

The All Source Information Fusion Unit

a new phenomenon in UN intelligence

Kees Garos

Supervisors: Dr. F.H. Baudet
Dr. Ir. S.H.J. Rietjens

Breda, 30 April 2015

Thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Masters MSS



Table of content

SUMMARY	1
I. INTRODUCTION	2
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	5
II.A INTELLIGENCE AS INDICATOR OF MISSION SUCCESS?.....	5
II.B SITUATION AWARENESS	6
II.C INTELLIGENCE SHARING	8
II.D THE MISSION-PROTECTION PARADOX AND THE “THIRD DIMENSION”	9
II.E THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY	9
III. MINUSMA AND ASIFU	12
III.A BACKGROUND.....	12
III.B MINUSMA.....	13
III.B.A THE INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE OF MINUSMA	15
III.B.B ASIFU	16
IV. DOES THE ASIFU CONTRIBUTE TO MINUSMA’S SUCCESS?	19
IV.A ASIFU’S CONTRIBUTION TO MINUSMA’S INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY	19
IV.B MINUSMA’S ACHIEVEMENTS MEASURED THROUGH CODES AND CATEGORIES	22
IV.B.A FIRST-LEVEL LEARNING	23
IV.B.B SITUATIONAL AWARENESS.....	24
IV.B.C INTELLIGENCE SHARING	25
IV.B.D THE MISSION-PROTECTION PARADOX	26
V. CONCLUSION	27
BIBLIOGRAPHY	30
INTERVIEWS	32
DEBRIEFINGS	32
APPENDIX A	33
APPENDIX B	34
APPENDIX C	35

Summary

Since 2000, a new concept of UN peacekeeping has evolved: the multidimensional integrated stabilization mission. From monitoring cease-fires with the consent of all parties involved, the last decade PKOs are mandated to investigate human rights violations, provide electoral support, manage disarmament and reintegration programs, and occasionally support active combat operations. At the same time, the UN has steadily built up an intelligence system, in which the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) has become a pivotal element between UNHQ and UN intelligence in theatre. Since 2006 JMACs are mandatory in such missions.

In 2013, the UN Security Council authorized the establishment of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). A new intelligence unit was introduced as well: the All Source Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU). This unit is the object of this thesis. Which intelligence gaps is this unit supposed to fill?

Based on theories of, inter alia, Morjé Howard, Endsley et al., Ara et al., and Lester, I discern four intelligence challenges for UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs): first-level learning, situation awareness, intelligence sharing and the mission-protection paradox.¹

After outlining the specifics of the Malian crisis, and the establishment of MINUSMA, I focus on the role and performance of the ASIFU through the research of documents, reports, debriefings of and interviews with redeployed military personnel. By codifying and categorizing their responses, a picture emerges of how those directly involved perceive the ASIFU and the way this unit contributes to MINUSMA's answer to the four challenges.

I argue that this unit fills at least two intelligence 'gaps' in MINUSMA: First, the introduction of the ASIFU enables the JMAC to focus its efforts on the political-strategic level, while the ASIFU fills the gap at the operational and tactical level in an integrated way, in accordance with the 'comprehensive approach'. The comprehensive approach ensures the link to the political-strategic level, essential to integrated assessments. This way, it enables MINUSMA to take the first steps in coping with first-level learning, situation awareness and intelligence sharing. Second, through the deployment of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Companies (ISRCoys), the ASIFU fulfills an indispensable requirement for situation awareness: the systematic collection of information by dedicated sensors, assets that were lacking in earlier UN missions.

Finally, I argue that MINUSMA appears to be a hazardous enterprise. According to the model of Morjé Howard and the results of the interviews, necessary conditions for successful peacekeeping are not present.

¹ Morjé Howard, Lise (2008), *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Endsley, Mica R., Bolté B., and Jones, D.G. (2003), *Designing for Situation Awareness. An Approach to User-Centered Design*. New York: Taylor and Francis Group; Ara, Martin J., Brand, T., & Larssen, B.A. (2011), *Help a Brother Out: A Case Study in Multinational Intelligence Sharing, NATO SOF*. Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.; Lester, Philip T.G. (2010), *The Mission-Protection Paradox*. Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Downing College.

I. Introduction

During the 1980s the post-Second World War order started to disintegrate. In 1989, the Berlin Wall fell and the implosion of the Soviet empire accelerated, together with the rise of globalism. There was a widely felt optimism that peace, freedom and democracy would rise and endure worldwide.² This euphoria, however, was rapidly and severely dented by horrendous civil wars such as the one in the Balkans (1992-95), and the equally horrendous massacre in Rwanda in 1994. Furthermore, the transition from the post-Second World War order to a vaguely defined 'globalized' new world order was also characterized by a more or less unchallenged rise of organized, transnational crime. In the wake of these events, international terrorism was rapidly (re)developing, feeding in these same grounds.³ But in the 1990s, a strong and optimistic sense of a new world order in which the UN would play an important role still prevailed.⁴ In reality, the international institutions were overwhelmed by the new circumstances, including the UN.

The world community was confronted by a growing number of disorderly and chaotic incidents and conflicts that were either transnational or intrastate or both. The UN, however, was built and organized on the assumption that conflicts would be primarily interstate and was found to be unfit to effectively handle these kinds of crises. It became gradually obvious that the original philosophy, as expressed in the UN Charter, had become obsolete. Doubts were growing whether the UN was up to the current situation, while at the same time expectations were rising: the number of UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) was soaring. It led to an approximately five-fold increase in UN personnel deployed since 2000. Moreover, where PKOs used to be mandated primarily to monitor cease-fires with the consent of all parties involved, from then on PKOs were meant to, *inter alia*, 'investigate human rights violations, provide electoral support, manage combatant disarmament and reintegration programs, and occasionally support active combat operations'.⁵ Some of these PKOs took place in violent and dangerous theatres. Insight was dawning that in these circumstances, decision makers, commanders and their troops cannot do without (military) intelligence.⁶

In 2000, the High-level Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, in its final report (from now on referred to as the Brahimi report, named after its chairman) concluded 'that the Secretary-General needs a professional system in the Secretariat for accumulating knowledge about conflict situations, distributing that knowledge efficiently to a wide user base, generating policy analyses and formulating long-term strategies'.⁷ At that time, this recommendation was not followed upon due to resistance of member states of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Nevertheless, during the last fifteen years, a profound change is discernable concerning UN intelligence capabilities. From 2005 onwards, the concept of a Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) was implemented in various mission theatres.⁸ Notwithstanding the political reluctance⁹, at UN headquarters (UNHQ) an intelligence structure was gradually implemented. Within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), as part of the Situation Center, the Research and Liaison Unit was established in 2007; since 2008, the

² Fukuyama, Francis (1992), *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press

³ Glenny, Misha (2008), *McMafia. Crime Without Frontiers*. London: Random House Group

⁴ Slaughter, Anne-Marie (2005), "Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of UN Reform, *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 99, No. 3 (Jul., 2005); UN (2004) "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, UN Doc. A/59/565, at 8 (2004)

⁵ Ramjoué, Melanie (2011), "Improving UN Intelligence through Civil-Military Collaboration: Lessons from the Joint Mission Analysis Centres, *International Peacekeeping*, 18(4), p. 468

⁶ Cammaert, Patrick C. (2003), "Intelligence in Peacekeeping Operations: Lessons for the Future, *Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future*, de Jong, B., Platje, W., and Steele, R.D. (eds), Oakton, VA: OSS International Press, p. 11

⁷ UN (2000), *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, UN doc. A/55/305 – S/2000/809, paragraph 68, quoted by Ramjoué, M. (2011), p. 470

⁸ Shetler-Jones, Philip (2008), "Intelligence in Integrated UN Peacekeeping Missions: The Joint Mission Analysis Centre." *International Peacekeeping*, 15(4)

⁹ Barry, Joseph A. (2012), "Bolstering United Nations Intelligence: Cultural and Structural Solutions." *American Intelligence Journal*, 30(1)

Assessment Team is fully operational within the Office of Military Affairs of the DPKO. Furthermore, intelligence and analysis assets are part of the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) and the Department of Political Affairs.¹⁰

The intelligence architecture at UNHQ is linked to the field missions through the concept of 'integrated missions' (IM). This concept is the bedrock of UN multidimensional peacekeeping. Part of this concept is the idea of integrating civilian and military information and actors; decision-making, operations and activities are to be supported by 'fused' intelligence. For this purpose, JMACs became a mandatory part of UN multidimensional peacekeeping, although its mandatory character was toned down in the UN 2010 JMAC policy.¹¹

By means of its intelligence architecture, but also through its tens of thousands of staff, deployed worldwide and privy to information through their daily interactions with local communities and political actors, the UN is well positioned to collect large quantities of data. Moreover, although the UN has no formal intelligence sharing arrangements with national intelligence agencies, the UN receives information from states on an ad hoc basis, especially from UN Security Council (UNSC) members.¹² Lack of intelligence seems to be a thing of the past.

Although intelligence does not go well with UN principles such as neutrality, transparency and impartiality, the UN has, in less than ten years, built up an intelligence system that should cover its intelligence needs. Nevertheless, a new intelligence element has been introduced. Within MINUSMA, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, an All Source Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU) is added to the existing intelligence assets of a UN PKO.

This thesis focuses on this new phenomenon. Why such an additional intelligence element? It concentrates on the question which intelligence gaps ASIFU is actually filling in. The UN has not made a formal statement concerning the ASIFU and to which intelligence deficiencies it is the solution. Therefore this thesis explores the ASIFU's origin, its actual functioning and its contribution to the fulfillment of MINUSMA's mandate.

The next chapter will provide a theoretical framework for the research into this question. In her seminal work 'UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars', Lise Morjé Howard studies and compares ten complex cases of UN multidimensional peacekeeping. She discerns three factors which are necessary, and jointly sufficient, to explain success in UN peacekeeping operations. One of these factors is first-level organizational learning in the field, for which she has developed a descriptive model. I will use this model to study the role of intelligence in acquiring first-level learning.¹³ Secondly, I argue that situation awareness is a precondition for first-level learning. Mica R. Endsley et al. have elaborated basic principles to design systems aimed at providing situation awareness for individuals and organizations.¹⁴ An intelligence architecture might be seen as such a system, because the *raison d'être* of intelligence is to supply political and military decision makers with situational awareness and understanding. However, to achieve situational awareness and understanding, significant obstacles have to be overcome.¹⁵ Apart from the intelligence gaps the ASIFU is to resolve, it is likely to encounter 'common' dilemmas such as intelligence sharing, diverging mental models and the mission-protection paradox. These issues will also be attended to in this thesis.

The theoretical framework is generally based on independent, academic publications. Concerning MINUSMA and ASIFU, data are collected by research of resolutions, mandates,

¹⁰ Gøransson, Stian B. (2014), "Intelligence in UN Peacekeeping. A case study of the challenges facing ASIFU." Bachelor thesis in military studies, Norwegian Military Academy Linderud, p. 19

¹¹ Norheim-Martinsen, Per Martin & Ravndal, J.A. (2011), "Towards Intelligence-Driven Peace Operations? The Evolution of UN and EU Intelligence Structures." *International Peacekeeping*, 18(4); Ramjoué, M. (2011), p. 471

¹² Ramjoué (2011), p. 468, p.470

¹³ Morjé Howard, Lise (2008), *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

¹⁴ Endsley, Mica R., Bolté B., and Jones, D.G. (2003), *Designing for Situation Awareness. An Approach to User-Centered Design*. New York: Taylor and Francis Group

¹⁵ UK MoD (2010), Joint Doctrine Publication 04, *Understanding*.

orders, debriefings and interviews with (re)deployed intelligence personnel. These data are analyzed through process tracing and content analysis.¹⁶

Due to the scope of this thesis, there are some critical limitations in the research of this study. First, many data originate from sources such as interviewed personnel and debriefings held by redeployed military. All interviewees were active in Mali during some time in 2014. Though this method is susceptible to subjectivity, this is mitigated by the number of interviews and debriefings, and the divergence of levels at which this personnel was deployed. Second, due to limitations in resources and time, this study has a predominantly Dutch perspective, because most interviews are held with, and attended debriefings were done by Dutch intelligence personnel.¹⁷ The collected data are codified over fourteen items, and divided over four categories: First-level learning, situational awareness, intelligence sharing, and the mission-protection paradox. By measuring positive as well as negative perceptions of these items, preliminary conclusions of MINUSMA's and ASIFU's achievements can be made. For obvious reasons, the interviewees are anonymous.

An exploratory approach in the sampling of data is used, because it not only involves a new phenomenon, but there was no clear premeditated planning or concept of ASIFU.¹⁸ This exploratory element accounts for the abductive character of this research: the presence of a new phenomenon provokes new insights.

Chapter III will go into the UN PKOs' intelligence capabilities and the way they are organized, the different levels for which they are tasked, and how they relate to each other. In other words, the intelligence architecture of a UN multidimensional mission. Subsequently, I will describe the way this intelligence architecture is supposed to function within the MINUSMA mission, with a specific focus on the ASIFU. Chapter IV provides an analysis of the actual role and functioning of the ASIFU in the Malian context. Finally, in Chapter V, there will be conclusions and projections.

¹⁶ Venneson, Pascal & Wiesner, I. (2014), "Process Tracing in Case Studies." in: *Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in Military Studies*, Joseph Soeters, Shields, P.M., and Rietjens, S.H.J. (eds), New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group; Rietjens, S.H.J.

