TUPAMAROS
A PATTERN FOR URBAN GUERRILLA
WARFARE IN LATIN AMERICA

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I. History and origin

The guerrilla group "Tupamaros" of Uruguay, which is making itself known all over the world, is an example of a phenomenon that, with only slight variations, is becoming more and more frequent on the Latin American scene. Parallels between this group and more or less similar organizations in other countries are so evident that it is hardly necessary to stress them specifically point by point.

Like most relatively "native" guerrilla groups in Latin America, whether rural or urban, the "Tupamaros" started out as a gang of bandits. It was at the end of 1963 that the name "Tupamaros" was first heard in Uruguay. At that time they were a gang of University drop-outs, beatniks and juvenile delinquents, whose chief activity consisted of assaulting and trying to rape girls who were returning home from their classes at the University at night. (The name "Tupamaro" is derived from an Indian chief known as "Tupac Amaru", who claimed to be a descendant of the Incas and who led a revolt against the Spaniards in Peru in 1780).

On the other hand, as early as 1960 a group of "socialists" (at that time still pro-Soviet, but a little later pro-Chinese), under the leadership of Radl Sendic Antonaccio, initiated activities among the rural workers, especially the sugar-cane workers in the northern part of the country (the Department of Artigas). He organized the workers in a union (UTAA), which accepted as members any number of disreputable elements under the definition of "unemployed sugar-cane workers". Sendic and a few of his collaborators trained the workers, and especially the "unemployed" -- who had more spare time available -- in agitation and propaganda. A few of Sendic's local men went to prison for a time because they had been caught stealing sheep. This gave Sendic and the UTAA some welcome publicity, as the thieves claimed to have appropriated the sheep in order to "feed the starving families of the unemployed". Sendic, the son of Serbian-Sicilian parents and an advanced law student, achieved quite a name for himself as a leader and helper of the poor and desolate in their "fight against the capitalists, the big landowners, the exploiters of the peasants and workers".
II. Membership and methods

July 1963 marks the beginning of an era with occurrences which had been completely unknown in Uruguay before. In that month, a number of rifles were stolen from a rifle club in the interior of the country, and when some of the culprits were caught by the police, they declared that their motive was political. It was proved beyond reasonable doubt that the organizer and leader of the assault was Radl Sendic. The police were unable to lay their hands on Sendic, however; he escaped from the Department of Artigas over the River Uruguay to Argentina. For many months it was rumoured that he was staying in hiding on one of the many islands on the river (which had been prepared beforehand as a possible refuge) and that he later travelled repeatedly from Argentina to Brazil and back again. At the northernmost tip of Uruguay, in Bella Unión, where the UTAA has its headquarters, the borders of the three countries meet and it is one of the few places in Uruguay where there is enough vegetation (in the moist, almost subtropical climate) for guerrillas to hide; also, the region is advantageous from the standpoint of transportation: there are always boats available for crossing the River Uruguay to Argentina or the River Cuareim (Quaraf) to Brazil. Later the news was heard that Sendic was in Peking undergoing an intensive training course.

At about the same time (1964) a number of Argentine terrorists, who were fugitives from justice in their own country, were able to escape into Uruguay. They had been accused of political as well as civil crimes (including murder), and some of them had belonged to the left wing of the extremist movement "Tacuara", whose leader, José ("Joe") Baxter, was one of those to flee Uruguay. Others had belonged to a terrorist group that had been active in Argentina especially between 1962 and 1963, the "Uturanucas"; they had been found guilty of several assaults on banks, military installations and a hospital, where they had killed the guards who had resisted them. Among these delinquents was one named José Luis Nell Tacchi, who was wanted in Argentina for several crimes and who has a long police record. Several of these terrorists had graduated from guerrilla training courses in Cuba, Algiers or China. Most of them were originally ordinary criminals who realized that by camouflaging their activities under a "political" mantle they had better chances of evading justice.

The Argentine terrorists who entered Uruguay illegally were given refuge by persons seemingly above suspicion, and they got in touch with ultra-leftist elements of the pro-Chinese line, especially anarchists, members of the pro-Chinese organization MIR and some pro-Chinese "socialists". They used the existing "Tupamaros" gang as a basis for forming a new terrorist group. For many months the members were drilled; it is supposed that at that time the group consisted of 25 or 30 members made up of Argentinians and Uruguayans, about a third or fourth of them women. In the first place there were some students, among them a few who had been expelled from the youth organization of the pro-Soviet Uruguayan Communist Party for their excessive revolutionary zeal. Then there were highly skilled persons such as engineers, lawyers, physicians, etc., who were to play a most important part and without whose collaboration the "Tupamaros" could not exist with any hope of success. Of the latter, some were employed in large State or privately-owned enterprises, and in the case of the most important ones there had generally been no evidence of leftist leanings.

