence producer – policy consumer linkage. *Studies in Intelligence*, 71-85. Retrieved March 13, 2015, from <http://media.nara.gov/dc-metro/rg-263/6922330/Box-9-108-7/263-a1-27-box-9-108-7.pdf>

³¹ Davis, J. (1992). The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949. *Studies in Intelligence*, 35(2), 91-103. Retrieved January 10, 2015, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol35no2/pdf/v35i2a06p.pdf>

Brammer, D., & Hulnick, A. (1980). Intelligence And Policy-The On-Going Debate. *Studies in Intelligence*, 9-16. Retrieved December 8, 2014, from <http://media.nara.gov/dc-metro/rg-263/6922330/Box-7-88-2/263-a1-27-box-7-88-2.pdf>

³³ Davis, J. (1992). The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949. *Studies in Intelligence*, 35(2), 91-103. Retrieved January 10, 2015, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol35no2/pdf/v35i2a06p.pdf>

on the mind of the policymakers. Therefore guidance is needed by the policymakers. Furthermore intelligence professionals must be able to put their product on the table for the policymakers, after all if the product is ignored the product has become useless. According to Kent the relation is thus not as simple as the original traditionalists were stating. His opinion of the relation is "*Intelligence must be close enough to policy, plans, and operations to have the greatest amount of guidance, and must not be so close that it loses its objectivity and integrity of judgement.*"³⁴

The reasoning of Kent is likely the basis for several intelligence agencies on their relationship with policy makers. However as mentioned in the period just after the Second World War not everybody agreed with the traditional approach and the view Kent described. The detractors of the traditional approach are known as the activists.

3.3. *Activist approach*

The activists advocate a closer relation between intelligence services and policymakers. They are of the opinion that intelligence and policy should have a symbiotic relationship.³⁵ The radical activists argued three specific elements

- "*Intelligence analysts should examine and understand the policy process more thoroughly-and the effect of intelligence inputs*
- *Intelligence should devote its resources to those issues that are meaningful to policymakers*
- *A feedback mechanism is needed between Intelligence and Policy"*³⁶

The activists see that the focus of intelligence is set by the policymakers by providing information regarding the general situation without prejudice. Within this information it must be clear what the meaning of the information is with regard to the US policy alternatives. So the intelligence process should not be done without guidance, it should be done on specific policy problems. In the end the policymakers will have the responsibility of the decision.³⁷

³⁴ *ibid*

Cimbala, S., & Hulnick, A. (1987). Relations Between Intelligence Producers and Policy Customers: A New Way of Looking at and Old Problem. In *Intelligence and intelligence policy in a democratic society* (pp. 129-144). Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Transnational.

³⁶ Hulnick, A. (1985). The intelligence producer – policy consumer linkage. *Studies in Intelligence*, 71-85. Retrieved March 13, 2015, from <http://media.nara.gov/dc-metro/rg-263/6922330/Box-9-108-7/263-a1-27-box-9-108-7.pdf>

Brammer, D., & Hulnick, A. (1980). Intelligence And Policy-The On-Going Debate. *Studies in Intelligence*, 9-16. Retrieved December 8, 2014, from <http://media.nara.gov/dc-metro/rg-263/6922330/Box-7-88-2/263-a1-27-box-7-88-2.pdf>

3.3.1. *Point of view Kendall*

Willmoore Kendall, professor in political philosophy, was a prominent activist who reacted on the book that was written by Kent by writing his own book in 1949, *Strategic Intelligence*. In his book Kendall agreed with Kent that it was of the utmost importance to get the right relation between intelligence and policymakers. That was however roughly the only agreement they had. In reaction on the book written by Kent, Kendall wrote *The Function of Intelligence* which was a review of the book.³⁸ Kendall disagreed with Kent on the function of intelligence. According to Kendall intelligence should not build knowledge on current and potential enemies, since this diverts the attention from supporting the country in performing its task in the world as a whole. With regard to the relation between intelligence and policymakers he agrees that intelligence needs guidance, however he sees "*the intelligence function as helping the policymakers "influence" the course of events by helping them understand the operative factors on which the US can have an impact.*"

By this he means that intelligence should not predict the future in scenarios, he has the opinion that intelligence should mention the driving factors and the way they can be influenced. This way the US can influence the situation it is monitoring. Furthermore Kendall disagrees on the traditional separation between intelligence and policymakers. According to him the key function of intelligence is to come forward with the relevant information and knowledge on the policy decisions that are going to be made. He is even of the opinion that intelligence should not interact with the policymakers at the mid-level which Kent suggests, but with the policymakers that indeed make the decisions, the top-level policymakers.³⁹

Although Kendall was not as influential as Kent was in that period, his ideas have been part of the debate ever since. In the 1990's several points of Kendall's view were discussed by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Besides, as Jack Davis, who is known as the *de facto* Dean for Analytic Tradecraft of the US Intelligence Community, both doctrines are not mutually exclusive. Also time has changed, and intelligence is more than ever a scarce asset so can intelligence and policy be fully separated or must a contemporary relationship have aspects of both views?

³⁸ *ibid*

³⁹ Davis, J. (1992). The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949. *Studies in Intelligence*, 35(2), 91-103. Retrieved January 10, 2015, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol35no2/pdf/v35i2a06p.pdf>

3.4. *British point of view; Joint approach*

The British intelligence community is organized differently from the one in the USA. Where the scholars in the USA mainly described how intelligence should relate to the policymakers, in the United Kingdom they created a joint environment. This Joint Intelligence Organization (JIO) was first established in 1936, and was meant as a central intelligence coordination and assessment machinery. The development was driven by the need to coordinate intelligence among the armed services. Furthermore they wanted to create a body that was able to prepare joint papers. Although the organization had several changes, from coordination of intelligence amongst the armed services to becoming a national intelligence apparatus, according to Davies the organization has five fundamental elements;

- “The corpus of intelligence agencies and departments that make up the UK’s equivalent of an intelligence community
- An additional complex of interagency joint bodies and operating units that not merely coordinate but integrate intelligence activity at the operational level
- The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which coordinates at the executive level
- The working-level interagency committees and teams operating under the JIC that make up the rest of the Joint Intelligence Organization (JIO)
- The network of Cabinet Office committees and staffs that function alongside and above the JIO.”⁴⁰

One of the committees within the JIO is the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), the body that was meant to produce joint papers. Within the JIC the Directors of UK’s intelligence service have a chair but also several policy practioners⁴¹. Not only policy practioners from the ministry of Defense and the Foreign office, but also from the Home Office, Treasury department and the Department of industry and trade have a seat in the committee. Also representatives from other departments can attend meetings if the issues on the agenda fall under their jurisdiction. The policy practioners are present to give the policy perspectives and their departments’ appreciation as input into the assessment process. As the JIC was designed to make interagency assessments, one of the responsibilities of the JIC is to produce the national assessments.⁴² Furthermore the common assumption has been made that the JIO with

⁴⁰ Davies, P. (2012). *The Whitehall Village Market for Intelligence: The JIC System Prior to 2001, Great Shows of Reform, 2005-10*. In *Intelligence and government in Britain and the United States a comparative perspective* (Vol. 2, pp. 13-73, 292-313). Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger Security International.

⁴¹ Within the UK the policymakers are only two echelons of ministers, those who sit on Cabinet representing departments. Therefore all the civil servants within the UK are referred to as policy practioners.