(2014), "Qualitative Data Analysis: Seeing the Patterns in the Fog of Civil-Military Interaction." in: *Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in Military Studies*, Joseph Soeters, Shields, P.M., and Rietjens, S.H.J. (eds), New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group

¹⁷ Twelve intelligence personnel were interviewed based on a semi-structured interview design. These interviewees represent the strategic, operational and tactical level of MINUSMA. Debriefings were primarily presentations held by re-deployed personnel as part of the intelligence preparation of pending rotations.

¹⁸ Interview 7

II. Theoretical Framework

Just after the end of the Cold War, the early 1990s were characterized by a rapid growth of the number of UN peacekeeping missions and the gradually evolving multidimensionality of these operations. The record of these missions is ambiguous. UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda and Angola turned into disastrous failures, while other PKOs were successful in achieving their mandate.¹⁹ Is there an explanation for these different outcomes?

II.a Intelligence as Indicator of Mission Success?

In her comparative study of ten PKOs, Morjé Howard argues that “three conditions are necessary, and jointly are sufficient, to explain success in UN peacekeeping. These three elements consist of, first, certain favorable ‘situational factors’ of the country emerging from civil war; second, consensual but only moderately intense interests of the powerful members of the UN Security Council, and finally, ‘first-level’ organizational learning on the ground, on the part of the UN peacekeeping mission.”²⁰

Morjé Howard measures success in two comprehensive ways: First, she examines “success or failure in mandate implementation for the various tasks assigned to the mission.”²¹ [-] Second, the method of evaluation involves a broader assessment of the state of the country after completion of the UN intervention. This measure also takes into account the fact that sometimes the UN might fulfill its mandate, even though the conflict has not ended in a positive peace.”²²

Based on her measurement of success, Morjé Howard suggests that there is a causal relationship between first-level learning and successful outcomes.²³ She describes four indicators of first-level learning. It is the organization’s ability to (i) gather and analyze information, (ii) coordinate among the different divisions of the peacekeeping missions, (iii) engage the organization with its post-civil war environment, and (iv) exercise leadership in such a way that the organization commands authority from all actors.²⁴

Morjé Howard specifies the second indicator as frequent coordination meetings that include all elements of the UN peacekeeping operation, and governmental and nongovernmental organizations. The third indicator is specified as organizational engagement with the environment, among the population. The fourth indicator involves the early engagement of the peacekeeping mission’s leaders, and their situational awareness and understanding.²⁵

The first indicator is the most relevant for this thesis. Morjé Howard posits that widespread mechanisms for gathering information are one of the most important preconditions for learning, while sound analysis of that information indicates actual learning. The analysis is used to define problems, including judgments about causal relationships and an evaluation of the intentions of the parties involved.²⁶ Basically, without mentioning intelligence, Morjé Howard gives a quite accurate description of an intelligence process. As a matter of fact, the

¹⁹ Morjé Howard (2008), p. 10, Table 1. Morjé Howard confines her study to PKOs in countries emerging from civil war; she defines civil war as a conflict where organized sides contend for power within a single recognized state, and where there are more than 1,500 casualties, footnote p. 1. The vast majority of PKOs are involved in such conflicts, (KG)

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 2

²¹ *ibidem*, p. 7. “For each case, I (MH) compare the UN Secretariat’s mandate, as expressed in peace accords and UN Security Council resolutions, with the Secretariat operation’s interpretation and fulfillment of the mandate.”

²² *ibidem*, p. 7

²³ Morjé Howard (2008), p. 14. According to Barash, positive peace entails human rights, economic fairness and opportunity, democratization, and environmental sustainability.²³ These factors reflect a number of multidimensional elements in contemporary UN missions. If the UN fulfills its mandate without a positive peace, then there might be a discrepancy between goals and means. This will be discussed later on.

²⁴ *ibidem*, p. 15

²⁵ *ibidem*, p. 18

²⁶ *ibidem*, p. 16-17

results of her comparative study²⁷ could be seen as empirical evidence that intelligence ‘on the ground’ is a prerequisite for successful UN peacekeeping missions. Moreover, Morjé Howard’s description implies not only intelligence capability, but an intelligence capacity as well.²⁸ To clarify the difference between being able to do something, and the entities that actually do it, we refer to Svendsen’s definition of intelligence.

According to Adam Svendsen, “intelligence can be best summarized as being: (i) a *process*: The means by which certain types of information are required and requested, collected, analyzed, and disseminated, and the way in which certain types of covert action are conceived and conducted, (ii) a *product*: The product of these processes, that is, the analyses and the intelligence operations themselves; as well as being (iii) *institutionalized* or an *organization*: The units that carry out its various functions.²⁹ Morjé Howard, in her description of the first indicator of first-level learning, refers to process and products, but is vague about institutionalization or organization: “widespread mechanisms”. I argue that these ‘widespread mechanisms’ are in fact the constituent parts of an intelligence architecture.

Furthermore, engagement with and adaptation to the mission environment, implies a susceptibility to the peculiarities of that environment, or, in other words: situation awareness.

II.b Situation Awareness

First-level learning within the UN entails “individual-level learning and [-] the ways in which experience in the field enables representatives of the UN to change organizational structures on the ground” in order to engage better with its environment.³⁰ ‘Experience in the field’ and ‘engage better with its environment’ refer to concepts such as situation awareness and understanding.

Situation awareness (SA), one of the main goals of intelligence, can be seen as conditional to first-level learning. Endsley et al.: “Basically, SA is being aware of what is happening around you and understanding what that information means to you now and in the future.”³¹ SA breaks down into three separate levels:

- level 1: perception of the elements in the environment
- level 2: comprehension of the current situation
- level 3: projection of the future status

These three levels sound familiar to intelligence personnel. In military intelligence doctrine, level 1 corresponds with the concept of ‘situational awareness’, and level 2 and 3 with ‘situational understanding’.³² These levels roughly correspond with different stages of the intelligence cycle.

When designing an intelligence system, a first requirement is to implement units for collection and collation³³: Ensuring that the necessary information is obtained and presented in a way that makes it easily processed by its users. Moreover, confidence in the information, based on the sensor, the organization or individual providing it as well as the information itself, forms a critical part of level 1 SA.³⁴

Level 2 SA entails comprehension that is based on a synthesis of disjointed level 1 elements, and a comparison of that information to one’s goals.³⁵ Such comprehension can only be achieved through ‘mental models’. Once a person has a perception of the disparate elements and knows

²⁷ *ibidem*, p. 10, Table 1

²⁸ An example may clarify the difference between capability vs capacity: the introduction of the F-35 into the Dutch Royal Air Force will increase the air power capability of the Netherlands through its technological innovation, but the Dutch airpower capacity will decrease because of the decline in number of air fighters from 68 to 37.

²⁹ Svendsen, Adam D.M. (2012), *Understanding The Globalization of Intelligence*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan

³⁰ Morjé Howard (2008), p. 15

³¹ Endsley et al. (2003), p. 13

³² UK MoD (2010), JDP 04

³³ NATO Allied Joint Publication-2 (2003), *Allied Joint Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Security Doctrine*

³⁴ Endsley et al. (2003), p. 16/17

³⁵ *ibidem*, p.17

what they mean in relation to his or her current goal(s), it is the ability to predict what those elements will do in the (near) future that constitute level 3 SA.³⁶

A well-designed intelligence architecture takes into account how decision makers and analysts process information. There are limits to how much information can be processed at one time, which obviously forms a central bottleneck to SA. In processing information, and thus in achieving SA, working memory and long-term memory play essential roles. A person's working memory is activated by new information, but its capacity is very limited. To achieve SA (levels 1 to 3), long-term memory is indispensable.³⁷

Long-term memory structures defined as mental models play a significant role in establishing and improving a person's SA. Mental models help a person determine what information is important and enables him or her to form expectations. Mental models are used to form higher levels of SA. Without mental models, a person would be very poor at understanding what is happening. Mental models provide 'default' information: when data are incomplete or missing, mental models fill the gaps (by way of assumptions and pattern-matching based on personal experience) to complete the situational picture.³⁸

SA is indirectly influenced by other factors. The active goals guide which mental models are chosen. Both selected goals and associated mental models are used to interpret and integrate information.³⁹ Further factors are predetermined expectations, which guide how attention is directed and how the person absorbs information, and experience, which in turn again contributes to the development of mental models.⁴⁰

Mental models are essential elements to take into account by intelligence personnel. They have to be conscious of their own mental models and the effects on their SA, but they also have to estimate the mental models their decision makers use. Intelligence that contradicts the mental models of decision makers will most likely be neglected or explained away, especially under pressure. Intelligence might become irrelevant in the decision-making process.⁴¹

On the other hand, however, intelligence is meant to do just that: challenging prejudiced views. In interpreting the analyzed and integrated information, steps should be taken to guard against partiality or bias, especially given the natural inclination to "exclude the unexpected, the inexplicable, the unpalatable or the counter-intuitive." Intelligence personnel should be trained to mitigate this inclination.⁴²

There is a precarious balance between influencing decision makers and producing assessments that might not corroborate the policy or fit the mental models of decision makers. This is a common dilemma in intelligence⁴³, which almost inevitably occurs within MINUSMA as well. "At the heart of the problem are the limits to human cognition that constrain our ability to anticipate the unexpected or novel, especially if the future fails to match our existing analytical concepts, beliefs, or assumptions."⁴⁴

The SA within an organization involves the passage not only of data, but also of comprehensions and projections, in other words of all levels of SA. Especially in military operations, it is essential to 'project' what other actors will do. The transfer of comprehensions and projections, and thus establishing common understanding, is difficult and prone to failure, especially in multinational and multidimensional organizations. Fellow workers may assume that the other(s) will arrive at the same conclusions or assessments given the same set of data or they may not realize that certain information has to be conveyed.⁴⁵

³⁶ *ibidem*, p. 18/21: A formal definition of mental models is provided by Rouse & Morris (1985), quoted by Endsley et al.

³⁷ *ibidem*, p. 20-21

³⁸ *ibidem*, p. 23

³⁹ *ibidem*, p. 27

⁴⁰ *ibidem*, p. 28

⁴¹ *ibidem*, p. 41

⁴² NATO (2014), *Human Network Analysis and support to Targeting, Handbook*. First Draft

⁴³ Betts, Richard K. (2009), "Analysis, war, and decision. Why intelligence failures are inevitable." in: *Intelligence Theory. Key questions and debates*. Gill, P., Marrin, S., and Phythian, M. (eds), London, New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis

⁴⁴ Wirtz, James J. (2009), "Theory of surprise." in: *Intelligence Theory. Key questions and debates*. Gill, P., Marrin, S., and Phythian, M. (eds), London, New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis

⁴⁵ *ibidem*, p. 204

Common understanding is the ability to comprehend perceptions of groups other than our own and to establish a common baseline for communication, interpretation and action.⁴⁶ A common operational picture is “a single display of relevant information within a commander’s area of interest tailored to the user’s requirements and based on common data and information shared by more than one command.”⁴⁷ A common operational picture enables collaborative planning and decision-making. Still, convergent analytical frameworks are very difficult to attain. Decision makers are “remarkably impervious to objective intelligence and the reporting of contrary evidence rarely impedes the path of the determined policy-maker.”⁴⁸

Shared mental models are preconditional to common understanding and a common operational picture. They can be induced through common experiences – working together on a regular basis or having done so in the past -, through common education or training, or direct communications preceding deployment.⁴⁹ The issue of common training and the need for the development of a UN doctrine for PKOs was one of the recommendations of Patrick C. Cammaert in his call for a UN intelligence capacity.⁵⁰

It goes without saying that to create shared mental models is an enormous challenge in multinational and multidimensional missions. It seems evident that mental models are strongly related to cultural background. UN PKOs are therefore confronted with a ‘double’ challenge: First, because of their multinationality, PKOs are an amalgam of very different cultural backgrounds, different experiences and levels of education. Secondly, because of their multidimensionality, UN entities within or aligned to a PKO have different and sometimes competing goals, hampering or even obstructing unity of effort.

A UN PKO intelligence architecture should be designed to cope with these challenges, but there is another issue to be dealt with: intelligence sharing.

II.c Intelligence Sharing

Martin Ara et al. distinguish four factors that enable intelligence sharing. First, the perception of gains or mutual benefits. These for example refer to the ‘traditional’ guiding principle of ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’. The second factor is trust. Generally, cooperation is based on trust and the level of trust strongly influences how much intelligence is shared. There are two important pillars of trust: competence and a common culture. Competence is necessary in an intelligence-sharing environment, preferably embedded in a common culture. A common culture is characterized by shared values, goals, norms, policies, and similarities. The third factor is direct control, which can temper the fear that participants will violate agreements, will not be as responsive as required, or will withhold information. Direct control can be achieved by relying on clear hierarchy in which there is one leading agency or nation within the intelligence collaboration framework. Finally, effective intelligence sharing requires accessible and compatible means of secure communications.⁵¹

The analysis of Ara et al. resonates NATO doctrine: “. .the full impact of intelligence cannot be effectively applied unless the intelligence itself and the information from which it is derived can be shared. Interoperability, in this case to exchange information and intelligence, is key to successful multinational operations.”⁵²

Research in different fields, such as business alliances, confirms these views. Wittmann et al. suggest that “successful relational exchanges result from certain characteristics of the relationship, including trust, commitment, cooperation, and communication.”⁵³

⁴⁶ UK MOD, JDP 04, p. 2-3

⁴⁷ US DoD (2008), Field Manual 3.0 *Operations*, Glossary-4

⁴⁸ Aldrich, Richard J. (2004), “Transatlantic intelligence and security cooperation.” *International Affairs*, 80, 4, p. 752

⁴⁹ Endsley et al. (2003), p. 205

⁵⁰ Cammaert (2003), p. 30

⁵¹ Ara, Martin J., Brand, T., & Larssen, B.A. (2011), *Help a Brother Out: A Case Study in Multinational Intelligence Sharing*, NATO SOF. Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.

