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This review is an effort to meet the growing need for information and documentation on the political, cultural, psychological and other aspects of East-West relations. It will indicate briefly views and facts which have been presented already in pamphlets, papers, articles etc.

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POLITICS

SINO-SOVET STALEMENT

(The Interpreter, February, 1970)

After a decade of wrangling the Sino-Soviet quarrel shows no signs of easing, nor is a settlement of the border issue in view.

The return of Moscow's chief negotiator to the Sino-Soviet talks in Peking on January 2 was inauspicioulsy timed. It followed the resumption of anti-Chinese polemics in the Soviet Press and a new blast against Moscow in the three main Peking newspapers on New Year's Day. The sickness that prevented Mr. Kuznetsov's counterpart, Chiao Kuan-hua, from greeting him on arrival looked like a diplomatic chill. Illness was also the reason given by the Russians for the replacement of Kuznetsov's deputy, Major-General Matrosov, Chief of Staff of the Soviet border guards, who had accompanied his superior back to Moscow on December 14. Chinese displeasure at the prolonged suspension of the talks was reflected in Peking's announcement of Kuznetsov's arrival; it pointedly recalled the date of his departure three weeks previously, when official sources had stated that he would be away for "about a week". Another ten days passed before the confirmation from Moscow that talks had been resumed. But at his Press conference on January 13, enlivened by the New China News Agency correspondent's outburst against Soviet-American "collusion" over Taiwan, the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman, Mr. Zamyatin, threw no light on the Peking negotiations - it was, he said "too early" to sum them up.

The Chinese view had been conveyed four days earlier through the Hong Kong Communist newspaper, Ta Kung Pao. On January 9 both its daily issue and an extra edition of its English-language weekly blamed the Soviet side for the deadlock. Up to Kuznetsov's departure in mid-December, the newspaper said, there had been "no progress" because the Russians had broken the understanding alleged to have been reached last September between the Soviet and Chinese Prime Ministers. According to the article, Mr. Kosygin and Chou En-lai had
agreed that provisional measures should be taken to maintain
the status quo, avoid armed clashes and withdraw their
troops from the disputed areas, so that negotiations towards
an "all-round" settlement of the border issue could proceed
free from duress. The accusation that Moscow had failed to
restrain its forces and refused to disengage during the talks
added substance to reports of continuing border skirmishes;
it seemed mainly intended to embarrass the Russians by
implying that they were using their military superiority to
exert pressure. In making Soviet bad faith responsible for the
lack of progress, the Peking-inspired article no doubt reacted
also to recent suggestions from Moscow attributing the stale-
mate to China.

While the escalation of Press attacks appears to be aimed at
placing the other side in the worst possible light in case of a
breakdown of the talks, this does not seem likely for the time
being. Though the outlook is one of arduous and protracted
negotiation, both sides have an urgent interest in avoiding a
breakdown. Zamyatin affirmed that there was "no lack of good
will" on the Soviet side, and the T a K u n g P a o article
emphasised China's realism and view that ideological
arguments should not hinder the normalisation of State relations
between the two countries. But there is as little common ground
on practical details as on general principles, while the war of
words nurtures mistrust and fear of a major clash of arms.

Moscow hits out

After three months of restraint on the subject of Mao and his
policies in the wake of the Kosygin-Chou En-lai meeting, the
end of the year saw a renewal of polemics in the Soviet Press
suggesting that against the receding prospect of a quick
settlement Moscow judged verbal militancy more useful to its
cause. The campaign gathered steam in January, with relatively
mild criticism in the December issue of the journal
Problems of Philosophy and the New Year issue of the weekly
New Times giving place to strong attacks in
Pravda, Izvestiya, Literaturnaya Gazeta
and Krasnaya Zvezda. A T a s s report on January
9 on "war psychosis" in China cited new travel restrictions
on foreigners, trench-digging, the building of air raid shelters
and stockpiling of provisions, and the condemnation of old films
depicting the horrors of war as part of an official drive to foster
a "siege mentality" directed against the Soviet Union. T a s s
said that Chinese war preparations and anti-Soviet propaganda
were aimed at distracting attention from Peking's serious
economic and political difficulties and growing popular unrest.
The Chinese leaders were accused of invoking the foreign threat
to overcome internal divisions, as well as to prevent the re-
habilitation of good Communists repressed for favouring co-
operation with the Soviet Union. I z v e s t i y a deliberately
placed the T a s s article beside its report of the renewal of
Sino-American talks in Warsaw and, like the theme of China's
war preparations, that of a sinister Sino-American rapproch-
ment has featured prominently in other Press articles and
broadcasts for home and foreign consumption and been echoed in
Eastern Europe and Mongolia.

Soviet allegations about Peking's collusion with the greatest
"imperialist" Power - seen as the natural consequence of
growing internal crisis caused by a betrayal of Marxism-
Leninism - closely mirrors Chinese charges against the Moscow
"revisionists". Thus the New Year joint editorial in the
People's Daily/Red Flag/Liberation
Army Daily described "Soviet revisionist social-
imperialism as but an episode in the coursë of imperïalisni
heading for total collapse". The article said that the successors
of "Khrushchov the clown" had got into even deeper waters than
the fallen Soviet party leader and dismissed the "Brezhnev
doctrine" as a "variation of moribund neo-colonialism".

Mutual suspicion

One reality behind the extravagant slogan-mongering is mutual
fear that sooner or later the logic of the Sino-Soviet conflict
may push its protagonists to seek a rapprochement with their
major Western adversary, the USA. On January 9 China sent
a Note to the Soviet Union alleging that the Soviet Press was
abetting the American "two Chinas policy", particularly in their
coverage of the visit to Taiwan of Vice-President Spiro Agnew.
The Russians in turn expressed suspicion at the resumption
of the Sino-US ambassadorial talks in Warsaw on January 20
and the lifting of some American trade and travel restrictions against Peking dating from the Korean war nearly 20 years ago. The magazine *New Times* said that the strict secrecy observed about the Warsaw talks could not but feed the apprehensions of "peace-loving people", while a Soviet broadcast in Chinese claimed that the Peking leaders and American policy makers had discovered a mutual attraction in their hatred of the Soviet Union.

The lack of progress in the Sino-Soviet negotiations has no doubt encouraged the Chinese to open a line to the United States. As well as wishing to sound out Washington about its future policy in Asia generally and Taiwan in particular, Peking may well aim to bring pressure on the Russians to settle the border issue on terms satisfactory to itself. The comparative moderation in China's propaganda about President Nixon and Vice-President Agnew's Asian tour could also have been designed to keep Moscow guessing.

At the same time both China and Russia have accompanied their increased contacts with the Americans with fresh attacks on the US - clearly to prevent each other's criticisms of "collusion" from seeming convincing to their own peoples and to the world at large, which might undermine their credentials as revolutionary leaders. This was noticeable in Moscow's propaganda output after the agreement last October to open preliminary talk on strategic arms limitation with the Americans in Helsinki, when the Russians seemed particularly anxious to prove that they were not capitulating to US pressure. Similarly, in rebutting Chinese charges of Soviet-American collusion in the wake of the Agnew tour, Moscow protested that it had consistently condemned the tour as a move to perpetuate "the US policy of aggression against the Asian peoples". And at a time when China has been the subject of several American initiatives to relax trade restrictions, her Press has been alleging that the exporting position of the United States has drastically worsened and that "frantic attempts" are being made to dump industrial and agricultural products.

**Words of war**

In referring to "a flirtation of imperialist forces with Peking", Moscow Radio (on January 16) complained that reports in the "capitalist" Press about an imminent military conflict between China and the Soviet Union were "provocative lies" aimed at a deliberate distortion of Soviet intentions towards Peking. Yet, with its own sabre-rattling, reflected in boasts about Soviet nuclear superiority, leaks about possible counter-strikes, and the systematic denigration of Mao's concept of "people's war" or "protracted war" as hopelessly outdated in the atomic age, Moscow itself has given the impression of wanting to use its military power as a threat - a possibility underlined by its action against Czechoslovakia. The Russians are adding to the tension by continuously warning the Soviet public about China's war preparations, quoting in support the same foreign observers that they have accused of spreading unnecessary alarm.

**Literaturnaya Gazeta**, which was in the forefront of the anti-Chinese propaganda war last year, on January 14 again alleged that the whole of China, and particularly the regions bordering on the Soviet Union, were being subjected to "total mobilisation" amounting to "preparations for aggression". The journal then punctured its own argument by taunting the Chinese with their "lack of means" to carry out their attempt at intimidation, and coupled a gibe about the "discrepancy between ambition and ammunition" with a Russian proverb that "God doesn't give horns to a cow that butts". The cow, not unnaturally, has tried to show that it has horns. In his speech to the Ninth Party Congress in April, the Defence Minister, Lin Piao, called for preparations against every kind of warfare, including a nuclear blow, but the present emphasis would appear to be on defence against conventional attack and guerrilla tactics, in which China's superior manpower would be the "ocean" to drown the invaders. In declaring their readiness to meet the worst, the Chinese leaders must be calculating, too, that patriotic fervour will help restore the unity shattered by the impact of the cultural revolution.

Against this background, the Peking negotiations look even more unpromising than last October. At the moment the two sides seem to have differing views on what the talks should be about. While the Chinese clearly wish to concentrate on the border issue, they accuse the Russians of wanting to broaden the context. At all events, the Soviet Union is quite clearly unwilling to consider...
a new comprehensive treaty which would give the Chinese what they want most - less territory than official recognition that the vast tracts ceded in 1858 and 1860 to Tsarist Russia were acquired through "unequal" treaties. A solution to the dispute over the islands in the Amur and Ussuri rivers, where sharp clashes broke out last year, and over the demarcation of the Sinkiang frontier, is complicated by conflicting readings of existing maps - though the deliberate inaccuracy of Soviet maps, apparently for reasons of security, which was recently uncovered by Western cartographers, has made the Chinese case look more convincing. It may be that both Moscow and Peking have settled for a policy of attrition - with continuing negotiations as an insurance against the worst - until a new development (Mao's death, a change of leadership in the Soviet Union) deals them a new hand.

IMPERIALISM SEeks TO EXPLOIT SOVIET-CHINESE DIFFERENCES
(Soviet News, 24-2-'70)

"Confronted by the increasing strength of socialism internationally, imperialism is trying to weaken the unity of the world socialist system. It uses the differences in the international revolutionary movement in a mass media, in the service of anti-communism and its struggle against socialism and against all progressive forces." - Extract from the main document of the 1969 International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties.

One is particularly conscious of the justice and correctness of these words when one reads some of the publications which have become particularly widespread lately in the West, and especially in the USA and Britain.

The authors of these publications invent all kinds of lies about an alleged "Soviet threat" to China and, at the same time, declare that the People's Republic of China would "benefit" immensely from establishing friendship ... with the USA.

The London Times, for instance, at the beginning of February, featured a series of articles on the topic.

These demonstrated in every way that the sympathies of The Times, which has long been wellknown for its hostility to communism, are completely with the Peking leaders who are supposed to be very peaceful, but according to Neville Maxwell, the paper's commentator, are confronted by a "real and deadly threat" from the USSR.

These articles were echoed by some equally provocative statements in the Washington Post. In its issue of February 9 the paper said that Soviet troops were deployed for an attack on Red China and added that the Russians were also thinking of using nuclear weapons.

Catchpenny title

Other U.S. newspapers, which have suddenly developed sympathies for the present leadership of China, are churning out similar statements.

This is a case of another and obviously provocative manoeuvre by the imperialist propagandists aimed at disrupting the normalisation of relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China and at the same time aimed against the cause of international peace and security, particularly in countries where anti-Soviet propagandists are at work.

Perhaps this new propaganda campaign by our ideological opponents is best demonstrated in a recently published book by Harrison Salisbury, the well-known columnist of the New York Times, with the catchpenny title The Coming War Between Russia and China.

The bourgeois press in the West has started, as if by command, praising this book and featuring numerous laudatory reviews and advertising its author as an experienced "Sovietologist."

The Guardian in Britain, for instance, said that Salisbury had known the communist world for 20 years, having gone to Moscow as a newspaper correspondent 20 years ago. It went on to say that his predictions were based on the knowledge he acquired about Russians at that time and during subsequent visits to the Soviet Union.
Yet the predictions with which the author has so abundantly provided his book certainly do not justify this widespread praise, but look rather like wishful thinking by a medicine man; they have nothing in common with a sober and objective analysis of the prospects of development of the current international situation.

Salisbury was obviously in a great hurry to get out a book which would suit certain circles who are afraid of a possible relaxation of tension in relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

One can see from the very title of the book that the author wants to convince the reader of the inevitability of an armed clash between the USSR and the People's Republic of China.

The political task which is being fulfilled by the author is rather a delicate one: on the one hand, he appeals in his book to the U.S. ruling circles not to miss the opportunity but, by exploiting the tension in Soviet-Chinese relations, urgently to normalise American-Chinese relations - on terms advantageous for America.

On the other hand, his book is addressed to the nationalist-minded elements among the present Chinese leaders.

It generously supplies them with all kinds of anti-Soviet lies and concoctions such as the threat of a "preventive" Soviet nuclear attack on China, and tries to convince them that the only way to save themselves from this alleged Soviet threat is by establishing close co-operation with the USA.

Salisbury does not go to any great pains to convince the American reader that his prophesies and predictions are correct. The arguments with which he tries to impress the "average" American are reduced to extensive quoting and reporting of anti-Soviet attacks in current Chinese periodicals, official statements, hostile to the USSR and the CPSU, by the Peking leadership, and crazy nationalistic ratiocinations by anonymous Chinese spokesmen whom Salisbury met in expensive restaurants in Hongkong and Macao.

As for the political arguments that the author of the book intends for the eyes of the Chinese leadership, they are far from new, even though they are worth examining in greater detail.

The author takes no trouble to hide the fact that he is a true supporter of Sir Halford Mackinder's school of geopolitics.

Although he admits that the geopolitical philosophy was "always closely associated with the imperialist or continental aspirations of one nation or another," and even disavows possible accusations that his outpourings as regards "China's lebensraum" may look "like a line out of a bad Nazi propaganda picture," nevertheless he bases all his arguments and predictions precisely on concepts of imperialist geopolitics, on the assumption that a collision between the USSR and China in Asia is "inevitable" and that the USA is the messiah, the only balancing factor that supposedly keeps the world on the tightrope between peace and war.

Unnamed Russians

Here the author treats commonly known facts in an absolutely carefree and, in places, inexcusable way.

Salisbury tries might and main to instill into his readers the idea that the Russians are "traditionally" suspicious of other nations, and this is supposedly due to their geography and history.

Viciously slandering the Soviet state's nationalities policy, he supports his inventions with this kind of "information": in Peking, in the spring of 1969, an unnamed Soviet diplomat allegedly assured his Western colleagues that the Europeans must jointly repulse the yellow Asian hordes; another unnamed Russian official in Khabarovsk told an unnamed British tourist that Kipling was right when he said that "East is East and West is West and never the twain shall meet," and so on and so forth.

Salisbury naturally found no place in his book for an impartial exposition of the facts relating to the traditional friendship between the peoples of the USSR and China.

He has completely ignored the long Soviet effort on the international scene to deliver China from the oppression of imperialist powers, the policy of full equality that Soviet Russia has conducted vis-a-vis China since the very inception of the Great October Revolution, and the Soviet renunciation of all the
unequal contracts and treaties earlier imposed on China by tsarism and all the concessions, rights and privileges that the Russian bourgeoisie and bureaucracy once acquired.

Salisbury deliberately fails to mention the fact that it was precisely the Soviet Union which, in 1924, was the first to appoint an envoy of ambassadorial rank to China, whereas the other powers "traditionally" looked down upon China as a second-rate power, sending Peking envoys of only ministerial rank.

Salisbury says nothing either about the fact that it was only because the Soviet Union voiced a strong protest against the seizure of Manchuria in North-East China by the Japanese warlords in 1931 that all the patriotic anti-Japanese forces in China rallied together. It was also the only country which gave effective help to embattled China between 1937 and 1941.

Although Salisbury is compelled to admit that during those years the Soviet Union sent China tanks, aircraft, fuel, arms and ammunition, volunteer pilots and experienced military advisers, such as Chukov, Rybalko, Zhitarev and others, even here he cannot abstain from an anti-Soviet attack, and complains that all this aid was meant for Chiang Kai-shek and the national government rather than the communists.

It appears that he is counting on his American readers being unaware of the fact that at that time there was in China a single front against the Japanese invaders, and it is precisely this policy of a single front between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China that was implemented with the Soviet Union's vigorous support. It is common knowledge that it bore fruit, thwarting the Japanese military plans and preventing China's surrender.

It would be interesting to ask Mr. Salisbury: what would the situation in the Pacific theatre have been like had the national government of China, left without support of the Soviet Union, capitulated to the Japanese as early as 1938 or 1939?

USA supplied Japan

Incidentally, it is permissible to remind Mr. Salisbury of the fact that it was precisely in those years that the United States, just like Britain, actively supplied Japan with strategic military raw materials, including aviation fuel for the aircraft making bombing raids on Chinese cities and raw materials for the aviation industry.

The Soviet Army, which routed the hand-picked one million strong Kwantung army of Japan in 1945, made a great contribution to the national struggle which the Chinese people were waging.

However hard Salisbury may try to cast aspersions on the Soviet Union's entry into the war against militarist Japan on the strength of its allied commitments, he does not succeed.

Therefore he resorts to another provocation when he writes that the Soviet troops in the autumn of 1945, in spite of all their efforts, were unable to reach Peking and Port Arthur before Japan's actual surrender.

It is well known that the Soviet Army at no time in the military campaign in the Far East set itself the task of entering Peking. The strategic aim of the military operations was to route the Japanese Kwantung army in Manchuria and Korea, and also the Japanese forces in South Sakhalin and the Kurile islands, which was bound to speed up Japan's capitulation.

Equally incorrect is Salisbury's assertion about Port Arthur. Troops were airlifted to the cities of Port Arthur and Dalny on August 22, 1945. As soon as the first plane landed at Port Arthur, a crowd of Chinese and Koreans came to the airfield to give valuable information about the Japanese garrison stationed in the city.

The Soviet command made use of the information and the enemy garrison was quickly disarmed.