It is interesting in this connection to note that the "Tupamaros" -- not unlike similar groups in other parts of Latin America -- are practically all members of the "bourgeoisie" and not of the under-privileged classes which they allege to defend and whose problems in reality they do not know at first hand at all. Among the leaders are sons of millionaires and wealthy "capitalists", a phenomenon which, of course, is not restricted to terrorists or guerrillas, but may be observed to a certain extent also among the Latin American orthodox communists, most of whose leaders do not even try to hide their not exactly "proletarian" way of life.

III. Extremism and its motivations

Moreover, the most active members of the "Tupamaros" not only belong to what the Marxists call the "bourgeoisie" and the
"oligarchy", but some of them are the sons of men who in the late 1930's and early 1940's were registered in the Uruguayan Nazi organization "Alianza Nacional" which was materially and morally supported alternately, and sometimes simultaneously, by Berlin and Rome. (Also the Argentine terrorist organization "Tacuara" was a far right, pro-Nazi movement to begin with). Apart from the commonplace explanation which the French express so aptly as "les extrèmes se touchent", this latter case gives rise to interesting Freudian speculations as well as common sense deductions. The sons obviously feel obligated to "expiate the sins of their fathers" by taking what they consider the opposite road: the extreme left instead of the extreme right. In reality, however, it is evident that the family influence usually triumphs after all, as the excitement of joining a Nazi party in the 1930's can be compared today only to that of participating in another extremist movement, such as the "Tupamaros". In other words, there is much more resemblance between the personalities, character and activities of the "Tupamaros" and their parents than they realize. The actions of fathers (in the past) and sons (today) are quite similar, in spite of the fact that the apparent motivation, with which they rationalize them, may be, at least superficially, quite different or even opposite.

IV. Propaganda and infiltration

Chief theoretician of the "Tupamaros" became the Spanish anarchist Abraham Guillén, who under the pen name of "Arapey" writes a weekly column on political-economic matters in an afternoon paper belonging to one faction of the governing Colorado Party. Guillén is the author of several books and articles on the theory of war and guerrilla warfare, urban guerrillas, etc. In the Spanish Civil War he fought on the side of the communists and was later trained in guerrilla tactics at a special camp in Albania.

In the months that the "Tupamaros" were becoming familiar with modern criminal and guerrilla tactics, the Argentine members of the gang remained in close touch with the terrorists or would-be terrorists in Argentina, many of whom were -- and are -- ultra-left Peronists (a few of them at present in jail).
discovered that "Tupamaro" meetings had taken place on the premises of the physicians' union (which maintains the country's largest mutual health insurance fund), at the School of Architecture, at the Medical School and at the Arts School (all three belonging to the State-owned but completely autonomous University of Montevideo, the only one in the country). It has been known for a long time that the Arts School harbours the core of the anarchists and the School of Architecture that of the Trotskysites. In a relatively short time, the "Tupamaros" found new adherents on whom they believed they could rely, especially in the above-mentioned University schools. The meetings which the police were able to find out about at that time were attended by 40 to 50 persons.

The most important aim of the "Tupamaros" at that stage remained, however, to infiltrate key positions: in the police, the banks, the autonomous State enterprises, wherever possible. They had some success in this: among the bank employees, for example, there are a considerable number of "Tupamaros" or "Tupamaro" sympathizers; the same is true of some public services such as UTE (State-owned light and telephone company); ANCAP (State-owned petroleum refinery and alcohol, cement and fertilizer plant), OSE (State-owned waterworks), etc.

As regards their hideouts, to judge from the number of these discovered by the police in the past three or four years, it appears that they have several dozen; from luxurious holiday chalets to simple workers' huts, from modern apartments in the best districts of Montevideo to smaller houses and apartments in the capital and all around it, especially in the many beach resorts which surround Montevideo, but also in the interior of the country. If, in general, the "Tupamaros" do not live in ostentatious luxury, it is not because of any modesty on their part but for the very much down-to-earth reason not to call attention to themselves.

