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DEVELOPMENT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS  
THROUGH FREER MOVEMENT OF  
PEOPLE, IDEAS AND INFORMATION

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CONTENTS

	Page
1. Introduction by C. C. van den Heuvel	1
2. <u>A European View</u> by Dr. C. Berkhouwer President European Parliament	3
3. <u>A Soviet View</u> by V. M. Kuznetsov 1st Secretary Embassy USSR in The Netherlands	10
4. <u>Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe</u> by Dr. J. van der Valk Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs	19
5. <u>Soviet Conception of Coexistence and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe</u> by Professor Dr Boris Meissner Prof. of International Law - University of Cologne	30
6. <u>The Free Movement of Peoples in Europe East-West Contact and the Christian Churches</u> by Rev Michael Bourdeaux MA BD Director of the Centre for the Study of Religion and Communism, Great Britain	34
7. <u>Committee</u> : Freer Movement and "Peaceful Coexistence"	49
8. <u>Committee</u> : Free Flow of Information	52
9. <u>Committee</u> : Freer Movement and Dissenters	55

## INTRODUCTION

Détente has been the central subject in the discussion on East-West relations for a number of years now. It is, on the one hand, the expression of the strong desire for peace of the people in East and West and, on the other hand, of the efforts of their governments to achieve better relations. These governments however, realize that détente also includes risks. The main risk is seen by Western governments as that of being unable to keep up the necessary defense level, by Eastern governments, as that of increasing political and ideological diversion.

In the discussions on détente the freer movement of people, ideas and information across Eastern and Western Europe has always been a very sensitive problem. Particularly since it is an item on the agenda of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). A committee and sub-committees have been formed on "Development of human contacts, broadening of cultural and educational exchanges, and wider flow of information".

The official Eastern reactions to the issue of freer movement of people, ideas and information, have always been negative. They express the fear that freer movement will undermine the belief of the people in communist ideology and the communist system. Moreover, they regard it as interference in their internal affairs. One of the more moderate opinions expressed on this matter was by Mr Brezhnev himself. In a meeting of the leaders of the Warsaw Pact States at the end of last year, he showed an awareness that his country was entering a new period of relations with the West, bringing both advantages and disadvantages, the latter being more contacts of a kind that would be both unwelcome and difficult to control by traditional methods.

The official Eastern views, of course, do not reflect the attitudes of all the people in those countries, nor are these likely to prove uniform throughout the Warsaw Pact, the official and unofficial attitudes of whose members are conditioned by historical background and experience, as well as by communist ideology. No doubt, freer movement appeals to various groups

in the communist countries and not only to dissenters, but to others as well. Therefore a certain response can be anticipated in Eastern Europe.

In spite of the negative reactions, freer movement has never been officially rejected by the Eastern countries as an agenda item for the CSCE. There is a certain preparedness now on that side to meet this Western demand.

The purpose of this conference was to investigate various aspects of the problems briefly described above. Several papers were presented and discussed. As certain subjects were dealt with in several papers, not all the papers could be included. Three committees discussed specific problems, their reports are included.

## A EUROPEAN VIEW

Dr. C. Berkhouwer

The year of 1973, in which we are meeting today, will presumably go down in European history as the year of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This conference and the political events which preceded it, especially the treaties concluded by the West German government with certain East European countries may have far-reaching consequences for the organization of political life in our continent; on the other hand, they may come to nothing - depending on the spirit and persistence with which the aims set out are pursued.

A historical comparison will perhaps help to emphasize how urgent it is to put our European house in better order. This year of 1973 comes 55 years after the Russian revolution, an event which - whatever one's opinions about it may be - was the ultimate cause of the present division and tension. That took place more than half a century ago. The magnitude of this period of time may be measured by comparing it with the time needed to overcome the consequences of the first major change in Europe, the French revolution. Fifty-five years after the French revolution it was 1839, the Napoleonic regime was a thing of the past and the major European powers had imposed a new order on the continent which guaranteed the status quo by reinforcing the demarcation between countries and repressing the aspirations of middle-class democrats. France vacillated between democracy and monarchy, the whole continent was rife with inner tension. And in the final analysis the following century of wars and revolutions was the consequence of the problems which were either left unsolved or repressed by force, consequence of the order which is linked with the name of Metternich.

Today, as I said before, more than half a century has passed since the events of Saint Petersburg and still we have not established a definite new order. Our comment on this would be, perhaps, 'unfortunately' or, perhaps, 'Thank God'. 'Unfortunately' because, as I said before, it is high time that something was done. 'Thank God' because a lesson can be learnt from the mistakes made in trying to create order after the French revolution. It is not enough to sign treaties confirming

the status quo. This creates no security at all. What is good for national frontiers is not necessarily equally as good for the frontiers of freedom of opinion. The recognition of national frontiers is only desirable if it is a step towards abolishing them in the sense that once recognised they will increasingly lose their significance.