The entry of the Red Army units into Port Arthur developed into a festival of friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples.

On August 24, units of the Sixth Tank Army of the Guards arrived in Port Arthur by rail.

It would be pointless to look in Salisbury's book for an objective testimony of the enormous fraternal and disinterested assistance from the Soviet people to the young People's Republic of China during the first 10 years of its existence.
Salisbury does not say a word about the fact that 256 large industrial projects, which are the kernel of Chinese industry to this very day, were built with Soviet technical assistance during those years, that Soviet instructors trained more than 20,000 specialists with a higher education in Soviet and Chinese higher educational establishments, that the Soviet Union, during all those years, ensured the defence of the legitimate interests of the Chinese people at an international level.

"Chilling prospect"

All these things are forgotten by Salisbury when he furiously defends the thesis of the allegedly eternal and irreconcilable animosity between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

As has already been indicated, Salisbury's purpose is to prevent the normalisation of Soviet-Chinese relations.

Salisbury does not conceal the fact that he is horrified at the idea of Soviet-Chinese friendship being restored, which, as he puts it, "would confront the United States with the most critical foreign policy crisis of the century - the prospect of facing 1,000 million or 1,200 million Chinese and Russians armed with nuclear weapons in bewildering array, the latest in modern military technology, striding the Eurasian continent like a colossus."

Another admission made in this connection by the author is also not accidental. He writes that such a prospect "is chilling and it is precisely this dreadful potential which has caused Americans to welcome Sino-Soviet hostility."

Salisbury is only too ready to snatch up any anti-Soviet pronouncements by the Peking leaders. He admits that although at times it seems as though Chinese propaganda is directed equally against Moscow and Washington, in all their talks the Chinese officials draw a sharp distinction between China's attitude towards Russia and the United States.

"Visitors come away from these talks," Salisbury goes on, "with a feeling that the differences between Russia and China are differences of principle, whereas those between China and the United States are superficial and relate almost entirely to Taiwan."

Salisbury falsifies the history of the demarcation of the Russo-Chinese border. He repeats the nationalist Chinese propagandists' slanderous concoctions about the imaginary "exploitation" of China by the Soviet Union, about certain "territorial seizures" by the USSR in China, and mythical Soviet claims to Chinese territory. At the same time, he endeavours to justify the chauvinistic, hegemonic policy of territorial claims by the Chinese nationalists on the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic.

At the same time, Salisbury tries, in every possible way, to prove the possibility and need for the establishment of friendly relations between China and the United States. With this aim in mind he alleges that U.S.-Chinese differences are of a temporary, transitional nature, and that they only sprang up in 1950, after the U.S. occupation of Taiwan.

The author completely "forgets" to mention here the many U.S. bases near the People's Republic of China, the stationing of U.S. troops in South Korea, and other "trifles" of this kind, which constitute a threat to China.

This "forgetfulness" helps Salisbury to maintain silence over the problem of the fundamental difference between the interests of the Chinese people and the criminal aspirations of U.S. imperialism.

Salisbury devotes considerable space in his geopolitical discourses to the Mongolian People's Republic. He impudently declares that Mongolia should be neutralised, and, if possible, brought into alliance with China.

Incidentally, it should be mentioned here that Salisbury is not the only one to encroach upon the national sovereignty of the Mongolian People's Republic. Recent years have seen many organs of the capitalist press circulating reports which were far from the truth and pursuing the object of discrediting the international prestige of the Mongolian People's Republic.

Primitive purpose

Not so long ago, the Mongolian newspaper, U n e n, spiked the provocative United Press International report of December 22, 1969, which distorted the real situation in the Mongolian People's Republic and sought to create a wrong
impression of People's Mongolia in public opinion in many countries.

In his book, Salisbury urges the United States to meddle in Soviet-Chinese affairs. If the United States wants to play a major part in the Chinese-Soviet dispute, he writes, it should set up viable relations with China.

As Salisbury sees it, the object of U.S. interference is to make its influence felt in Peking and, thus, counterbalance Moscow.

In the final analysis, this lengthy geopolitical incantation fits in nicely with the desires of imperialist circles, and boils down to the primitive purpose of frightening the Chinese leaders with the bogey of a Soviet threat and of pushing the People's Republic of China into the embraces of the United States.

In his speech at the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties on June 7, 1969, Leonid Brezhnev said that "ultra-aggressive circles often influence the shaping of the foreign policy of the big capitalist states. To curb the activity of these circles it is necessary to be firm, to expose their intrigues and provocations and constantly be ready to administer a determined rebuff to aggressive encroachments. This is the foreign policy that the CPSU and the Soviet Union pursue."

Attempts to distort and present the Soviet Union's peaceful foreign policy as "aggressive" are in vain. On the contrary, in relations with other states this policy is based on the principle of respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity and on the non-use of force.

The whole world is aware that the Soviet Union is doing everything to encourage goodneighbourly relations - in accordance with these principles - with the People's Republic of China as well. This is in the interests of both countries and of the entire socialist camp.

CHINA AND THE UNITED NATIONS
- The Problem of the Universality and Effectiveness of the World Organization -
(Review of International Affairs, 5-2-'70, Belgrade)

There is no doubt that a detailed analysis will be made during preparations for observing the 25th anniversary of the United Nations of the balance sheets of the world organization. The discouraging fact that the People's Republic of China is still outside it is bound to emerge as one of the world organization's major failures. There are several arguments to support this claim.

1. Despite the fact that the number of UN member-states has increased from 51 in 1945 to 126 in 1970, the world organization is not yet a truly universal organization in view of the absence from its ranks of the People's Republic of China.

2. Universality is a vital prerequisite of the United Nations' effectiveness; without including the People's Republic of China, whose population is larger than that of Africa and both Americas taken together, the world organization remains defective and dangerously handicapped in performing its historical mission.

3. The absence of the People's Republic from the UN means sanctioning an impermissible precedent - the fact that an emigree, puppet government is allowed to represent a nation and a state which have nothing in common with it except that twenty years ago, after completing successfully their revolutionary and liberation struggle, they outlawed this very same government and degraded it to the level of a foreign agent that took refuge on Formosa.

There is no legal or political ground on which to oppose the admission of representatives of the People's Republic of China to the UN. The reasons which are put forward belong to the arsenal of anti-communist propaganda and in reality express a tendency and an effort to keep the world organization subordinated to the interests of one power or a group of powers. The reason most frequently cited is that the People's Republic of China does not meet the conditions which the UN Charter requires that each member-state must meet, i.e., that the People's Republic of China is not a peaceful country and that it is not striving for the realization of the principles and aims laid down in the Charter.

Just how reasonable this kind of argument is is best illustrated by the fact that some of the powers most insistent on it were or are themselves guilty of acts of armed intervention which
are in flagrant contradiction with the principles and aims of the UN Charter and with the obligations and duties of the UN member-states. It thus follows that one logic applies to the role and activity of the People's Republic of China in the Korean dispute and another to the armed intervention in Vietnam or in the Dominican Republic, the tripartite aggression on Egypt and the invasion in the Middle East, the colonial and racialist ventures of the Republic of South Africa and Portugal and other adverse "episodes" in the behaviour of UN member-countries which are assumed to be morally and legally obliged to respect and adhere to the principles and aims of the UN Charter and implement the resolutions and recommendations of the world organization.

Politically and legally speaking, the question of representation of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations does not necessitate procedure for her admission, as she was one of the founders of the world organization, but requires procedure for depriving the representatives of Formosa of their mandate and transferring this mandate to the legitimate representatives of the Chinese people, i.e. those of the People's Republic of China. There are no legal obstacles or difficulties to prevent this transfer of political and legal warrant from being effected promptly and radically. There is no legal dilemma, either de jure or de facto, as to a) who stands for and represents China - one Chinese island, Formosa, or China herself, and b) who has effectively held power in China since 1949 - Mao Tse-Tung or Chiang Kai-Shek? In all cases of constitutional or non-constitutional, peaceful or revolutionary change of government in the UN member-countries from 1945 to 1970, representatives of the régime that effectively held power in a given country automatically assumed their sovereign right to have their delegation in the United Nations. All except the government of the People's Republic of China. Even régimes which had an incomparably lesser right to be representatives of their people and those which could never claim to hold effective power in their countries.

However, for the want of legal obstacles there were political barriers to prevent a prompt and radical solution of the question of Chinese representation in the UNO. We have already said that these are the product of the attitude and behaviour in the United

Nations of one power or a group of powers. The history of the creation and misuse of these barriers is at the same time the history of the world organization: of its slow and painstaking evolution from a European-American mechanism subordinated to the bloc's voting machines in the early post-war period, towards a balance of forces in which the interests of the numerous newly-independent states, the interests of the democratic socialist and non-aligned majority of members have asserted themselves more. This evolution may also be illustrated by the following table containing the results of the voting on the admission of China in the UN:

<table>
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As shown by this table, despite sporadic fluctuations, the number of countries voting in favour of the admission of China.
is constantly on the increase: from 7 in 1952 it rose to 56 in 1962, and after a certain fall increased again in recent years (to reach the figure of 48 in 1969). Although the number of countries voting against the seating of China in the UN has likewise increased as compared to 1951, the following evidence should be observed: This number remained unchanged for a whole decade, from 1951 to 1961, and after attaining its maximum in 1968 (58 countries), it is falling again. The number of abstentions was the lowest in 1953 - 2 countries, and the highest in 1968 - 24 countries. If we take the lowest and the highest numbers of votes as an index of the most important tendencies, we shall see that the number of countries which voted in favour of the admission of China increased in some years as many as eight times (56 in 1962 as against 7 in 1952); that the number of those voting against increased one and a half times (58 in 1968 as compared to 37 in 1951); and of those which abstained increased twelve times over (24 in 1968 as against 2 in 1953). The largest percentage of votes in favour of the American attitude was recorded in 1953 - 73 per cent, and the lowest in 1969 - 36 per cent. This figure rose to 44 per cent in 1969.

Realizing that prospects for the admission of the People's Republic of China would increase parallel with the strengthening of the democratic majority in the United Nations and with the democratization of relations in the world organizations, the opponents of China's admission transferred the whole matter to the procedural field, taking advantage of the provision of the Charter stating that a two-thirds majority is needed for a decision to be passed on any important matter. In this manner, an obvious procedural obstacle has prevented the settlement of a question which could quickly and easily be disposed of by a decision passed by a simple majority of member-countries.

Between the two basic stands there are several "compromise" theses:

- the thesis on the existence of two Chinas which should both have a place in the United Nations;
- the thesis that both Chinas should be members of the UN, only one of which, the People's Republic of China, would have the right of veto among the permanent members of the Security Council, while Formosa would enjoy the status of an ordinary member;
- the thesis that the People's Republic of China should be admitted to the UN but that Formosa should remain as a permanent member of the Security Council.

Although they constitute "compromise" solutions, these proposals have not met with much support as they transfer the question of China's representation to the terrain of pragmatic breaking up of the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the Chinese state.

It is not our intention to show how the exclusion of certain countries from the UN system in an obviously shortsighted and illegal manner defies the provisions of the UN Charter and favours a climate which hampers the realization of the principles of the United Nations. Nor do we propose to prove that admission of states to the United Nations helps to induce them to respect and implement the principles and aims of the UN Charter. We merely wish to point out that the admission of the People's Republic of China would mark a decisive step towards making the world organization a truly universal organization and towards increasing its effectiveness.

Therefore full support should be given to the initiative calling for a decision to be passed in this jubilee year of the United Nations to admit the legitimate representatives of China to the world organization.

CHINA - TWENTY YEARS OF COMMUNIST RULE
(Freedom First, nov. 1969, Bombay, India)

When two decades ago Communists took over in China and Mao Tse-tung became the overlord of the mainland, with the exception of a few democrats, most people over the world welcomed the turn of events in that sub-continent. Compared to the corrupt regime which people around Chiang Kai-shek had established in China, the newly imposed communist totalitarianism appeared a blessing in disguise. But before long the real character of Chinese communist regime became apparent, and the world
realised that what had emerged in China was totalitarianism of the most atrocious kind, and that it lacked all human elements. The hope which the communist victory in China had initially raised had fallen to the ground. Mao's regime was no better than the worst of Stalin's tyranny. The "Let hundred flowers bloom" era, which was made much of by Communists throughout the world - at that time all Communists including the Soviets were full of praise of China - proved to be a fraud on the world.

Today when China is celebrating twenty years of communist hegemony, it would be worthwhile to take stock of the achievements and failures of the communist regime in that country. It is true that Mao Tse-tung who made his appearance at the celebrations is not fatally ill as originally reported in Moscow press but on the contrary is in good health; yet it is obvious his stature in the eyes of the world is positively on the decline. Today Mao has no reliable friends in the world. The only friend China has in communist fraternity is Albania; but it is too insignificant to count for anything.

The first decade of communist rule in China was marked by its friendship with the Soviet Union which was, in fact, held as a model by the Chinese leaders. The first five year plan which China adopted in 1953 for its economic regeneration was based on Soviet type of planning; even the Chinese constitution, launched in 1954, was patterned after that of the Soviet Union. Soviet system of state administration and control was increasingly copied by Chinese leaders in 1954 in the reorganisation of their own system of government and communist party machinery. People's Liberation Army was sought to be modernised on the Soviet lines in 1955. The professional officers of armed forces of China donned Soviet type uniforms; agriculture was collectivised on Soviet model in 1955-56. During the first ten years of communist rule there was considerable fraternisation between Russians and Chinese and the leaders of both the countries called themselves "comrades-in-arms". Nikita Khruushchev, the Soviet Premier, then had made it a point to be present at the celebrations of the first decade of communist rule. There were constant exchanges of military, political and cultural missions between the two countries. There were thousands of Russian technicians and advisors in China and they had become a part of China's social and industrial life. They were greeted by the

Chinese as "comrades" and in turn the Russians too reciprocated. But since 1956 things began to change. Mao took a dislike for the Russians and denounced them as "Khruushchevist revisionists". All fraternisation between Russians and Chinese ceased; no longer they called one another as comrades. The Russian technicians and advisers left Chinese soil - for good. At first the change in Chinese attitude towards Russians was kept secret but soon it was made open.

At the end of twenty years of communist rule, China is economically much weaker than before and China's prestige abroad has suffered serious setback. This is the conclusion one irresistibly comes to inspite of her bid to enter the big power club by exploding a 3-megaton nuclear device in atmosphere in early October.

Actually, China's economic decline began with the Great Leap Forward in 1958 when she attempted the reorganisation of Chinese society into small communes, for the purposes of carrying on specific economic tasks. Instead of serving the intended purpose the communes, which even separated husbands from wives and children from parents and introduced a sort of camp-life with common messes for all had disastrous effects on the Chinese society. With the result social life was profoundly shaken. Before it could recover from the disastrous effects of the commune-system, the Chinese society was overwhelmed by the great proletarian cultural revolution, in which young men and women in their teens under the inspiration of Mao himself and under the garb of "Red Guards", sought to overthrow ancient values of Chinese civilisation and strike terror in the hearts of elders who still had some faith in the past. The great proletarian cultural revolution had nearly led to chaos and anarchy when it was halted on the orders of the Premier, Chou En-lai. China has yet to recover from the horrendous consequences of that revolution.

When in 1949, Communist hegemony was established in China, Mao and his colleagues had hoped that their victory would inspire revolutionary zeal throughout the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Not only has their hope been belied, but the very image of China in these continents is tarnished. When, a few years ago Premier Chou En-lai returned home after
A tour of African countries and made a statement that those countries were on the verge of revolution. The African leaders were put on guard and they seriously suspected Chinese intentions. The result was that whatever little influence China had in Africa was weeded out. Burundi, following an attempt at assassination of its President, broke off diplomatic relations. Kenya took up an anti-Chinese attitude; and Congo expressed its reservations about the external policies of China. Similarly in Asian countries, with the exception of Pakistan, Chinese influence is on the decline. Malaysia, Burma, Indonesia, Philippines and the countries on the periphery have deep suspicions about China. Her border disputes with India in 1962 and with Russia at present have helped to expose expansionist policies.

The People's Liberation Army which had taken the world by surprise in 1949, has lost much of its power and prestige. It is true, that China's armed forces of 2.5 million men is a potent force, which the democratic world cannot afford to ignore; but it has ceased to inspire revolutionary ideas anywhere in the world. It is primarily tied down with the task of garrisoning cities and farms after the tragic failure of the cultural revolution. As reports suggest the armed forces lack a true offensive capability and its small nuclear arsenal is still not in a deliverable position. Further, the great mass of foot soldiers, though well-trained in fighting techniques, are without overall technological support; hence, in an event of serious combat with a super power like Russia or the United States, it will be at serious disadvantage. The army has no heavy artillery larger than a 155 millimeter howitzer, and the tank force at its disposal is not as large as it is generally supposed. Again, in order to keep dubious friends like Pakistan on its side, China is forced to part with a number of tanks, which renders its military strength still weaker. The air force has no modern bombers, and most of its fighters are old-MIG-19s. The navy too is not much of a threat, although it is euphemistically called "the guerrilla task force on the sea". The naval strength consists of only light petrol craft and a few submarines. According to China watchers, Chinese armed forces may put up impressive defensive warfare, but they can hardly show any large-scale offensive capability.

In addition to all this, the economy of China is seriously jeopardised. Industrial production has fallen by 15 per cent since 1967. Revolutionary disruption has resulted into social dislocations which have desperately affected the processes of production. For instance, recent rioting in Anshan, which normally produces 12 million tons of steel a year, is reported to have destroyed several blast furnaces. The agriculture which was disorganised as a result of the Great Leap Forward has not caught up. There is also constant recurrence of famine in various parts.

It will be thus clear that the progress communist China had made during the first decade of revolution is largely dissipated during the second. "There is a fantastic contrast between the first and second decades" observed Alexander Eckstein, Director of the University of Michigan's Centre for Chinese Studies: "The first decade was turbulent, but it was a useful turbulence - upheavals that were engineered and organised for a definite purpose, such as the collectivisation of farms. The turbulence of the second decade was of a more destructive type, accomplishing little and inhibiting progress".

Yet, whatever be the condition at the present moment, the fact that China is a nuclear power - though far behind in the nuclear chain - cannot be ignored. It constitutes a potential threat to most Asian countries. Further it has shown tremendous capacity in instigating overseas Chinese to sabotage local governments. Malaysia and Indonesia are typical examples in this respect.