These dwellings, apart from guaranteeing refuge to escaping "Tupamaros" serve as meeting places and also as deposits for subversive literature, weapons, explosives, etc., as laboratories for the manufacture of home-made bombs (although many of these are complicated and usually put together with great care and technical knowledge, in some cases they prove fatal, because the bombs exploded while being assembled, and the explosion brought the police to the premises, forcing the "Tupamaros" to flee, in one case at least with serious burns, as make-shift hospitals or first-aid stations, as training grounds, etc. It is known that the "Tupamaros", with the help of their physician and medical student members, staffed several complete "field hospitals". In the schooling of the urban guerrillas advanced medical knowledge is obligatory.

It is interesting in this connection to note that the sugar workers' union UTAA is constructing and staffing a polyclinic in Bella Unión. The drugs and other supplies are being delivered by the Montevidean physician Ruben Mario Navillat Odriozola, who is supposed to be one of the leaders of the "Tupamaros", and by another physician, Mrs. Azarella Munz de Almirati, the wife of another "Tupamaro" leader, engineer Pedro Almirati. Both were repeatedly seen in the area around Bella Unión and during 1968 they passed the night on at least two occasions in the home of the family of José María Severo, one of the most important persons of the UTAA, who was arrested by the police in 1965 for organizing communist-inspired disturbances.

Engineer Almirati (37) has been wanted by the Uruguayan police since March 1969, when his name was discovered on some confiscated documents and he fled. He was observed in the border city of Rivera after that and it is possible that he escaped to Brazilian territory or else he is hiding at some "Tupamaro" hideout in the Department of Rivera (which is located southeast of the Department of Artigas). This Almirati, who was financially very well-off, was described by his acquaintances as extremely "rightist"; since he visited Hungary in 1954 with a Uruguayan football team, nobody had been aware of any leftist inclinations or contacts on his part. His wife had declared that she was completely ignorant of the present ideas and activities of her husband, a statement that was obviously a lie.

As regards Navillat Odriozola, he had attended training courses in Havana and is supposed to know many of the jungle regions of South America thoroughly. His task is above all to build First-Aid cadres of four persons each, who are taught to
remove a bullet, reduce a fracture, etc. These cadres are being sent into different parts of the country, to be ready in case of any emergency; either where guerrilla or terrorist activities are to be carried out or in the vicinity of "Tupamaro" hideouts. As mentioned above, this operation has been quite successful. Navillat Odriozola works for several mutual health insurance funds in Montevideo and he is also employed by a private hospital. Also in these places he is on the lookout for possible adherents to the terrorist movement.

The above persons are mentioned in some detail because they are typical of one kind of guerrilla leader.

V. The "Tupamaro" mentality

A brief analysis of the "Tupamaro" mentality reveals, even to the layman, a strong neurpsis, which is especially noticeable among the leaders of the group. In nearly all instances, the individuals involved are frustrated "bourgeois" elements, who suffer either from insufficient professional recognition or from lack of erotic satisfaction. It is evident that engineers, physicians and advanced University students who did not complete their studies, faced with personal problems, find solace in an evasion of these problems and in their sublimation to violent action or at least the advocacy of violence.

Another type of guerrilla is usually either divorced or leads an extremely irregular erotic and emotional life (promiscuity among the members of their own group); feeling themselves rejected, they isolate themselves from the rest of society — to whom they attribute their own failure (or sometimes only imagined failure) — and pretend that it is they who reject the bourgeois society and not vice-versa.

As regards the (former or present) Catholic priests and seminarists who appear to favour a violent revolution as a panacea for the social ills that plague humanity, it is significant that once they abandon celibacy and marry or enter into a more or less durable liaison with a woman, their violence greatly diminishes; if it continues at all, it is owing to the fact that they sublimate the sin they have committed by abandoning celibacy (in the sense they have been taught and have been teaching it themselves), by explaining that their struggle for helping the poor and improving the world cannot be accomplished without violent means.

In other words: more than social or even political, the underlying motivation for the guerrilla movement is glandular. In this there is marked similarity with the motivation of ordinary criminals (with whom the guerrillas indeed have much more in common than the general public believes), as has been established by renowned experts in the field.