⁴² The National assessments is the British equivalent of the USA National estimates.

the JIC was created to offer the policy makers solutions instead of problems. This implies that the products did not only give the intelligence but also would suggest a policy option, so called intelligence informed policy papers.

3.4.1. Point of view Capel-Dunn

In 1945, roughly the same period as the debate in the USA was started, a report was issued called "The Intelligence Machine" and it represented an idea regarding intelligence theory. The report was written by Denis Capel-Dunn who was the secretary of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). One of the issues he points out is, in accordance with the Kent-Kendall debate several years later, the problem of analytic independence. Capel-Dunn observed that *"the officials who receive, collate and assess information are also formulating policy. This is not necessarily a bad system, but the system does possess a serious weakness."*⁴³ His practical solution to this theoretical problem was to have one's intelligence product peer reviewed by colleagues of other departments. Capel-Dunn was of the opinion that any postwar intelligence system *"should be controlled at the top by a strong inter-service and inter-departmental body, representing the needs of producers and consumers"*⁴⁴

In the years after 1945, there was not much debate on this issue. During the nineteen sixties the Cabinet Secretary Sir Burke Trend was involved with reforming the British Joint Intelligence Organization. He had the opinion that Intelligence could not just drop intelligence on a desk and then *"wash its hands of what happens"*. According to Trend the intelligence services must be structurally distinct, but also able to react on the policy makers and vice versa. This way both the intelligence service and the policy makers had some responsibility for the recommendation that was indeed submitted to the minister's level.⁴⁵ Sir David Omand, who served on various high ranking intelligence positions in the United Kingdom, sees the intelligence services as an essential partner of the policy makers in the day-to-day business of government, in which intelligence adds value by improving the quality of decision making. The Joint Intelligence Committee (UK JIC), the top inter-service and inter-departmental body, is the British result of *"a long evolutionary process"* to bring intelligence and policy together. In the UK JIC intelligence professionals work together with policy practitioners to co-produce

⁴³ Davies, Philip H. J. "Volume 2: Evolution of the U.K. Intelligence Community." *Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States: A Comparative Perspective*. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2012. N. pag 13-73. Print.

⁴⁴ *ibid.*

⁴⁵ *ibid.*

the assessments for the decision makers.⁴⁶ During Omand's period as Intelligence and Security coordinator he later observed "Since I had significant policy responsibilities at that time for counter-terrorism strategy when I was Intelligence and Security Coordinator... I did not chair the JIC and there was thus a separate channel from the Chairman of the JIC for intelligence reaching the Prime Minister"⁴⁷

The British intelligence thus had not had much debate on their relation between policymakers and intelligence services. Within the joint approach the intelligence professionals are drafting policy documents with the policy practitioners in order to give integrated solutions to the decisionmakers.

3.5. Tribal tongues

According to several contemporary scholars there are several reasons for the fact that the relation between intelligence and policymakers is one of debate.⁴⁸ According to Lowenthal, a national security expert, one of the reasons is the misunderstanding that both the intelligence community and the policymakers believe that they speak the same language and work in the same way. This leads to a cultural barrier between both worlds. Lowenthal illustrates this with the statement " Britons and Americans being divided by a common tongue".⁴⁹

Several cultural differences are observed by Lowenthal in the US, like policymakers assume that the government supports their efforts including intelligence. For policymakers this includes advocating the decisions, while intelligence services have the position not to advocate any policy and generate value-free intelligence. Second the intelligence community is part of the permanent government contrary to the policymakers who are elected for a shorter period of time. This can create a we-they divide between the two groups. Finally, policymakers have completely other interests than intelligence services. Policymakers try to make successful policy and want credit for their actions. Intelligence services rarely get credit,

⁴⁶ Omand, David. *Securing the State*. New York: Columbia UP, 2010. Print.

⁴⁷ Davies, Philip H. J. "Volume 2: Evolution of the U.K. Intelligence Community." *Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States: A Comparative Perspective*. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2012. N. pag 13-73. Print.

⁴⁸ Barry, J., Davis, J., Gries, D., & Sullivan, J. (1993). Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide. *Studies in Intelligence*, 37(3), 1-16. Retrieved March 15, 2015, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol37no3/pdf/v37i3a02p.pdf>

Lowenthal, M. (2004). Tribal Toggles: Intelligence Consumers, Intelligence Producers. In L. Johnson & J. Wirtz (Eds.), *Strategic Intelligence: Windows into a Secret World: An Anthology* (pp. 234-241). Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Company.

⁴⁹ Lowenthal, M. (2004). Tribal Toggles: Intelligence Consumers, Intelligence Producers. In L. Johnson & J. Wirtz (Eds.), *Strategic Intelligence: Windows into a Secret World: An Anthology* (pp. 234-241). Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Company.

they are judged on longer periods of time on their ability to predict potential outcomes, both good and bad.⁵⁰

3.6. Conclusion

So, in theory three approaches between intelligence services and policymakers are possible. It is however doubtful that a relation from another country can be based totally on the traditional approach, on the activist approach or on the joint approach. As Davis describes it is possible to choose the best of both American schools, since they are not mutually exclusive. The British approach is an example of joining the best of intelligence with the best of the policy, without the full interference of intelligence into the policy process. As mentioned, there are several reasons why the relation can be difficult, and it is possible that on the different topics choices are made which are not coherent with just one approach. Nevertheless, indicators have been filtered of the individual approaches and are shown below. It will be interesting to use these with the case study.

Traditional approach

- strict separation between intelligence and policy
- policy is a process, intelligence feeds input, policy decides
- Intelligence professionals have no direct contact with policymakers
- Intelligence does not formulate objectives
- Intelligence does not draft policy
- Intelligence does not make or carry out operations
- Intelligence informs policymakers and serve them
- Intelligence must be guided by the policymakers to be relevant

Activist approach

- Intelligence must help policy by showing how to influence the situation
- Intelligence should not build knowledge about current and potential enemies
- Mention driving factors and the way they can be influenced
- Intelligence must have a direct relation with the top-level policymakers
- Intelligence and policy must have a symbiotic relationship
- Intelligence professionals should understand the policy process and the effect of intelligence inputs

⁵⁰ *ibid.*

- Intelligence should devote its resources to those issues that are meaningful to policymakers
- A feedback mechanism is needed between intelligence and policymakers

Joint approach

- Intelligence produces joint products with the policymakers
- Intelligence is an essential partner of the policymakers in the day-to-day business of government
- Intelligence adds value by improving the quality of decision making

The case study chosen in this research is the Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (NLD DISS). This case study will look into how all these elements are arranged in the Netherlands, and how NLD DISS copes with their policymakers. Does NLD DISS tend more to the traditionalists and the more practical version by Kent or more towards Kendall and the activists? Is there any jointness in the Dutch relation? And how is the relation with the policymakers, does intelligence speak a different dialect than the policymakers? Before we take a closer look, it is necessary to briefly look into the constellation of the Dutch policy environment and the position NLD DISS has.

4. The position NLD DISS has within the Dutch ministry of defence.

To understand the relation between NLD DISS and Dutch policymakers, it is important to know where NLD DISS is positioned and to have some knowledge of the service's recent history. After all, as will be described in chapter five, many interviewees mentioned that NLD DISS's relationship with the policymakers has changed over the years. This prompts the question of what the driving factor behind this is? Also, the position of NLD DISS is based on its recent history. Therefore I will shortly describe the history of NLD DISS and its position within the Ministry of Defence.