It is, therefore, imperative that we in India are ever vigilant. China's friendship with Pakistan is obviously based on sinister motives, hence our caution must be doubly great. Further, there are parties in our midst which are openly sympathetic to China and regard Mao Tse-tung as a hero of Asian liberation. We must be cautious of these parties, for any day they may indulge in subversion and abet in China's expansionist designs.

INDONESIA: ANTI-COMMUNIST BATTLE GOES ON

Like the mythical phoenix, the Indonesian Communists have gone through a recurrent cycle of suicide and resurrection three times in the past four decades. A key question here now is
whether they can plausibly rebuild their organization — once the largest in any non-Communist nation — after the massive military crackdown that decimated them following their abortive coup d'état in late 1965. The collapse of that coup was an event of enormous significance, not only for Indonesia but in the broader perspective of international development in Asia at the time.

There is for example, little doubt that their elimination greatly encouraged the Johnson administration to continue escalating in the Far East. Among other things, the Communist failure shattered growing alignment between Peking and Jakarta and, in the process, it may have indirectly prompted North Vietnam and North Korea to revise their attitudes toward Red China.

Impact in Peking

It is fair conjecture, too, that the Communist setback exacerbated tensions in Peking between the faction around former President Liu Shao-chi, which apparently favored the coup, and Mao Tse-tung’s partisans, who hold that People’s War is the only valid revolutionary strategy. In the estimation of Indonesian and Western specialists here, the prospects for a Communist revival in the years ahead depend on two principal factors. The first of these factors is the capacity of the remnant Communist leaders, now reportedly in disarray, to achieve a degree of unity and shape a coherent plan for the future. The other is the ability of the predominantly military government under Gen. Suharto to promote domestic, social, economic and political programs to curb the potential attraction of Communism.

At the moment, both the Communists and the government appear to be aware of their respective shortcomings. But, in typically slow, mysterious Indonesian fashion, neither has yet been able to turn to effective long-range action.

Flourishing Again

By the early 1960’s, the Communists were flourishing again, now with Sukarno’s blessing. In addition to their card-carrying members, they counted some 12 million sympathizers in various peasant, student, labor and cultural associations. Though the precise reasons for their conduct have never been fully clarified, the Communists apparently launched their coup on the night of Sept. 30, 1965, to prevent a similar move by the army. But the coup, in which the Communists murdered six Indonesian generals, misfired badly. The army unleashed a reign of terror in which an estimated half-million suspected Communists and fellow travelers were slaughtered from Sumatra through the eastern-most islands of the archipelago. Virtually the entire Communist leadership, including the party chairman D.N. Aidit, was killed in the massacre.

After that, Indonesian Communists who had been visiting Peking and survived the holocaust criticized the bungled coup as a form of military adventurism ... detached from the masses." Parroting Mao Tse-tung’s principles, the pro-Soviet faction calling itself the Marxist-Leninist group of the party emerged with pleas to the Communists to ignore Maoist advice and to
concentrate instead on rebuilding their political foundations. But the surviving Communist leaders in Indonesia chose to heed the Chinese.

In 1967, appointing themselves as the new politburo, this group proceeded to reconstruct a covert and more flexible party apparatus apparently modeled on the Viet Cong guerrilla organization in South Vietnam. They created regional bureaus responsible for small administrative entities and formed village guerrilla units. They also established urban Communist committees. Though most of the Indonesian Army was loyal to Gen. Suharto, many military units and individual officers had been recruited into the Communist machine through a clandestine network known as the "Biro Chusus," or "Special Bureau." Several of these units and officers continued to be a part of the Communist underground after the failure of the 1965 coup d'etat.

Emulating Mao, who had retreated to Yenan in the mid-1930s, the new Indonesian politburo decided to set up a revolutionary base in a remote, hilly area south of the town of Blitar, in East Java. Here, in the style of the Viet Cong, the Communists dug connecting caves and tunnels with the help of friendly peasants. Here they also debated their next move. How the government learned of this base is still unclear. In any case, the army swept through the region in a six-week campaign in mid-1968, killing an estimated 2,000 Communist leaders and sympathizers, including most of the members of the new politburo. The destruction of the Communist base touched off arrests and purges that have been going on steadily for 18 months. Hardly a day passes here without official reports of army officers, government employees and lesser citizens being uncovered as secret Communists or, equally bad, conspirators plotting to bring Sukarno back to power.

Army Purification

In a speech six weeks ago, Suharto stressed the need to keep up the purification of the army, saying: "We should not be ashamed if among our ranks are people involved in the Communist movement, since they are remnants of the old order." That statement was the prelude to the dismissal or imprisonment of a dozen generals charged with having been linked to Sukarno and therefore obliquely connected with the Communists. These and other arrests, many of them on apparently flimsy grounds, reflect the nervousness of the Suharto government. Or as a senior officer here put it: "As long as there is one Communist at large, we are in danger." Though they are hounded and hunted, the Communists are still reported by reliable informants here and elsewhere in the country to be striving to reorganize. According to a well-placed source in Central Java, new Communist cells are being formed among the prisoners, often with the complicity of troops assigned to guard them. There are 120,000 suspected Communists in more than 300 special jails.

Other Communist elements are believed to have withdrawn to wooded mountain regions, where they have teamed up with bandits and assorted outlaws, living by raiding villages or receiving handouts from sympathetic peasants.

Future Insurgency

Several Indonesian and Western observers here contend that Indonesian officials and ordinary citizens are inadvertently contributing to a future insurgency by ostracizing alleged Communists and thereby giving them no choice but to turn toward the party for help. The government's awareness of this is mirrored in high-level directives calling for leniency toward Communist suspects. But directives and appeals are having little effect in the villages, for a wide assortment of reasons. Hence the Communists may well rise again in the years to come - by default.
It is still uncertain whether and when the third and no less important dialogue will start, that on normalizing relations between the two German states. If this should also take place, which would be highly desirable, it can then be said that a start has been made along a road which is heavily laden with the burdens of the past.

It was along the border between the Third Reich and Poland that three decades ago began the Second World War. It is on the border between the German Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic that ran the line separating the territories under the control of two military blocs, the line which split the European continent. It is in this centre of Europe that the main political contradictions, on which the present-day European division rests, are concentrated. The unsettled questions of frontiers and the abnormal relations between West Germany and the East European countries have become a barrier against which various initiatives for a European settlement have been and still are breaking down. Therefore a positive outcome of the present and future talks might mark the beginning of a new phase in Europe's history.

The new crew in Bonn, the government of Social Democrats and Liberals headed by Chancellor Brandt, has made it possible for a new leaf to be turned and for an exit to be found out of the situation which was characterized by political paralysis and futile propaganda feuds.

Following the initiatives dating back to 1966, a dialogue between the USSR and West Germany was opened in Moscow on December 8th. So far several talks have been held which have been described by the German side as preliminary, in order to establish the actual points which would be subsequently negotiated. How far they have got the public at large does not know. The talks are being conducted in full secrecy, which in this case seems to be the most promising method. The fact that the job was undertaken from the outset by no less a person than Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet foreign minister, should be taken as a sign that both sides have approached the talks very seriously. This impression has been strengthened by Chancellor Brandt’s decision to send to Moscow his close collaborator, State Secretary Egon Bahr, otherwise a great champion of Bonn's new Eastern policy. After so many meetings it can be assumed that the preliminary talks have gone so far as to have outdone themselves. If it is true that a great deal of extremely delicate questions have been cleared up, it is reasonable to expect that the ground for negotiations and a definitive formulation of a future agreement on the renunciation of the use of force will be cleared.

In the meantime there were some other moves whose influence on the atmosphere in the Moscow-Bonn relations should not be underestimated. First of all, there is the contract on the sale of Soviet natural gas to West Germany and German gas pipelines to the USSR, all this within a large credit arrangement. At the same time ambassador Egon Emel of the Bonn foreign ministry spent some time in Moscow and discussed a far-reaching scientific and technical cooperation (industrial equipment, licences, preparation of projects, exchange of "know-how", joint explorations, etc.). These talks are said to have been held in an "atmosphere of full understanding". There was also an increased trade between the USSR and Federal Germany by about 500 million DM during last year, so that the total trade reached the figure of 2.3 billion DM. All this is certainly far below the real possibilities for an economic and trade cooperation between these two countries, but it hints at a new policy, at a new awareness of mutual interests, which in time might produce qualitatively new results. In fact, this domain contains very significant elements for the bases upon which other important forms of inter-state relations rest.

Independently of the course of talks in Moscow, whether they promise success or failure, various political circles and groups in and outside Europe are following and commenting upon them frequently from the standpoints of their own narrow and tactical interests and aims. The West German extreme right wing, recognized today in the circle around Franz Josef Strauss, sees in the failure of these talks its chance of a lifetime and the opportunity to grab the helm of the government. This is why it is bringing a very strong pressure to bear upon the government, trying to force the entire Christian Democrat party to follow its policy, in which it is not likely to succeed, at least while the Moscow talks are continuing. It is, however, also noticeable that some circles in the West, especially in the US
but also in Britain and France, are also not very enthusiastic about the Brandt government's resolution to normalize the relations with the USSR and its Eastern neighbours, in fact about its independence and foreign political flexibility. The success of Brandt's Eastern policy would threaten someone's monopoly, someone's status of patron or mediator between the West and the East, and it would undermine the foundations of the present bloc structures, which also does not please those who are bent on perpetuating the military bloc arrangements. This suggests that the failure of this policy would, at least for a while, upset the European applecart.

In contrast to the Moscow talks, the "Warsaw round" lasted for only two days. They are to be resumed in the second week of March. These talks were also surrounded by full discretion. It is obvious that they were devoted to the outlining of standpoints and to a better mutual acquaintance. This part of the job went off well, in a working atmosphere. It is expected that long and difficult talks lie ahead, although it would not be advisable for them to be protracted too long, because when such a sensitive matter is at stake, and when various opponents of these talks and of settling the disputed questions are not finicky about the means they use, even a side issue could undermine them.

At the moment both governments have shown their earnest desire and intention to arrive at an agreement. All that is left is to see whether they will be able to get out of the labyrinth of objective difficulties which they inherited from the past. The stumbling block is the Oder-Neisse border, established at the Potsdam Conference with the proviso that it must be endorsed by a peace treaty. It has become the European "Bashomon" in the true sense of the word.

Discussing this border in the summer of 1945, Stalin, Churchill and Truman undoubtedly believed that it was definitive, and for understandable formal reasons they felt it to be confirmed by the peace treaty.

In the course of a quarter of a century, life has confirmed this border. It cannot be changed by any means other than war, which would naturally be a catastrophic one and on a very broad scale, even so on condition that the side wanting to change it should "win". Normal mind cannot even envisage such a "solution". It is just as hard to imagine that there will ever, or at least for several generations, be a peace treaty such as was envisaged at Potsdam. Consequently, there are hardly any even theoretical possibilities for the border to be generally recognized through a peace treaty. Out of the three Western powers, members of the anti-Hitlerite coalition, so far only France has officially recognized the new Polish western border, whereas the US and Great Britain have not yet officially done so, either for reasons dictated by their relations with the Christian Democratic government in Bonn, or in the hope that in a general game there should be as many "roles" as possible. The West German right wing is making out of this its political capital, although it is fully aware that this question has been settled once and for all.

On the other hand, it is understandable why Poland insists on a legal settlement of this question, just as any state would insist on having legally recognized borders. The Oder-Neisse border was recognized twenty years ago by East Germany under the Görlitz Agreement. Poland wants West Germany to do the same. The Brandt-Scheel government is willing to recognize Poland's territorial integrity in its present borders through the agreement on the renunciation of the use of force, but it leaves over the definite legal settlement of the border or the peace treaty in which it does not even believe itself. This has created a situation which looks a little like a vicious circle.

Poland put the border issue into the centre of the talks, although it is also interested in other agreements. Bonn is trying to avoid possible internal complications which might, although not necessarily, arise in the event of his signing a treaty on the definitive legal recognition of the Oder-Neisse border. The outcome of these talks will depend not only on the skill of the two sides in finding a mutually acceptable formula, but also on the further political and economic internal developments in West Germany. If Brandt's government strengthens even more its internal position, it will have a freer hand in foreign affairs. Judging by some recent hints, it is quite aware of the fact that it will be difficult to avoid a formal recognition of the basic realities in Central Europe, i.e. of another German state and the present borders. Herbert Wehner has hinted at such a
possibility in the future, which was the sign for a new wave of attacks from Strauss' and Barzel's camp.

No one denies that the subject of Bonn-Warsaw talks is extremely delicate and difficult. As a hard legacy of an inglorious past, it befogs the horizons of Europe's future and therefore it deserves the utmost efforts to be placed into its solution.

Conditions for a broader cooperation between West Germany and Poland are favourable. During the negotiations on trade and industrial cooperation, which started on October 9 and were adjourned on February 3, a wide range of mutual interests was recognized. Since the interruption came only as a result of differences over German credits to Poland, it is expected that this job will soon be successfully accomplished, which might give a stimulus to the main talks.

A certain optimism is inspired by the fact that there is a favourable wind of change between Warsaw and Bonn and a mutual desire to profit of the present tide of relaxation in European relations. The same could not be said for the relations between the two German states, because after the exchange of letters there is a feeling of a new breakdown. It is obvious that there can be no talk of any normalization of relations in Central Europe unless it embraces the relations between the two Germanys. It is only after this that the next stage can be envisaged, a broader development of all-European cooperation, which again is an essential prerequisite for our continent to reach one day the level of development of inter-state relations that would be completely freed of the ballasts dating back to the cold war.

In all these talks the vision of such a Europe could be the source of inspiration for bold and courageous decisions, for a generous break with the legacies left over by the previous stages, and for an energetic turning toward the future.

'FINLANDIZING' GERMANY

(International Herald Tribune, 21-2-70)

A crisis over the inevitable U.S. decision to withdraw troops from NATO by late 1971 is already building up a full head here, with some top officials in the government of Chancellor Willy Brandt ominously warning that a major troop cut would be the first step toward "Finlandizing" West Germany. This means that, if President Nixon pulls back anything more than a token force of 20,000 to 30,000 of the nearly 300,000 U.S. troops here, West Germany could go the way of Finland. While no Communist satellite of Moscow, Finland's every move is dominated by the Soviet Union. This grave view, obviously exaggerated to make the point, is now being privately discussed both in Brandt's government and in Brandt's Social Democratic party. It is based on this conviction: that a U.S. troop cut, spurred by a yearning for disengagement, would have a "psycho-political" reaction guaranteed to suck West Germany gradually out of its Western orbit. In short, it would be universally regarded as only the first step in a unilateral U.S. fallback, to be followed by a second and a third step, while to the east the Soviet Union retained its 30 to 32 divisions intact.

Threat to Ostpolitik

Moreover, the prospect of a major U.S. troop cut terrifies Chancellor Brandt's highly capable manager of Ostpolitik - the word used to describe Brandt's diplomatic and economic probes in Moscow, Warsaw and East Germany.

Again, the reason is not that a loss of, say, one of the five NATO divisions would in itself vitally affect the military balance. It would simply change the already overwhelmingly pro-Soviet ratio of ground forces - now 6-to-1 - to perhaps 7-to-1, scarcely a catastrophic change. The reason is both psychological and political. By signaling U.S. withdrawal symptoms, it would weaken Bonn's bargaining power and encourage Moscow (which controls all the Communist countermoves in Bonn's new game of Ostpolitik) to play an indefinite waiting game.

But worse still, a more than token withdrawal of U.S. troops would totally wreck another Brandt scheme: his call for balanced, mutual reduction of forces in Central Europe. If the West starts withdrawing unilaterally, Moscow's Warsaw Pact has everything to gain from sitting tight.

The new German government is well aware that economic factors in the United States are a major reason for troop-withdrawal
pressures, quite apart from neo-isolationism. About one-half the billion-dollar balance-of-payment loss that the United States now takes in West Germany comes from salary payments to NATO-employed German civilians and other household costs such as utilities and construction. German agreement to absorb that half-billion dollars would sharply ease the economic pressure for a troop cut. But Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt is against that for political reasons. It could trigger a vicious, debilitating defense debate in the Bundestag, with opposition leader Franz-Josef Strauss demanding that any such huge addition to defense costs be used to build up the German Army.

Risk of Inflation

Likewise, Brandt's economic advisers are against it on grounds that the federal budget, already fattened to carry out Brandt's pledge for major reforms in Germany's dilapidated educational structure, could not absorb such a cost without risking inflation or a cutback in domestic reforms. Those are risks Brandt won't accept.

Although some of the economic arguments against a larger German share of NATO costs are poormouthing, there is no poormouthing about the psycho-political effect of a substantial U.S. troop cut. To a man, the best Western strategists here agree that it could be catastrophic.

That is why Chancellor Brandt, with the concurrence of U.S. Ambassador Kenneth Rush, is being strongly pushed to add the troop-cut question to the agenda of his April talks with Mr. Nixon. The Germans have no clear idea of what Mr. Nixon is going to do and Mr. Nixon has no clear idea of what the German response will be. Considering the enormous stakes, that is a dangerous state of affairs.

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE AT THE PCF CONGRESS

(Radio Free Europe, 11-2-'70)

Summary: The 19th Congress of the French Communist Party was largely a demonstration of reconsolidation after the trials of the recent past. Traditional solidarity with the CPSU was reaffirmed (although the PCF has not withdrawn its criticism of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia), and the rebel philosopher Roger Garaudy, his views formally condemned, was ousted from his leadership posts. But he was not expelled from the party -- and the congress brought other signs that the PCF is not immune to the winds of change.

Television coverage of the 19th Congress of the French Communist Party (PCF) left the viewer with one unforgettable picture. It was that of Roger Garaudy, sitting in lonely detachment among the delegates of Val-de-Marne: arms folded, eyes somber behind spectacles, stubborn lines etched around his mouth -- impassively watching the tribune where, as Politburo and Central Committee member, he ought to have been seated with the rest of the leadership, while a succession of speakers denounced him for "anti-Sovietism" and for holding positions "completely opposed" to the line of the party.