In their rationalization the "Tupamaros" also believe that the utilization of violent revolutionary actions in itself creates a "revolutionary mentality" in the population, because it is "basically the revolutionary actions which provoke the revolutionary situation prematurely". That is to say: it is not necessary to wait until a "revolutionary conscience" has appeared in the people, but rather this can be purposely and artificially created by the revolutionary actions of a few. (Recent happenings have proved this theory, once more, to be completely erroneous).

The kidnapping, in 1968, of the President of the State electricity and telephone works UTE marks the beginning of a new phase in the activities of the "Tupamaros". The kidnapping was considered by many to have been no more than a rehearsal. If that should be true, it was certainly successful. During ten days the "Tupamaros" were able to elude all discovery and keep the executive hidden in a locked room without arousing any suspicion. Even after he was found, half drugged, in a pick-up truck, the police were unable to pick up the trail and many months elapsed until, rather by chance, the police found the place where the prisoner had been held captive. The kidnapping also had other effects: thousands of police and soldiers had been unable to locate the missing man and the Uruguayan forces of order had thus been effectively discredited. At the same time, the image of the "Tupamaros" was becoming more brilliant.

Although in December 1965 they had killed a policeman, people talked of how "humane" and "kind" they were, as they had treated the President of the Electricity Works relatively well. Especially impressed was the Uruguayan public by the courteous
and considerate manners of the "Tupamaro" leaders. Later this image changed; besides being well educated and courteous, the "Tupamaros" proved ruthless and cruel. This was evident once again when, one September 9, 1969, they kidnapped one of the members of the board of an important newspaper enterprise who was simultaneously on the board of several important banks which had been merged not long before. Kidnapping, of course, has been a favourite tactic of guerrillas in Latin America (and elsewhere), especially since Fidel Castro set the example in the 1950's. It is a crime which is nearly impossible to prevent and very difficult to solve. If carried out intelligently, the risk to the kidnappers is relatively small in comparison with the advantages that can be expected.

With the assaults on the Casinos of Carrasco (Montevideo) and San Rafael (Punta del Este) and on several banks in the summer (January-April) of 1969, the "Tupamaros" obtained a considerable amount of funds (in total approximately 300,000 dollars, of which only a small percentage was recovered). Although it was proclaimed repeatedly that these funds (as well as others obtained in the past and future) would be used for helping the "poor" and the "people", nobody ever saw anything of the money again. The "Tupamaros" made another gesture intended to win the approval of public opinion: They announced that they were willing to return that portion of the money robbed in Punta del Este which corresponded to the tips of the employees of the Casino. The police declined the transaction. The only other sign of "preoccupation with the poor" were several robberies of foodstuffs from a chain of shops, that were given away in a workers' district (not a slum).

VI. Relations with other terrorist movements

It was only at the beginning of 1969 that there appeared proof of what before had been no more than a rumour: that Radl Sendic was back in Uruguay, that he was connected with the "Tupamaros" and was even their leader. The indisputable fact remains that he was seen in the vicinity of the Casino San Rafael shortly before the assault and seems to have been the one who rented the house where the robbers dwelt for several days before carrying out their plans. It was assumed that after having spent two or three years in China, Sendic had returned to take charge of the entire guerrilla movement in Uruguay. This would seem to indicate that the Chinese communists had realized that guerrilla warfare should be carried out in Uruguay above all in the cities. This is only a logical conclusion, in view of the fact that 80% of Uruguay's inhabitants live in cities and towns; more than 50% are to be found in the capital and its surroundings alone. On the other hand, the fact that the "Tupamaros" were able to obtain so much money on their own, made them to a certain extent independent of the Red Chinese as well as the Cuban communists.

It was furthermore confirmed that the "Tupamaros" continued maintaining friendly relations with the Argentine terrorists, and it is presumed that certain activities were carried out in coordination between terrorists on both sides of the River Plate. This seems to have been the case in May-June 1969, for example, when terrorist activities broke out simultaneously in several parts of Latin America, but especially Uruguay and Argentina. A continental subversion plan which was found and made public in Argentina in the middle of 1969 also confirms the theory that the guerrilla groups of the countries in the "southern cone" of Latin America tend to coordinate their activities.