⁵² NATO Allied Joint Publication-2, *Allied Joint Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Security Doctrine P2*, (2003), 1-1-1

⁵³ Wittmann, Michael C., Hunt, S.D. & Arnett, D.B. (2009), “Explaining alliance success: Competences, resources, relational factors, and resource-advantage theory.” *Industrial Marketing Management*, 38, p. 745

II.d The Mission-Protection Paradox and the “Third Dimension”

To be fully effective, intelligence has to be shared. In order to engage with the environment, a mission, UN or otherwise, has to convey information, policies, and intentions to the local population. This is why intelligence sharing is so ambivalent and precarious: in a mission environment, the local population is not only a source of intelligence, but to be able to provide security to the population, intelligence has to be shared as well. At the same time, sensitive intelligence has to be protected, not in the least because the parties involved can (ab)use this information for their own ends. Still, to be effective and to be able to fulfill the mandate, the local population has to become part of the PKO.

Philip Lester has pointed out a phenomenon, which he called the mission-protection paradox: issues of force protection should be secondary to the mission. However, during unpopular conflicts, force protection is perceived to be more important than the mission: the ‘Mission-Protection Paradox’. The mission-protection paradox creates a dilemma for politicians and military commanders on how to protect one’s own forces while demonstrating commitment to succeed in the mission.⁵⁴

The mission-protection paradox evokes another challenge for intelligence staff in a PKO: the information domain and the role of third parties, such as media, law, and public opinion, referred to by Lester as ‘the third dimension’. This third dimension has a significant impact on decision making by both politicians and the military. Politicians are inclined to both follow and influence public opinion.⁵⁵ PKOs are easily framed by political opposition, media and public opinion as unsuccessful, a waste of money, and not worth the risk of casualties of ‘our own troops’. This will pressurize policy makers as well as military commanders to give priority to force protection instead of the mission. As a consequence, the focus of intelligence will inevitably shift from multidimensional (‘comprehensive’) to ‘current’: real-time tactical ‘threat-to-the-force’ estimates. The focus will no longer be mission- or population-centric. Such a shift in focus is detrimental to first-level learning. If it occurs, the UN only engages with the civilian environment in a narrowed sense; troops tend to literally ‘disappear’ under armor and are no longer seen by the population as relevant for their protection and security. The UN leadership’s authority will be severely undermined, which will further fuel discontent ‘at home’.

II.e Theoretical synthesis and methodology

Constructing this theoretical framework by combining these four theoretical concepts was the first step in this study of the ASIFU. Together these concepts form the main intelligence challenge in PKOs. Subsequently, the background of the MINUSMA mission in Mali, its intelligence architecture and the establishment of ASIFU was researched by examining UNSC resolutions, (inter)national documents, reports, and academic publications. Next, the actual performance of MINUSMA and ASIFU was explored by conducting semi-structured interviews with redeployed Dutch military personnel. This method was chosen for practical reasons. First, because the ASIFU is a new phenomenon, an exploratory approach was needed. Second, this method allowed for the collection and analysis of experiences and perceptions of those directly involved. Third, due to limitations in resources and time, only Dutch personnel was interviewed.

The collected data were categorized through coding. Categories and codes are derived from the theoretical framework:

- *First-level learning.* MINUSMA has to be able to engage with and adapt to the Malian environment in its broadest sense.

⁵⁴ Lester, Philip T.G. (2010), *The Mission-Protection Paradox*. Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Downing College, p. 5

⁵⁵ *ibidem*, p. 6

- *Situation awareness.* To enable first-level learning, situational awareness and understanding has to be developed. Hence, intelligence is crucial, but due to the multinationality and multidimensionality, different mental models are likely to be evoked by decision makers, staff and intelligence personnel alike. To support the decision-making process, MINUSMA's intelligence units have to take into account the diverse cultural and institutional backgrounds, while at the same time upholding professional standards. Situation awareness and first-level learning are strongly related and mutually reinforcing.
- *Intelligence sharing.* MINUSMA is a coalition of many troop contributing countries (TCCs) and civilian UN organizations. Successful coalitions rest upon trust, commitment, cooperation and communication, factors that enable intelligence sharing. Again, this relationship is mutually reinforcing. Furthermore, first-level learning and SA can only be achieved by sharing intelligence. Finally, to achieve its goals, MINUSMA has to share certain intelligence with cooperative elements of the local population, which Joseph Barry has referred to as 'public outreach'.⁵⁶
- *Mission-protection paradox.* Political and military decision makers will need to beware of the mission-protection paradox, because it can draw them into a vicious circle.

Responses and remarks were codified over fourteen items. By measuring positive as well as negative perceptions on these items, preliminary conclusions of MINUSMA's and ASIFU's achievements can be made. Conclusions are preliminary due to two limitations. First, the scope of research has a specific time frame. All respondents but one were deployed in MINUSMA during the first half of 2014, corresponding with the first rotation of the Dutch contingent. Second, during this time frame MINUSMA was still evolving and so was the situation in northern Mali.

The indicators formulated in the theoretical framework are used as the codifying items. By dichotomizing the responses on these codes in positive or negative scores, a coarse assessment was made regarding the achievements of the mission on the four categories. Therefore, a snapshot in time can be derived as to if, and to what extent the intelligence challenge is met.

The first four codes concern first-level learning⁵⁷:

- (1) the ability to gather and analyze information
- (2) " to coordinate among the different units of MINUSMA
- (3) " to engage with the mission environment
- (4) " to exercise leadership

Morjé Howard saw first-level learning as a prerequisite for success in peacekeeping operations. An overall positive score on each code indicates at least the opportunity to first-level learning.

The codes five till nine refer to situational awareness (SA)⁵⁸:

- (5) level-1 SA: perception of the elements in the environment
- (6) level-2 SA: comprehension of the current situation
- (7) level-3 SA: projection of future status

The codes eight and nine corroborate codes six and seven:

- (8) the existence of a common operational picture
- (9) " of shared mental models

⁵⁶ Barry, Joseph A. (2012), "Bolstering United Nations Intelligence: Cultural and Structural Solutions." *American Intelligence Journal*, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 7-16

⁵⁷ Morjé Howard (2008), p. 2

⁵⁸ Endsley et al. (2003), p. 13

Level-2 SA and level-3 SA correspond with the military concept of 'situational understanding', which enables anticipation and proactivity based on scenario-building and intelligence-driven planning ('actionable intelligence'). Positive scores on the codes seven, eight and nine indicate a sustainable situational understanding enabling effective and efficient decision making.

Codes ten till thirteen concern intelligence sharing⁵⁹:

- (10) the perception of gains or mutual interests
- (11) trust based on perceived competence or common cultural background
- (12) direct control of sharing through hierarchy
- (13) the availability of accessible and compatible means of secure communications

Intelligence sharing is enhancing all levels of SA and first-level learning. Positive scores on each code at least suggest intelligence sharing, and should be corroborated by the existence of a common operational picture and efficient decision making. Negative scores suggest an organization which disintegrates into an archipelago of separate units.

Code fourteen refers to the mission-protection paradox⁶⁰:

- (14) the occurrence of the mission-protection paradox

When responses indicate that force protection becomes predominant and paramount to the goals of the mission, the mission-paradox becomes more likely, and in that case a PKO is probably heading for failure. This is mirrored in the focus of intelligence: when the mission-protection paradox occurs, current and tactical intelligence will become more important than long-term strategic intelligence. If responses point that way, they are counted as a positive score on this item.

The methodological reliability of interviews is questioned by Brenda Moore. Interviews may not yield the same results when duplicated, the accuracy of reporting may be doubtful and peoples' memory is filtered and sometimes distorted.⁶¹ In this thesis, these reliability issues have been mitigated by the diversity of respondents: the strategic, operational and tactical levels of intelligence are represented. Besides, all interviewees came from different units or sections. Factual errors in reporting were checked by examining documents.

Generalizability is another issue, because the interviews referred to a specific mission at a specific moment in time. Nevertheless, by using indicators of general theories as codes, some provisional generalizations can be made. For instance, there were hardly any remarks made concerning the mission-protection paradox, which correlates with the overall perceived permissiveness of the area during that period. This at least indicates internal validity.⁶²

The dichotomized results on the fourteen codes are represented in a matrix, enclosed in Appendix A. All twelve interviews held are represented. When during the interview a positive or negative remark was made regarding one of the codes, it is scored accordingly in the column representing the respondent. The rows represent the codes; each row is totalized, showing the overall positive or negative perception of this code, as is the frequency of reference. The four categories and the codes which represent them are presented as well.

The next chapter will go into the background of the crisis in Mali, the birth of MINUSMA and the establishment of the ASIFU.

⁵⁹ Ara et al. (2011), p. 25

⁶⁰ Lester (2010), p. 5

⁶¹ Moore, Brenda L. (2014), "In-depth Interviewing." in: *Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in Military Studies*, Joseph Soeters, Shields, P.M., and Rietjens, S.H.J. (eds), New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, p. 125

⁶² Rietjens, Sebastiaan H.J. (2014), "Qualitative Data Analysis: Seeing the Patterns in the Fog of Civil-Military Interaction." in: *Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in Military Studies*, Joseph Soeters, Shields, P.M., and Rietjens, S.H.J. (eds), New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, p. 139

III. MINUSMA and ASIFU

III.a Background

The NATO intervention in Libya in 2011 had some serious and unexpected consequences on the other side of the Sahara. In the aftermath of the downfall of Gaddafi, heavily armed Tuareg émigrés returned to the north of Mali, setting off an insurgency in early 2012. A succession of crises followed. The precarious balance between the armed forces of Mali (FAMA), its proxies, and the rebellious Tuaregs was disturbed by the influx of these heavily armed and battle-hardened fighters from Libya. The army blamed president Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) for the lack of ammunition and reinforcements as well as the general reluctance to enable them to fight the insurgents. This led to a spontaneous military coup on 22 March 2012. The FAMA more or less imploded. A transitional government was installed, aiming at reconciliation, and presidential and parliamentary elections, as part of a transitional roadmap. Meanwhile, Islamist and Tuareg forces firmly seized control of the whole of the north.⁶³

Since 2006, state authority in northern Mali had been weakened by a policy of decentralization, which saw power handed to local leaders in favor with Bamako. These, however, were not the leaders of the upper casts of the Tuaregs and Arabs, causing a rupture of the traditional social fabric of the northern society. The president of Mali, ATT, 'outsourced' the security of northern Mali to leaders whose security interests aligned with those of Bamako. As a result, the government supported lower-cast Arab and Tuareg militia. They became irregular army units, sometimes even led by FAMA officers. Worse still, these militias were heavily involved in illicit trafficking, blending state security and political structures with international crime.⁶⁴ From 2007 onward, Malian government officials and various northern elites with (narco) trafficking interests became allied in a battle against anti-state Tuareg rebel groups and their own trafficking interests.⁶⁵

What was new in 2012 was the alliance and partly merger of the anti-state Tuareg rebels with Islamist groups.⁶⁶ The Islamist groups had found refuge in the north of Mali, after being expelled from neighboring countries, mostly Algeria.⁶⁷ They too associated with international organized crime. Furthermore, the Islamist groups attracted fighters, ideologically or otherwise motivated, from across Africa and beyond.⁶⁸

Soon after the expulsion of the state presence from the north and the proclamation of the independent state of Azawad, the MNLA⁶⁹ was pushed aside by its Islamist allies.⁷⁰ For eight months, till January 2013, the Islamists imposed Shari'a law, resulting in severe human rights violations, particularly in Gao. Hundreds of thousands of refugees flooded the south of Mali and its neighboring countries.⁷¹

During 2012, the international response was lukewarm. Only just on 20 December 2012, the UNSC resolution 2085 established the *African-led International Support Mission to Mali* (AFISMA). The deployment of AFISMA, however, was overtaken by a sudden acceleration of events. In January 2013, the Islamist groups, combined with hundreds of Tuareg fighters, started

⁶³ Interview with Ousmane Sidibe (2013), "The Malian Crisis." *New Left Review*, Vol. 84, pp. 67-83

⁶⁴ The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (2014), "*Illicit Trafficking and Instability in Mali: Past, Present and Future.*" Part of the Series on Governance, Democracy and State Fragility, January 2014

⁶⁵ *ibidem*, p. 11

⁶⁶ interview Ousmane Sidibe, p. 77

⁶⁷ Hicks, Celeste (2013), "Burning Curve. Assessing Africa's 'arc of instability'." *Jane's Intelligence Review*, September 2013, pp. 32-35. Especially fighters who had fought the Algerian government in the 1990s, such as Mokhtar Belmokhtar and the *Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat* (GSPC), who were chased out of Algeria. These Islamist fighters regrouped under the name of AQIM.