Garaudy's very presence in the Nanterre Palais des sports was an act of moral courage. He could easily have absented himself on the ground of ill-health, as did Louis Aragon, his friend, fellow-Central Committee member, fellow-champion of Czechoslovak reform and, occasionally, fellow-critic of Soviet dogmatism (whose illness lasted until the evening of the third day, when he entered the congress hall to warm applause -- just after Garaudy had made his unrepentant speech, and departed). Since October 1969, when he broke a year's silence by publishing the book, Le grand tournant du socialisme, (See RFE Research 0470, "PCF Seeks to Close Ranks at 19th Congress," of 4 February 1970, by Kevin Devlin, pp. 4-5.) Garaudy had been repeatedly denounced by the Politburo, the Central Committee and a drumfire barrage of major and minor party spokesmen, while his views on such subjects as the Communist regimes, intraparty democracy and the French path to socialism had been condemned in one section of the Congress Theses. He knew that at the Nanterre Congress he would be subjected to further attacks and formal condemnation, that he would lose his leadership posts and might be expelled from
party; yet he came — and came not to offer the traditional self-criticism, but to reaffirm his stand in lonely integrity. In a way, the outcast was the central figure of the congress.

"Normalization"

But only in a way. The 960 delegates were participants in a well-staged demonstration of organizational unity which brought few surprises. This was, as expected, a congress of "normalization" and consolidation, intended to manifest the PCF's recovery from the trials of the recent past — notably the Czechoslovak crisis, which obliged it break hallowed tradition by disassociating itself from Soviet actions; the student uprising of May 1968, which exposed it as an essentially non-revolutionary force; and domestic developments, which confirmed its position as the opposition force but left it as far as ever from its primary goal, a leftist alliance based on a common program.

The PCF's loyalty to the CPSU, already demonstrated at the Moscow Conference of Communist parties in June, has been reaffirmed. The party would "fight intransigently against any manifestation of anti-Sovietism, from whatever source it may come," declared its new strong man, Georges Marchais. (L'Humanité, 5 February 1970.) In line with this posture, L'Humanité quietly censored certain passages in the speeches of the Yugoslav and Rumanian fraternal delegates which must have grated on the ears of the strong Soviet delegation. (See L'Humanité of February 7 for partial reports of both speeches.) Omitted, for instance, were the passages in which the Yugoslav Mika Tripalo and the Rumanian Paul Niculescu-Mizil called for the abolition of military blocs in Europe.

Then there was the curious case of the chief Italian delegate, Giorgio Napolitano, who had been expected to restate his party's well-known views on such subjects as Czechoslovakia and inter-party relations, but instead delivered a blandly uncontroversial address. The puzzle was solved by Le Monde, whose reporters discovered from "sources close to" the Italian delegation what had happened. The PCF leadership had twice insisted that Napolitano modify passages of his prepared speech dealing with Czechoslovakia and the Moscow Conference. Napolitano refused: rather than make the changes demanded, he dropped those passages. (See report by Andre Laurens in Le Monde, 7 February 1970.)

The Czechoslovak Issue

As for Czechoslovakia both Marchais in his opening address and Etienne Fajon in his report on the theses reaffirmed the PCF's "disapproval" of the August invasion, but they did so briefly and linked this with a declaration of solidarity with the Soviet Union. So the "disapproval" remains on the record, but the PCF -- in contrast to more progressive Western Communist parties, notably the Italian, Spanish and British -- has ceased giving active support to the cause of reform in Eastern Europe. Indeed, it seems that the PCF has actually helped Czechoslovak conservatives to demolish the heritage of the Prague Spring.

During the congress Le Monde confirmed with circumstantial details the revelation -- made a little earlier in Czechoslovakia by the conservative Indra and Bilak (Indra made revelation at a speech on January 14 and it was repeated, again without details, by Bilak at the Czechoslovak plenum at the end of the month. Bilak headed the Czechoslovak delegation to the PCF congress.) -- of the ignoble role that the PCF recently played in the sorry process of Czechoslovak "normalization." Last November (1969) a three-man delegation of the PCF had gone to Prague, and there handed over the minutes of conversations which Waldeck Rochet had with Dubcek on July 14-15, 1968 (a few days after the French leader returned from Moscow, where he warned the Russians against invading Czechoslovakia). According to Le Monde (6 February 1970), Rochet expressed the PCF's concern about developments in Czechoslovakia, its amazement that the Czechoslovak CP could tolerate the existence of the K-231 society (for victims of Stalinism) and the "reactivation of the social-democratic party." By handing over these notes, taken at the time by Jean Kamapa, the PCF of course provided Czechoslovak hard-liners with more ammunition to use against the fallen Dubcek and all that he stood for.

Down - But Not Out

As it reaffirmed the PCF's traditional positions in interparty matters, so the congress also reaffirmed its tradition of disciplined unity. The challenge to that tradition was, of course,
personified by Roger Garaudy; and, as noted earlier, the issue was never in doubt. In a series of unanimous votes during the closing session, the congress formally condemned his positions -- "on all points the antithesis" of the party line, said l'Humanité. Garaudy -- Stalinist turned Marxist humanist, member of the Central Committee for 24 years and of the Politburo for 14, Communist deputy for 11 years, author of 21 books -- was duly dropped from the top leadership; dismissal from his post as director of the party's Center for Marxist Studies and Research (CERM) will certainly follow.

But he was not expelled from the party; and before he was formally condemned he was allowed to defend his heretical theses (as he had already done during the pre-congress discussions, in his Humanité statement of January 2) in a frigid silence broken only by occasional groans and angry whistles. He did so with subtlety, eloquence and courage. While avoiding the more extreme formulations of his book, Garaudy repeated his call for a profound transformation of the PCF, a fuller acceptance of open debate, a more convincing commitment to democracy, a less dogmatic analysis of political realities -- and a new attitude to existing socialist regimes. The PCF he insisted, must state clearly what aspects of those regimes it approves of and what aspects it rejects; in particular, it must declare that "the socialism" that we intend to build in France is not the socialism that has been military imposed on Czechoslovakia."

Signs of Change

The fact that an influential intellectual who has challenged the leadership so radically, and has been condemned so vigorously, remains a member of the Party (at least for the time being) is without precedent in the purge-ridden history of the PCF. It is the most dramatic demonstration -- though not the only one -- that, despite the stage-managed show of continuity, the Party is being affected by the winds of change. Other signs included the pre-congress "debate," which was more of a true debate this time than ever before, and the presentation of "unscreened" amendments from the floor of the congress. (See Roland Leroy's report on amendments made to the Theses. L'Humanité, 9 February 1970.)

This is not merely a matter of showing outsiders how "democratic" the PCF is, although the need to impress this on the other left-wing parties (with which the PCF is, so far in vain, trying to conclude an alliance) must have been an important factor. Even more important, however, is the fact that Garaudy represents a wider current of unrest within the Party. Just before the congress, 175 Communists and ex-Communists signed a manifesto condemning the "normalization" imposed on Czechoslovakia. The independent review, Politique Aujourd'hui, produced by dissident Communists and leftists, has entered its second year of vigorous life. Garaudy's friend, the writer Aragon, continues to criticize authoritarian Communism in his weekly, Les Lettres Françaises.

The dissident magazine, Unir-Débat, which represents a "clandestine" anti-Stalinist faction within the Party, and claims a readership of 20,000, prepared for the congress by issuing a strongly anti-Soviet "draft program" of its own. ("La ligne communiste pour la France." Unir-Débat (Paris), 10 September 1969, pp. 11-30.) "New Left" militance continues to make inroads.

Thus, despite the conservative temper of its leadership (strengthened by the election of Georges Marchais as Deputy Secretary-General to the ailing Waldeck Rochet), the Nanterre congress has shown that the PCF cannot escape the pressures of change. As Garaudy reminded the congress, the Party can get rid of those who raise inconvenient problems, but the problems will continue to be posed by life itself. To sum up the 19th congress one might, perhaps, adapt a familiar French saying: "Plus c'est la même chose, plus ça change."

CONVENTIONAL 'WISDOM' ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST

( International Herald Tribune, 7-2-70 )

It is conventional wisdom about the Middle East that (1) the superpowers share an interest in peace, but cannot "control" the states with which they are closely associated; (2) the absence of peace is the equal responsibility of Israel and its Arab neighbors; and (3) the United States has been "pro-Israel" at the expense of broader national interests.
All three propositions are incorrect or misleading.

Since 1955, the Soviet Union has played on the Arab sense of grievance about the existence of Israel as a catalyst for policies which have brought one Arab nation after another under extremist control, and now threaten to engulf the entire region, save only for Iran, Turkey and Israel.

**Soviet Arms**

Without Soviet arms, war would not have occurred in 1956 or in '67. In 1967, false Soviet reports of an Israeli mobilization against Syria were the Ems dispatch (which triggered the Franco-Prussian war) of the six-day war. And there would have been peace long since between Israel and its neighbors if the Soviet Union had not rearmed the Arab nations after June, 1967, and supported the Khartoum policy of "no peace, no negotiations and no recognition."

This process has converted the Arab-Israeli problem from one of local conflict into a threat to NATO, and other national interests of the U.S., and therefore to world peace. A continuation of present trends would threaten the life of Israel and other state interests of the U.S. and its allies, from Morocco to Iran.

Soviet air and naval positions already outflank the main NATO defense area. The space and the resources of the region are of fundamental importance to the commerce, the communications and the safety of the Atlantic alliance, and of nations associated with it.

This development challenges the moral and political obligations implicit in the creation of Israel, and the American policy of support on many occasions since 1950 for the political independence and territorial integrity of all the states of the region - a policy confirmed by congressional resolutions in 1957 and 61, which authorize the use of force to uphold these interests.

It does not follow that our interests in peace for the Middle East can no longer be defended by political means. Despite the attractions to Soviet policymakers of continued proxy war in the area, they must be conscious of its risks. The Soviet Union does have a need to limit its rivalry with the U.S. symbolized by the non-proliferation treaty and the SALT talks. If perceived

these interests should help restrain programs of adventure like that in the Middle East.

The error in the second and third theses of the conventional wisdom flows from the inadequacy of the first.

**UN Resolution**

The Security Council resolution of Nov. 22, 1967, is not self-executing. It calls on the parties to negotiate an agreement establishing peace. The stalemate thus far in the Jarring mission is the responsibility of the government of the United Arab Republic. It says it is ready to implement the resolution "as a package deal," in all its parts. But it has rejected procedures accepted by the other parties for negotiating an agreement of peace. It could hardly persist in that posture in face of genuine Soviet pressure.

Has American policy in the Middle East been "even-handed?" The question misses the point. The purpose of American policy should be to protect American interests. So far as the parties are concerned, American policy has been fair and even-handed. We agree with Israel that the time has come for the nations to make peace in the Middle East. But to insist on peace is not to oppose the rightful interest of any Arab state.

The policy outlined in Secretary Rogers's recent speech follows that stated by President Johnson in his speeches of June 19, 1967, and Sept. 10, 1968. Only those privy to diplomatic messages can know whether its application has been altered in detail. In this, as in other areas, American policy should be bipartisan, firmly, if flexibly, based on the continuity of national interests.

The Rabat conference has liberated President Nasser from the Khartoum formula. Is he ready as yet for the historic decision to implement the Security Council resolution? That wise step on his part would transform the situation. It is the key to peace, and to his reputation in history.
ECONOMICS

GERMAN LABOR TANDEM TO EAST-WEST TALKS
(International Herald Tribune, 27-2-’70)

While Chancellor Willy Brandt and Walter Ulbricht pirouette their way gingerly to some kind of an East-West rendezvous, the trade unions of West and East Germany are doing their own thing in tandem with their respective governments.

The vagueness in the foregoing paragraph is unavoidable because the negotiations between the powerful, Socialist-oriented West German Labor Federation, DGB, and the Communist-controlled East German grouping, FDGB, move at the same deliberate pace as the negotiations between both governments.

The only reason for describing the inter-union discussions is that they reflect what must be the difficulties, fairly well concealed, between Bonn and Pankow as pressure grows to discuss what, if anything, should or could be done about divided Germany.

If anything were to demonstrate the intermingling of West German trade unionism, and the Brandt government foreign policy, it is in the DGB’s Ostpolitik as evidenced in an exchange of letters between the two national trade-union centers. The West German DGB letter, dated Feb. 4, was addressed to A.H. Warnke, president of the East German FDGB. Heinz O. Vetter, DGB president who sent the letter, said that in an effort to help workers and maintain peace, the DGB had inaugurated a series of contacts with trade unions in Warsaw Pact countries. These contacts had their beginning with DGB meetings in Moscow last December with A.N. Shelepin, former Soviet secret police chief and now head of the Soviet trade unions.

Criticism Barred

Vetter assured Warnke that the DGB had no intention of mixing “in the affairs of other states” and, further, that all intervention in the jurisdiction of another labor organization “is incompatible with the peaceful coexistence and the right of self-determination of members within their own unions.” One can properly interpret Vetter’s statement as a guarantee of East German immunity from criticism as to its labor policies, one of which admittedly is suppression of free collective bargaining and freedom of association.

This may be an unjust interpretation of Vetter’s statement, since he argues in his letter that a free exposition of opinion by radio is necessary because the two organizations stand for different principles. He therefore proposes that each labor organization should publish its point of view in the publications of the other in the name of “an equitable judgment of the existing social systems and trade-union objectives.” Presumably, there could be an “equitable” assessment of the significance of the Berlin wall or imprisonment of East Germans without trial for political offenses or other attributes of the “existing” East German dictatorship. The East German FDGB response to this letter was announced last week and was hand-delivered to DGB headquarters in Dusseldorf by two FDGB representatives. The letter said that the FDGB accepted Vetter’s suggestion for the opening of negotiations looking to the establishment of “normal relations” between the two labor organizations on the basis of “equal rights.”

The rest of the East German labor leader’s letter is the usual Communist line that the workers, peasants, intelligentsia and other sectors exercise the political power which creates the higher form of societal organization of Socialism, that the unions are working-class organizations which ensure democracy and social security, etc.

Obviously, should the West German labor leader, Vetter, suggest that East German labor unions are government stooges, the prospect of East-West negotiations would dim immediately. It is well-established among Iron Curtain ideologists that there are two kinds of truth —Socialist truth, which is truth and non-Socialist truth, which consists of lies and propaganda to be suppressed.

Place of Meeting

In any case, the FDGB suggests that the first meeting of both labor organizations should be “the capital of the German Democratic Republic, Berlin.” However, if the DGB prefers, the chairman of the East and West German organizations could first
meet to prepare the joint meeting.

What is unusual in these negotiations is that while one expects Communist labor unions to reflect government or party policy, it is rare to see a labor organization in a democratic country formally and officially reflecting so whole-heartedly its government's policy. How this works out in the ensuing weeks - the DGB has scheduled a March meeting of its executive to pursue the project further - will be a momentous event for democratic trade unionism, which has argued against too close an identity between labor and government. Britain is the classic example of where a powerful organization, the Trades Union Congress, a founder and supporter of the Labor party, combats the Wilson government on such issues as trade-union leaders feel are unjustified.

The German labor movement has undertaken one of the trickiest maneuvers in its short postwar history. Whether the maneuver can succeed is exceedingly doubtful. Walter Ulbricht did not become Moscow's first minister to preside over the liquidation of his East German empire.

GOSPLAN AND THE ALCOHOL PROBLEM
( Radio Free Europe, 6-2-'70 )

Summary: Any design to control alcoholism in the Soviet Union must consider the role of Gosplan, which plans the supply to the demand for hard spirits. There is a direct relationship in the schedules for wage growth and vodka production.

The current Soviet campaign against alcoholism, spearheaded by recent speeches from Brezhnev, Shumilin, and Shelepin, differs from the many previous efforts in that it is aimed at tightening labor discipline among workers so as to reverse the declining economic growth rate that has characterized the Soviet economy in recent years. (For details see RFE Research report, "Shelepin on Behavior of the Workers," by r.r.g., 3 February 1970.)

Khrushchev's motives in his several efforts to fight alcoholism were based more on social considerations; he wanted to change the drinking habits from vodka to light wines and fruit drinks, and energetically expanded the areas planted to vineyards and orchards.

While the Soviet press advances many rationalizations for the steadily increasing consumption of hard spirits, such as the advent of the five day week resulting in a 25 percent increase in vodka sales in Moscow, the decisive statistics on vodka consumption and sales became a casualty during the Khrushchev regime. Until 1962, the Economic Yearbooks (Narkhoz) gave the annual national figures for the sale of alcoholic drinks and their proportion of the total retail trade. Some years these figures included non-alcoholic beverages so as to obscure the drinking problem. But since then relevant statistics have not been released on the aggregate sale and consumption of hard spirits in the Soviet Union. The only authoritative data are those for the production of hard spirits, and these tell a revealing tale.

Production of Alcoholic Spirits: USSR (deciliters)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>267.0 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>262.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>243.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>236.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>170.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Narkhoz 1968, p. 307

Since 1960, the output of "elite spirits," vodka, has shown a 60 percent increase, compared to a 13 percent growth in the Soviet population. On a per capita basis, this would show 11 liters available in 1968 compared to 8 liters in 1960. (Average annual consumption schedules for alcohol are based on the population 18 years and older. In the USA it is 8.4 liters, in the USSR about 15 liters, both countries considered "hard drinking.")

Such growth rates must be seen in the perspective of the rise in wages to indicate a planning tie-up. From 1960 to 1968...
monthly wages rose from 80.6 to 112.6 rubles, a 40 percent increase, or an average of 5 percent a year. (Narkhoz 1968, page 555.) This rate compares to a 6.6 average annual growth in hard liquor output.

Obviously, Gosplan has an active hand in the output of alcoholic spirits. The distilling industry provides the largest income to the Soviet treasury of any single production enterprise in the entire economy. As such it is closely under Gosplan and Gosbank control and planning. Tied together with the projected growth in personal incomes, Gosplan equally sets the target for the output of spirits and allocates the amount of raw materials and other inputs to the industry. Clearly any brake on vodka consumption and a decline in alcoholism would necessitate a decision from Gosplan.

All the administrative, educational, and hortatory measures now being advanced to curtail alcoholism for whatever reasons, are only palliatives unless Gosplan is determined to cut back the output. Here lies the power. The craft of samogon may flourish but that is another issue in the battle on alcoholism.