4.1. The origin of NLD DISS

The "third section of the general staff", which was founded in 1914, can be seen as the inception of Dutch intelligence and security services. However, since 1914 a lot has changed, although the most important changes were driven by World War II.

In the years following World War II the Dutch Armed forces all created their own intelligence division. The Navy and Army had theirs shortly after World War II, the Air Force created its own in 1951. Added to those, the Central Security Service and the Civil Foreign Intelligence service made their contribution to the Dutch intelligence community. Although there was some cooperation between the different Armed Forces intelligence services and the Internal Security Services, all four services basically had their own intelligence position and were more competitive than cooperative when it came to sharing intelligence. This created pillarization.

During the 1970's the Netherlands parliament wanted to institute a formal law concerning the intelligence services. This was finally accomplished in 1982, when the first Law on Intelligence and Security Services became enacted, in which all five intelligence services were mentioned. However, shortly thereafter the parliament wanted to merge the three military intelligence services. This merger was officially sanctioned on 3 December 1987, when the new Law on Intelligence and Security Services came into effect. Within the military services there was a lot of resistance against the merger which was enhanced by the pillarization. Said resistance resulted in a huge delay of the start of the actual merging process, which was only implemented in the year 2000. It was finalized in 2002 and it left the

Netherlands with two intelligence services left: the Military Intelligence Service (MID) and the Internal Security Service (BVD).⁵¹

The birth of the MID and BVD lead to the next amendment of the 1987 law. In 2002 the new law on Intelligence and Security Services was officially announced (“Wet Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten”; Wiv 2002). A major change in the Wiv 2002 concerned an extra responsibility for the BVD: the foreign countries intelligence task. Furthermore, in the Wiv 2002 created the situation where the two services were occupied with both an intelligence and a security task. The names of the two services were also amended after the implementation of Wiv 2002. The BVD was henceforth called the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) and the MID Defence Intelligence and Security Service (DISS).⁵²

4.2. Governmental position NLD DISS

NLD DISS is placed within the Ministry of Defence. The Minister of Defence has political responsibility for the service and is accountable for its actions. The direct control, however, is exercised by the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defence. This means there is no command structure governing the relations between the Director of NLD DISS and the Commander of the Armed Forces or the Commanders of the four branches of the military forces. Even so, the Commander of the Armed Forces is one of the most important customers of the intelligence products of NLD DISS and is required to make his intelligence requirements known in the Intelligence and Security Requirements [of the Ministry of] Defence (IVD). Besides the Armed Forces, NLD DISS also serves the ministries of Foreign Affairs and General Affairs, as mentioned in the Wiv 2002 article 7. In 2015, for the first time, the requirements of all three customers together with the intelligence requirements of the National Coordinator Terrorism (NCTV) were integrated in the “Geïntegreerde Aanwijzingsbesluit” (GAWB), which decides which service is responsible for which requirement. In this document all customers have integrated their requirements for both NLD DISS and the NLD AIVD. Both services have commented on the requirements and allocated resources to the requirements they could meet. This ‘negotiation process’ resulted in the final GAWB. The Ministry of General Affairs directed these negotiations, the office of the Coordinator of the Intelligence and Security Services in particular. In short: although NLD

⁵¹ Sielaff, R. (2013). *Van Prioriteren Naar Positioneren* (Executive Master Bestuur En Beleid, Utrechtse School Voor Bestuurs- En Organisatiewetenschap (USBO)). Retrieved December 13, 2014, from author.

⁵² *ibid*

DISS is part of the Ministry of Defence, it serves more ministries and thus interacts with them. Chapter five covers the interaction between NLD DISS and the three ministries, based on interviews with several stakeholders from both NLD DISS and the ministries.⁵³

⁵³ Ibid

Ministerie van Defensie; organisatiestructuur Bestuursstaf. (n.d.). Retrieved June 21, 2015, from <https://www.defensie.nl/organisatie/bestuursstaf/inhoud/organisatiestructuur>

5. What is the opinion of the interviewees on the relationship between NLD DISS and the policymakers?

“NLD DISS used to be a black box to the policymakers. It wanted to be secret, which was convenient for the policymakers as well.” This was mentioned by one of the NLD DISS interviewees. It describes the situation of the military service in the first years after the different services had merged. This point of view was shared by several interviewees. At the start of the interview all interviewees were asked which approach best described the relationship between NLD DISS and the Dutch policymakers. Therefore, first of all the interviewees were briefly introduced to the different approaches: the traditional, the activist and the joint approach. All interviewees were of the opinion that a hybrid situation in which all approaches come together describes the Dutch case best. However, when asked to make a choice, the traditional approach was considered dominant. Most respondents still referred to the past in which the service was very traditional. Although it is trying to become more open, it still has many traditional habits. One interviewee gave a deviating opinion, he mentioned that NLD DISS also has a security task in which sometimes influencing the situation is asked for. This is part of the service’s modus operandi. The service has four different levels of research to offer its customers. These levels are tied to different courses of action that the customer wants to be able to take. The first research level is the least in depth kind of research requiring just the monitoring of the situation. The fourth research level is the most in-depth kind of research, requiring the deployment of all the collection assets of the service. These must then yield enough information to enable the customer to influence or even control the situation in the area which is subject to research. Regarding some topics, this level four research depth is requested, like sometimes during mission support and counter-espionage. The general description of the NLD DISS interviewees however is that the service gives the weather forecast and policymakers must decide how to act upon this forecast.

This chapter applies the different theoretic approaches and their indicators, which are based on the literature research, to the practice of the relationship between NLD DISS and the Dutch policy makers. It is largely based on the interviews with members of both NLD DISS and the policy arena. For all of these interviews the indicators (mentioned in the charts below) formed the framework. In the charts on the following pages the qualitative answers of the interviewees – when asked whether a particular indicator was applicable to the relationship between NLD DISS and the policymakers – have been labelled “yes” or “no”. The indicators

are grouped by approach in both the charts and the following paragraphs. They are all treated separately in these paragraphs, which at times means there is an overlap as it turned out not all identified theoretical indicators could be completely separated.

Traditional approach

Strict separation between intelligence and policy
Policy is a process, intelligence feeds input, policy decides
Intelligence professionals have no direct contact with policymakers
Intelligence does not formulate objectives
Intelligence does not draft policy
Intelligence does not make or carry out operations
Intelligence informs policymakers and serves them
Intelligence must be guided by the policymakers to be relevant

Activist approach

Intelligence must support policymakers by showing them how to influence the situation
Intelligence should not build knowledge about current and potential enemies
Mention driving factors and the way they can be influenced
Intelligence must have a direct relation with the top level policymakers
Intelligence and policy must have a symbiotic relationship
Intelligence professionals should understand the policy process and the effect of intelligence inputs
Intelligence should devote its resources to those issues that are meaningful to policymakers
A feedback mechanism is needed between intelligence and policymakers

Joint approach (UK)

Joint intelligence product
Intelligence is essential partner of the policy makers in the day-to-day business of government
Intelligence adds value by improving the quality of decision making

NLD DISS 1	NLD DISS 2	NLD DISS 3	NLD DISS 4	NLD DISS 5
NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
YES	YES	YES	NO	YES
YES	YES	YES	NO	YES
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
NO	NO	NO	NO	YES
NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Traditional approach