⁶⁸ Hicks (2013), p. 34

⁶⁹ *Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad*, the main Tuareg nationalist organization

⁷⁰ Sahla, Soumaya (2014), "Mali: broedplaats voor extremisme, terrorisme en criminaliteit?" *Militaire Spectator*, jaargang 183, No. 3, p. 110

⁷¹ Diallo, Falilou (2013), "The War in Mali and its consequences for the sub-region." *Guest Author Series*, Think Security Africa

a new military offensive, pushing further into the south of Mali. The then interim president of Mali and the chairman of the ECOWAS⁷² called upon France to intervene.⁷³

On January 11th, 2013, France launched *Opération Serval*. The 4,300 AFISMA troops now entered Mali in the wake of the French. The French were also joined by 2,000 Chadian troops, which can be seen as a token of the sudden urgency felt by the governments of the region regarding the Islamist threat.⁷⁴

Although a predominantly unilateral French operation, the theatre rapidly became an international scene. The US and UK decided to support France with strategic airlift and *Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance* (ISR). In mid-February, French and Chadian forces swept across northern Mali. By April, *Opération Serval* had achieved its main goals: liberation of northern Mali, dislocation of the jihadist coalition, and the debilitation of their military capabilities, while dispersing them across the region. However, ‘residual cells’ still remain active in the Niger area and northern Mali, thereby constituting a continued terrorist threat.⁷⁵

The thrust of Islamist groups (and organized crime for that matter) is still enabled by the crumbling of state structures inherited from decolonization.⁷⁶ Corruption, internal instability, poor economic growth, and the climatological environment are equally driving forces.⁷⁷ In this region, counter-terrorist operations tend to shift rather than solve the problem. This is one of the reasons why the international community reverted to a well-known, albeit not very successful strategy so far: counter-terrorist operations followed and combined by a ‘comprehensive-approach’ strategy. MINUSMA was born.

III.b MINUSMA

On April 25, 2013, The UNSC authorized Resolution 2100, establishing the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). In Resolution 2100, the UNSC decided the mandate of MINUSMA should entail:

- Stabilization of key population centers and support for the re-establishment of State authority throughout the country
- Support for the implementation of the transitional roadmap, including the national political dialogue and the electoral process
- Protection of civilians and UN personnel
- Promotion and protection of human rights
- Support for humanitarian assistance
- Support for cultural preservation
- Support for national and international justice.

Resolution 2100 contains some interesting issues and positions. First, the UNSC “requests the Secretary-General to include in MINUSMA, in close coordination with the AU and ECOWAS, AFISMA military and police personnel appropriate to United Nations standards;”⁷⁸ whether these forces comply with ‘UN standards’ seemed to be a matter of doubt, resolved by paragraph 18 of the same resolution: “authorizes French troops...[-] to intervene in support of elements of MINUSMA when under imminent and serious threat upon the request of the Secretary-General.”⁷⁹ It seems these positions are based on two assumptions: the UN forces are probably not up to their adversaries, and the French are willing to protect UN troops. This evokes two questions, first, if UN troops are not capable of defending themselves, you cannot

⁷² *Economic Community of West African States*

⁷³ Gros (2014), p. 10

⁷⁴ *ibidem*, p. 7

⁷⁵ *ibidem*, p. 8

⁷⁶ *ibidem*, p. 17

⁷⁷ Stewart (2013), p. 51

⁷⁸ UN, *Resolution 2100 (2013), S/RES/2100 (2013)*, United Nations Security Council, New York, p. 5, paragraph 7

⁷⁹ *ibidem*, p. 9, paragraph 18

expect them to protect the population, and second, it implies that there is no consent by all parties, and MINUSMA troops will not be seen as impartial.

Secondly, the UNSC “reiterates its readiness to sanction individuals, groups, undertakings and entities who do not cut off all ties to Al-Qaida and associated groups, including AQIM, MUJAO and Ansar Eddine, in accordance with the established listing criteria.”⁸⁰ What stands out are the insurgent groups not mentioned, among them the MNLA. The UNSC apparently tried to differentiate between ‘nationalist’ insurgents and ‘international’ jihadist groups, anticipating the distinction between compliant (CAGs), non-compliant (NCAGs), and Terrorist Armed Groups (TAGs).

‘Readiness to sanction’ in fact meant ‘readiness to use force’: The MINUSMA rules of engagement included ‘the use of force, up to and including deadly force, in order to ‘support the transitional authorities of Mali to extend and re-establish State administration throughout the territory’.⁸¹ With this mandate, the claim to the classic UN principle of ‘impartiality’ seems untenable, however wide its interpretation is stretched.

Finally, the UNSC requests MINUSMA’s civilian and military components to coordinate their work with the aim of supporting the tasks outlined in paragraph 16 (which constitute the mandate).⁸² Apparently, this is not a matter of course.

Resolution 2100 was meant to give MINUSMA a head start, commencing 1 July 2013. By re-hatting the AFISMA troops, the MINUSMA battalions were already in place.⁸³ Unfortunately, the deployment of the other assets of MINUSMA turned out to be a much slower process. This amounted to a curious form of force generation: the tactical level almost entirely in place, while the strategic and operational levels were being designed.

Even before the actual implementation of the mandate, resolution 2100 accelerated the political process. Through mediation of the president of Burkina Faso, the transitional government of Mali and the so-called Compliant Armed Groups⁸⁴ signed the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement (OPA) on June 18, 2013. The CAGs agreed to a cease-fire, the cantonment of their troops, the return of the Malian Defense and Security Forces (MDSF) to the north of Mali, and presidential and parliamentary elections. Furthermore, there would be negotiations and a Political Dialogue to reach a lasting general agreement. Last but not least, the insurgents acknowledged the territorial integrity of Mali.⁸⁵

As a result of the success of Opération Serval which had ousted the terrorist armed groups (TAGs) from large parts of northern Mali, the conclusion of the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement, the re-hatting of the AFISMA troops, and the political transitional roadmap accepted by the main parties, Morjé Howard’s ‘situational factors’ seemed more than favorable to MINUSMA. In fact, the OPA appeared to make MINUSMA more or less superfluous. Most of the mandate of MINUSMA seemed fulfilled by this agreement. However, as in MINUSMA’s mandate, the same deficiency appeared in the OPA: The most threatening armed groups had not been represented in Ouagadougou. The disconcerting words of the Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali of 26 March 2013 still lingered: “..take into account the fact that the UN is operating in a new geopolitical context and faces threats that have not been encountered before in a peacekeeping context. The situation on the ground remains fluid. Although the extremists and criminal elements have been dealt a heavy blow, they continue to pose a significant threat to the safety and security of the civilian population and any UN personnel deployed in Mali.”⁸⁶ One of the means to counter that threat is intelligence, and Under

⁸⁰ *ibidem*, p. 2

⁸¹ UN (2013), *TCC brief: MINUSMA CONOPS and RoE*, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Office of Military Affairs, Military Planning Service, 25 June 2013, quoted by Gøransson, Stian B. (2014), Appendix D

⁸² *ibidem*, p. 9, paragraph 17

⁸³ *ibidem*, p. 2

⁸⁴ NLD Ministry of Defence, *Periodieke Rapportage Militair Attaché Mali*, MLI/2014/002

⁸⁵ *ibidem*, p. 4

⁸⁶ UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali*, UN S/2013/189, paragraph 99, p. 19

Secretary-General (USG) Hervé Ladsous, Head of the DPKO, did not hesitate to acknowledge this. MINUSMA was provided with a solid intelligence structure.⁸⁷ (See Appendix B)

III.b.a The Intelligence Architecture of MINUSMA

In line with its broad mandate, MINUSMA was set up as a multidimensional integrated stabilization mission. This kind of mission has evolved over the years as a result of “an exponential growth of UN peacekeeping in terms of breadth of mandates and scale and duration of operations.”⁸⁸ Such a mission demands for improved situation awareness and it has prompted efforts to integrate the management of information, which is held by the various entities of the UN present in theatre.⁸⁹

In 2006, these demands resulted in the establishment of the JMAC as a mandatory unit in every UN mission with a robust (‘Chapter VII’) mandate.⁹⁰

The JMAC is a multidisciplinary, analytical team, reflecting the spectrum of expertise found in multidimensional peacekeeping – political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, socio-economic, and security – with the task of producing balanced, timely and systematically verified information tailored to support ongoing operations and senior decision-making.⁹¹

According to Shetler-Jones, during the last years three approaches to intelligence have evolved within the UN. The first approach is ‘intelligence for operations’. This approach is reflected in all deployed JMACs, especially in missions in which operations involve the use of force. The second is ‘intelligence for safety, security and protection’, a formula that emerged when multidimensional mandates inflated the scope of commitments and the size of the civilian components. The third approach defines intelligence as ‘supporting senior management decision-making in an integrated mission’, underlining “the rich opportunities for information-gathering offered by a large, wide-spread population of UN staff embedded in a range of processes across the country or region.”⁹²

Shetler-Jones argues that the third approach has never really matured in the JMACs so far. The JMACs in the field are predominantly operating in line with the first two approaches, although JMACs were conceived to provide strategic intelligence for integrated mission management. In his view, their impact in this respect has been “mainly felt in terms of process, where the JMAC prompts consultation and the sharing of resources and information in ways that could prove habit-forming, thus promoting a kind of integration among senior management and the wider mission.”⁹³

On the other hand, Ramjoué argues that the achievements of several JMACs have demonstrated that the UN is capable of producing high-quality intelligence assessments when provided with the necessary mandate and resources.⁹⁴ But she also implicitly acknowledges that the JMACs are successful only on the operational and tactical level: “JMACs should operate at the integrated mission level rather than only the DPKO mission level, to better support the holistic strategy of the UN in post-conflict countries and to better address the concerns of the UN agencies”.⁹⁵

Conceptually, JMACs are the interface between the peacekeeping missions and the humanitarian agencies and development programs, and as the intelligence liaison between UNHQ and the mission in theatre. They should be the embodiment of the idea of mission integration. In reality, JMACs are far more narrowly employed. In several missions, JMACs functioned “as part of the force commander’s team and operated as a de facto military

⁸⁷ Gøransson (2014), p. 5

⁸⁸ Ramjoué (2011), p. 468

⁸⁹ Shetler-Jones (2008), p. 517

⁹⁰ Ramjoué (2011), p. 471

⁹¹ Shetler-Jones (2008), p. 517

⁹² *ibidem*, p. 518

⁹³ *ibidem*, p. 520

⁹⁴ Ramjoué (2011), p. 469

⁹⁵ *ibidem*, p. 482

operations analysis cell.”⁹⁶ In his study of intelligence in African Peace Operations, Mark Malan found substantial ‘turf’ resistance to the JMAC concept⁹⁷, which was corroborated by a JMAC analyst, deployed in MINUSMA.⁹⁸

The JMAC is formally the core unit of MINUSMA’s intelligence architecture, supporting the SRSG level in the field, and the Assessment Team of the DPKO in New York.⁹⁹ Next to JMAC, there are several other intelligence capacities in different units: at the civilian level the Department for Safety and Security (DSS) cell and the Joint Operations Cell (JOC) also work directly in support of the SRSG; there is intelligence capacity supporting Police Command; in the military branch, the U2 cell is a regular intelligence section of the Force Commander’s staff; at the tactical level, the Sector West and East headquarters, SHQ(W) and SHQ(E), are provided with G2 (intelligence) sections; finally, the UN battalions in the field have S2 sections in their staff, completing the ‘vertical chain’ of regular military intelligence: U2 – G2 – S2.¹⁰⁰

Generally, the UN intelligence capacity seems to be sufficient, but some serious flaws are inherent. First, there is no UN doctrine regarding intelligence, which hampers the effectiveness of the intelligence processes and products. Secondly, the regular military chain of intelligence acts independently from the civilian intelligence branch, which is the reason why the JMAC is meant to integrate all information. Thirdly, JMACs are dependent on the benevolence of those UN agencies to supply them with information. Fourth, the regular UN military intelligence chain lacks analytical capacity.¹⁰¹ Finally, and the most serious deficiency, is the absence of intelligence collection capacities. UN missions, until MINUSMA, were not provided with traditional sensors. The UN was dependent on the willingness of the TCCs to equip their infantry battalions with additional ‘INT’ capacity.

MINUSMA is the first mission to fill the intelligence-collection capability gap by deploying ISR companies (ISRCoys) in the Sector East (the Gao region), and, starting from March 2015, in Sector West (the Timbuktu region). Moreover, MINUSMA has at its disposal Special Forces conducting long-range surveillance and AH64 attack helicopters that provide ISR, next to force protection. These non-traditional sensors are directly under the command of the Force Commander.¹⁰²

The ISRCoys, on the other hand, are embedded in the ASIFU, specifically designed to collect and produce intelligence. The ASIFU should, if only by its name, cause some apprehension at the JMAC, especially regarding JMACs central position within the intelligence architecture of MINUSMA. And it did, as will be discussed later. Moreover, when the ASIFU deployed in theatre, the JMAC was still severely understaffed.¹⁰³

III.b.b ASIFU

During the planning process of MINUSMA in May 2013, the Head of the DPKO, USG Hervé Ladsous, requested UN member states to provide MINUSMA with intelligence capacity and Special Forces. After preliminary talks, the Netherlands and Norway agreed to take the lead in setting up an All Source Information Fusion Unit, attached to the regular intelligence architecture of MINUSMA.¹⁰⁴

These preliminary talks at UNHQ resulted in a revision of the original concept. Initially, DPKO had a battalion-like intelligence unit in mind, consisting of companies for analysis, SIGINT, HUMINT and UAVs, similar to the way *Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance* (ISTAR) units are organized. The UN had planned this battalion-like unit to be

⁹⁶ *ibidem*, p. 475

⁹⁷ Malan, Mark (2005), *Intelligence in African Peace operations: Addressing the Deficit*. Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre, Accra, Ghana

⁹⁸ Interview 4

⁹⁹ *ibidem*

¹⁰⁰ debriefing 3

¹⁰¹ *ibidem*

¹⁰² interview 5. Non-traditional sensors are (military) units that have other primary tasks than collecting information.