BIG CONCESSIONS TO OLD-AGE PENSIONERS WHO WORK
(Soviet News, 24-2-'70)

In order to encourage the employment of old-age pensioners, the Soviet government has decreed extensive concessions in the payment of pensions to pensioners who continue to work. (The previous position was that old-age pensioners were allowed to work a maximum of two months in the year without reduction in their pensions.)

Now, over a wide range of employment, there will be no reduction in pensions while the pensioner continues in full-time employment, and for another wide range the reduction will be 50 per cent -- or 25 per cent in the Urals, Siberia and the Far East. In no case in the categories affected will the pension be less than the minimum old-age pension. Full pensions will be paid to the following workers and foremen, regardless of their place of work.

Postmen, communications operatives, postal sorters,

Sales personnel, cashiers, cooks, waiters and other similar categories of workers in retail trade and public catering;

Superintendents at construction, erection and repair projects;

Personnel -- except executives and engineers with diplomas -- in public service enterprises and organisations for the collection and preprocessing of scrap;

Junior and middle-rank medical personnel at health establishments, pre-school institutions for children, commissions for assessing work disability and homes for the aged and invalids.

Half pensions -- three-quarters in the Urals, Siberia and the Far East -- will be paid to:

Engineering and technical workers at industrial and building enterprises, transport enterprises -- except management of railways, motor vehicle and city transport organisations, shipping and air services.

Communications, housing and municipal employment, services and state-owned agricultural enterprises;

Veterinary surgeons, doctors' assistants and technicians, doctors at preventive medical and forensic medical institutions and at pre-school establishments and at commissions for assessing work disability.

Pharmaceutical personnel, communication workers in mass trades, teachers at general schools and instructors at vocational training establishments -- where not entitled to the full old age pension -- teachers at pre-school and extra-school establishments, chairmen, vice-chairmen and secretaries of village and settlement Soviets and control inspectors in trains.

The new system of issuing old age pensions comes into effect at once.

New contract rules

The Soviet government has approved new rules on contracts for
capital investment projects. The new rules are mainly concerned with relations between a client and a contractor, and provide for heavy penalties for the violation of contracts. At the same time they grant construction organisations the right to provide workers with free transport between their place of work and their homes if the distance is greater than three kilometres (just under two miles) and if there is no adequate public transport. The need must be confirmed by the executive committee of the local Soviet.

RUSSIANS FEAR A WIDENING OF EEC
(The Times, 4-2-'70)

Soviet propaganda has unequivocally condemned attempts to widen the European Common Market and eventually turn it into a political federation, officially, the Russians view the idea of a United States of Europe as aimed against the communist block. Privately, Moscow must fear its economic potential and its powers of attraction for east European countries. Of all the possible alternatives in development of the Common Market, the Russians have been least hostile to the idea of an Europe des patries stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals. (Ironically, they have not indicated what status Siberia, as an integral part of the Russian Federation, might achieve in such a loose association, or whether "Europe" would have to be considered as stretching right across to the Pacific.)

What really infuriates Moscow is the suggestion that a future European union might reach from the Atlantic to the Black Sea and the Bug, the border river between Poland and the Soviet Union — excluding the latter, but taking in the other Warsaw Pact powers. The Russians are also deeply opposed to what is most likely to be the outcome of present moves towards European unity — a federation stretching from the Atlantic to the eastern borders of west Germany. They have openly encouraged France in her past efforts to block British membership and tighter political integration, and are showing alarm at the gathering momentum of events this year. The Russian's main argument is that a united western Europe will inevitably be dominated by the Germans, and that this will encourage "revanchism" and deepen the present European split, for which they invariably blame the west. "Only the Soviet Union," an authoritative Moscow commentator wrote recently, "by participating actively in a system of all-European security, can stop the revanchists who are encroaching on postwar frontiers ... the more so, since the revanchists are not disembodied ghosts living in science fiction novels. They are alive, fully real and for that matter extremely harmful elements." There is a paradox in the Soviet attitude to British entry. The Russians want to reduce American influence in Europe, and keep west Germany in her place. Thus they might have been expected to welcome, at least cautiously, the prospect of Britain helping to balance German influence, and being prised away from her relationship with the United States. The Russians have not taken this attitude, because the short term is more important to them than the long term. In the short term, they seem to consider that Britain will simply act as an American bridgehead. The Soviet leaders are apparently having trouble readjusting their thinking even to the slow progress being made towards unification "west of the Elbe", and they continue to emphasize that a united western Europe would be simply another anti-Soviet bloc, like the Atlantic Pact. Doubtless they realize that the west Europeans are not likely to abandon the American nuclear shield until, if ever, they have developed a credible one of their own.

At present, the Soviet Union has two main aims in Europe. One is the acceptance by all concerned that the other Warsaw Pact powers shall remain within the Soviet sphere of influence for the foreseeable future. This is the real message which the proposed European security conference is supposed to put across. The other aim is that, if Russia is unable physically to prevent the growth of prosperity in western Europe, she should at least be able to exploit it for the benefit of herself and the other eastern bloc countries.

In economic terms, the Russians cannot but see the Common Market as an exclusive club, with its members trading increasingly among themselves. The Soviet Union alone, with its huge resources, geographical isolation and disciplined people, might be able to shrug off this trend, while disliking it. However, the Russians make no bones about the fact that the Warsaw
Pact is considered essential to their own security, indeed to the survival of their entire system, and they are aware that the attraction of western prosperity could split and destroy the pact if other east European nations were given their head.

That is why the fundamental Soviet strategy towards the Common Market is a delaying action, negative in its purpose and its tactics, and not very effective. The Russians still pin some hopes on to France, but they have not overlooked the trends in French foreign policy since the departure of General de Gaulle, and must be worried by them. Their press studiously emphasized Franco-German differences at the recent Paris meeting.

At the same time the Russians will do all they can to expand their trade and technological contacts with individual west European countries, in an attempt to siphon off some of the west's vitality and draw it into a complex economic involvement with the Soviet Union which would eventually have political implications because of its sheer size. Late last year, as the omens for the Soviet-sponsored security conference were becoming obviously less favourable, the Russians produced a whole package of economic proposals to be linked to the success of such a conference (that is, to the recognition of Soviet domination in eastern Europe). These included transcontinental oil and gas pipelines (like the gas link just agreed with west Germany), a common electric power grid, efforts against water pollution, cancer research, and joint exploitation of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. As with so many Soviet diplomatic initiatives, the hook is just a little too obvious under the bait.

On the political front, the Russians have lost much of their previous back-stage influence in western Europe. The large, old-established communist movements either have important reservations about the Soviet style of communism, and Moscow's foreign policy, or are badly split among pro-Soviet and "revisionist" factions.

Worst of all, modern western youth movements are largely out of sympathy with Moscow communism, and Moscow is out of sympathy with them, though it pays lip service to their ideals and achievements. For most young people in the west, Russia is simply "square".

**OIL PRODUCTION TARGET, 1971-75**

(Radio Free Europe, 18-2-'70)

Summary: A Pravda article gives an oil production target of 2.7 billion tons for 1971-75. On present evidence this level is most unlikely to be reached, and it may simply be an indication of the unreality of the next five-year plan as regards one key product. But it might alternatively mean that the Kremlin now sees its recent oil targets for 1975 and 1980 as being too low.

An article in Pravda concerning the Tyumen oilfield gives the first firm target for oil production in the next five-year plan which runs from 1971-75. (16 February 1970, by A. Murzin.) It says that "in the next five-year plan the country is faced with the extraction of about 2.7 billion tons of oil, out of which the Tyumen share ... will be not more than 400 million."

Whether 2.7 billion will finally be produced remains a wide open question, when one considers that in the current five-year plan (1966-70) the output is likely to be in the area of 1.54 billion, and that output is now rising by about 30,000,000 tons p.a. (Tass, 17 February 1970)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Soviet Oil Output</th>
<th>(Millions of tons)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>358 (est.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The past rate of progress noted above shows the improbability of 2.7 billion being achieved. Nevertheless the figure is the first available semi-official target covering these years as a whole, and consequently is of some interest. For example Tyumen at present is delivering about 20,000,000 tons a year,
with the result that its annual output is expected to grow about fourfold, to an average of 80,000,000 tons a year for the 1971-75 period. The chances against this happening must be rated high.

Moreover the 2.7 billion figure implies a rate of progress well above the recent targets for individual years mentioned by Soviet sources. In January 1969 the Minister of the Oil Industry, V. Shashin, gave an interview to Tass in which he set a goal for 1975 of 460,000,000 tons (Tass, 10 January 1969) and subsequently Tass published a 1980 target of "more than 500 million tons" (16 May 1969) (compared with the former 1980 target announced in 1967 of 630,000,000).

The latest Pravda article is probably not much more than a statistical curiosity, but it may also be an indication of the unreality of the new five-year plan's oil target. On present information output seems likely to rise roughly as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Output</th>
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<td>1971</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
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<td>1974</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
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This would represent a faster expansion than Shashin foresaw a year ago, but would still be a very long way below the 2.7 billion for the five years which Pravda now mentions, apparently as a firm target.

**A BIG STINK IN RUSSIA**

by Victor Zorza

( The Guardian, 11-2-'70 )

Soviet scientists, like their colleagues in the West, have been warning their Government of the "stink explosion" which could overtake their country "if no serious steps are taken" to avert it.

These quotations come from a "Pravda" article by a pillar of the Soviet academic establishment, but in Russia, as in the West, the early pressures came from anti-establishment lobbies. Academician A n d r e y Sakharov's illegal pamphlet, launched through the Soviet "underground" to demand radical reforms, also blamed the country's economic system for causing damage to the environment, and thus "changing the face of the earth."

**Industry**

The official press tries to steer clear of the politically sensitive aspects of the problem, but this is not easy. In discussing possible remedies, the more serious articles have to come to grips with the real issues. The article in "Pravda" pointed to the contradiction between the "unrestrained" growth of industrial production on the one hand, and outdated technology of Soviet industry on the other. The organization of industry was also to blame.

The author was saying, in effect, that Soviet industry was so preoccupied with growth targets that it neglected to keep its own house in order - which is what has so often been said of capitalists. "Many industrialists," said an article in "Izvestia," "argued thus: 'We deliver the goods, and the rest is of no importance.'" It was speaking of Soviet, not Western, industrialists.

**Profit motive**

In the West the strength of the profit motive is often said to drive capitalists to press on with production regardless of damage to the environment. In Russia it is the weakness of the profit motive that gets the blame. "Tremendous material losses" were caused by the failure of the oil industry to develop the necessary procedures to remove water and salt from the oil. The price paid for the oil remained the same, whether these unwanted constituents had been removed or not.

Oil production is supervised by the Ministry of Oil Fields and by the Ministry of Oil Refineries - and they have been arguing "for many years" whether the water and the salt should be removed in the oil fields, or in the refineries.

From the oil fields, in the absence of drainage, oil often flows into the rivers. Some offshore oil wells in the Caspian Sea have
been sealed off to stop oil leaks, and a special programme has been launched to prevent pollution in the lower reaches of the Volga River before it reaches the Caspian. But in the huge Perm oil field there is no drainage at all. The oil collects on the ground, flows into the Kama River - and the Kama is the Volga's largest tributary.

Factories which discharge untreated effluent into rivers are another familiar menace. Perm itself is a major industrial centre of a hundred factories. They all pour their unclean waste into the river. One of Russia's largest chemical industry centres, at Bereznikovo, discharges more than a million cubic metres of contaminated water into the river every day. There are many others which behave no better. The Ministry of the Chemical Industry, which administers them all, said an article in "Trud," did not care. Half of the huge amount of water which its factories discharged into rivers was polluted.

Bad health

When the Soviet press first became agitated about this state of affairs, most of the complaints were about the poisoning of the fish and the effect on the country's food supplies. Increasingly, however, the effect on social amenities, on health, on nature itself in the larger sense, is being discussed by the more thoughtful contributors to the public debate.

Other aspects of human interference with the environment, not necessarily concerned with pollution, are brought to the fore by critics whose unspoken complaint is against the Government and the system which allows this to happen. In a country where the governing party is supposed to be beyond criticism, the critics concentrate on the effect of its actions, and leave the rest to the imagination.

Virgin land

Russia has huge areas of virgin land and forest, but this does not make the urban sprawl in the industrial areas any more tolerable to those who have to live with it. The ploughing up of virgin lands under the Khruschev regime is still producing dust bow conditions and dust storms as bad as anything that the United States saw in the thirties.

The annual cost of soil erosion is calculated by Soviet scientists to be equal to about 1 per cent of the gross national product. In a land of forests, deforestation is a new danger. The European part of the Soviet Union which has only a quarter of the country's forests, is providing two thirds of its timber.

In the United States, motor vehicles are responsible for 60 per cent of air pollution. But Russia, which has barely begun to enter the motor age has an air pollution problem too. The Soviet press often boasts, with good reason, that the air in Moscow is cleaner and sweeter than that in any other comparable capital city. But most of Russia's industry is outside Moscow.

"Pravda" itself has confessed that "we are turning the atmosphere of our major industrial regions and large cities into a dump for poisonous industrial wastes." This already made it "difficult to breathe" for the people who live there, and the trend of industrial development would "inevitably" cause even greater air pollution unless something was done to avert this, "Pravda" said.

Something is being done, in Russia as in the West. Anti-pollution programmes are drawn up, new Government regulations are laid down, resolutions are passed. The Central Council of Soviet Trade Unions does not press the Government for higher wages, but issues worthy declarations about air pollution in industrial regions, with stern demands that industry must put things right.

Three and a half years after the council had passed a resolution about the steelmaking city of Dneprodzerzhinsk, in the Ukraine, "Izvestia" reported that the sky was as laden as in the past, and the air as heavy. Some of the measures demanded by the unions had been taken but new steel furnaces were built to increase the output. The smoke which they were now sending into the sky contained five times as much ash and harmful gases as used to go up the old chimney stacks.

Impure plant

In spite of repeated Government directives, new factories are still being built without any purification plant, for water or smoke; indeed, where smoke filters are provided, they often "work badly, or not at all." More than half of the Soviet towns discharge
their sewage, untreated, directly into nearby waters.

Some Russian writers still insist that capitalists in the West are plundering nature for the sake of profit, while the Soviet system "does not allow the destruction of natural resources." They are "hardly" as simple as that. In the Soviet Union, too, say the critics, "every industrialist proceeds in the first place from the needs of his enterprise" -- which is owned and managed, of course, by the State. The critics maintain that many Soviet industrialists, driven by excessive zeal, "are plundering the natural resources of our motherland, claiming that this is dictated by real economic needs."

This claim, they say, under-estimates the "colossal and sometimes irreparable damage" which is being done to nature "and therefore to our society." But in this sense "their" society is ours, too, and our fight for a better environment is theirs, too. The world is one, after all.

CULTURE

PARTY PRESS RAPS YOUNG DROP-OUTS
(Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union, 10-2-'70)

Summary: The growing estrangement of Soviet youth, cynical about official ideology and eager for emancipation from their more conservative elders, is causing concern. But Party leaders are less disturbed by the more extreme forms of dress and behaviour of the minority than by the increasing tendency of the broad mass of young Soviet citizens to view the world through their own eyes and not through the eyes of the Party.

In recent months the Soviet press has redoubled its attacks on members of the younger generation, accusing them of estranging themselves from Soviet society; they are materialistic, guilty of ideological hypocrisy, of coveting Western prosperity and of violating the moral standards laid down by the Party higher-ups. This criticism is directed not only at the more flagrant offenders, but also at those who "are not avid collectors of tape recordings, do not twist the nights away with friends and do not chase after sensational poems 'a la Yevtushenko'" but at the same time try to be individualists (Sovetskaya Rossiya, December 27, 1969). The newspaper makes this plain in its report of an interview with a young civil engineering student, who sincerely believes that

... the main thing is to land yourself a good job with bonuses. It is nonsense and an empty slogan to say that "all forms of work are good," and he does not believe in slogans, even the "most emotional ones." He thinks that an engineer should have no truck with emotions at all. For "emotions" read ideology, which my young interlocutor rejected in our confidential chat, although his report book shows that for social science he is invariably awarded a "five," and for Komsomol and trade union activities he had nothing but "threes." (Ibid.)
This young student frankly confessed that the only reason why he takes certain obligations is to appease the Komsomol activists and obtain a good report from them. The Party press is even more irritated by the "intellectual hypocrisy" of young church-goers. A survey among worshippers leaving a church in Kazan revealed the following:

Age -- from 22 to 30; sex -- male and female; education -- secondary and higher. The overwhelming majority of these people are former Komsomol members who have quite recently passed Komsomol age and sometimes also Komsomol members. Naturally they are members of a trade union ... What sort of occupation does this young church-goer have? In fact, practically the whole spectrum of urban professions are represented here -- turner, engineer, doctor, salesman, designer, student, trainer, kindergarten mistress, etc. Where does the young church-goer work or study? The Kazan general store, an aircraft or engine manufacturing works, one of the city hospitals, an agricultural or aircraft institute, Kazan University, various research institutes in the city, etc. (Smena, No. 17, 1969, p. 5)

Most ominous for the Party, is that at work practically all these people profess to be atheists and to all intents and purposes are public-spirited and model Soviet citizens. Older schoolchildren are also causing the authorities concern with their largely unspoken, but no less determined opposition to the ready-made solutions purveyed by their elders. The well-known Soviet writer, V. Rozov, for example, points to the gulf separating 16 and 17-year-olds from the older generation. "We," he writes, "exist with them in the same dimension of space and time, but there is no mutual understand." Whereas the preceding generation of youths and girls vented their feelings about the conservatism of the older generation, says Rozov, today's adolescents simply keep aloof and behave as they think fit (Literaturnaya gazeta, July 2, 1969).

Trying to establish whether the modern 17-year-old is a worthy Soviet citizen, Literaturnaya gazeta (September 3, 1969) found that people in this age group are frequently very sceptical towards officially-prescribed social and ideological standards. Hinting at the existence of a conflict between the generations, the newspaper's correspondents agreed unanimously that today's 17-year-olds scoff at things that are sacrosanct to older Party members:

Just try talking with them about the feats of Aleksandr Matrosov and Viktor Talalikhin. "As old as the hills" is what you'll probably hear. And, God save us, you'll blurt out such remarks as: "And after school you'll have to work for the good of the nation." And you are sure to be countered with ironical smiles ... "Drop it, will you. We'll slog away in the factory, and that's all... (Ibid.)