Strict separation between intelligence and policy
Policy is a process, intelligence feeds input, policy decides
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Intelligence professionals should understand the policy process and the effect of intelligence inputs
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Joint approach (UK)

Joint intelligence product
Intelligence is essential partner of the policy makers in the day-to-day business of government
Intelligence adds value by improving the quality of decision making

EXT	EXT	EXT	EXT	EXT
1	2	3	4	5
NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

5.1. Results of the interviews; traditional approach

5.1.1. Strict separation between intelligence and policy

The general opinion is that not long ago, as mentioned in the introduction of the chapter, NLD DISS was completely isolated from the policymakers. However, NLD DISS is opening up towards the outside world, including the policymakers. With this in mind, all interviewees stated that there is no longer a strict separation. Especially on the management level there are several committees which ensure interaction between NLD DISS and policymakers. However, some interviewees argued that there is still a long way to go before a good partnership is realized. As one of the external interviewees stated *“the black box culture is still ingrained within employees of NLD DISS, when NLD DISS should enlarge its visibility within the government. Especially to the political side, since they control the budgets. Therefore, both purpose and necessity of NLD DISS must be clear to them.”* Another interviewee agreed with this and stated that *“more liaison officials within the departments and more briefings enabling interaction will lead to more mutual familiarity and trust.”* So all interviewees agreed that there is some form of interaction between the policymakers and NLD DISS, but that although there is no *strict* separation, as it is defined by the traditionalists and Kent, there still is *a degree of* separation. This is illustrated by the differentiation between the institutionalized interaction in committees on the director’s level, as mentioned above, and the informal initiatives and individual based interaction on the shop floor. Several interviewees argued that this separation is necessary to maintain NLD DISS as an independent intelligence service. One of the interviewees stated *“Intelligence outlines several scenarios but the policymakers draft courses of action on which intelligence can accordingly align its sensors.”*

5.1.2. Policy is a process into which intelligence feeds its isolated input

All interviewees were of the opinion that policy is indeed a process and that policymakers indeed make the decisions. However, NLD DISS is making a big effort to connect with the policy process and prevent isolated input that does not effectively inform the policymakers. As an external interviewee stated *“NLD DISS does try to connect with the policy process, but it must intensify this link. So although NLD DISS is trying, it still lacks the timing.”* According to him this is exacerbated by the fact that NLD DISS is not clear about whom to address within its organisation for specific topics. This makes it difficult for the policymakers to get NLD DISS involved at the right time. This view is shared by all external interviewees. They all feel that NLD DISS must be involved more with regard to the policy process, and that it is also a task of the policymakers to get NLD DISS more involved.

They also stated that NLD DISS should improve their knowledge of the policy process in order to be better equipped and better prepared if policymakers ask for their input. The internal interviewees agreed that NLD DISS is trying to keep up with the external processes, but that there is a lot of room for improvement. One of the NLD DISS interviewees stated that “*NLD DISS has some administrative mastodons who are not changing with the organisation.*” By that he means there are some managers who are not connecting enough with the policymakers, and are therefore unaware of the real policy process which means they are unable to time the input NLD DISS has to deliver appropriately. NLD DISS should not always have to be asked, it can also position liaisons at the policy offices who can hint NLD DISS which processes are ongoing and how NLD DISS can adjust their products to best serve these processes⁵⁴. The other NLD DISS interviewees agreed that NLD DISS personnel still lacks thorough knowledge of the policy processes, in which it is important to distinguish between the service’s different customers NLD MOD for instance has a completely different policy process (military decisionmaking) than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, both the NLD DISS and external interviewees agreed there is an improvement in the level of cooperation between NLD DISS and the policymakers. So the second indicator of the traditional approach is not completely applicable to the relationship between NLD DISS and the Dutch policymakers.

5.1.3. Intelligence professionals have no direct contact with policymakers
According to the traditionalists intelligence professionals should have no direct contact with policymakers. In the Dutch case, there is a form of interaction between the intelligence service and the policymakers, according to the interviewees. The institutionalised interaction is at the managerial level, where several committees have been put into place. However, one of the external interviewees argued that institutionalised interaction does not really exist. There is some form of organised interaction, but it is very limited and mainly focussed on further explanation of the intelligence reports. He had the opinion, as several other external interviewees, that the interaction with NLD DISS must be intensified. Again, some interviewees even believed that NLD DISS should place more liaison officers within the different ministries.

One of the NLD DISS interviewees was more positive regarding the level of interaction. According to him there is indeed mutual interaction when one needs the other,

⁵⁴ One of the NLD DISS interviewees mentioned that liaisons are indeed desired, but that NLD DISS lacks the personnel to follow this through.

even though this is not institutionalised but ad hoc. Furthermore, according to him there are several functional points of contact which go from the top to the shop floor level. So not all interviewees agree on the intensity of the interaction between NLD DISS and the policymakers, but they do all agree there is some level of interaction. This means that this indicator is not applicable to the case of NLD DISS and the Dutch policymakers.

5.1.4. Intelligence does not formulate objectives and does not draft policy

According to Kent, intelligence professionals should not formulate objectives and should not draft policy. These are the fourth and fifth indicator. All five external interviewees agreed that NLD DISS does not formulate objectives or draft policy with regard to the national agenda or national strategy as such. NLD DISS does provide input for the drafting of national intelligence laws and regulations. Furthermore, it influences objectives and policy through its intelligence products and the outcome of its scenario analyses. Also, one of the external interviewees stated that when there is interaction concerning certain policy issues, NLD DISS personnel is willing to think along with the policymakers. According to him this is a very important aspect of the cooperation.

Two NLD DISS interviewees were of the opinion that, although on a small scale, NLD DISS does sometimes formulate objectives or drafts policy. The service does so implicitly, specifically regarding certain topics requiring such activities during for instance military mission support. The other three NLD DISS interviewees were of the opinion that NLD DISS does not have a hand in formulating objectives or policy. One of them stated that NLD DISS “...must be able to tell the inconvenient truth without directly giving solutions”. Otherwise this could lead to the politicizing of intelligence. So NLD DISS must stick to the weather forecast and analyse scenarios that follow from the solutions the policymakers come up with. Kent’s statement is therefore largely applicable to NLD DISS, with the caveat that NLD DISS indirectly influences objectives or policy on some occasions.

5.1.5. Intelligence does not make or carry out operations

NLD DISS is not only an intelligence service, but also has a counter-intelligence and security task, as mentioned in the previous chapter. Exploring how the part of NLD DISS that deals with these tasks relates to the topic at hand, is an investigation on its own. Therefore, this thesis merely mentions that the counter-intelligence and security branch do indeed plan and conduct operations. However, these are not made public to the policymakers who were

interviewed. Therefore these operations which were described by the NLD DISS interviewee from this branch, as mentioned in the introductory remarks, have not been taken into account.

The other nine interviewees all argued that NLD DISS does not execute operations drafted by the policymakers. There is also no legal ground to do so. So based on these interviews, NLD DISS does not make or carry out operations, as Kent mentions.