¹⁰³ interview 4

¹⁰⁴ Gøransson (2014), p. 5

centrally based in Bamako, with its sensors deploying from Bamako on short missions to the regions. This idea was rejected by the Dutch and Norwegians; not only would it be an enormous logistical challenge considering the vast area of operation, it would also seriously hamper the build-up and consolidation of an intelligence network in those regions.¹⁰⁵

The Dutch and Norwegian military intelligence authorities, supported by Denmark and Finland¹⁰⁶, proposed a decentralized intelligence unit, with a relatively small command and control (C2) and analysis fusion center at a Bamako HQ, and ISRCoys in Gao, Timbuktu and, eventually, Kidal. UN officials, including senior management in Bamako, readily conceded, relieved European countries were at least prepared to contribute. These contributions do not only “provide sorely needed capabilities on the ground, but can also strengthen the overall legitimacy and governance of peacekeeping, reducing the divide between those that finance and mandate UN peace operations and those that provide the boots on the ground.”¹⁰⁷ Thereafter, it was a ‘top-down decided’ but nonetheless ‘bottom-up’ venture, with a ‘hush, don’t mention it, let it just happen’ approach from the side of the UN Secretariat.¹⁰⁸

Subsequently, the Dutch, first to be in command of the ASIFU, designed its organization according to Dutch doctrine.¹⁰⁹ This resulted in a network-enabled intelligence unit, which would simultaneously support the strategic, operational and tactical level. Four considerations were leading: first, the availability of only scarce resources and a complex, vast environment calls for intelligence-driven operations; second, intelligence analysis should be more than the traditional ‘enemy, weather and terrain’ assessment. In order to support a combined soft-and hard-power approach, a cross political, military, economical, social, infrastructural and informational layer-based intelligence concept (the so-called X-PMESII method) would be needed; third, to efficiently support all levels of MINUSMA, unity of effort is important. All available information should be fused and analyzed by a ‘network-enabled intelligence unit’. Finally, information and intelligence can be sensitive. To protect the mission, the force and the population, and to secure UN impartiality, a professional, secure intelligence communications network was essential.¹¹⁰

The similarity to the JMAC concept is obvious. These ‘leading thoughts’ are a Western phenomenon, and well known among NATO allies as a part of the “comprehensive approach”. Unfortunately, non-Western military are far less familiar with these ideas. It almost inevitably gave rise to misunderstandings and distrust.

Another important decision was the way the ASIFU was embedded in the intelligence structure of MINUSMA. It was decided that the ASIFU would be ‘attached’, which basically meant it was not part of the MINUSMA military intelligence chain. As a military unit, it falls under the Force Command, but in the “attached mode” the ASIFU operates separately from the Force Commander’s U2 staff. The attached mode also implies a separate, independent ASIFU C2 and staff. The commanders of the ISRCoys are sub-commanders of C-ASIFU. This architecture implicated that these companies were not under direct command of the Force Commander. Furthermore, in line with Dutch doctrine, sub-commanders have a substantial freedom of action, contrary to the African culture of command.¹¹¹ Finally, the NLD ISRCoy has a considerable analysis capacity, the All Source Intelligence Cell (ASIC), capable to exceed the tactical level, which it was more or less forced to do occasionally.¹¹²

With the ASIFU as an additional intelligence capacity, the JMAC, the regular military chain of intelligence, the intelligence assets of the DSS and Police Command, and non-traditional sensors such as the AHdet and the SOLTG, the intelligence architecture of MINUSMA is extensive and robust in capabilities. However, given the enormous extent of the area of operations and the

¹⁰⁵ interview 7

¹⁰⁶ NLD Ministry of Defence, *Periodieke Rapportage Militair Attaché Mali*, MLI/2014/002

¹⁰⁷ Karlsrud, John and Smith, A.C. (2015), *European Military Participation in MINUSMA. Experiences and Lessons-Learned*. International Peace Institute, New York, p. 2

¹⁰⁸ Gøransson (2014), p. 6

¹⁰⁹ NLD MoD (2011) *Joint Doctrine Publication-2 (JDP-2)*; NLD MoD (2014), *Operationeel Concept Landoptreden*.

¹¹⁰ UN (2015), *Presentation by Col. Tony Keijsers, Commander ASIFU from February till August 2014*, 9 January 2015, UNHQ New York

¹¹¹ interview 5

¹¹² interview 3

specifics of the environment, it is still likely to be insufficient in capacity. This will ameliorate when additional ISRCoys are deployed in Timbuktu and, eventually, Kidal.

The next chapter will examine the *raison d'être* of ASIFU, what kind of intelligence it is supposed to produce, how it copes with the 'usual' intelligence dilemmas, and if it contributes to the fulfillment of MINUSMA's mandate.

IV. Does the ASIFU Contribute to MINUSMA's Success?

IV.a ASIFU's Contribution to MINUSMA's Intelligence Capability

In the design of the intelligence architecture of MINUSMA, the ASIFU was not integrated into the traditional intelligence chain, but understood as an additional intelligence asset supporting all levels of MINUSMA. This implicated a certain degree of independence. As a military, the C-ASIFU was sub-commander of the Force Commander, but the ASIFU as a unit itself was out of reach for the Force Commander's staff: C-ASIFU received his orders from the Force Commander, but was free to task his own assets as he saw fit. This is in correspondence with the doctrine and training of Dutch military intelligence units.

Furthermore, the proposed¹¹³ network-enabled approach implied a 'horizontal' comprehensive outlook, different from the traditional 'vertical' military chain of command, encompassing all actors within the human domain through the X-PMESII-method, resulting in integrated ("fused") assessments and products.¹¹⁴ This approach was developed in Afghanistan in support of the 'comprehensive' ISAF strategy.

The mission statement of the C-ASIFU summarized the network-enabled way of thinking: "The All Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU) should significantly improve the timely processing and production of MINUSMA broad accessible and useable (fused) information and intelligence in order to support the Decision Making Processes on the Operational (FHQ) and Tactical (SHQ) level. ASIFU will also be able to support the Strategic level (SRSG through the JMAC and UNDSS)."¹¹⁵

Again, this mission statement is very similar to what the JMAC is supposed to do. It aims at reinforcing an integrated situational understanding by surpassing the traditional 'barriers' between the different levels and encompassing all relevant actors in the operational environment. At the same time, the statement displays sensitivity to the hierarchical relationships within MINUSMA. Nevertheless, it still is an ambitious vision and it did raise some eyebrows, especially within the JMAC, but at FHQ too.¹¹⁶

Officially, the Statement of Unit Requirements (SUR) of the ASIFU did not correspond with both organization and mission statement of the actual ASIFU. The SUR detailed a traditional battalion structure consisting of three companies with respectively Short-range Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems (STUAS), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Electronic Warfare (EW) and staff analysis capabilities, operating from a central base.¹¹⁷ Such an intelligence battalion is fitting for supporting a maneuver brigade or battle group in traditional combat. Dutch military intelligence authorities (J2 Directorate of Operations), however, had rejected this structure as infeasible regarding logistics and the build-up of an intelligence position, taking into account the nature of the mission and the vast area of operation.¹¹⁸ Probably relieved to have European forces on board, the Dutch were given a free hand by the UN. The SUR, however, was not changed, resulting in a discrepancy between the official organizational structure and the actual one on the ground. C-ASIFU confirmed that, at least during his tour, the ASIFU as a network-enabled intelligence unit was thus operating on an informal basis.¹¹⁹

Next to ASIFU, the Netherlands provided MINUSMA with a Special Operations Forces

¹¹³ NLD Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Artikel-100 brief MINUSMA*, 1 november 2013/DVB/CV-195/13, p. 2

¹¹⁴ NATO (2014), *Human Network Analysis and support to Targeting, Handbook*. First Draft, December 2014. X-PMESII stands for a cross-examination of political, military, economic, social, infrastructural and information factors to produce a fused intelligence picture. (CG)

¹¹⁵ UN (2015), *Presentation by Col. Tony Keijsers, Commander ASIFU from February till August 2014, at UNHQ*, 9 January 2015

¹¹⁶ interview 4

¹¹⁷ Gøransson (2014), p. 21; interview 7

¹¹⁸ interview 7

¹¹⁹ *ibidem*.

(SOF) Company and four AH-64 attack helicopters.¹²⁰ These units came under the direct command of the Force Commander, and were thus separated from the command of ASIFU.¹²¹ More importantly, the Force Commander and his staff did not see them as exclusively 'intelligence' units, contrary to the Article-100 letter of the Dutch government.¹²² This letter implied a "Dutch" integrated intelligence contribution, which would be self-supporting and independent of other UN entities. It certainly did not suggest a separate command.¹²³ 'The Netherlands would provide a specific military contribution to support the UN mission, that is, an integrated intelligence capacity.'¹²⁴

The letter elaborates on the deployment of the Special Forces in a Special Operations Land Task Group (SOLTG). It specifically emphasizes that its primary task would be collection of intelligence through long-range surveillance, as one of the sensors of ASIFU. If they were to be tasked otherwise, the explicit approval of the highest Dutch military authority, the 'Commandant der Strijdkrachten', was needed.¹²⁵

Furthermore, the Dutch government referred to the unique event of the establishment of a parallel force in the MINUSMA mandate, which was interpreted as the Opération Serval. But in the mandate the French were mentioned as a means of last resort, not as a parallel force.¹²⁶ In reality, the French did not see themselves as a 'parallel force' to MINUSMA: Opération Serval was about to expire, and the new Opération Barkhane's center of gravity was the border area of Niger, Chad and Libya, a long way from Mali. Approximately one thousand French troops would stay behind in northern Mali to counter terrorists; a relatively small force compared to the area of operation.¹²⁷

In spite of the Article-100 letter, controversy arose between the different elements of the 'integrated' Dutch contingent, even before deployment. During preliminary meetings, meant to develop a common operational picture of the mission, different experiences and backgrounds evoked different mental models. Representatives of the SOLTG saw the mission in the light of their experiences in Afghanistan where they participated in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), while representatives of the ISRCoy drew a parallel between MINUSMA and their experiences during ISAF. These diverging perceptions were not brought together and, inevitably, came up again in Mali.¹²⁸

The core of the controversy was about the perceived nature of MINUSMA, and the role of the different Dutch units within this mission. The professional training and focus of the SOLTG is on special operations and not particularly on long-range surveillance. They expected to be supported by the ISRCoy, while C-ISRCoy assumed the SOLTG would primarily act as a sensor for them. Although the three Dutch units had a weekly meeting in Gao in order to fuse intelligence, these differences were not overcome. Eventually, it had a negative effect on both trust and the perception of mutual interests, and ultimately on intelligence sharing. In interviews, representatives of the ISRCoy complained that they received reports from the SOLTG only weeks after the events. The S2 of the AHdet tried to mediate, but in the end the ISRCoy and the SOLTG were hardly on speaking terms.¹²⁹ This deadlock, however, was quickly resolved with the arrival of the second rotation.¹³⁰

The ISRCoy in Gao initially had to cope with several other challenges. Notwithstanding the priority of intelligence, on the ground UN's priorities proved to be otherwise. The ISRCoy's arrival appeared to be planned at the end of August 2014, but these troops already arrived in April and May. Emergency measures were taken and the ISRCoy became operational under very

¹²⁰ Gøransson (2014), p. 21. Since October 2014, Chinook transport helicopters are added to the AHdet. Apart from their regular transport missions, they are tasked as sensors as well.

¹²¹ interview 5

¹²² interview 7

¹²³ NLD Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Artikel-100 brief MINUSMA*, 1 november 2013/DVB/CV-195/13

¹²⁴ *ibidem*, p. 4

¹²⁵ *ibidem*, p. 14

¹²⁶ *ibidem*, p. 3

¹²⁷ debriefing 3

¹²⁸ interview 3; interview 5; NLD MoD (2014), *Evaluatierapport MINUSMA A-1200*, C-1(NLD)ISR-Coy ASIFU; interview 6

¹²⁹ interview 3; interview 5: debriefing 2; interview 11

¹³⁰ interview 12

provisional circumstances. Due to their specific requirements, the STUAS detachment, however, was not able to fly its UAVs until the last week of August 2014.¹³¹

The military branch of the UN in Gao seemed hardly interested in the newly arrived ISRCoy. One of the orders of C-ASIFU to the ISRCoy was to integrate with the military staff at SHQ(E).¹³² In reality, there was a barely concealed reluctance to cooperate. Officers of the ISRCoy were under the impression that they were regarded as redundant, to no avail to the military effort. And in a certain way they were: “An African military staff is similar in appearance to a Western staff, but is in fact quite different. It is there to fulfill the Commander’s requests, but it is not to take any initiative on its own, let alone to provide its commander with assessments that might challenge his view or judgment”, according to an involved ISRCoy officer. “This is especially true with regard to intelligence. All information is conveyed directly to the commander, without interference of his intelligence section. Decisions are made by the commander on his own, after consultation with his sub-commanders. The staff is there to work out the details.”¹³³

The civilian branch of the UN in Gao, though, was very interested in the sensor and analysis capacity of the ISRCoy. As it turned out, there were mutual interests, resulting in a close cooperation. The civilian UN elements in the region were ‘customers’ as well as rich sources of non-military information, which fitted perfectly well in the aimed-for comprehensive approach. As a result of this cooperation, integrated daily and weekly intelligence products started to flow to a steadily increasing list of clients. Several civilian UN elements in the Gao region contributed, including the local representatives of the JMAC. Unfortunately, these combined efforts were not to last. After two months, the JMAC withdrew its cooperation, and the initiative petered out.¹³⁴

Because of this shift to the support of civilian decision-making, the nature of the intelligence products of the ISRCoy changed likewise. Officially, the ISRCoy was meant to support the military decision making on the tactical level, but instead the ISRCoy’s ASIC produced assessments for the civilian Head of Office in Gao. Subsequently, these products were occasionally disseminated by Gao’s Head of Office to the SRSG and his Senior Management Team in Bamako. These products turned out to be very useful to them, but as a side effect the hierarchical order in the intelligence architecture was inadvertently disrupted.¹³⁵

These events in Gao were mirrored by the experiences of the HQ ASIFU in Bamako. Deployed in three phases, the initial command element of ASIFU, arriving in February 2014, found it self to be more or less unexpected. Accommodations were not yet ready, so the initial command element, including C-ASIFU, and four analysts¹³⁶, were temporarily housed at the MINUSMA HQ. They shared the same floor as the JMAC, which, at that moment, was almost completely unmanned. The U2-section was not understaffed, but had no analytic capacity. The U2 was also quartered in the same premises. At the end of May, the Analysis & Fusion Cell (AFC) of the ASIFU was completely manned, comprising 15 well trained, Western-European military analysts. In fact, both U2 and JMAC were dwarfed by the intelligence capacity of the ASIFU.¹³⁷

Operating on the basis of a network-enabled approach, which essentially entails traversing the borders of the traditional ‘level’ approach and supporting all levels of command¹³⁸, also meant trespassing the turf of the JMAC, and bypassing the Force Commander’s U2. Despite weekly, informal meetings between the civilian Heads of the JMAC and DSS, and the C-ASIFU, distrust was growing. The main reasons for this budding “turf war” were the initial inequality in capacity, and more important, the X-PMESII-based products of the ASIFU. These

¹³¹ interview 12

¹³² NLD MoD, C-ASIFU (2014), *OPORDER 001*, classified.