Another favorite target of the Party press is the "materialistic" outlook of Soviet youth. Komsomolskaya pravda (September 9, 1969), condemning "mercenary" attitudes, suggests that they are the result of lack of contact with the realities of working life up to the age of seventeen under the present school system. The future expectation of senior pupils in the secondary schools, apparently, are largely concentrated on the acquisition of consumer goods.

Numerous reports during the past year deal with attempts by young people to improve their finances through "business" or various forms of shady transactions, frequent offenders being young intellectuals, students or sportsmen who travel abroad. Komsomolskaya pravda (June 7, 1969) called for a relentless struggle against this "wretched business mentality" and remarked that "public complacency and tolerance provide fertile soil for new two-bit businessmen and cause even callow youths to become infected with the bacillus of petty gain." A later issue of the same newspaper stated that many intelligent young people, "strokings the sides of foreign cars, are more and more often inclined to sigh that with us 'the business-like person' is given no chance to get ahead" (Ibid., July 18, 1969). A similar report from Lvov University relates that even in special political circles for Komsomol activists "the traditional disputes flare up about private cars, etc., etc., which every average American possesses ..." (Molodyy kommunist, No. 6, 1969, p. 15).
Extracts from readers' letters, published in Literaturnaya gazeta (December 18, 1968) under the heading "Is There Cause For Alarm?" must have made depressing reading for Party dogmatists. Some readers confirmed that for many young people money is the only motivation, and one young schoolmistress wrote:

I cannot understand why it is that our fathers, brothers and sisters fought for our happiness and shed their blood, yet their successors behave in such an unworthy fashion... I thought I would live under communism, but now I see more and more clearly that it will be difficult to attain communism with young people like us. (Ibid.)

Komsomolskaya pravda believes that if the authorities give an inch young people will take a mile: "If you allow girls to wear mini skirts, smoke cigarettes and kiss in the Metro, as they do in Paris, there is no holding them, and they flout the standards of moral behavior set up by the Party" (September 4, 1969). Nor are the following sentiments pleasing to official ears: "Just living in our times means that you can do anything you like. Nobody has the right to rebuke others for their behavior. Life is very brief, and everyone should try to make the most of it. Why shouldn't one get the best out of it?" (Ibid., July 25, 1969).

In their determination to assert their right to live as individuals Soviet youngsters sometimes resort to extremes of behavior and dress that put their Western counterparts in the shade. Komsomolskaya pravda is duly shocked at the ringlets and beards sported by many Soviet youths: "One can hardly believe one's eyes: latterly everywhere is teeming with long-haired characters. Manes, beards, sideburns, mustaches (individually not so bad, but when you get the lot together) can be seen at any place of work" (July 29, 1969). Protests that Karl Marx wore a beard are unavailing. Among the newspaper's worries is the question of whether youths in the senior classes of the secondary schools should be forbidden to dye their hair. (Ibid., February 22, 1969).

Another article in Komsomolskaya pravda (June 3, 1969) describes the "beach boys and girls," who haunt the seaside resorts and flock to the beaches, where they scrounge money from the better-off tourists. The typical "beach boys" wear hair down to their shoulders, even have it artificially waved and dyed and "in the season the best cafes and bars are occupied by these same youths and girls. They drink, swear, strum guitars and dance to transistor radios" (Ibid.).

These teenagers see themselves as epitomizing modern youth and feel that "grown-ups will never understand us." They vent their disillusionment and cynicism in satirical songs, which have prompted the following tirade from the "orthodox" young writer, V. Chivilikhin:

among the authors of these topical songs are riff-raff who purvey dirty texts, spread political rumors and sow the seeds of suspicion and mistrust among decent people... "One would love to tell Gogol all about our miserable life," they say. Another modernizes thieves' jargon and mocks even the most sacred things while yet a third advises us not to keep in step otherwise we will bring down the bridges. At heart this counsellor, or rather this anti-Soviet individual, chooses to regard us as a flock of sheep... (Molodaya gvardiya, No. 4, 1969, p. 93)

Literaturnaya gazeta suggests that rather than seek complicated psychological reasons for the protests of modern Soviet youth it should be admitted that the chief culprit is the "Western virus" (July 2, 1969); this interpretation is seconded by Moloday kommunist (No. 8, 1969, p. 31), which points to the unsettling effects of the broadcasts by foreign radio stations. This is an attempt to find a scapegoat for the Party's own shortcomings. Just as potent, indeed more so, is growing political and intellectual maturity due to rising educational standards; a survey among Soviet 17-year-olds in one secondary school revealed that 60 to 70 per cent of them are better informed about the latest developments in science, the arts and the world of sport than their teachers (Literaturnaya gazeta, July 2, 1969). Even those with only secondary education can see the irrelevance of Marxist-Leninist dogmas in a rapidly changing world, and they share the conviction of many Soviet sociologists that the only true alternative lies between communism and a post-
industrial society managed by a highly-qualified scientific and technological elite.

The change which Soviet society is now undergoing is part of a world-wide scientific and technological revolution. Under its influence young Soviet citizens are learning to see the world through their own eyes and they are already beginning to shape the future of the society in which they live.

CHILDREN OF PARTY LEADERS HEAD REBELLIOUS STUDENTS

(Radio Free Europe, 12-2-'70)

Summary: Children of top Party functionaries can be found among the rebellious Belgrade students, especially at the Philosophical and Sociological Faculties, the Belgrade daily Politika writes in its issue of 8 February 1970. A Ljubljana research institute claimed recently that "the most aggressive students" come from families with high living standards. "The most radical speeches are those made by students whose pocket money is guaranteed." The following is a translation of an article by Slavoljub Djukic entitled "Causes of Rebellion."

There are topics which are more suited to a literary essay than a newspaper comment. Such a topic was superficially touched on by deputy Jovan Parlïc (par-litch) at a recent session of the Serbian National Assembly (in Belgrade). He revealed that the signatories of a letter sent to the Assembly by about 50 students included the names of the children of revolutionaries and the (Communist) "fighters from the earliest days" (of the Revolution). The students in question are studying philosophy and sociology; they have denied the necessity for a debate concerning the ideological-educational influence exerted by their professors.

Among the deputies who took part in the above-mentioned session (of the Serbian National Assembly) have been sons of revolutionaries and leading fighters. One of them, the young Koncar (kon-char), is the son of People's Hero Rade Koncar (executed by the Italian Fascists in May 1942 as a member of the Yugoslav CP Politburo). It was Koncar's son who spoke with inspiration at the above-mentioned session about the younger generation. Here we have an inspiring literary topic which can never be exhausted.

No one commented on Parlïc's observations. Only an ironic remark was made by several deputies to the effect that "now the children of our revolutionary leaders are continuing the revolutionary traditions of their parents."

Parlïc mentioned something which has not been unknown in the past. In the group of students of philosophy and sociology, which of late has become too noisy, we really see boys and girls whose family names are easily remembered. However, the researchers neglect this point: for them it is only a curious fact and nothing else.

Asked what he thought about the behavior of the children of the revolutionaries, a psychologist answered that he did not concern himself with this problem. He said: "If I were to investigate the behavior of the children of the revolutionaries, it would also be logical to show an interest in the behavior of the children of reactionary parents. This would then be followed by the children of shoemakers, physicians, chimney-sweepers, bakers, railwaymen, confectioners and plumbers.

Investigation of this kind is not a good way to search for truth. To say "he is the child of a revolutionary" is per se the admission of a special status. Just as the title "the child of a reactionary" sounds like an invitation to be suspicious. The simple fact is that there are young people who behave one way or another. At least for the time being.

They study or do not study; they break into cars or do not do this; they are creators or anarchists in politics; they know or do not know what they want; they work or do not work; entertain themselves, protest, demonstrate and take life as they find it. Now.

It is difficult to believe that this is their lasting orientation. Who knows how they will react tomorrow? We remember the comical pretentiousness of some young people 10 years ago; we remember their aimless strolling and confusion. Some of them are today well-known politicians. Others have not yet realized how stubborn their ideas were. Most of them have simply lost themselves in the everyday life imposed upon them by their families or their own
way of living.

Daniel Cohn-Bendit, whose name was spoken by our students with great respect, appears today in cowboy films as a killer. It seems only yesterday that this chief source of inspiration for the young French rebels pledged eternal loyalty to the Revolution. "An active minority does not worry about its own future," Cohn-Bendit said.

However, politics has no time to concern itself with psychology. Still less can the political public sit with arms crossed while an aggressive group of young people tries to impose upon society its political style, views and behaviour. Still, it is a pity that we have not been doing more than simply being politically active. It would have been easier to direct further political-pedagogic action.

What is the source of passion demonstrated by the rebellious youth? What are the motives of their actions? To what degree is it really a question of a firm political attitude?

Ljubljana researchers claim, for instance, that the social structure of the most aggressive students is very characteristic. These boys and girls chiefly belong to families in which they have secured a carefree living, which has not been the case of some of their peers. The most radical speeches are those made by students whose pocket money is guaranteed.

Everyone looks in his own way for the way out "from horribly ordinary living." Some of them become thieves of automobiles, others study passionately, while some exhaust their surplus energy by hitting each other's cars. Individual young people, however, try to free themselves from frustration by mixing into politics, entering it through the big gate, noisily and with the aim of calling people's attention to themselves.

A girl said the following about her mother, who was a Partisan fighter (in World War II): "I am jealous of my mother for what represented a misfortune to her generation, for that misfortune, the absence of which today represents a misfortune to my generation."

Is the present effort to create a myth around the June (1968) student riots a mere accident? A 20-year-old girl student said recently: "Perhaps student riots are only our excuse, aimed at manufacturing our own past." A sociologist is presently investigating the phenomenon of politicizing as a kind of folklore or fashion. This phenomenon has been noted in Yugoslavia in the course of the two past years. One wishes to be "persecuted," feeling it as a pleasure because no real persecution exists.

The sociologist, however, warns that it is not only a question of a feeling of pleasure. If one does not go too far in voicing opposition, one can still make progress. All of a sudden everybody starts being concerned about our "restless children": everyone from politicians to publishing houses.

It is difficult to trace the psychology of these young people and the motives of their engagement. There you can find everything: from naivety to an established political attitude. A psychological-sociological investigation would not only bring us closer to (or farther from) them, but would help our political action.

SOVIET CITIZENS AIR SEX PROBLEMS

(Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union, 17-2-70)

Recent letters to the Soviet press have indicated that there is a growing demand in the country for adequate sexual education. At present, the majority of children in the USSR receive their information on sexual matters from friends of their own age, a situation which obviously leads to misconceptions. Moves to introduce reforms in this sphere, however, are hampered by the hypocritical puritanism which still exists in Soviet society.

Recently, a German journalist, contrasting Western permissiveness with Soviet puritanism, pertinently queried the ability of the Iron Curtain to hold relaxed sexual attitudes at bay. For an objective view of sex in the USSR, however, two things should be clear: there is a genuine and developing interest in the Soviet Union in sexual education and sexual problems in general, but commercial exploitation of sex in the press, cinema, theater, etc., does not, indeed cannot, exist because of the Party censorship.

Eroticism in literature and the cinema is virtually non-existent,
but this does not mean that Soviet youth has no interest in the theme of love and marriage. The writer Lev Kassil, for example, commenting on replies to an article in Komsomolskaya pravda on "A Girl's Pride and Honor," severely criticized the growing belief among Soviet youth that virginity is now old-fashioned and that love is just another item for mass consumption. Equally false is the widespread notion that a girl can rescue her honor by rushing into marriage with her seducer. The real need, he believes, is for sexual education and frank discussion, so that young people are not obliged to turn to the editors of the youth press with their sexual problems. He writes:

There are some things which are more easily discussed in confidence. But how can one talk privately with each one of those who have sent in letters (there are hundreds of these letters) on a theme which for some reason we can hardly bring ourselves to discuss in the press? Not every mother decides to have a straight-forward talk about this with her daughter, and you are even less likely to hear a talk of this nature in the school classroom or in a university lecture hall.

Yet this is a subject that perturbs everyone, particularly the young, of course. Not for nothing has the "discussion on a girl's pride" in Komsomolskaya pravda prompted such a stream of letters from agitated readers. The responses varied, and letters were received from girls and youths; some were disturbed and some polemical, but always sincere, frank and exacting. (Ibid, January 10, 1969)

Kassil does not deny that some young people in the Soviet Union have an animal approach to love and sex, which he condemns in strong terms:

Coarseness, boorishness and the unpardonable use of force towards a woman, insolent disregard for the feeling of female modesty and affronts to a girl's or a woman's dignity are extremely disgusting and cannot be condoned in our society. The attitude of some youths to girls, in whom these young louts see only an object for their gratification, is vile and revolting. (Ibid.)

Kassil's article brought a fresh stream of letters from young readers, the general tenor of which is summed up by the final lines from one of them:

Lev Kassil's article is extremely interesting and necessary. It broaches a subject which disturbs us all... I should like to draw attention to the following lines from the article: "... and you are even less likely to hear a talk of this nature in the school classroom or in a university lecture hall."
This is the most injurious thing of all. Why not, in fact, invite medical staff, lawyers and writers to talk on this subject in the schools and universities? (Ibid., February 5, 1969)

Soviet boys and girls are strongly in favor of a frank and sober discussion of sexual problems and believe that sexual instruction in the senior classes of the secondary schools is particularly necessary. So far, however, there is little evidence that these demands will be met in the near future. For decades Soviet teachers have been under orders to avoid such intimate topics in the schools, an attitude endorsed by Makarenko, an authoritative educationalist who believes that sexual relations are a natural and innate part of the human make-up and therefore need no special elucidation. His theories have served to reinforce the traditional reluctance in the Soviet Union to bring sexual problems into the open and it can be assumed that the majority of Soviet teachers will continue to oppose the introduction of instruction in the schools. Not everyone believes wholeheartedly in Makarenko's theories, however:

Makarenko considered that children should be shielded from this sort of knowledge for as long as possible. But, of course, if the question is asked it should be answered honestly. Here it is necessary to forestall the influence of the street which, as is well-known, can supply "exhaustive" information....
It is wrong to lie to children, even in the smallest matters. It is just here, in this delicate question, that the most varied forms of deception can be practiced, although truth is one and indivisible.

It is good that there was a talk about the naturalness of sexual education. Actually, if we adopted a more sensible approach to this there would be more purity and less vulgarity. (Ibid., February 23, 1969)

If sexual instruction has any future in the Soviet Union, it will probably lie in the hands of doctors, psychologists and writers. Some pioneering work has already been done, and since 1966 a laboratory for sexology has existed at the Institute of Psychiatry of the RSFSR Ministry of Health. Unfortunately, the scientific staff is limited to only six doctors, two of whom, Professor P.B. Posvyansky and Candidate of Medical Sciences G.S. Vasilchenko, organize research, consultations and the training of specialists (Literaturnaya gazeta, November 27, 1968, p. 13). The staff is far too small to cope with the vast number of people in need of advice; although the existence of this laboratory is by no means generally known in the Soviet Union, it receives more than a hundred requests for help each week. It can handle only a small number of these inquiries and accepts only those patients who are specially recommended by various ministries. Even so, applicants must frequently wait for several months for their turn. The limited capacity of this laboratory and the absence of plans for the creation of a network of consulting centers is most probably due to the long-standing and firmly-rooted prejudices of Party and Government bodies, against whom doctors and other specialists are relatively powerless. Despite difficulties, however, the laboratory was able to train more than 400 specialist doctors in the first two years through seminars and courses (Ibid.). After suitable training these doctors should work as sexologists in various hospitals and out-patient departments, but so far their opportunities are restricted: "The republican ministries send doctors to study but do not oblige them to apply their newly-acquired knowledge. For this reason, far less than the whole four hundreds are available for consultation: it is a new field and not everyone wishes to shoulder the responsibility" (Ibid.).

One does not have to look far for evidence of the great demand in the Soviet Union for reliable information about sex and married life. In 1968 the above-mentioned laboratory published a book entitled "Current Questions of Sexual Pathology" -- the first scientific work in this field for thirty years -- which, although written in difficult scientific language, was quickly sold out. Even more successful was the Russian translation (entitled "A New Book on Marriage") of a popular work by an East German, Dr. R. Neubert, dealing with the intimate side of married life. It was published in 1967 and is now out of print; the waiting lists for library copies stretch into months. Conservative members of the public were clearly shocked by the frank interest displayed, particularly by young people, in sexual questions, while others, sociologist I.S. Kon, for example, stated that such interest in sex is absolutely natural and is in no way due to "prurient curiosity," as some people claimed (Ibid.). He believes that young people should receive progressive instruction in sex from doctors and teachers, who must receive appropriate training beforehand:

But for this they themselves must know more about sexual life than is possible on the basis of limited personal experience. The half-knowledge and the half-truths transmitted by popular articles in the journal Zdorovye are completely inadequate for them. It is necessary to begin with the creation of a serious scientific course on sexology which would unite the efforts of doctors, psychologists and sociologists working in this field. (Sovetskaya pedagogika, No. 12, 1966, p. 77)

Research has shown that youths and girls who have not received the necessary sex instruction either at home or at school look for the answers among their equally inexperienced friends. N. Solovyov, for example, in his book Semya v sovetskom obshchestve (The Family in Soviet Society, Moscow, 1962, p. 147), states that on average 65 per cent of adolescents get their information about sex from their friends, 16 per cent in school and 6 to 7 per cent from their parents. As a result, Soviet youth suffers from both a lack of knowledge and from misconceptions:
An adolescent's impressions of love, anticipating actual experience, are also contradictory. On the one hand, he dreams of a sublime love which has no association with anything base or mean. On the other, the bodily, physical side of love—sex, his notions of which are for the most part derived from smutty anecdotes and "reinforced" by the experience of masturbation, appears tempting but rather dirty. Inexpert lectures and talks on moral topics, which do not show the process of the humanization of the romantic love on the other, only strengthen this dualism, in the light of which love appears only a beautiful illusion, a moral and psychological superstructure over what is essentially a base biological appetite... Meanwhile, the basis (and the basic difficulty) of the sexual maturing of the personality consists namely in the overcoming (psychologically and practically) of this dualism. (I.S. Kon, Sotsiologiya lichnosti (The Sociology of the Personality), Moscow, 1967, pp. 157-58)

Kon also quotes a sample of 500 students in Lenigrad of whom 88 per cent of the males and 46 per cent of the females admitted that they had had and were having sexual intercourse (Ibid., p. 152). He considers that this survey is not representative of Soviet youth as a whole, however, because in some Soviet republics sexual relations are governed by strong national traditions and because the patterns of sexual behavior among youth in general are not identical with those of students in the largest cities. Particularly strict are the customs among the rural population, where pre-marital relations for girls are considered very immoral. Kon, together with other writers on the subject, has other criteria for what constitutes morality and immorality:

One has to be a hopeless bigot not to see the difference between casual relations with several chance partners and the intimate relations of a pair of lovers who later intend to marry. Statistically both fall under the heading of an extra-marital relationship, but the social and moral content of these relationships are different. (Ibid., p. 152)

According to Kon and others like him, for the purpose of achieving a harmonious future married life young people should learn how to combine the spiritual and physical elements of love and sex. This is no revelation, of course, but in the Soviet Union it has only recently become possible to speak and write about this openly.