Moreover, the "Tupamaros" maintain good connections with the Brazilian exiles in Uruguay and some of the terrorists who live underground in Brazilian territory. Furthermore, it is known that Brazilian border guards have been bribed to supply the "Tupamaros" or their envoys with weapons, owing to the fact that the Uruguayan police have confiscated most of the stolen arms and there have been no new shipments forthcoming either directly from Cuba or via other Latin American countries. As it is impossible to obtain arms in sufficient quantities in Uruguay itself, and as Fidel Castro has let the "Tupamaros" down in this respect, the "Tupamaros" are thinking of supplying themselves with arms and munitions in Algeria, but it is not yet quite clear how.

According to estimates there now exist around 500 "Tupamaros",
of whom over 200 have been identified but only relatively few (30 or 40) have been imprisoned (five terrorists were killed in battles with the police). The sympathizers and occasional helpers of the terrorists are variously calculated at between 2,000 and 5,000 according to the degree of involvement in the movement. These latter add the "Tupamaros" either because of the spirit of adventure which this kind of activity seems to exude or simply for money. At present the "Tupamaros" are busy creating additional cells among the students and also among the workers; main targets: members of the Communist Party who are fed up with doing nothing. By the way, the second most important immediate objective of the "Tupamaros", after their anti-Government activity, is to fight against the regular communists of the orthodox, pro-Soviet Communist Party.

VII. Primary aims

Documents captured by the police show the following primary aims of the "Tupamaros":

1. To establish connections and cultivate good relations with all leftist movements;

2. To build an apparatus for attracting militant leftists who appear to be good subjects for successful indoctrination in theory and practice.

3. To create organisms for propaganda purposes, in order to "radicalize" the struggle and create a "revolutionary conscience".

4. To organize and keep a well-armed, well-trained and well-supplied group that has "battle" experience and has demonstrated its merits in guerrilla and guerrilla-like activities.

VIII. Contradictory aspects of "Tupamaro" thinking

Regular political activities within the legally established parties in a free and democratic country appear to the "Tupamaros" as an impossible road, not only because it is obvious that they could hardly be successful in the traditional tactics of Latin American politics, but also because such a step would demand considerable time, dedication, detailed work, patience and perseverance, none of which they are capable or willing to sacrifice. They believe that violence may be a shortcut to power. The example of Fidel Castro fascinates and blinds them; they avoid analyzing the particular conditions which made Castro's advent to power possible and they simply ignore the fact that in history events do not repeat themselves in different surroundings and under dissimilar conditions.

It is unrealistic, too, that these "revolutionaries", who pretend to be the champions of the poor and the underprivileged, should worship as their maximum hero a man like Ernesto Guevara, the son of well-to-do bourgeois parents who was himself a technocrat -- while he was Minister of Industry in Cuba he made plans to convert the entire country into a huge city-factory -- whereas they endeavour to evade the age of mechanization and technification. "Che" Guevara is being worshipped as a "romantic dreamer", who died for his ideals, while in reality his struggle had the object of gaining power in Latin America with the most unscrupulous, cruel and sanguinary means; he loved the terrorist activities not only as an instrument to intimidate the population and force them to support and aid the guerrillas, but also as a means of provoking the forces of law and order of the Government concerned to use repressive measures, which in turn were calculated to arouse a violent reaction on the part of the people.

In the opinion of the "Tupamaros", the fact that in Uruguay there exists a (for Latin America) well organized labour force is very favourable. As the labour unions are in a position to paralyze the entire State apparatus, as has happened more than once in the past, they believe that all that is necessary is to infiltrate the leadership of these labour organizations in order to secure the paralysis of the nation and take over power. In other words, the terrorists propose to take advantage of the Moscow-led unions to create unrest and debilitate the country for their own benefit. These intentions were given specific form, it is supposed, during the visit of "Che" Guevara to Montevideo in disguise early in 1967, when he met several
"Tupamaro" leaders.

The "Tupamaros" furthermore consider it an advantage that half the population and nearly all industrial enterprises are found in and near Montevideo — 300 square kilometres of streets and buildings, in which to carry out terrorist actions and, if necessary, hide without leaving a trail (as one terrorist expressed it). The terrorists believe that the Uruguayan army of 12,000 is one of the weakest on the continent, and that of the 6,000 policemen in Montevideo (out of a total of 22,000 in the whole country) only about 1,000 are moderately well schooled and equipped for anti-subversive action. As according to "Che" Guevara every good guerrilla is worth at least 20 soldiers or policemen, the "Tupamaros" were extremely optimistic. This optimism, it has been shown, was somewhat exaggerated.