¹³³ interview 3

¹³⁴ *ibidem*

¹³⁵ NLD MoD (2014), *Evaluatierapport MINUSMA A-1200*, C-1(NLD)ISR-Coy ASIFU

¹³⁶ interview 2. Norwegian analysts, arriving two weeks later, departed again in anticipation of the HQ ASIFU accommodations. They returned at the end of May, when the ASIFU moved to headquarters of its own. (CG)

¹³⁷ *ibidem*

¹³⁸ interview 7; interview 4

products, such as scenario building, power analyses (strategic), link- and trend assessments (operational), and current threat analyses (tactical) were very much in demand by decision makers on all levels. At the same time it was a challenge to the position of the JMAC, which was supposed to produce such strategic products.¹³⁹ Besides, according to Shetler-Jones, JMACs in UN missions had never been able to operate at the strategic level.¹⁴⁰ The ASIFU filled this void. Despite assurances that the ASIFU was there to support the other intelligence units and to make their lives easier, the Head of JMAC and the Chief U2 were taken aback.¹⁴¹ Probably, the discontinuation of the cooperation between local JMAC personnel and the ISRCoy in Gao was a result of these tensions in Bamako.¹⁴² Nonetheless, the ASIFU potentially enables the JMAC to finally focus on its primary task, that is producing assessments for the political-strategic level. Figuratively speaking, the ASIFU pushed the JMAC upwards by filling the gap underneath it.¹⁴³

The uneasiness caused by the arrival of the ASIFU brought to the fore a typical weakness in UN peacekeeping operations. The enormous diversity of contributing countries and the inherent 'globalized' character of the UN brings about an almost insurmountable divergence of perspectives and professional standards. Within MINUSMA, the staff of the JMAC, for example, is selected not only according to professional merits, but also on political grounds.¹⁴⁴ The re-hatted AFISMA battalions are far from complying with the standards of the UN. They especially lack the logistical reach and the means of communications required in such a vast area of operations.¹⁴⁵ As a consequence, they are simply not able to act on the proactive 'actionable' intelligence produced by the ASIFU.¹⁴⁶ In this perspective, the intelligence the ASIFU provided is a source of embarrassment for the Force Commander. For example, assessments of the ASIFU suggested the Force Commander shift the center of gravity from the key population centers to the rural areas, which was reiterated in UNSC resolution 2164.¹⁴⁷ But to do this effectively, you need better trained and equipped troops than those the Force Commander had at his disposal.

At present, within MINUSMA, there is a fully staffed, professional Western intelligence unit with operational experience in asymmetric environments, and used to an operational pace that far exceeds that of the traditional UN peacekeeping missions.¹⁴⁸ Then there are various civilian UN organizations, IOs and NGOs that are sometimes reluctant to associate with MINUSMA, but, on other occasions, are dependent on MINUSMA for their protection. To overcome these discrepancies, and to integrate all these elements into one mission certainly is a long-term project; let alone to create a common understanding of the environment and to achieve unity of effort.

All the same, the ASIFU is a powerful asset. For the first time, a UN mission is provided with technological and intent-based sensors, and robust analytical capabilities to support the mission at all levels of decision-making. If it is sufficient for the particular circumstances in Mali, remains to be seen.

IV.b MINUSMA's Achievements Measured through Codes and Categories

Based on the theories of Morjé Howard, Endsley et al., Ara et al., and Lester, four categories of indicators¹⁴⁹ for mission success are formulated: first-level learning, situational awareness, intelligence sharing, and the mission-protection paradox.

¹³⁹ interview 4

¹⁴⁰ Shetler-Jones (2008), p. 520

¹⁴¹ interview 7

¹⁴² ibidem

¹⁴³ ibidem

¹⁴⁴ interview 4

¹⁴⁵ ibidem; interview 11

¹⁴⁶ interview 7; interview 11

¹⁴⁷ UN, *Resolution 2164 (2014)*, S/RES/2164 (2014), United Nations Security Council, New York, p. 6, paragraph 13

¹⁴⁸ Karlsrud and Smith (2015), p. 6

¹⁴⁹ see Chapter II, paragraph II.e

IV.b.a First-Level Learning

Morjé Howard mentioned four indicators of first-level learning: The ability to (1) gather and analyze information, (2) coordinate among the different divisions of the peacekeeping mission, (3) engage the organization with its post-civil war environment, and (4) exercise leadership.¹⁵⁰

- (1) As to the ability to gather and analyze information, most respondents were positive. They found the environment to be relatively permissive, which allowed for far more opportunities to collect data than previously expected. The C-STUAS, however, thought otherwise. Due to infrastructural and bureaucratic barriers, he was not able to fly his UAVs until only one week before his redeployment. Moreover, he expressed doubt as to the utility of such a short-range sensor compared to the vastness of the area of operations.¹⁵¹
- (2) Regarding the ability to coordinate between the different units of MINUSMA most respondents were equivocal, except for the JMAC analyst, who was rather skeptical, bringing up the lack of coordination between the JMAC and the ASIFU. This occasionally resulted in analysts from both units separately producing assessments on the same topic. This was corroborated by the ASIFU analyst.¹⁵² Within the military, liaison officers enable coordination. Nonetheless, most respondents indicated that there was hardly any coordination between their units and the UN battalions. Finally, the stubborn cooperation between the ISRCoy and the SOLTG during the first rotation had a detrimental effect on the coordination between these two units, according to those involved.¹⁵³
- (3) Respondents who had been deployed in Afghanistan, were stricken by the relative permissiveness of Malian society. However, to actually engage with the environment depended on an important proviso: fluency in French or the availability of interpreters.¹⁵⁴ But far more decisive is the fact that some of the groups in northern Mali are defined in the mandate as adversaries, while at the same time boundaries between most groups are fluid, to say the least. Even the division between MDSF and these groups are unclear, loyalty being opportunity-driven.¹⁵⁵ To engage with these actors would mean the UNSC has to condone such initiatives, which might mean a deterioration of the relationship with the Malian government.
- (4) Most respondents were discontented with the way leadership was exercised within the UN. Some military were bewildered by the fact that civilians are leading in such a UN mission. Nearly all respondents described leadership as bureaucratic, indecisive and awfully slow-paced. Overall, coordination and leadership were judged negatively not only within MINUSMA, but at the UNHQ as well as in the national domain. Deficiency of understanding, oversight, guidance and pace were frequently mentioned. Lack of C2 impedes intelligence, because it distorts the first phase of the intelligence cycle, direction. Intelligence personnel then has to decide by itself what the intelligence priorities of their leadership might be.¹⁵⁶

What are the odds for first-level learning? When the ASIFU and the ISRCoy have overcome the initial setbacks, the gathering and analyzing of information will probably accelerate. The Swedish ISRCoy has started to deploy since March 2015. They will cover the Timbuktu region, which is now more or less out of reach for MINUSMA intelligence. Furthermore, Dutch UAVs are operational since September 2014, and a slow-starting sensor like

¹⁵⁰ Morjé Howard (2008), p. 2

¹⁵¹ interview 12

¹⁵² interview 2; interview 4

¹⁵³ interviews 3, 6, 8, 9, 10

¹⁵⁴ interviews 3, 10

¹⁵⁵ The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (2014), *“Illicit Trafficking and Instability in Mali: Past, Present and Future.”* Part of the Series on Governance, Democracy and State Fragility, January 2014

¹⁵⁶ interviews 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10

HUMINT will gradually build up its network of sources. Likewise, coordination within MINUSMA will evolve, because it is advantageous to all. This pace of development is fairly common in multinational operations. Leadership will improve, when mutual experiences shape shared mental models and more high-quality intelligence is available. The only factor that most probably will seriously hamper first-level learning is the growing lack of engagement with the environment. The rather “standard” mandate does not properly fit the situation in northern Mali. The unequivocal backing of the Malian state in northern Mali has already created an image of MINUSMA as being the delivery boy of Malian authorities.¹⁵⁷ Most of the population of northern Mali have no confidence in MINUSMA at all as far as their protection is concerned.¹⁵⁸

IV.b.b Situational Awareness

Endsley et al. developed a concept of situation awareness containing three levels of SA: (5) perception of the elements in the environment (level 1), (6) comprehension of the current situation (level 2), and (7) projection of future status (level 3). The levels 2 and 3 imply a (8) common operational picture and (9) shared mental models.¹⁵⁹

- (5) All but one of the respondents were positive about the opportunities to acquire level 1 SA. Due to the particular circumstances of his unit, only the C-STUAS expressed a negative opinion.¹⁶⁰ The other respondents, however, were convinced that the most important data concerning the environment could be collected through ISR. One officer mentioned ‘an abundance of information’ waiting to be picked up by sensors and liaison officers. ‘You just have to find out who within the UN is willing to cooperate’.¹⁶¹ The only proviso made was the magnitude of the area to be covered compared to the means and personnel available.
- (6) Most respondents were positive MINUSMA had acquired at least some level 2 SA, with the exception of the JMAC representative.¹⁶² This is noteworthy, because it indicates the ‘stove-piping’ of information: certain organizational levels and units are cut off from intelligence collected elsewhere in the organization. If it concerns the JMAC, it is a serious problem for MINUSMA.
- (7) Level 3 SA is hardly mentioned by most respondents. Only C-ASIFU and C-ISRCoy are positive about achieving this level of SA. They refer to several intelligence reports ASIFU has produced, providing actionable intelligence to commanders at all levels, outlining future contingencies and scenarios. Some were not acted upon, with serious consequences.¹⁶³
- (8) All respondents were unanimous about the lack of a common operational picture, even between Dutch units.¹⁶⁴ They all mentioned, in different key of terms, the wide variety of perspectives. To them, it seemed that almost every UN element had its own operational picture. Differences in professional, cultural and military perspectives came to the surface on several occasions.¹⁶⁵ It even led to reproaches by African military of ‘a colonial attitude’, when ASIFU personnel suggested certain actions on the grounds of particular intelligence.¹⁶⁶
- (9) As to shared ‘mental models’, several terms served as signals, such as background (national, cultural, civilian or military), mindset, Western versus non-Western (mostly African), military experience, and competence (professional vs ‘political’).

¹⁵⁷ interviews 11, 12

¹⁵⁸ NLD Ministry of Defence, *Periodieke Rapportage Militair Attaché Mali*, MLI/2014/002, p. 30

¹⁵⁹ Endsley et al. (2003), p. 16-21

¹⁶⁰ interview 12

¹⁶¹ interview 3

¹⁶² interview 4

¹⁶³ interview 7

¹⁶⁴ several respondents referred to the discord between the ISRCoy and the SOLTG, but some remarks also hinted at the relationship between HQ ASIFU and the ISRCoy.

¹⁶⁵ These were mentioned in every interview.

¹⁶⁶ debriefing 2

Common, shared mental models were found to be existent only within the confines of Western cultural backgrounds. Remarkably, this exceeded differences between military and civilians, although here some contrasts lingered on.¹⁶⁷ The presence of shared mental models between the culturally different contingents were rated negatively, with one or two exceptions. There seemed to be no connection whatsoever between for instance the ISRCoy and the UN battalion of Niger (operating in the same area), or between the military branch of SHQ(E) and the Dutch units in Gao. Incompetence, 'political' appointments (as opposed to 'based on merit'), and differences in work ethic, were frequently mentioned.

The prospects of developing all levels of SA are favorable, especially through the establishment of a second ISRCoy in Timbuktu (and maybe a third to come in Kidal), and the gradual build-up of an information position. The most critical part, however, is to connect the myriad of islands in the UN archipelago. Although the supple cooperation with the UN civilian units is promising, the almost complete lack of cooperation with the UN battalions is worrisome.¹⁶⁸ It is to be feared that the development of a common operational picture and shared mental models will only be established in the short term when violent incidents occur, involving UN troops.