The advocates of sexual education present their case so soberly and logically that it is difficult to understand why they encounter such obstructionism in practice. The publication in Literaturnaya gazeta (November 27, 1968) of the above-mentioned article calling for the creation of a comprehensive system of sexual education provoked an outraged response from certain quarters, of which the following is a typical example:

We, a group of teachers in Tyumen, were extremely distressed to read the article "Neither Beast nor Angel" in Literaturnaya gazeta ... We are decidedly against sexual matters being raised in our press in such a way as in the article "Neither Beast nor Angel;" we oppose such "enlightenment"... The more discretion there is the less there will be of this indelicate intrusion into the most intimate spheres of human life" (January 8, 1969, p. 12)

Other readers' letters, defending sexual education, point to the hypocritical puritanism which still exists in Soviet society. The same edition of Literaturnaya gazeta reproduced the following letter:

The newspaper has touched upon a very important question. To deny the need to create the institute of sexology and sexual pathology would be simply unreasonable... I am extremely angry at the bigots, because of whom, it seems to me, there is a fear of publishing the necessary books and of seriously discussing an important aspect of human life. At heart they are philistines, because they see only filth in intimate relations... The bigots
believe that it is better to suffer proudly than
to turn to a sexologist for advice. (Ibid.)

The more interest in sexual questions grows in the Soviet Union
the stronger becomes the reaction of the prudes, both private
individuals and officials. The opposition of these zealous
moralists is so great that the advocates of sexual education are
unlikely to make much progress in the foreseeable future.

EAST GERMAN CITIZENS DENIED LEGAL RIGHT TO
WESTERN TELEVISION RECEPTION

(Radio Free Europe, 23-1-70)

In an early January issue of Freies Wort (published in Suhl,
East Germany), District Attorney Werner Köttnitz stated that
the administrators of all dwellings in the GDR are bound by the
Constitution not to grant requests for the installation of television
roof antennas capable of ensuring good reception of Western
television programs. The remarks by the District Attorney were
obviously prompted by complaints from the households which had
requested the installation of such antennas and had been refused.
Köttnitz argued that these refusals were part of the struggle
"against the ideological diversion of the class enemy" and that
these decisions were based on "justified social interests." It
therefore evolved logically that no one has a legal right to
receive interference-free transmissions from NATO states. In
his argumentation, Köttnitz referred specifically to Article 21
of the GDR Constitution of 1968; this article deals with the right
and duty of the East German citizen to "co-determine the
political, economic, social and cultural life of the socialist
state." Apparently this right applies only to administrators and
functionaries, but not to the population at large.

There is, incidentally, no specific law in East Germany which
forbids listening to Western radio broadcasts or watching
Western television. However, numerous pressures are exerted
on the population to discourage such habits, including the
subjection of young school children to questions which might
reveal something about the listening habits of their parents. In
the legal sense, the reception of Western broadcasts becomes
"spreading of anti-state propaganda" only if it occurs "in
public," e.g., if guests are invited in for the purpose. There
was a time in the early sixties, after the erection of the Wall
when the SED launched a campaign against the so-called "ox-
head antennas" (so termed because of their shape) which were
known to facilitate reception of Western T.V. channels. This
campaign was carried out primarily by the FDJ youth organi-
ization, whose members literally ripped the antenna from the
roofs. These methods were soon discontinued, however,
because they created too much resentment among the people.
From the statements of the Suhl District Attorney, it would
seem that the SED has now resorted to administrative methods
in order to try to block Western reception.

SCIENTISTS AND INDUSTRIAL EXPERTS DISCUSS PROBLEMS
OF TECHNICAL PROGRESS

(Soviet News, 17-2-70)

A general meeting of the USSR Academy of Sciences, devoted to
problems of technical progress, was held in Moscow from
February 3 to 6. It was attended by some of the Soviet Union's
leading scientists and by representatives of industry and heads
of research centres concerned with various branches of industry.

Among those attending the meeting were Pyotr Demichëv,
alternate member of the political bureau and secretary of the
central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union;
Mikhail Solomentsev, secretary of the CPSU central committee;
Vladimir Kirillin, Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of
Ministers and chairman of the USSR State Committee for Science
and Technology, and Sergei Trapeznikov, head of the CPSU
central committee's department for science and educational
institutions.

A report on the tasks of the USSR Academy of Sciences in relation
to technical progress was given by the Academy's president,
Mstislav Keldysh.

Great achievements

"Our country is about to commemorate the centenary of the
birth of Lenin, the founder of the world's first socialist state,
with great achievements to its credit in the economic, social and cultural spheres," he declared.

"The Soviet Union has built the world's biggest hydro-electric and thermal power stations, and power transmission lines stretching for great distances.

"It is making up-to-date airliners. It has an extensively developed industry producing synthetic diamonds and other crystals.

"Major achievements in many areas of science and technology have helped to develop means of ensuring the country's defence.

"Our country's enormous contribution to the solution of the immense scientific and technical problems of our times has received worldwide recognition," he continued.

"The Soviet Union has played a very big part in developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Our country has blazed the trail into space for mankind."

Academician Keldysh went on to say that the experience of building a communist society had, however, brought to the fore problems of economic development, mainly in relation to the intensification of production. He emphasised that technical progress nowadays was based entirely on the achievements of science and on the ability to apply them quickly to work.

"Success in organising production also depends very much on science and on the utilisation of the results achieved recently in the development of the theory and means of processing information and the theory of control at all levels," he said.

"The vistas which science is opening up in this sphere are a major factor in the scientific and technological revolution of the present day."

Academician Keldysh went on to speak about how great scientific discoveries and ideas had led to a real revolution in the development of various branches of technology and to the appearance of new sources of power, sophisticated structural materials, highly efficient machines and very accurate instruments.

Computers

Computers, he pointed out, had opened up unlimited prospects for improving control processes and for the automation of some functions which had previously been regarded as belonging exclusively to the realm of man's intellectual activity.

"Computers are already invading many branches of our activities, up to and including medicine and research in the field of the humanities," he said.

"I believe that in the period of the present scientific and technological revolution, computers and the opportunities they offer will have an influence on further industrial and social development which will be as great as that exercised by the appearance of machinery at the time of the industrial revolution.

"The biologists are penetrating further and further into the micro-world and this is having a great influence not only on medicine and agriculture but also on some branches of industrial production. Biological methods are helping us, for instance, to obtain many useful substances and to use new raw materials for their manufacture.

"A case in point is the processing of oil products to produce protein and other preparations.

"Mankind has already had a foretaste of the benefits coming from the new trend in biology. It is there that new principles of genetics and selection are emerging, leading to ever greater achievements in developing new and highly-productive plant and animal strains and making it possible to overcome a number of human diseases."

Stressing the importance of ensuring the application of scientific achievements with the maximum speed, Academician Keldysh went on to speak about the branches of science which are particularly important in raising the technical and economic level of the various industries. A major task, he said, was to intensify work on the design of computers and to extend the use of computers. "Soviet scientists," he went on, "have made impressive progress in the majority of fields covered by theoretical mathematics and computing techniques. We cannot as yet be satisfied, however, with the scale on which research
is being conducted on a number of problems related to computers and control practices.

"In particular, we must considerably expand the work on perfecting the mathematical equipment of our computers and on training mathematicians to operate these machines." After referring to the big contribution made by electronics, he went on to add that the institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences should pay more attention to developing micro-miniatuised electronic instruments.

"Extremely promising is the development of optical electronics, which is opening up new possibilities for creating effective systems of information processing," he said.

"Laser technology has presented us with particularly promising possibilities. This branch will introduce changes in many fields of human endeavour of an importance as great as those resulting from semiconductors."

"We are making good progress in that field, although the situation as regards the industrial uses of laser beams is not as yet satisfactory. "The application of superconductivity will undoubtedly be very stimulating in many fields of technology. We need more intensive research on the development of new basic types of electrical equipment - test models of generating sets, electric motors and commercial transformers based on the use of superconductive materials. We must also start work on applying superconductive magnetic devices in plants converting thermal and nuclear power into electricity, and in magnetic accumulators and accelerators."

He went on to say that the transmission of the ever-increasing flow of information was being hampered to a great extent by the "congestion" in radio frequencies and overloads in the cable communication network.

"This challenges scientists to master new radio wave bands, including the sub-millimetre ones," he said. "We have to solve complex problems of developing broad-band trunk communication lines based on the use of wave guides, laser equipment, satellites and tropospheric lines," he said.

Nuclear physics

"Nuclear physics is penetrating to an increasing extent into various spheres of science and the national economy. Certain ways of making practical use of the physics of elementary particles in medicine are also appearing. Pi-meson beams, for instance, are being used to treat malignant tumours.

"Methods developed by nuclear physics must be used much more extensively for controlling production processes, in chemical technology, in agriculture and medicine and for the preservation of food products, and also in research.

"In the sphere of new methods of generating power, we know that atomic energy and new methods of transforming thermal energy into electricity are the most promising. Among them there is the magneto-hydrodynamic method and, in the future, controlled thermonuclear synthesis.

"Atomic power engineering must solve some important fundamental problems connected with the development of more efficient fast-neutron reactors."

Turning to important problems connected with machine building, Academician Keldysh stressed the importance of the automation of machines and machine systems with the use of computers and with the use of processes based on high pressures and temperatures, very low temperatures, high velocities, and radiation and chemical techniques of all kinds.

Growing complexity

"The process by which machines and machine systems are becoming increasingly complex, up to and including automatic factories and other industrial establishments, gives rise to a wide range of problems connected with ensuring the reliability of structural materials and improving their quality," he said.

"All this makes the successes of machine building increasingly dependent on the achievements of fundamental sciences - mathematics, mechanics, physics, chemistry and even biology, on whose boundary with technology a new field - bionics - has been developing." He drew attention to the importance of research into the further development of polymer
materials. Academician Keldysh also spoke of the problems needing to be solved in order to ensure the further progress of the chemical and microbiological industries and agriculture, including the development of effective fertilisers, chemicals for the control of pests and diseases, and growth regulators. The production of physiologically active substances was acquiring increasing importance for medicine, agriculture and certain industrial processes, he explained.

"It is necessary to strengthen the bonds between biological science and medicine," he said.

"Surgery, for instance, has reached a high level of technical perfection which ensures the possibility of transplanting organs. This, however, requires the investigation of ways and means of overcoming biological incompatibility.

"The struggle against cancerous diseases remains an extremely important problem. We can expect decisive developments in this field only if we succeed in discovering the role and participation of genetic mechanisms, immunity phenomena and factors of a vital nature in that connection."

Owing to the steadily increasing depths at which mineral raw material was being mined, he said, an all-round investigation of the properties of substances deep in the interior of the Earth, and of their structure and the processes taking place in them, was of tremendous practical importance. The future necessity of utilising large deposits of ore with a low content of useful minerals posed the problem of evolving new and more efficient methods of processing minerals.

"An important problem," he said, "is to find ways of reducing to the greatest possible extent the economically unjustified losses of minerals during their extraction and processing.

"The problem of providing the national economy with fresh water is becoming particularly acute nowadays," he said. "Scientists at the Academies of Sciences of Union republics have in recent years discovered important basins of fresh artesian waters under desert sands and in semi-desert zones of Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

"The Institute of Water Problems, which was founded not long ago, must make an important contribution to solving the problem of the rational utilisation of water resources." He went on to say that a problem which was becoming increasingly vital was that of utilising the resources of the world's oceans. The investigation of the oceans should help to solve important practical problems such as restoring, increasing and qualitatively improving the biological resources of the sea, as well as mining minerals on the continental shelf and, in the future, in deep parts of the ocean. It was likewise important to arrive at forecasts of the chances of mining minerals and making use of all the biological resources in the ocean.

Combating pollution

He went on to speak about the problems of combating pollution and protecting natural wealth.

"It is necessary," he said, "to intensify research in order to find effective means for protecting and transforming nature and especially means of combating the pollution of water, the soil and the atmosphere, brought about by industrial and urban waste products.

"Measures must be taken to develop research connected with the protection of the biosphere from the harmful consequences of man's economic activities, to protect the soil from toxic substances, erosion and salination and to protect many species of animals and plants from extinction.

"Space exploration has helped to increase immensely our knowledge of near-terrestrial space, the Moon, the nearest planets of the solar system, the Sun, and the relationship between terrestrial and space phenomena. This research has opened up vistas for interplanetary travel.

"The results of space exploration and the achievements of space rocketry are having a growing influence every year on scientific and technical progress.

"Sputniks have helped us to establish long-range television and radio-telephone communications and to improve weather forecasting services."
"At the present time great attention must be paid to research in developing orbital stations which will provide new opportunities for the investigation of the world's natural resources, including geological, hydro-logical and oceanological investigations, for geodesy and geophysics, for navigation, for the development of astronomy and possibly for carrying out especially refined technological processes in special conditions."

Academician Keldysh devoted part of his speech to the science of economics, which had been responsible recently, he said, for promoting ever more actively the rational use of the country's resources and the improvement of the machinery of economic management.

"The economic reform has substantially increased the effectiveness of production," he went on. "The scientists specialising in economics are confronted with some serious problems in developing proposals which will improve the structure of production and encourage the development of new technical achievements.

"Research should be stepped up on problems concerning the long-term forecasting and long-term planning of economic development in the light of the opportunities provided by science.

Fundamental research

"The progress of science," he continued, "is influenced, as everyone knows, by the requirements of practical work and by virtue of the logical requirements of the development of science proper, and by the desire of mankind to obtain a better understanding of the universe.

Consequently, in order to promote scientific and technical progress, it is also very important to stimulate strictly theoretical fundamental research. In the past few decades our country has paid great attention to the physics of high-energy particles.

"This research is already yielding some important results. For instance, during experiments with the Serpukhov accelerator it has been possible to synthesise nuclei of anti-helium 3, consisting of two anti-protons and one anti-neutron."

He went on to say that amazing successes had been achieved recently in the investigation of galaxies and stars. The discovery of relic emissions, quasars and pulsars, and indications of the possible registration of gravitational waves confronted scientists with new mysteries and at the same time opened up new opportunities for a better understanding of the structure of the universe and of the processes taking place in it.

Academician Keldysh also spoke about problems of improving labour productivity in the scientific field, stepping up the effectiveness of research and improving the ways in which science is organised and in which scientists are trained. He dwelt on the need for a substantial increase in the facilities for making scientific instruments and on the importance of automation in scientific research.

Academician Nikolai Basov, winner of a Nobel Prize for Physics, made a report to the meeting on "Physics and Technological Progress."

"Let us try to assess the influence of physics on technology in the near future," he said. "It seems to us that this influence will be seen most clearly in the following fields: power engineering, the development of new super-high-speed methods of processing and information transference, the development of new materials, new production processes and new methods of research and measurement."

He pointed out that investigations connected with the transformation of different kinds of energy into electricity (solar and nuclear batteries, thermal elements and fuel elements) and investigations connected with energy accumulation and an increase in the efficiency of power stations (magneto-hydrodynamic installations, the use of superconductive materials) were far from being the exclusive concern of the power engineers. Chemists and physicists also had to make their contribution.

"The solution of these problems - and also of problems involved in improving atomic power stations - will be of tremendous importance for large-and small-scale power problems of the
future," he said.

He stressed that the reproduction of nuclear fuel on the basis of fast-neutron reactors and the achieving of controlled thermonuclear synthesis would have tremendous economic and social consequences.

Electronics

Academician Basov went on to speak about the need to improve the organisation of research in the field of electronics. The research conducted in laboratories often lost all point if it was divorced from the modern technological base, he said. In many cases, the work done was of doubtful practical value while, at the same time, little attention was being paid to a whole number of trends, such as micro-miniaturisation, the Gann effect, optical electronics, holography and the development of superconductive elements for computers.

He forecast that a new stage in the development of computers and in other fields of electronics would be connected with the change-over to coherent optical radiation.

"On the basis of semiconductor diode lasers," he said, "it is possible, in principle, to work out elements for computers performing scores of thousands of millions of operations a second.

"Technological progress is largely connected with the development of new materials," he continued. "Research in the field of solid-state physics is promoting progress in this field.

"Superconductive materials are playing an even greater role in technology. Their importance will grow to a tremendous extent if we can obtain superconductive materials operating at room temperature, or at least at the temperature of liquid nitrogen. Present theoretical notions favour this possibility rather than denying it

"In many cases, however, the materials turned out by industry do not satisfy research workers, although our laboratories have produced materials which are superior to the best foreign specimens. This is largely connected with the fact that factory physics laboratories are either non-existent or inadequate."

Academician Basov dwelt on some of the organisational requirements arising from progress in science and engineering.

"The number of problems to be solved in basic and applied physics is so great that even a major increase in the research force will not make it possible to deal with all of them at once," he said. "In these conditions, our main concern is to concentrate efforts on the major problems in order to solve them as speedily as possible." He said that there was a need for the technical re-equipping of many physics institutes. The provision of modern research facilities would enable the Academy of Sciences to increase the pace of research work considerably and reduce the time required for discoveries to reach industry.