Détente is not without risk, but as we can see from the experiences of the 19th century mentioned earlier, the opposite of détente, namely the non-recognition of historical facts, and the attempt to turn back history by force, embraces even greater risks - greater risks for both personal and political peace. These risks do exist, but at the same time I would like to add this: the risks of a policy of détente between East and West are only one side of the coin and if they are to be assessed properly they must be weighed up against the risks which would arise without a policy of détente. Allow me to explain this in somewhat greater detail.

1. To put it as briefly as possible: détente and a policy of recognition of the existing state of affairs and a policy of adjustment are, in the last third of our century, the only alternative to a policy of brinkmanship. We had a taste of what this could mean in the 50's. The accumulation of weapons has not lessened since then, on the contrary it has grown monstrously. You know that each side has enough explosives to destroy every single person on this earth many times over. It has never been easier to annihilate people, even to annihilate the whole of humanity. We cannot afford to forget that these weapons exist, that they are operational and - this is the most important point - that it is a question of politics whether they will ever be used or whether they will end up on the scrapheap.

However we must also not forget, despite the war in Vietnam, despite continuing conflicts in Latin America and Africa, that the nerve centre of world politics was, is, and will continue to be, Europe. Europe is the most densely populated region in the world and, it has the densest concentration of production potential. The two super-powers and the two social systems confront each other more directly in Europe than anywhere else in the world. There is greater commitment in Europe and the safeguarding of

interests is correspondingly keener. If better conditions for peace could be created here the results would be reflected throughout the world. It would appear that governments in the East and the West have come to understand this. And the Helsinki Conference was a preliminary step in the process of reorientation and reorganization within Europe which will be the task of the next decade.

2. The peace we are seeking depends on security, and this security in my opinion must be sought in three sectors or, if you prefer, at three levels:

Firstly, security against military threat as a  
'Continuation of politics by other means':

Secondly, security against economic and social hardship and economic pressure as a political device and

Thirdly, security against any form of limitation and repression in the development of the individual. To put it more precisely, guarantees for the safeguarding of the freedom of movement of people, ideas and information.

I would like to look briefly at each of these points.

There will only be genuine security against military threats when a political system has been created in the world which makes the use of force unnecessary and allows us to put our weapons into the melting pot. Unfortunately, there is no sign of such a situation arising as yet. For the time being we must confine ourselves to reducing the importance of the military component in politics and bring it under political control by creating balanced armament control facilities, by mutual information and by a sensitive system for the peaceful settlement of conflicts. This is one of the major tasks of the European Security and Cooperation Conference.

At the same time we must also not forget that the military component in politics can only be reduced if we succeed in overcoming the mutual fears which have dominated Europe for the last half century, by removing the military, economic or political threat to our own way of life and the independence of our own nation. The most powerful factor of uncertainty in the life of the nation and of the individual people is fear. Fear is however not something which one can localise object-

ively and it cannot be overcome by material arrangements alone. Nor can it be removed by a high level of armament or a high standard of living. It can only be overcome by confidence in other people, and this is a highly subjective matter depending primarily on the possibility of getting to know these other people in peaceful circumstances and communicating with them. It is, however, this last subjective factor which is at the same time a subject of negotiations and one of the leading factors at the third level of efforts to create détente and understanding, the level involving freedom of opinion and freedom of movement - a subject I shall return to later.

3. The same could be said of the second level of efforts to achieve détente and extend economic and technical cooperation. I think it would be useful to look into the political significance of this first, i. e. the political and not the economic significance. In large measure the problems between East and West are the result of unequal levels of development between the two parts of Europe. This unequal development of productive forces has created great differences in standards of living and therefore different levels of satisfaction of human needs which, and this is something we must say cautiously, is one of the reasons for the hesitation of certain East European Governments to allow complete freedom of movement between East and West.

It is, however, possible to discuss at great length the reasons for this unequal economic development - that was one of the favourite occupations of certain circles in the 50's. Today, it appears to me that the important thing is to see what there is, and to take this as a basis for understanding what must be done. This means that ways have to be sought of lessening and overcoming economic differences in Europe, and indeed in the world at large.

The Helsinki Conference committees which are now busy looking into ways of creating economic and technical cooperation are, as I understand it, taking steps along this path. However, economic cooperation requires more than mere agreements between states. Trade, technical cooperation, trans-frontier traffic and tourism - all these require above all confidence in the dependability of the other country. This

has been so for many centuries and is not different today. If it were not so economic cooperation would give way to hostility. However, if we are to have confidence in the reliability of the other partner we must know him and be able to assess his actions and reactions. The parties must see each other and talk to each other, visit each other and obtain information about each other.