5.1.6. *Intelligence must be guided by policymakers, informs and it serves them*

The last two indicators deal with the guidance of the policymakers to the intelligence services and the role an intelligence service has. As described in chapter two, Kent is of the opinion that intelligence must serve the policymakers. In order to be able to serve them, intelligence professionals must know what is on the mind of the policymakers. Therefore policymakers must give guidance. When asked all interviewees said that policymakers are able to give guidance to NLD DISS. This is underlined by the recent interactive process of generating the Integrated Requirements⁵⁵ (Geïntegreerd Aanwijzingsbesluit, GAWB) to both NLD DISS and NLD AIVD. It was described as an opportunity for the policymakers to explain their focus and for NLD DISS to say which requirements fit its capabilities and what does not. It is seen as an exchange of needs versus capabilities. All interviewees were positive about the process. Everyone agreed, however, that this prioritization is flexible. If the state of the world dictates new policy questions policymakers are able to redirect the intelligence service to their own benefit. This is what makes the intelligence service relevant, also according to the external interviewees. After all, policymakers want products they can use. As one of the NLD DISS interviewees stated “*we write products in order to create awareness and understanding of and inform about threats. With these products policymakers can reduce uncertainty, and make well informed decisions.*”

So, according to the NLD DISS interviewees, NLD DISS’s products are written with an idea to serve the policymakers. This is confirmed by the external interviewees who consider those intelligence analyses relevant. This means that this paragraph’s indicators are applicable to the case study involved.

5.1.7. *Subconclusion*

To sum up, based on the outcome of the interviews the first three indicators of the traditional approach are not applicable to the case study. There is no strict separation between

⁵⁵ Before policymakers were able to give their guidance, however there was no interaction. The new process has room for interaction. This was seen by both the NLD DISS interviewees and the external interviewees as a great improvement.

intelligence and policy, nor does the intelligence service feed isolated products into the policy process. Finally the intelligence professionals of NLD DISS have direct contacts with the policymakers. However, the other five indicators do apply to the relationship between NLD DISS and the Dutch policymakers. According to the interviewees NLD DISS does not formulate objectives, draft policy or make or carry out operations. Furthermore, NLD DISS is guided by the policymakers in order to be relevant, informs the policymakers and serves them.

5.2. Results of the interviews; activist approach

5.2.1. Intelligence must help policy by showing how to influence the situation

Nine of the ten interviewees were of the opinion that NLD DISS does not suggest how to influence situations such as policy issues, security issues, democracy matters, etc.⁵⁶ Several interviewees argued that NLD DISS provides the weather forecast, i.e. how situations can develop. Whether to bring an umbrella or sunscreen is up to the policymakers.

Besides that, according to one of the NLD DISS interviewees it would be very difficult since the Netherlands “*lacks a national agenda or a strategic vision*”. This view was shared by three NLD DISS interviewees and one external interviewee. The number of level four research assignments, where intelligence should create a situation where the customer can exert influence or even control, is remarkably small. To ask for level four research the desired end state and the Dutch long term policy goals must be clear to the policymaker himself. In the Netherlands policymakers often lack this ambition, probably amongst other things reflecting the absence of a national agenda, strategic vision, or the possibility of the Netherlands to be able to influence a situation since mostly the Netherlands acts in multi-national or coalition environments. So the first indicator of the activist approach is not applicable.

5.2.2. Intelligence should not build knowledge about current and potential enemies

The second indicator is that intelligence services should not build knowledge on current and potential enemies, since this diverts the attention from supporting the country in performing its task in the world as a whole. One of the interviewees stated in this regard that NLD DISS “*shines on the topics threat to the force and threat to the mission*”. To conduct these kind of analyses one must build knowledge on the current enemy. Also during the aftermath of the

⁵⁶ One interviewee, who mentioned that NLD DISS does indeed exert influence over certain policy areas, will not be taken into account since his statement refers to the counterintelligence and security division

incident with flight MH-17, NLD DISS was asked to look into the potential threats in the area, this was asked through the official committees on the managerial level. Furthermore one of the external interviewees argued that the input of NLD DISS in this respect is extremely relevant when policymakers “*want to deploy troops and NLD DISS assesses the situation or when policymakers have to decide which weapons to buy for the defence forces NLD DISS has to look merely into the developments of threats from current and potential enemies*”.

So both internal and external interviewees regard the second indicator not applicable since NLD DISS is asked to look into the current and potential enemies.

5.2.3. *Mention driving factors and the way they can be influenced*

In this respect several interviewees, both NLD DISS and external, argued that NLD DISS does analysis in which driving factors play a large role. These analyses are the so-called scenario analyses. In this analysis technique analysts identify and describe factors of influence on the situation and determine the most relevant factors as driving factors. These driving factors are used to make plausible futures. Within scenario analysis analysts do not look into the way those factors can be influenced. NLD DISS does, according to an internal interviewee “*offer scenarios to the policymakers which force them to reflect and can be seen as call to make policy or to make a decision.*” This interviewee also sees the scenario analysis as a very good tool to get the conversation going between intelligence and policy. Another external interviewees also stated specifically that scenario building sessions are a good forum to open discussions. He even referred to a scenario session where external personnel was invited to NLD DISS to join a session in which drivers were identified and scenarios were built. By this it is possible “*on the shop floor level to discuss opinions and options.*”

So NLD DISS does provide driving factors in certain occasions, however it does not look into the way these factors can be influenced by the policymakers. This makes the third indicator not applicable to this case study.

5.2.4. *Intelligence must have a direct relation with the top-level policymakers*

Kendall was of the opinion that intelligence should interact with the top-level policymakers. He disagreed on the traditional separation and with Kent that contact with mid-level policymakers was important. According to Kendall intelligence must have contact with the top policymakers that indeed make the decisions. When asked what interaction exists between NLD DISS and the Dutch policymakers all interviewees mentioned several committees. One of the committees is a recently established committee, the Ministerial Committee on Security

(MCV) where several ministers and the prime minister are attending as well as the director of NLD DISS. This committee is not a policymaking committee, its purpose is more to exchange information and opinions. Furthermore the Committee on Intelligence Services (CVIN) is mentioned where several top level policymakers attend the meeting and where the director of NLD DISS is permanent member. The CVIN is the formal gate to the Council of Intelligence and Security Services (RIV), which is a subcommittee of the Council of Ministers. Furthermore a committee exists within the ministry of Defence which is called Defence Intelligence and Security Council (DIVR). In this committee the Director of NLD DISS is present as well as several other directors from the MoD, including the Chief of Defence (CHOD), and chaired by the Secretary General of MoD. Within these committees adjustments can be made to the focus of NLD DISS, according to the interviewees, but NLD DISS is also able to bring certain topics to the attention of the policymakers up to the prime minister. One of the external interviewees stated that the approach of NLD DISS within these committees is varying. *“The approach within the CVIN and RIV is more towards the traditional approach where NLD DISS offers information to the policymakers. Within the MCV there is much interaction and exchange followed by a joint discussion on options for the policymakers.”*

So NLD DISS joins the top-policymakers in several committees and thus has a direct access to them. This is besides the interaction which exists on lower levels. NLD DISS has therefore several levels on which interaction with the policymakers is taking place. So this indicator is applicable to the relation between NLD DISS and the Dutch policymakers.