All the above does not mean that the rural guerrilla plans have been abandoned completely. The chief planned site is still the Department of Artigas, especially the region around Bella Unión. In this border zone are stationed 4,000 Brazilian and 2,000 Argentine soldiers and officers, while the Uruguayan forces on this side of the frontier amount to exactly 1 lieutenant and 24 men.

The problem of the sugar-cane workers has been played up artificially. There is quite enough work in the region and there exists little unemployment; even the unavoidable seasonal unemployment causes little real distress and not any widespread poverty, as the sugarcane workers' trade union, the UTAA, claims. A much greater problem for the hard-working people of Bella Unión and its surroundings is the installation of the UTAA camp near the town, where some "unemployed workers" are living and others are being trained in guerrilla warfare. The fact, as mentioned above, that the UTAA is installing a clinic in this region, with the help of terrorist leaders, suggests that the latter expect large-scale actions, with a relatively high number of casualties, to take place in that region. Among the intellectuals of the area, the UTAA people have not had much success; only 17 students in the Department of Artigas have declared their (at least verbal) support for the extremists.

However, strangers are frequently seen in the area, most of them from other parts of the country and even foreigners, whose business is not clear. They get in touch with the leaders of the UTAA and help to indoctrinate and drill the members of the union. Constantly arriving from Montevideo are students, professionals, labour leaders and other persons, who exchange their knowledge of propaganda, agitation, subversion and terrorist methods for information in the possession of the UTAA people: observations made on the borders with Brazil and Argentina, details about border guards, the mood among the workers, tensions between employers and employees, etc.).

On October 8, 1969, the second anniversary of the death of "Che" Guevara in Bolivia, the "Tupamaros" carried out what has been to date their most daring attack. Using cinema-like props (they ordered a funeral coach and several cars) they entered the town of Pando (approximately 10,000 inhabitants; 40 kilometres north-east of Montevideo and only about 15 kilometres from the beach and its many resorts), overpowered and took over the police station and adjoining fire station. They next cut off the town's main telephone lines and then proceeded, in separate groups, to rob three different banks. For 10 or 15 minutes they appeared to have been successful and hauled away three big bags with an estimated 60 million pesos (240,000 dollars). The people of the town, however, noticed something was amiss and found ways of informing the road patrols and through them the Metropolitan police and the army. After a spectacular Hollywood-type chase, which included all kinds of vehicles and even Army helicopters and planes, more than 20 "Tupamaros" were arrested; three were killed (as well as a young onlooker in Pando) and several were injured. Another 20 or more were able to escape on foot. It is estimated that in total about 70 "Tupamaros" were involved in the "coup".

This attack on the town of Pando was probably not intended as a real take-over but rather as a rehearsal and at the same time a large-scale robbery (nearly all of the stolen money was recovered). It had been suspected before that not all of the terrorists' hideouts in and near the beach resort had been discovered. Furthermore, the police had known for a long time
that near Pando there existed a training camp for guerrillas, organized among others by the Brazilian, Leonel Brizola.

IX. Conclusion

To sum up, it may be stated that the urban guerrilla movement in Uruguay, "Tupamaros", is a typically "bourgeois" organization, comprising predominantly sons of former Nazis and of wealthy and upper-middle-class parents, members of the clergy, professionals and students. It has no definite political doctrine and its ideological outlook is hazy. Its immediate goals are empirical but at the same time unrealistic and unrealizable: the take-over of power in a country by a small group through violent means. The phraseology with which this bastard goal is being camouflaged — "social justice", "fairer distribution of wealth", etc. — resembles that of similar movements of the past and is therefore not very original. The driving impulse, apart from lust for power, is the terrorists' painful realization of their own inadequacy in their professions, studies, sexual and personal relations.

Basically, the "Tupamaros" are an organized criminal gang of the Mafia type. It is relatively successful in Uruguay because this country has limited defence possibilities and practically no preventive measures can be taken, precisely because the "Tupamaros" belong to the "ruling classes". The protection of these ruling classes furthermore makes them less vulnerable to discovery, or even punishment (they can afford better lawyers, for example) than ordinary criminals. In a sense, therefore, the "Tupamaros" are really a variation of the "oligarchy" which they allegedly combat. Should they ever win, it would mean a victory of the "ruling classes" in a modern variation. Those in whose name this "revolution" is said to be carried out — the "people", the "masses" the "proletariat" — will be the ones to be duped.

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