IV.b.c Intelligence Sharing

Ara et al. distinguished four factors that enable intelligence sharing: (10) gains or mutual benefits, (11) trust based on competence and common culture, (12) direct control through hierarchy, and (13) accessible and compatible means of secure communications.¹⁶⁹

- (10) Almost all respondents were predominantly positive regarding the aspect of mutual interests, only one was skeptical and referred to 'many-hatted' colleagues.¹⁷⁰ Although aspects such as a common operational picture and shared mental models were rated negatively, in the end there seemed to have been a consensus in the belief that all participants in MINUSMA were aiming to achieve the same goals. Which is remarkable, giving the rather duplicitous character of the mandate. For example, it has to be seen if the restoration of Malian state authority coincides well with the protection of human rights, the goals of UN humanitarian assistance or the rule of law.
- (11) You might expect the rating of trust to correspond with the negative rating of the presence of a common operational picture and shared mental models, but this is not the case. All respondents were very positive as to the trust they had in their own units and most fellow-Western colleagues. They were firmly convinced of their competence and professionalism, especially NATO colleagues. It explains the mixed results on this item: there is great trust in Western troops, and far less in non-Western personnel.
- (12) Direct control was hardly mentioned by the majority of respondents. If so, then it tended to be rated negatively. Most respondents were taken aback by the way leadership was exercised within MINUSMA. To them, clear leadership was non-existent. This corresponds with the negative rating of item (4). Several respondents underlined the enormous difference between a NATO-led mission and a UN mission, in pace, decisiveness and guidance.¹⁷¹
- (13) The most frequent remarks were on the lack of secure communication and management of data. The UN disposed of confidential and secret communication

¹⁶⁷ interview 11, 12

¹⁶⁸ interviews 3, 4, 6, 7, 11

¹⁶⁹ Ara et al. (2011), p. 25

¹⁷⁰ interview 12

¹⁷¹ interviews 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12

networks, but these were distrusted by all respondents: for example, there were no restrictions in email, and there were no security checks as to who sent emails to whom, worldwide. But even had these networks been secure, the security awareness of most UN staff was found to be minimal: confidential data that after all ended up on 'open' sites, or classified information which was disseminated indiscriminately.¹⁷² Within ASIFU, and the SOLTG and AHdet, a secure data and communication network was installed by the Dutch to enable the conveyance of classified data: Titaan-red. This system was only accessible to personnel of the ASIFU, SOLTG, and AHdet, which de facto meant it was only accessible to Western-Europeans. The fact that the UN accepts such an arrangement is no less remarkable. Still, it is open to debate if that sort of compartmentalization of sensitive intelligence is detrimental to intelligence sharing or that it might actually enable it. By protecting such intelligence, it can be used by intelligence personnel to assess unclassified information on relevance and truthfulness. This 'open' information can then indirectly and silently be rectified without compromising sources and methods. This 'rectified' unclassified information can be disseminated indiscriminately.¹⁷³

Intelligence sharing within the UN will always be a sensitive matter. Not only because of its sheer size and transparency, but because it is an organization that encompasses inimical nations, religions, ideologies, and adversarial interests. In peacekeeping missions such as MINUSMA, this all-encompassing character can be mitigated by selecting like-minded TCCs with shared cultural backgrounds and military experience, but the anxiety of classified intelligence being disseminated to (potential) adversaries will not dissipate. Therefore, the 'stove-piping' of intelligence within MINUSMA is almost inevitable.

IV.b.d The Mission-Protection Paradox

(14) In total, five comments referred to force protection, but none indicated the mission-protection paradox. This corresponds to the perceived low-level threat and relative openness of the Malian society.¹⁷⁴ However, the security situation in Mali is deteriorating.¹⁷⁵ But as far as MINUSMA is concerned, the 'third dimension' is still a sleeping giant. MINUSMA has not stirred any political or public attention so far.

¹⁷² interviews 4, 5

¹⁷³ interview 7

¹⁷⁴ interview 6

¹⁷⁵ NLD MoD (2015), *Evaluatierapport MINUSMA A-1200, C-1(NLD)ISR-Coy ASIFU (2)*

V. Conclusion

The ASIFU is in many ways a new experiment for the UN. Although it is organized differently than initially envisaged, the DPKO has accepted the mission statement as formulated by the first C-ASIFU. As a consequence, the ASIFU is officially intended to provide fused, relevant, timely, actionable, and integrated intelligence analysis based on a comprehensive approach, in order to support all levels of MINUSMA and enable the force to mitigate the threats to the mission, the threats to the force and identify opportunities for the mission.¹⁷⁶

To what extent has the ASIFU lived up to its promise? During the first months of its deployment the ASIFU had to cope with several setbacks. The unsynchronized planning during the first phase of the deployment caused an initial delay in the launch of sensors such as the UAVs.¹⁷⁷ Another obstacle to the status of “fully operational capable” was the embedding of the ASIFU within the intelligence architecture of MINUSMA. The conceptual change of the ASIFU was not officially formalized in its Status of Unit Requirements (SUR). Worse still, it apparently was not communicated to the Senior Management and the Force Commander of MINUSMA, resulting in skirmishes between ASIFU and other intelligence units within MINUSMA.¹⁷⁸ These discussions, however, were mostly about hierarchical levels and “turf limits”, not about the concept itself or the methods of intelligence gathering and analysis.

Obviously, there are many similarities between the JMAC concept and the ASIFU. The composition of the JMAC along the lines of multidimensional peacekeeping – political, socio-economic development, rule of law, security, human rights – is mirrored by the X-PMESII method of the ASIFU. Redundancy seems apparent, but actually the ASIFU resolves the dilemma of ‘narrow employment’¹⁷⁹, which has hampered the JMAC in most missions so far. The introduction of the ASIFU enables the JMAC to concentrate its efforts on the political-strategic level and finally perform its role of “supporting senior-management decision-making in an integrated mission”¹⁸⁰, and to function as the intelligence liaison between UNHQ and the mission in theatre. The ASIFU is able to fill the gap at the operational and tactical level in an integrated manner, in accordance with the “comprehensive approach”. This comprehensive approach ensures the link to the political-strategic level: essential to integrated assessments, but also prone to be misunderstood as trespassing the boundaries of levels. The traditional (military) dogma of strict distinctions between levels is persistent and difficult to breach.

The ASIFU fills another UN intelligence gap. Its ISRCoy(s) fulfill an indispensable requirement in any intelligence architecture: the systematic collection of information through dedicated sensors. The employment of different sensors, technological as well as intent-based, enables the ASIFU to gather all-source information, which can be processed to integrated intelligence. Without ISR, military units operate ‘in the dark’ and are unable to anticipate. In other words, they are incapable to act proactively, which is, for instance, imperative to the protection of the population.

Still, MINUSMA, its intelligence architecture, and therefore ASIFU, faces some fundamental challenges. When analyzing the comments of those directly involved on the conditions Morjé Howard pointed out as “necessary, and jointly sufficient” to the success of a UN PKO, it becomes clear that these are not present. One of these conditions is the ability to first-level organizational learning. This analysis makes clear that just one of the four indicators of first-level learning is met: the ability to gather and analyze information. It is certain that MINUSMA is yet unable to engage and adapt its organization to its environment. Obviously, this is a long-term objective, but it is doubtful MINUSMA will be offered the time and opportunity to achieve first-level learning. If not, the occurrence of the mission-protection paradox is more than

¹⁷⁶ LDCR Ahrnberg, Kari (2015), *Presentation at the ASIFU After Action Review*, US Army War College, 27 January 2015

¹⁷⁷ NLD MoD (2014), *Evaluatierapport MINUSMA A-1200, C-1(NLD)ISR-Coy ASIFU (1)*

¹⁷⁸ interview 7

¹⁷⁹ Ramjoué (2011), p. 475

¹⁸⁰ Shetler-Jones (2008), p. 518

likely. To avoid force protection becoming paramount to the mission, is perhaps the most important role of intelligence in this mission.

MINUSMA's intelligence architecture is probably not up to the challenge. First, northern Mali is simply too vast for the number of UN troops deployed. This applies all the more for the intelligence units involved. The ISRCoy in Gao is hardly able to cover the whole Gao region, let alone areas beyond. In fact, MINUSMA only has a limited intelligence picture of Kidal, the most volatile region in northern Mali.¹⁸¹ The SOLTG's and the AHdet's reach is much further, but their operations exclude permanent presence, and therefore they are unable to sustain an intelligence network or provide continuous protection of the population.¹⁸²

Second, the UN battalions are severely hampered by their (very) limited logistical reach and means of communications. But what is more important, they lack basic training and knowledge as far as intelligence is concerned. In the non-Western military culture, intelligence is perceived as of no added value and foremost only of concern to the commander. As a consequence, patrol reports have no intelligence value whatsoever.¹⁸³ This is hazardous to the prospect of success for MINUSMA. It means that in the military intelligence chain (U2-G2-S2) there is no 'bottom-up' flow of information, which impedes the development of SA. Instead of systematic engagement with the population, it leads to isolation. Such an attitude is very hard to mitigate, because it originates from different experiences and mental models. It de facto precludes a "level 3 SA", and a common understanding of the environment. That is why a concept such as a "network-enabled" or "comprehensive" approach is alien to these troops. Furthermore, non-Western commanders are easily annoyed by unasked-for assessments that urges them to certain actions, because it infringes on their prerogative of command. There are two conceivable ways to alleviate this cultural barrier: to develop a mature and extensive UN doctrine on peacekeeping, complemented by specific UN training and education facilities, in line with the recommendations of Patrick C. Cammaert¹⁸⁴, or long-term engagement and cooperation in the same mission.¹⁸⁵

Third, the most important precondition for intelligence sharing is absent: there are no accessible and secure communication networks available. All interviewed ASIFU personnel mentioned this concern. Within ASIFU, with extensions to the SOLTG and the AHdet, a secure data and communications network has been installed, but other MINUSMA units are excluded. Because of this configuration, classified and sensitive information remains in the Dutch national domain, only shared by trusted Nordic partners. Furthermore, there are bilateral arrangements as to intelligence sharing outside MINUSMA.¹⁸⁶ Overall, the absence of a secure data and communication networks basically makes an integrated common operational picture nearly impossible, and the 'stove-piping' of intelligence almost unavoidable.¹⁸⁷ The UN's Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping recommends the establishment of secure data storage networks for UN missions in her February 2015 Report.¹⁸⁸ Better late than never, but it will be an enormous challenge anyway: if all participating member states in a UN mission have access to such secure networks, what is so secure about it?

Despite initial challenges, the ASIFU has already proven to be a very useful, additional intelligence asset to MINUSMA. The ASIFU fills significant intelligence gaps at the operational and tactical level, especially by employing ISR capacity. Nonetheless, the ASIFU too is confronted with fundamental intelligence dilemmas, inherent to multinational and multidimensional missions. Different historical, cultural and professional backgrounds almost inevitably evoke different perceptions and mental models. These are at odds with the ultimate goal of military

¹⁸¹ Karlsrud and Smith (2015), p. 13

¹⁸² interview 5

¹⁸³ Referred to in every interview

¹⁸⁴ Cammaert (2003), p. 30

¹⁸⁵ Endsley et al. (2003), p. 205

¹⁸⁶ interview 7

¹⁸⁷ *ibidem*, a proposed solution was the compartmentalization of sensitive intelligence in a separate database, with a one-way link to an open database; so authorized personnel could assess, correct or delete the 'open' data.

¹⁸⁸ Karlsrud and Smith (2015), p. 13

intelligence: to create a common operational picture, which constitutes the basis for coherent, systematic decision-making.

To my opinion, the UN has made a great step forward in setting up the ASIFU, consisting of robust analysis capabilities and technological and intent-based sensors. Military commanders and civilian senior management alike are no longer dependent on others for their situational awareness. But, was it really meant this way? The impression lingers on that the ASIFU was originally planned as part of a parallel force next to MINUSMA. This parallel force, strictly separated from MINUSMA, should have substituted Opération Serval.¹⁸⁹ UN resolutions 2100 and 2164 are clear about the threat of jihadist groups, but leave it at that. MINUSMA is not authorized to actively find and fight them. The French have moved on, so which force was referred to?

The prospects of MINUSMA to success as defined by Morjé Howard are bleak. There are few indications for first-level learning, and the 'situational factors' are even worse. MINUSMA is in the middle of multi-layered conflicts, of which the inter- and intra-communal hostilities are the most complicated.¹⁹⁰ The inhabitants of northern Mali have always lived on the thinnest of safety margins, but in the last decade the traditional social fabric is devastated by the influx of drug money and weapons. 'Subservient' Tuareg and Arab castes became as powerful as the 'noble' castes through illicit trafficking. This development was exacerbated by the outsourcing of state authority to these subservient castes, causing the Malian government to actually become an accessory in crime.¹⁹¹ The mantra in both UN resolutions 2100 and 2164 to restore state authority in northern Mali will be very difficult indeed, the more so because it has been virtually non-existent for years.

Then there are the jihadist groups, who will fight the MDSF, the French and MINUSMA, but will also engage with Tuareg and Arab groups over the revenues of illicit trafficking. To make things worse, loyalties shift rapidly to the highest bidder. Fighters of the MDSF, Tuareg and Arab groups change sides when opportunities for earning more money occur.¹⁹² Furthermore, the compliance of the CAGs to the integrity of the Malian state and its authority is probably mere lip service, evidenced by the events in Kidal, May 21st 2014.¹⁹³

In the near future, MINUSMA may be confronted with diabolical dilemmas. What if Malian troops become a threat to the inhabitants of northern Mali? What if Opération Barkhane is successful in the border region of Chad, Niger and Libya, and jihadist fighters flee back into Mali with Islamic State in their wake? What policies to pursue regarding illicit trafficking? To stabilize northern Mali, illicit (drugs, humans, weapons) trafficking has to be dealt with, but it is the only lucrative source of wealth in the region and a livelihood to many. Both Tuaregs and Arabs probably will fight to keep it.