5.2.5. *Intelligence and policy must have a symbiotic relationship*
Activists argue there should be some kind of symbiotic relationship between policymakers and intelligence. This belief is based on the idea that intelligence should have an impact on the policy. This indicator is further broken down in the next three indicators. All interviewees indicate that there is a good relation between the intelligence service NLD DISS and the Dutch policymakers. However all interviewees had points to improve this relation. The phrase *“there is room for improvement”* was often made during the questions regarding the relation between NLD DISS and the policymakers. One of the external interviewees claimed that *“the contact with NLD DISS is still very much ad hoc. NLD DISS is not involved in the policymaking process systematic, while on several occasions that would be beneficial.”*

One of the internal interviewees stated that there has been a positive improvement in the relation but *“NLD DISS has invested much in the trade of intelligence but too little in advisors and surroundings. More contact will lead to more connection which will lead to*

more trust. And trust is of the utmost importance in a good working relationship.” Another internal interviewee argued that *“NLD DISS should have more liaisons in the offices of the policymakers. That would enable the service to notice developments at an earlier stage as a result of which the intelligence producers can adapt their output to the requirements of the policymakers. After all, the products are written to be taken into account during the decision-making.”*

So all interviewees were convinced there is a good relation, but also that there is still room for improvement. So there is a drive towards the symbiotic relationship where intelligence wants to make an impact by being taken into account.

5.2.6. *Intelligence professionals should understand the policy process*
Roger Hilsman⁵⁷, an activist in the 1950s, mentioned that intelligence professionals should understand the policy process and what the effect of intelligence inputs has in this process. On being asked all interviewees stated there is some form of knowledge of the policy process within NLD DISS. One of the external interviewees stated *“there is lurking knowledge present but timing severely lacks. NLD DISS is often unaware how to join the policymakers in a planning process.”* The other four external interviewees more or less agreed with this point of view. NLD DISS tries to join the process but lacks the timing. Also the policymakers have to keep monitoring when NLD DISS must be involved.

Furthermore the internal interviewees stated that NLD DISS is trying to broaden its knowledge on the processes and tries to react to the signals it receives. However the lack of liaisons is mentioned as one of the factors why the administrative practice of NLD DISS is different from that of the policymakers. There is however a positive trend that NLD DISS is trying to do better and that policymakers are more willing to get NLD DISS involved. One of the internal interviewees stated that NLD DISS *“has changed from unknown and unpopular to known and liked.”*

To what extent the intelligence input has an effect is hard to acquire. NLD DISS products are not written to have a direct effect, they are written to be taken into account. When asked what share NLD DISS products have in the policy processes all interviewees stated that this is different case by case. So there is no general answer to that question. The products must inform the policymakers, but do not necessarily have an impact on the process.

⁵⁷ Cimbala, S., & Hulnick, A. (1987). Relations Between Intelligence Producers and Policy Customers: A New Way of Looking at an Old Problem. In *Intelligence and intelligence policy in a democratic society* (pp. 129-144). Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Transnational.

So the sixth indicator of the activist approach is, as far as can be ascertained, applicable to the case study. There is understanding of the policy process, however there is some shade of meaning to what extent that knowledge is effective.

5.2.7. *Intelligence should devote its resources meaningful*
Intelligence gathering always depends on scarce assets. The activist Hilsman therefore stated that intelligence should devote its resources to those issues that are meaningful to policymakers. This is done in the Netherlands by the GAWB which was discussed in light of the eighth indicator of the traditional approach. Furthermore NLD DISS has the weighing and prioritizing method. In short this methodology is used as an internal tool to prioritize the intelligence collection and analytical assets to these dossiers. Every four months NLD DISS requests feedback of the customers to explore whether NLD DISS prioritized their scarce assets meaningful to them. So NLD DISS is guided by the policymakers and therefore is devoting its resources to relevant topics of the policymakers. NLD DISS is not able to do this on its own, since it lacks the required insight in the developments in the environment of the policymakers as discussed before. So although it is not autonomous, NLD DISS is devoting its resources to meaningful issues. Therefore this indicator is also applicable to the case.

5.2.8. *A feedback mechanism is needed between intelligence and policymakers*
A feedback loop is accommodated within the weighing and prioritizing method of NLD DISS, as mentioned before. Part of this methodology is to explore what the customers, including the policymakers, think of the products which were written by NLD DISS. Customer feedback is to answer the question whether NLD DISS has reached the goals specified in the various research assignments. Within NLD DISS the department which is responsible for weighing and prioritizing (BADA) approaches the policymakers for this feedback. According to the interviewees this is the only structural feedback loop in place. Furthermore the interviewees argued that during interaction between intelligence personnel and policymakers feedback is given ad hoc and also during for instance DIVR committee meetings. That is the feedback from the policymakers towards the NLD DISS. Some interviewees believe that more feedback should be given. One of the external interviewees even stated that no feedback is given besides the feedback within weighing and prioritizing.

Feedback from NLD DISS towards the policymakers is very rare according to the interviewees. This is done only on a ad hoc basis during personal interaction between a policymaker and an intelligence professional.

However there is a feedback loop in place, which makes the final indicator also applicable. Again room for improvement is identified by several interviewees.

5.2.9. Subconclusion

To sum up, of the activist approach five out of eight indicators are more or less applicable to the relation of NLD DISS with the Dutch policymakers. The other three out of the eight are not applicable. The relation between NLD DISS and the Dutch policymakers is also with the top-level policymakers, and there is to a more or lesser degree a symbiotic relationship. Furthermore the intelligence professionals are required to understand the policy process and must be guided by the policy in order to be relevant. To keep communicating about this there is a feedback loop in place. NLD DISS does not show the policymakers how to influence the situation– but, on the other hand, level four research assignments are to give the policymakers the information necessary to do just that by themselves- nor mentions how to influence driving factors, but it does inform the policymakers on current and potential enemies.

5.3. Results of the interviews; joint approach

5.3.1. Joint intelligence product

Within the joint approach from the United Kingdom it is characteristic that intelligence professionals and policymakers write products together. They co-produce products for the decisionmakers. In the Netherlands that is not common, according to the interviewees. The intelligence professionals of NLD DISS and the Dutch policymakers do not produce joint products as such. However there is some form of far-reaching cooperation, for instance during the Article 100 process. This is the process in which the parliament is informed of a military mission. Within the article 100 letter NLD DISS provides a part of the text: the threat analysis. The policymakers are not allowed to change the text without consulting the drafting agency. The process is in such a way designed that after the letter is finished and before the letter is presented to the parliament the Director of NLD DISS has to sign for it. This way the threat analysis is written independently from the policymakers by NLD DISS. However, the Minister of Defence has its own political responsibility: in the end, he can always make the political choice to change even the threat analysis. If NLD DISS does not agree with the final content of the letter, or the policymakers do not agree with the draft text of NLD DISS the parliament has to be informed. This is only applicable to the article 100 process. The same cooperation of drafting goes for the answering of questions by parliament. NLD DISS has a role in the drafting of answers but again on an independent basis. However parliament does

not have to be informed of differences in opinion. Besides these products all interviewees mentioned that several policy documents are attuned by the policymakers and NLD DISS. But no real joint products are written. So this indicator is not applicable to the case study.

5.3.2. *Intelligence is essential partner of the policy makers in the day-to-day business of government*

Sir David Omand sees intelligence as a day to day essential partner of the government⁵⁸. Looking at the fact that NLD DISS is just opening up towards policymakers it is hard to imagine that NLD DISS is a day to day essential partner. The interviewees argued that several contacts are still ad hoc and the mentioned committees do not convene on a daily basis. So NLD DISS cannot be identified as an essential day to day partner of the policymakers.