"However," he said, "in order to remove existing difficulties, I believe it is necessary to establish physics laboratories at all the branch institutes and plants with which physicists are cooperating and in some cases to establish the post of chief physicist, just as we now have chief technologists."

Academician Victor Glushkov, a leading mathematician, spoke about computers and problems of automation and control.

"One of the principal trends in technical progress," he said, "will be the blending of computers with communication systems and the setting up of national data-processing systems like the major power grids."

"Technical Progress in Power Engineering" was the subject of a report prepared by Academician Vladimir Kirillin and Mikhail Styrikovich and delivered at the meeting by the former. He said that work on the plan for developing power engineering in the Soviet Union in the period up to 1980 was now in its final stages. It was intended, between 1971 and 1975 inclusive, to install new capacities totalling 70-80 million kilowatts. An important trend was towards power units and also whole stations that were of greater capacity. A considerable section of the report was devoted to questions of boosting the economics and performance of thermal power stations.

"One of the major undertakings in this field is the switchover to higher steam parameters," said Vladimir Kirillin, who is a Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. "Powerful sets with super-critical steam parameters and a pressure of
240 atmospheres are being installed in the main at the power stations which are now being put into operation. The increase in capacity is planned to be completed in 1971-80 mainly by the installation of big power sets, including two with a capacity of 1,200,000 kilowatts.

"The efficiency of steam-turbine power stations has increased substantially in recent years and the best of them have almost 40 per cent efficiency. A definite increase in efficiency, in comparison with big steam-turbine sets, can be obtained with certain types of combined steam-gas installations, where the steam turbine is supplemented by a gas turbine. They probably have the best prospects for the future."

He pointed out that one of the basic trends of electrification in the USSR was the combined production of both electricity and heat at big heat and power stations, and the centralised supply of heat for municipal needs and for industry. In 1970 the electricity capacity of district-heating turbines would amount to nearly 40 million kilowatts, he said. A large section of the report was devoted to problems concerning the development of atomic power engineering. Academician Kirillin said that the priority development of thermal neutron reactors would most probably continue up to the 'eighties and even up to the 'nineties, when, according to the view of the experts, powerful and economically-competitive fast-neutron reactors would be built and run in. They would be the basis of atomic power engineering at the end of the present century. He said that as the case all over the world, the main trend of technical progress as regards hydro-electric stations was to build more powerful stations and generators. The growing capacities of hydrogenerators were posing increasing problems as regards the reliability of machines and unfortunately, in going over to such super-powerful generators, insufficient use was being made of the experience acquired in operating machines of new design.

Power grids

He stressed the important role to be played by big power grids and said:

"The development of Soviet science and engineering helped our country, in the 'fifties, to take its place among the few countries leading the world in the long-distance transmission of electricity. The Soviet Union also holds the leading place in the direct current transmission of electricity.

"The USSR is doing research to develop a D.C. long-distance line carrying 1,500 kilovolts and about 2,500 kilometres long. It will link the central areas of the country with the Ektibastuz coal-mining district in Kazakhstan.

"If need be, the transmission of large quantities of electricity from Eastern Siberia to the European parts of the country will be ensured by the development of a D.C. line carrying about 2,400 kilovolts.

Academician Kirillin outlined the plans for establishing a unified power grid for the USSR which, he said, would cover almost the entire territory of the country with the exception of the north-eastern areas. He emphasised that in the years ahead, thermal power stations would continue to take first place in power production and would be producing about 84 per cent of the country's electricity. Academician V. Trapeznikov gave a report on "Economic Management and Scientific and Technical Progress," in the course of which he said:

"Statistical data show science to be the most beneficial sphere of capital investments."

He pointed out that, proportionally speaking, the increase in the national income resulting from allocations to science was several times greater than that resulting from direct investments in industry. Academician Boris Paton, the well-known expert on advanced welding techniques, expressed the belief that technical progress depended in many respects on the development of metallurgy.

"Despite the rapid growth of the production of synthetic materials, metal will continue to be one of the main construction materials in the foreseeable future," he said.

The general meeting approved a resolution on the tasks of the USSR Academy of Sciences in connection with technical progress. This resolution determines the priority of research in the fields of power engineering, control and automation, electronics and other fields of science.
LITERATURE AND YOUTH
( Radio Free Europe, 3-3-'70 )

On February 10, Jozsef Darvas (president of the Hungarian Writers' Union) spent a few hours with the students living in a hostel in the Trans-Danubian town of Veszprem. The students, from the Technical School of the Chemical Industry, questioned Darvas on various subjects, and the Veszprem provincial newspaper Naplo in its February 15 issue gave a short account of what was said. Darvas pointed out inter alia that the young Hungarian writers of today have an easier life than their predecessors. While, for example, the great Hungarian poet Attila Jozsef (1905-1937) had personally to find subscribers for his books, the young writers of today work in a situation where everything is more stable. Quite possibly their opportunities for publication are few, but they do not have to fight for it.

Few countries in the world have produced greater poetry than Hungary's, Darvas said, but knowledge of this poetry has been greatly hampered by the language barriers. The discovery of Hungarian poetry -- and even prose -- abroad has now started, but the general international public has still only scanty information about it. Gyula Illyes is the greatest living Hungarian writer, because he has preserved the traditional "social sensibility" which is so characteristic of Hungary's literature. While keeping his feet on the pusztá (the Hungarian steppe) he reached the level of international literature.

At the next general meeting of the Hungarian Writers's Union (to be held in May 1970) Darvas will give a detailed account of the situation in Hungarian literature. In Veszprem he provided only a sketchy outline. He is no longer as optimistic as he was in 1962, when he heard the "flourish of trumpets," and believed he could see the blossoming of literature. Although his vision has been realized, he is now less optimistic, because a sort of doubled-faced culture is making headway: there is an "elite literature" for oversophisticated people (vajtfüllűek), and a lowbrow literature for the masses. "Trashy literature and best sellers inundate us," Darvas complained. However, this is a period of transition. The transform of popular education in its entire structure and spirit may be the proper remedy for this situation. If action is delayed, the double-faced character of literature will increase.

Turning to youth, Darvas emphasized that he does not agree with those who consider the younger generation cynical and rotten, but he does not go to the opposite extreme and believe that the decisive majority of young people are working wholeheartedly and constructively. The truth lies somewhere in the middle. Today's young people are certainly more frank and genuine, despite the signs of cynicism and idleness which can be detected among them. Their quality depends on that of those who have preceded them and are now adults.

In this connection it is worth taking a closer look at the views of Gyula Illyes, which were expounded in an interview given to Magyar Ifjusag on February 13, 1970.

Illyes began by saying that it has never been easy to be young in Hungary, but that the present time is especially difficult. I both envy and deplore the young people: they have boundless potential, but at the same time they have to fight hard to establish themselves. The family, which was a strong natural community for the conserving and educating of earlier generations, is now going through a critical time. Today, the character-shaping force of class consciousness by which the last generation was influenced has become a mere phrase or a pretext for self-assertion. The national consciousness of Hungarian youth, compared to that of the young people in the neighboring countries, is "undeveloped," "unclear," and dominated by bad influences; it is forever being regarded as a feeling to be ashamed of and pitied. It is quite inexplicable that we cannot or will not convey to our people feelings of national solidarity, national consciousness, and rightful pride. Therefore it is not surprising that they have no ideals (or only phony ones) and that they are being exposed to all kinds of mendacious chauvinistic ideologies, to a negative disillusionment and to anarchistic mock-revolutionism. It is unfashionable today to give beyond the limits imposed by personal want, to achieve more, to make sacrifices, or to look beyond the individual horizon.

If this generation has a few faults, errors and delusions and
often feels unhappy, and if the lot of youth is hard, responsibility for this situation must be laid largely on their fathers' doorstep. But was their fathers' lot an easy one? Were they deceived in their ideals? And if so, why did they transmit these false ideals to their sons? It is a strange irony of fate that fathers have been calling their sons to account because they have failed to transform these ideals, and have resented the fact that their sons have no ideals at all -- or, as often happens, only bad ones. Illyes ended by asking: What will happen in 15-20 years' time when a generation devoid of worthy ideals takes over the burden of running the nation?

The touchy question of why ideals are dying out in the younger generation has repeatedly been raised by people taking part in the nationwide discussion on youth problems.

YUGOSLAV PROFESSOR REJECTS MOSCOW ACCUSATIONS

by Slobadan Stankovic

( Radio Free Europe, 26-2-'70 )

Summary: The Zagreb philosophy professor Predrag Vranicki recently rejected Soviet accusations that, because of their claim that several types of Marxism existed, he and his Yugoslav colleagues were revisionists. Vranicki criticized Soviet theoreticians for considering that they alone were the true advocates of genuine Marxism and claimed that Soviet intellectuals have not made a single creative contribution to the field of Marxist theory over the past several decades. The author of A History of Marxism also termed the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia a hard-to-cure wound in the consciousness of progressive mankind.

Relations between Belgrade and Moscow are now entering upon a phase which may culminate in a new, open ideological clash over the correct interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. This conflict is actually more than 20 years old and was believed to have ended 15 years ago, when Nikita Khrushchev officially recognized the existence of "various roads to socialism" and, by implication, the existence of various ideological interpretations. The centenary of Lenin's birth, however, seems to have opened up a new chapter in a process which has had its very definite ups and downs over the past two decades.

In addition to a series of minor polemical clashes indicating a steady deterioration of ideological relations, the Soviet-Yugoslav atmosphere has been tainted by the recent prophecy of the Zagreb Professor of Philosophy, Predrag Vranicki (vra-nits-ki), that a new "blazing up" of the mutual ideological conflict is about to occur. In his interview with a Belgrade weekly (Nedeljne informativne novine (NIN), Belgrade, 22 February 1970, Vranicki's interview was entitled "My Answer to Kommunist.") Professor Vranicki rejected recent Soviet press attacks against him and some of his Yugoslav colleagues. While the January 27 Pravda had accused him and his colleagues Gajo Petrovic, Mihailo Markovic and Rudi Supek of deviations from the mainstream of scientific Marxism-Leninism (See RFE Research report No. 0457 "Pravda Attacks Four Yugoslav Marxist Philosophers," 28 January 1970, by Slobodan Stankovic.) a recent issue of the Soviet theoretical periodical Kommunist attacked the professor, together with Roger Garaudy, for propagating "poly-Marxism," i.e., the existence of several types of Marxism.

According to Momdzhyan, the concept of pluralistic "models of socialism" has been propagated by "bourgeois, reformist and revisionist ideologists." One of them is "the Yugoslav philosopher P. Vranicki, who, as far back as 1961, defended the idea that, at every stage of social development, one of the Marxist variants receives authentic historical justification." Momdzhyan further said that in 1968 Professor Vranicki, at the International Congress of Philosophers in Vienna, had advocated the thesis about the "pluralism of Marxist philosophy." According to the Soviet ideologist, Professor Vranicki claimed that "it is an urgent task to abandon radically the view that only one sole philosophy or one sole structure of that philosophy exists; it is necessary to recognize the inevitability of the existence of its various variants."

In addition, Momdzhyan accused Vranicki of having proclaimed
the "alienation of man as the central problem of Marxist philosophy." Of course, said the Soviet theoretician, "Vranicki has not created, and cannot create, any new variant of Marxist philosophy" because "the truth is one, while the errors are pluralistic." As proof of his claim that various types of Marxism cannot exist, Momdzhyan mentioned the "Czechoslovak model of socialism with a human face" which he said actually meant "the liquidation of the socialist order in the country." He concluded by claiming that the concept of several types of Marxism is aimed at destroying "the ideological and organizational unity in the international Communist movement."

Against Ideological Illusions and Mystifications

In his answer to Momdzhyan, Professor Vranicki stressed that the chief task of socialism has not only been to free man from the stigma of "hired labor," but also to free him "from being dependent on any political and state spheres, to free him from all ideological illusions and mystifications." In his book, The History of Marxism, published in early 1962, Vranicki had already criticized the Soviets' "clumsy ideological machinery" which has been imbued with both revisionism and dogmatism. He claimed that Soviet philosophers have been so confused that "they are wrong even when they argue something where they are formally correct." (In his above-mentioned interview with NIN, Professor Vranicki said he had just finished the revised edition of his History of Marxism, which will be almost twice as large as the first edition, which had more than 600 pages. The new edition will include new chapters on Marxism in Poland, describing the works of Lange, Kolakowski and Schaff, and on Marxism in Czechoslovakia, with a description of works by Ota Sik and Kosík, and of the events of 1967 and 1968.

Vranicki said that the ideological conflict between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union together with its East European allies always becomes acute when "our political relations have sharpened." This has transpired like an "ebb and flow" of the tides. He adds that not all Soviet or East European Marxists have agreed with the official interpretation of Marxism "nor with the appraisal of individual personalities, such as Sartre, Lefebre, Trotsky, Bloch, Lukacs, etc.; they especially do not agree with the interpretation and analysis of the latest concepts and events." The chief characteristic distinguishing the Yugoslav philosophers from those in the Soviet bloc is that the former advocate "self-managing socialism." This, logically, has led them to work out quite different appraisals of Stalinism, bureaucratic socialism, the events of 1948 "when they (i.e., the Russians) accused us to collaborating with imperialism, in order to condemn us one year later (in November 1949) as Fascists." "Can you imagine," said Vranicki ironically, "how subtle and creative all these Marxist analyses and interpretations were."

It is true, said Vranicki, "that I claimed in my book that one must differentiate between the various types of Marxism: more creative and less creative." However, in the Soviet Union all this "is still considered heresy." Why? Vranicki answers:

The reason is very simple: Since they believe that only what they have been preaching is real Marxism (even though in the past few decades they have not published any creative work in the field of Marxist theory), then this Marxism is also the one sole Marxism; all others are "revisionistic." For if some other Marxist concepts were to be recognized with the same dignity (as the Russian interpretation), people could pose the question: Which interpretation expresses in a better and deeper manner Marx's ideas and intentions. However, if one accepts the idea that there are no various types of Marxist philosophy and Marxism in general ... then we cannot accept as well Stalin's concept as one of the variants (a very bad variant). In such a case, Stalin's Marxism is either the sole and real Marxism (something which we, the Yugoslav philosophers and Marxists, have radically rejected), or is it no Marxism at all (something which the Soviet Marxists cannot accept). Of course, the Soviet philosophers can negate the existence of various types of Marxism and internally, if they wish, continue to hail Stalin as the fourth classic (of Marxism). However, such theoretical merchandise is not for export because it is of extreme-ly bad quality.
In other words, said Vranicki, either Stalin's interpretation of Marxism must be equivocated to the interpretations of Lukacs, Bloch, Marcuse, Lefebre, Sartre, Kosik, Kolakowski, Fromm, the Yugoslav Marxists, etc., -- "something which would be considered a real sensation" -- or all the mentioned non-Stalinist interpretations of Marxism "must be proclaimed non-Marxism or 'revisionism,' which also will be a real sensation and curiosity." Vranicki advised the Soviet philosophers "to think over seriously their underdevelopment with regard to the world development of Marxist and theoretical ideas in general."

Socialist Alienation

In contrast to the Russian philosophers, who have claimed that people living under socialism have no aversion whatsoever to the system, Vranicki and his Yugoslav colleagues have long insisted that a certain alienation does exist in socialist society. In his interview with NIN, Vranicki said that "with a delay of a good three decades" the Soviet philosophers have finally come to the conclusion that in their country as well people have been alienated, "but only as a result of the remnants of the old (capitalist) structure." And this is precisely what Vranicki considers false. "This is neither a philosophic nor a scientific claim." - he said. The existence of a personality cult, he added, also represents a kind of alienation, as does the fact that the workers are deprived of the labor surplus, "which in Marxist terminology is called hired labor," or the fact that political forces, i.e., the Party, interfere in all spheres of human life, culture, arts and science. This is not apparent in the Soviet Union because the leaders there have simply "abolished alienation by an administrative decree and have proclaimed 'a free society,' as was the case three decades ago with Stalin's Constitution."

Asked to say something more about the chapter in his book dealing with Czechoslovakia, Vranicki said:

By the end of 1967 and in the beginning of 1968, Czechoslovakia was passing through its real socialist and Marxist renaissance. In that period of time great efforts were made, both in theory and practice, to remove many contradictions from the Stalinist era and to create one's own model of socialism. The act carried out against them (i.e., the August 1968 military occupation), is, for me, the worst action taken in socialism in the past several decades. This is one of the greatest tragedies of socialism in the past few decades and a wound which will be difficult to remedy in the consciousness of progressive humanity. Socialism must do many good deeds in the future in order to enable people to forget this evil. At least some socialist principles, as well as inter-socialist relations, must once and for all become inalienable. For what should people fight for if they are not sure that at least the sovereignty of their party or of their country is secure.

Vranicki found a few nice words for the Chinese and Mao. He called Mao "an exceptional historical personality" who has demonstrated himself to be "an excellent strategist and tactician" during the "cultural revolution." In Vranicki's opinion the "cultural revolution" was "an anti-bureaucratic and political campaign." Vranicki is less optimistic about how things will go after Mao's death.

The Yugoslav philosopher also defended the French Communist maverick, Roger Garaudy, whom he praised as a true Marxist for having "repented" after many years as "one of the main ideologists of the Stalinized French CP." Garaudy has come to the conclusion, Vranicki said, that the Yugoslav Party has been correct and that its system of workers' self-management has been an excellent idea. Referring in a round-about manner to Garaudy's position on the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia, Vranicki said:

Soviet philosophers should once and for all clearly understand that criticism of Stalinism from the platform of Marx's and Lenin's correctly-conceived teachings is not "anti-Sovietism" but rather the opposite: (namely) real and genuine Sovietism, if we understand the idea of the soviets according to Lenin's manner and intention. In addition, Stalinism is not a French, Yugoslav
or other product, but rather the historical product of the Soviet Union. Of course, nobody can be excepted from criticism, but the right to historical criticism belongs to other sides, too.

In conclusion Professor Vranicki said that "the greatest theoretical advances in the Marxist field have been achieved in certain developed bourgeois democratic countries, in socialist countries during the period of de-Stalinization, in Yugoslavia and in Cuba." He stressed that Marxist philosophy and science could successfully develop only in freedom. "Marxist ideas necessarily become stunted without free criticism," Vranicki concluded; "history is not a one-way street."