To put it in a nutshell, at the first two levels those of military security and economic and technical cooperation, the efforts for détente, security and cooperation in Europe will have no lasting success if there is no progress at the third level, and if we do not succeed in creating an increasing measure of freedom of movement for people, ideas and information in Europe transcending national frontiers. What underlines the importance of your work here, and the Helsinki Conference has shown that the governments of the countries involved are also aware of this fact. The more far-reaching initiatives did indeed come from Western European countries; I am thinking here in particular of the detailed proposals from, for instance, France and the Federal Republic. But despite the scepticism expressed in your letter of invitation which was sent off before the conference there were also proposals from Eastern European countries. Here I would like to cite especially the joint proposal by Bulgaria and Poland on the development of cultural cooperation, contacts and exchanges in the field of information services. Generally speaking there are corresponding allusions in the proposals from almost all the European countries. In his introductory speech Mr. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, expressly referred to the 'considerable possibilities for further expansion of contacts in various fields' which could be exploited at the European conference. By this he meant the 'quite extensive cultural relations,' the 'tourist traffic' and the 'contacts between representatives of public life, youth and the professions' mentioned above.

There is therefore agreement in principle in both East and West that the present situation in regard to the exchange of persons and information is unsatisfactory and the Conference and its committees will have to deal with proposals to change the situation. We cannot presume that understanding on this matter will be easy to reach. Every proposal that we make

will have to be based on a realistic assessment of the interests of the Eastern and Western governments concerned. This assessment tells us that even half a century after the October Revolution, and quarter of a century after the creation of the Socialist States in Eastern Europe, the situation there is still fraught with uncertainty, with concern about subversion and internal revolution. This is partially a heritage of the Revolution and was in any case kept alive by the practices of the cold war. It does not seem to me sensible to counter such an attitude by making complaints and maximum demands. What is sensible, in my opinion, is what the West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, has called the policy of short steps. The possibilities offered in the Polish - Bulgarian proposals must be precisely ascertained. Also must be supported the unmistakable trends and attempts which are being encouraged by at least some influential circles in Eastern Europe to create greater freedom of movement for people and information. The Yugoslavian declaration which was submitted to the conference and dealt in a separate chapter with the respect for man and the basic freedoms including freedom of thought, opinion, religion and conviction may be of major significance. (The text is as follows. 'The participating states confirm the universal significance of the rights and basic freedoms of man, including the freedom of thought, opinion, religion or conviction and their obligation to respect these rights and freedoms as a basic contribution to the consolidation of security and the promotion of cooperation in Europe and in the whole world. They will make every effort both individually and jointly to guarantee permanent respect for, and fostering of, the rights of man and basic freedoms and to cooperate in dispelling discrimination based on race or nationality, or any other forms of discrimination, wherever they may appear. They will respect the interests of the national ethnic and linguistic minorities and their right to free development and thus make it possible for them to help to promote friendship and cooperation between the countries and peoples concerned.'))

In conclusion I would like to remind you of what I said at the beginning, that the path we have chosen is full of risks.

But there is no alternative either for our continent or for the world at large. The realisation that war can no longer be an extension of politics 'by other means' is conclusive and must dictate our actions.

After the bitter experiences which Europeans have had of each other, the creation of confidence cannot be easy and we shall only succeed if we constantly bear in mind the impossibility of the alternative solution.

One final point: cooperation requires balanced structures between the cooperating parties. However, the situation in Europe is dominated by a fundamental lack of balance: on the one hand there is a world power with some 250 million inhabitants fronted by a row of allied states, and on the other the medium and small powers of Western Europe. Now this is a structure which cannot provide a successful basis for cooperation in the long run. Therefore an important precondition for security and cooperation in Europe is that the West European states should persist in their efforts to create a European union as patiently and obstinately as they must try to bring about a settlement with Eastern Europe.

The first work is to unite mankind. Antoine de Saint Exupéry in his admirable book *Terre des Hommes*, once wrote: "le plus beau métier c'est d'unir les hommes". In my own daily work, which is dedicated to the unification of Europe, I feel myself often inspired by these words.

This work of reuniting the people of Europe will only then be crowned by success when there will be a free flow of people, products and materials, thoughts and ideas over the greatest possible extension of the whole European Continent, in the eastern as well in the western part, and between the two of them.