5.3.3. *Intelligence adds value by improving the quality of decision making*

As mentioned before the products of NLD DISS are written to inform policymakers. Furthermore several external interviewees stated that they read the products in order to inform the top decisionmakers. NLD DISS is also devoting its resources to the needs of the policymakers in order to be relevant. All the external interviewees, who are working directly in the staff of the decisionmakers, agreed that the products of NLD DISS are relevant. Some more than others, and case by case they put more weight on the scale. One of the external interviewees even argued that a good intelligence report can be decisive in the decisionmaking process. So the intelligence indeed adds value, the third indicator is applicable to the case study.

5.3.4. *Subconclusion*

Out of the three indicators identified to the joint approach only one is applicable to the relation between NLD DISS and the Dutch policymakers. The intelligence adds value by improving the quality of decision making. Two indicators are not applicable, no joint products are written by NLD DISS intelligence professionals and Dutch policymakers and NLD DISS is not assessed as being an essential partner in the day to day business of the policymakers.

⁵⁸ Omand, D. (2010). *Securing the state* (pp. 113-208). New York: Columbia University Press.

6. More towards the traditional approach, where is the room for improvement?

In this chapter the answer to the central question of this thesis is presented. What is the relation between NLD DISS and the Dutch policymakers? Is it more traditional and in line with Kent's ideas? Is it a more activist relation as described by Kendall or is the relation based more on the joint approach of which Capel-Dunn wrote a report with his view?

6.1. *The approach that fits the most*

NLD DISS is moving away from the pure traditional approach and, as described, also meets several indicators of the activist approach. The activists mention a symbiotic relationship which means that intelligence should know the policy process, devote its resources to the policymakers and have a feedback loop.⁵⁹ The case study does meet these indicators of the more activist approach. Although according to the interviewees several aspects can be improved, the ground rules of these aspects are met. Also, as Kendall mentions, intelligence services should interact with the top-level policymakers.⁶⁰ According to the interviewees the management team of NLD DISS has a representative in several policymaker committees up to the level of the prime minister.

The joint approach seems the least applicable. As observed by the interviewees there is no joint production of analyses. This only happens in very rare cases such as when the parliament is informed of a mission, but then NLD DISS provides input to the letter of the policymakers. That does not really qualify as a joint product. Furthermore the indicator that *intelligence adds value by improving the quality of decision making* is to a certain extent also applicable to other approaches. After all, all approaches want to best inform the decision makers in order to have them make the best possible decision.

As described in the previous chapter the research revealed that the relationship between NLD DISS and the Dutch policymakers is characterized by indicators of all three approaches,

⁵⁹ Hulnick, Arthur S. "Relations between Intelligence Producers and Policy Customers: A New Way of Looking at and Old Problem." *Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society*. By Stephen J. Cimbala. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational, 1987. N. pag 129-144. Print.

Hulnick, Arthur S. "The Intelligence Producer-Policy Consumer Linkage." *Studies in Intelligence* (1985): n. pag 71-85. *Www.cia.gov*. Winter 1985. Web. 13 Mar. 2015.

⁶⁰ Davis, Jack. "The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949." *Studies in Intelligence* 35.2 (1992): n. pag 91-103. *Www.cia.gov*. Web. 10 Jan. 2015. <<https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol35no2/pdf/v35i2a06p.pdf>>.

though not all of them. Of the traditional approach five out of eight indicators are applicable. The same goes for the activist approach of which also five indicators out of the eight are applicable. Of the three joint approach indicators one indicator is applicable to the case study at hand, but this indicator is to a certain degree also applicable to other approaches.

Looking at the development several interviewees described, NLD DISS is moving away from the almost strictly traditional approach. Kent's *comments* on the traditional approach, which were also an alteration on the traditional approach, are very much applicable to the case study at hand. First of all the so called "father of intelligence analysis" mentioned that the relation between an intelligence service and policymakers is a delicate case.⁶¹ Several interviewees stated that both NLD DISS and the policymakers are still working on their relationship. Some were of the opinion that more interaction is needed, but they are satisfied with the progress that is being made. Secondly, Kent deviated from the pure traditional approach in saying that intelligence should serve the policymakers and know what is on their mind, but not do their job. This describes the relationship between NLD DISS and the policymakers to the tee.

The research shows that NLD DISS and the policymakers influence each other. All interviewees agreed that NLD DISS can indirectly influence policymakers by bringing topics to their attention. However, they are not able to directly influence the decision making process. Also, in their turn, policymakers are able to indirectly influence NLD DISS. By asking questions or setting requirements policymakers direct the attention of NLD DISS towards certain topics or targets. Furthermore, the policymakers decide on the budgets allocated to the security services. These budgets influence the quantity and likely the quality of intelligence that can be obtained and analyzed. The policymakers, however, do not directly influence the assessments of NLD DISS.

NLD DISS is nowadays able to be involved with the policymakers since NLD DISS is gaining insight in the world of the policymakers. According to a NLD DISS interviewee, in the past they wrote products which did not involve the needs of the policymakers, they tried to be involved but without insight and by that they produced judgements without prospect. So to

⁶¹ Davis, Jack. "The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949." *Studies in Intelligence* 35.2 (1992): n. pag 91-103. *Www.cia.gov*. Web. 10 Jan. 2015. <<https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol35no2/pdf/v35i2a06p.pdf>>.

be involved, NLD DISS must have insight and is according to the interviewees able to produce judgements with prospects.

Since the three approaches are not mutually exclusive, they can be made visible in a schematic drawing (figure 2). Within it one can position the case study of the relationship between NLD DISS and the Dutch policymakers (orange star in figure 2). The relation is moving away from the traditional approach and moving towards the more activistic approach. The joint approach seems hardly applicable to the case study.

None of the approaches as described in chapter two is fully applicable to the experience of the interviewees. They all argued that not one theoretical model is wholly applicable to all the nuances of the relation. Kents alteration of the pure traditional approach fits, however, the case study best.




Figure 2: Schematic drawing of the three approaches, the orange star is the case study of the Thesis

6.2. Recommendations

The first two recommendations directly concern ways to improve the relationship between NLD DISS and the policymaker and result directly from remarks made by the majority of the interviewees.

(1) Based on the research at hand one of the general findings is that most interviewees would like to intensify the relation between the policymakers and NLD DISS. According to them, both policymakers and NLD DISS should work to improve their interaction. One example is the placement of NLD DISS liaison officers at relevant ministries⁶², as the AIVD has done. According to both some NLD DISS and some external interviewees this could significantly improve the interaction and the way NLD DISS could connect to the policy process. Also it would increase the visibility of NLD DISS within the policy departments. This will probably result in NLD DISS becoming a more relevant player on the policy stage.

(2) Several interviewees mentioned that, although there is a feedback loop in place, it is a rather limited feedback loop. A lot of feedback is given during informal meetings, and is not registered. Furthermore, the structural feedback loop is the feedback from the policymakers towards the NLD DISS with regards to the products. There are no other structural and formal feedback loops. It could be profitable to establish a feedback loop from NLD DISS to the policymakers. This way the effects of policymakers decision on NLD DISS can structurally be discussed.

The final two recommendations concern further research into the relationship between the Netherlands intelligence community and the Dutch policymakers. This research had a rather narrow focus. It would be interesting to broaden the scope of future studies into the interaction between Dutch intelligence services and policymakers. For instance, it is likely that the current findings and conclusions are not generally applicable to all of NLD DISS's relations with policymakers nor to the relation between the AIVD and the Dutch policymakers. Therefore:

(3) It would be interesting to conduct the same research on the shop floor level of NLD DISS and to investigate the relation between the AIVD and the Dutch policymakers.