MINUSMA will have to find its way in this quagmire. All intelligence capacity will be needed.

¹⁸⁹ UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali*, UN S/2013/189, paragraph 99, p. 19

¹⁹⁰ Pezard, Stephanie and Shurkin, M. (2013), *Toward a Secure and Stable Northern Mali*, Part of the RAND Corporation research report series, p. 5

¹⁹¹ The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (2014), *"Illicit Trafficking and Instability in Mali: Past, Present and Future."* Part of the Series on Governance, Democracy and State Fragility, January 2014

¹⁹² *ibidem*, p. 9

¹⁹³ NLD Ministry of Defence, *Periodieke Rapportage Militair Attaché Mali*, MLI/2014/002, p. 17-18.

Bibliography

- Aldrich, Richard J. (2004), "Transatlantic intelligence and security cooperation." *International Affairs*, 80(4), 731-753.
- Ara, Martin J., Brand, T, & Larssen, B.A. (2011), *Help a Brother Out: A Case Study in Multinational Intelligence Sharing*, NATO SOF. Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.
- Barry, Joseph A. (2012), "Bolstering United Nations Intelligence: Cultural and Structural Solutions." *American Intelligence Journal*, 30(1), 7-16.
- Betts, Richard K. (2009), "Analysis, war, and decision. Why intelligence failures are inevitable" in: Gill, P., Marrin, S., and Phythian, M. (eds), *Intelligence Theory. Key questions and debates* (pp. 87-109), London, New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis.
- Cammaert, Patrick C. (2003), "Intelligence in Peacekeeping Operations: Lessons for the Future, in: de Jong, B., Platje, W., and Steele, R.D. (eds), *Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future* (pp. 11-30), Oakton, VA: OSS International Press.
- Diallo, Falilou (2013), "The War in Mali and its consequences for the sub-region." Guest Author Series, Think Security Africa. Retrieved January 15, 2015 from <http://thinksecurityafrica.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/The-War-in-Mali-and-its-Consequences.pdf>.
- Endsley, Mica R. (1988), "Design and Evaluation for Situation Awareness." *Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 32nd Annual Meeting*, Santa Monica, CA: Human Factors Society, 97-101.
- Endsley, Mica R., Bolté B., and Jones, D.G. (2003), *Designing for Situation Awareness. An Approach to User-Centered Design*. New York: Taylor and Francis Group.
- Fukuyama, Francis (1992), *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press.
- Glenny, Misha (2008), *McMaffia. Crime Without Frontiers*. London: Random House Group.
- Gøransson, Stian B. (2014), "Intelligence in UN Peacekeeping. A case study of the challenges facing ASIFU." Bachelor thesis in military studies, Norwegian Military Academy Linderud.
- Gros, Philippe (2014), "Libya and Mali Operations. Transatlantic Lessons Learned." *Foreign Policy Papers*, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington DC. Retrieved January 15, 2015 from <http://www.gmfus.org/publications/libya-and-mali-operations-transatlantic-lessons-learned>.
- Hicks, Celeste (2013), "Burning Curve. Assessing Africa's 'arc of instability'." *Jane's Intelligence Review*, September 2013. 32-35.
- Interview with Ousmane Sidibe (2013), "The Malian Crisis." *New Left Review*, 84, 67-83.
- Joint Doctrine Publication 04, *Understanding. Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre*, Ministry of Defence, UK.
- Karlsrud, John and Smith, A.C. (2015), *European Military Participation in MINUSMA. Experiences and Lessons-Learned*. International Peace Institute, New York.
- LDCR Ahrnberg, Kari (2015), *Presentation at the ASIFU After Action Review*, US Army War College, 27 January 2015.
- Lester, Philip T.G. (2010), *The Mission-Protection Paradox*. Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Downing College.
- Malan, Mark (2005), *Intelligence in African Peace operations: Addressing the Deficit*. Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre, Accra, Ghana.
- Morjé Howard, Lise (2008), *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- NATO (2014), *Human Network Analysis and support to Targeting, Handbook*. First Draft, December 2014
- NATO Allied Joint Publication 2(A) (2013)
- NATO Allied Joint Publication-2, *Allied Joint Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Security Doctrine P2*, (2003), 1-1-1.

- NLD Ministry of Defence (2011) Joint Doctrine Publication-2 (JDP-2); NLD MoD (2014), Operationeel Concept Landoptreden.
- NLD Ministry of Defence, Periodieke Rapportage Militair Attaché Mali, MLI/2014/002
- NLD Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Artikel-100 brief MINUSMA, 1 november 2013/DVB/CV-195/13.
- NLD MoD (2014), Evaluatierapport MINUSMA A-1200, C-1(NLD)ISR-Coy ASIFU.
- NLD MoD (2014), Evaluatierapport MINUSMA A-1200, C-1(NLD)ISR-Coy ASIFU (1).
- NLD MoD (2015), Evaluatierapport MINUSMA A-1200, C-1(NLD)ISR-Coy ASIFU (2)
- NLD MoD, C-ASIFU (2014), OORDER 001, classified.
- NLD MoD, Report of the debriefing held by a French Major of Opération Barkhane during the ASIFU Intelligence Preparation for the Mission, The Hague, 8 – 11 December 2014.
- NLD MoD, Report of the debriefing held by C-ASIFU (2) during the ASIFU Intelligence Preparation for the Mission, The Hague, 8 – 11 December 2014.
- NLD MoD, Report of the debriefing held by the U2 Chief of Operations during the ASIFU Intelligence Preparation for the Mission, The Hague, 8 – 11 December 2014.
- Norheim-Martinsen, Per Martin & Ravndal, J.A. (2011), "Towards Intelligence-Driven Peace Operations? The Evolution of UN and EU Intelligence Structures." *International Peacekeeping*, 18(4), 454-467.
- Pezard, Stephanie and Shurkin, M. (2013), Toward a Secure and Stable Northern Mali, Part of the RAND Corporation research report series. Retrieved January 15, 2015 from http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research-reports/RR200/RR296/RAND_RR296.pdf.
- Ramjoué, Melanie (2011), "Improving UN Intelligence through Civil-Military Collaboration: Lessons from the Joint Mission Analysis Centres, *International Peacekeeping*, 18(4), 468-484.
- Rietjens, S.H.J. (2014), "Qualitative Data Analysis: Seeing the Patterns in the Fog of Civil-Military Interaction." in: Joseph Soeters, Shields, P.M., and Rietjes, S.H.J. (eds), *Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in Military Studies* (pp. 129-141), New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.
- Sahla, Soumaya (2014), "Mali: broedplaats voor extremisme, terrorisme en criminaliteit?" *Militaire Spectator*, 183(3), 104-117.
- Shetler-Jones, Philip (2008), "Intelligence in Integrated UN Peacekeeping Missions: The Joint Mission Analysis Centre." *International Peacekeeping*, 15(4), 517-527.
- Sidibé, Kalilou (2012), "Criminal Networks and Conflict-resolution Mechanisms in Northern Mali." *IDS Bulletin*, 43(4), 74-88.
- Slaughter, Anne-Marie (2005), "Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of UN Reform, *The American Journal of International Law*, 99(3), 619-631.
- Stewart, Dona J. (2013), "What is Next for Mali? The Roots of Conflict and Challenges to Stability." Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College Press, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
- Svensden, Adam D.M. (2012), *Understanding The Globalization of Intelligence*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan.
- SWE Ministry of Defense, Nilsson, Claes and Zetterlund, K. (2014) Ready or not? Revamping UN Peacekeeping for the 21st century, Report No. FOI-R-3833—SE.
- The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (2014), "Illicit Trafficking and Instability in Mali: Past, Present and Future." Part of the Series on Governance, Democracy and State Fragility, January 2014. Retrieved January 15, 2015 from <http://www.globalinitiative.net/wpfb-file/global-initiative-organized-crime-and-illicit-trafficking-in-mali-jan-2014-pdf>.
- UK Joint Doctrine Publication 04 (2010), *Understanding. Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre*, UK Ministry of Defence.
- UN (2015), Presentation by Col. Tony Keijsers, Commander ASIFU from February till August 2014, 9 January 2015, UNHQ New York.

UN Doc. A/59/565, at 8 (2004), "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change".

UN, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali, UN S/2013/189.

UN, Resolution 2100 (2013), S/RES/2100 (2013), United Nations Security Council, New York.

UN, Resolution 2164 (2014), S/RES/2164 (2014), United Nations Security Council, New York.

US Field Manual 3.0 Operations.

Venneson, Pascal & Wiesner, I. (2014), "Process Tracing in Case Studies." in: Joseph Soeters, Shields, P.M., and Rietjens, S.H.J. (eds), *Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in Military Studies* (pp.92-103), New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.

Wirtz, James J. (2009), "Theory of surprise." In: Gill, P., Marrin, S., and Phythian, M. (eds), *Intelligence Theory. Key questions and debates* (pp. 73-86), London, New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis.

Wittmann, Michael C., Hunt, S.D. & Arnett, D.B. (2009), "Explaining alliance success: Competences, resources, relational factors, and resource-advantage theory." *Industrial Marketing Management*, 38(7), 743-756.

Interviews

1. S6 (Information Management), HQ ASIFU
2. Human Terrain Analyst, Analysis and Fusion Cell, HQ ASIFU
3. Chief All Source Intelligence Cell, ISRCoy
4. JMAC Analyst
5. S2 AH detachment
6. Commander ISRCoy
7. Commander ASIFU
8. 2X (HUMINT), ISRCoy
9. HCO (HUMINT), ISRCoy
10. Field HUMINT Teamleader, ISRCoy
11. Commander ISRCoy
12. Commander Small Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems (STUAS)

Debriefings

1. Intelligence Officer Forward Liaison Team, September 2013 – January 2014, 6 November 2014, 't Harde
2. Commander ISRCoy (1), 6 November 2014
3. The ASIFU Intelligence Preparation for the Mission, 8 – 11 December 2014, The Hague

Appendix A

	HTA 8-10-14		C-ASIC15R 30-10-14		JMAC 4-11-14		S2AHdet 12-11-14		C-ASIFU 22-12-14		verslag 22-12-14		2x/HCO 19-1-15		S6ASIFU 1-10-14		FHT 3-2-15		C-ISR(1) 31-7-14		C-ISR(2) 4-03-15		C-STUAS 4-3-15						
	pos	neg	pos	neg	pos	neg	pos	neg	pos	neg	pos	neg	pos	neg	pos	neg	pos	neg	pos	neg	pos	neg	pos	neg	pos	neg	tot		
code 1	7	-4	19	-9	9	-8	21	-6	10	0	4	-1	4	-1	3	0	3	-2	7	-1	1	0	0	0	0	0	88	-38	50
code 2	5	-5	12	-13	4	-11	10	-11	5	-1	6	-2	3	-4	3	-2	2	-5	7	-4	1	0	3	-5	61	-63	-2		
code 3	3	-5	8	0	0	0	2	0	2	-2	0	0	1	-4	0	0	2	0	3	-1	1	0	1	-1	23	-13	10		
code 4	1	-3	1	-6	2	-12	5	-9	3	-5	2	-10	0	-3	1	3	0	-5	1	-13	0	-3	5	-18	21	-84	-63		
code 5	5	-1	17	-3	11	-11	8	-3	5	0	1	0	1	0	3	0	0	0	6	0	1	0	0	-2	58	-20	38		
code 6	3	-2	9	-4	1	-4	6	0	6	0	3	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	2	0	35	-11	24		
code 7	3	-2	1	-2	0	-3	1	0	8	0	3	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	19	-8	11		
code 8	4	-6	0	-2	3	-4	11	-15	6	-8	0	-5	0	-4	1	0	1	-2	2	-8	1	-2	3	-29	32	-85	-53		
code 9	6	-14	1	-5	7	-8	12	-22	17	-15	2	-8	0	-5	0	-2	1	-1	3	-21	0	-3	9	-14	58	-118	-60		
code 10	7	-2	4	-1	5	-3	14	-10	5	0	4	-1	2	-1	0	0	2	0	8	-3	2	0	0	-1	53	-22	31		
code 11	11	-9	1	0	5	-5	9	-13	3	-1	0	0	0	-1	0	-1	1	-1	3	-2	0	0	1	-2	34	-35	-1		
code 12	2	0	2	-4	1	-4	2	-6	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	-14	-5	
code 13	3	-5	1	-2	3	-5	5	-8	5	-5	3	-3	2	-1	2	-4	0	-1	1	-1	0	0	0	-1	25	-36	-11		
code 14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1	0	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	-1	0	0	1	-3	-2		

First-level organizational learning

- code 1: be able to gather and analyze information
- code 2: be able to coordinate between different divisions, sections, etc.
- code 3: be able to engage with the post-conflict environment
- code 4: be able to exercise leadership that commands authority


Situational awareness and understanding

- code 5: perception of the elements in the environment
- code 6: comprehension of the current situation
- code 7: projection of the future status of the environment (scenario's)
- code 8: common operational picture
- code 9: shared mental models

Intelligence sharing

- code 10: gains or mutual benefits/interests
- code 11: trust, through perceived competence and a common culture
- code 12: direct control, either by clear hierarchy of leading nation
- code 13: accessible and compatible means of secure communications
- code 14: mission protection paradox

Appendix B



Appendix C