⁶² One of the internal interviewees mentioned that liaisons is indeed desired however NLD DISS lacks the personnel to do so.

(4) Furthermore, it is advisable to look into the specific case of the counter intelligence and security department of NLD DISS. From some of the interviews it became apparent that this relation is different in some respects and possibly angles more towards the activist approach.

7. Appendices

7.1. Appendix 1: Indicators of the traditional and activist approach

In this appendix the indicators are mentioned which are used as the cornerstones of the interview. The indicators are based on the theoretical framework in chapter two.

7.1.1. Traditional approach

- strict separation between intelligence and policy
- policy is a process, intelligence feeds input, policy decides
- Intelligence professionals have no direct contact with policymakers
- Intelligence does not formulate objectives
- Intelligence does not draft policy
- Intelligence does not make or carry out operations
- Intelligence informs policymakers and serve them
- Intelligence must be guided by the policymakers to be relevant

7.1.2. Activist approach

- Intelligence must help policy by showing how to influence the situation
- Intelligence should not build knowledge about current and potential enemies
- Mention driving factors and the way they can be influenced
- Intelligence must have a direct relation with the top-level policymakers
- Intelligence and policy must have a symbiotic relationship
- Intelligence professionals should understand the policy process and the effect of intelligence inputs
- Intelligence should devote its resources to those issues that are meaningful to policymakers
- A feedback mechanism is needed between intelligence and policymakers

7.1.3. Joint approach

- Intelligence produces joint products with the policymakers
- Intelligence is an essential partner of the policymakers in the day-to-day business of government
- Intelligence adds value by improving the quality of decision making

7.2. Appendix 2: The interviewees

1. Director NLD DISS (DMIVD)
2. Deputy Director NLD DISS (PMIVD)
3. Head of the Policy Advice and Devils Advocate (BADA) NLD DISS
4. Head Analysis Branch (H-AI) NLD DISS
5. Head Counter Intelligence Branch (H-ACIV) NLD DISS
6. Head of the Intelligence Branch within the Operations Department of the Ministry of defence (J2 NLD MOD (J2 DOPS))
7. Director Security Policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
8. Head of the Counter-terrorism and National Security Branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
9. Director Strategy Policy Development and Innovation of the MOD Policy (HDB)
10. Foreign policy and Defence Advisor of the Ministry of General Affairs

7.3. Appendix 3: The interview

The interview has been done in Dutch, since all the interviewees were Dutch. The interview in this appendix has been translated from Dutch.

Good Morning/Afternoon,

Before we start the interview I will briefly introduce myself and describe the background of my research.

My name is Arjen Roosjen, I am one of the Master students attending the Master strategic studies. Within the master I enlisted for the Intelligence and Security track of which I am currently working on my thesis. For this reason I am looking onto the relation between and intelligence service and the policymakers. For my research I have chosen NLD DISS as my case study and I will look into the relation with MoD, General affairs, and MoI. For my research I would like to ask you some questions.

The given answers will be used in the research but anonymously. After I finished my thesis I will give you the final draft, so you can see whether you agree with the quotes I have used.

- 1) What is your position?
- 2) Do you have insights into the relation between NLD DISS and the policy makers from this position?
- 3) Are you familiar with the different approaches from the theory
 - Strict separation between intelligence and policy
 - A more activistic approach
 - Joint assessments of intelligence and policy
- 4) In your opinion, what approach is the most applicable to the relation between NLD DISS and the Dutch policymakers?
- 5) To what extent is there interaction between NLD DISS and the policymakers? On which level of the organisation is that arranged? Can this be on the single intelligence specialist level/ shop floor level?
- 6) How is the focus of NLD DISS defined? In the experience of the policymakers, is this focus useful?
- 7) Besides formal requests, is there a possibility to give ad hoc requests to NLD DISS, for instance on a personal basis?
- 8) How is the focus or the adjustment of the focus communicated? Is this formalized?
- 9) Do policymakers have influence on the products of NLD DISS or does NLD DISS has influence on the policymakers?
- 10) How do contacts between NLD DISS intelligence professionals and policymakers come about? On whose initiative?

- 11) Are there any formal arrangements on the intensity of the interaction?
- 12) How does NLD DISS get involved with the policy process? Is this process common knowledge within NLD DISS
- 13) Do intelligence professionals of NL DISS know when to link in the process?
- 14) To what extent does NLD DISS give policy advice?
- 15) What is the contribution of NLD DISS products to the total of information on which policymakers base their decision?
- 16) How is the relevance of the products of NLD DISS determined?
- 17) To what purpose are the products of NLD DISS written?
- 18) What cooperation exists between NLD DISS and the policymakers?
- 19) How is the feedback loop organised?
- 20) If NLD DISS has a meeting with policymakers, does NLD DISS always talk on behalf of itself or is this occasionally done also on behalf of the AIVD or does the AIVD talk on behalf of NLD DISS?

7.4. *Appendix 4: overview coded response interviewees in relation to the indicators*

	NLD DISS 1	NLD DISS 2	NLD DISS 3	NLD DISS 4	NLD DISS 5
Traditional approach					
Strict separation between intelligence and policy	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Policy is a process, intelligence feeds input, policy decides	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Intelligence professionals have no direct contact with policymakers	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Intelligence does not formulate objectives	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
Intelligence does not draft policy	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES
Intelligence does not make or carry out operations	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES
Intelligence informs policymakers and serves them	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Intelligence must be guided by the policymakers to be relevant	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Activist approach					
Intelligence must support policymakers by showing them how to influence the situation	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES
Intelligence should not build knowledge about current and potential enemies	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Mention driving factors and the way they can be influenced	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Intelligence must have a direct relation with the top level policymakers	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Intelligence and policy must have a symbiotic relationship	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Intelligence professionals should understand the policy process and the effect of intelligence inputs	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Intelligence should devote its resources to those issues that are meaningful to policymakers	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
A feedback mechanism is needed between intelligence and policymakers	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Joint approach (UK)					
Joint intelligence product	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Intelligence is essential partner of the policy makers in the day-to-day business of government	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Intelligence adds value by improving the quality of decision making	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Traditional approach

Strict separation between intelligence and policy
Policy is a process, intelligence feeds input, policy decides
Intelligence professionals have no direct contact with policymakers
Intelligence does not formulate objectives
Intelligence does not draft policy
Intelligence does not make or carry out operations
Intelligence informs policymakers and serve them
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Activist approach

Intelligence must support policymakers by showing them how to influence the situation
Intelligence should not build knowledge about current and potential enemies
Mention driving factors and the way they can be influenced
Intelligence must have a direct relation with the top-level policymakers
Intelligence and policy must have a symbiotic relationship
Intelligence professionals should understand the policy process and the effect of intelligence inputs
Intelligence should devote its resources to those issues that are meaningful to policymakers
A feedback mechanism is needed between intelligence and policymakers

Joint approach (UK)

Joint intelligence product
Intelligence is essential partner of the policy makers in the day-to-day business of government
Intelligence adds value by improving the quality of decision making

EXT	EXT	EXT	EXT	EXT
1	2	3	4	5
NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

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