## A SOVIET VIEW

V. M. Kuznetsov

The topic of this conference is really important, but you can of course understand how difficult it is to present in such a short time all the aspects of development of East-West relations, through cooperation in humanitarian and other fields. This subject is one of the prominent problems under consideration at the All-European Conference on Security and Cooperation - to be exact - item no. 3 on its agenda. The fact that it is placed third after the problems of main principles of relations among European states and security on the continent, as well as after the problems of cooperation in the economy, technology and environmental protection, testifies for itself.

So, after many years of artificial division, Europe is now trying to take the road of consolidation of peace on the continent. One cannot ignore the fact that Europe is the only continent where two military blocks of states with completely different social systems are facing each other. Different social order, ideology as well as approach to various problems - all these factors are making the process of political détente rather complicated, but extremely important.

Years of confrontation have made their gloomy impact on the continent. One could understand therefore, that it is not easy to achieve a period of lasting peace and equal cooperation among nations after the many years of tension, which sometimes reached the length of international crisis.

What are the Soviet Union views on Europe of the future? First of all, we want to see it as a continent where aggression will be ruled out once and for all. We strive to achieve a mutual trust and understanding, which would allow the present division to be overcome. The relations between states should become those of peaceful and mutually advantageous cooperation. Here, from our point of view, the building of such a Europe accords with the best interests of governments, political parties and different organizations, who are aware of their responsibility for the cause of peace, however they may



differ on other points.

The participants in the European conference have got together expressly to discuss and decide the basic, pressing questions on the agenda of European politics. Insurance of security and development of cooperation in Europe are a matter of common concern, and the Soviet Union is convinced that every participating country, big or small, can make its valuable contribution to this cause.

After the success of the first stage in Helsinki, now it is very important to cement its positive results and to work out drafts of final agreements and decisions. According to our point of view, there are already grounds to believe that the third stage of the All-European Security and Cooperation Conference could take place preferably before the end of 1973. These grounds are prepared by the agreed recommendations of the Helsinki preparatory consultations and the success of the conference at ministerial level.

We think it important that the final stage should be carried out at the highest level, as it would attach political weight and authority to the decisions of the conference that correspond to its historical importance.

Decisions of the conference must first of all reply to the task of creating, by joint efforts, the basis of true European security and cooperation on principles of peaceful coexistence, ensuring stable, peaceful development on the continent. The Soviet Union attaches importance to all the 4 items on the agenda, but naturally, most attention should be paid to item 1.

The USSR sees as quite natural in the circumstances of détente, the broadening of contacts, exchange of spiritual values and information, development of ties between the public of various countries, provided strict conditions of respect for sovereign rights and non-interference into domestic affairs of states are observed. The Soviet Union deems it important that in the final documents of the All-European conference the ideas of peace, friendship and good neighbourliness should be fixed.

Dealing with the problems of the 3rd item on the agenda, one should never forget that they were being formed under the influence of the two ideologies that divide socialist and capitalist countries.

Speaking in general I must underline that the Soviet Union

expects real results from the All-European conference in everything that deals with expansion of cultural cooperation, as well as contacts between organizations and people. Peace and security in Europe depend greatly upon the extent of trust between peoples, upon the fact whether feelings of goodwill and mutual respect are fortified or, on the contrary, mistrust and animosity grow. There should be no place for the propaganda of hate, aggression, militarism, the cult of force, racial or national superiority as well as of other aims contrary to the aims of rapprochement and cooperation between peoples, contrary to the UNO Charter, contrary to the common norms of morals.

It is common knowledge that in creating its great and rich culture, Europe drew on many civilizations of the past. Under the concept of Europe we conceive not only different states, but a concentration of countless spiritual values, numerous monuments of art, centres of scientific and technical thought and modern industrial complexes.

That is why the struggle for peace, cooperation and security in Europe is a struggle to preserve not only the life of the European peoples, but the entire treasure-house of European civilization.

The question of expanding contacts among all European countries in the sphere of culture, exchange of information and mutual enrichment of intellectual values has long been under discussion in the press and at various meetings.

It is natural and understandable. The favourable changes in the European political climate and the obvious tendency towards development of mutually advantageous multilateral cooperation in most diverse spheres - all these well-known and obvious phenomena help to promote contacts between peoples and the growth of mutual understanding. There is no argument about the importance and benefits of this trend.

The exchange of genuine intellectual values, which is acquiring an even wider character, serves to create an atmosphere of mutual trust and to enrich world culture, and it is quite natural that this set of problems has become one of the items on the agenda of the conference on security and cooperation in Europe.

It is equally legitimate that these problems have become the

subject of discussion in the press of many countries. Unfortunately, one has to state that in the course of these discussions, points of view are expressed and demands are made in the western press which have nothing to do with the noble ideas of mutual spiritual enrichment and growth of mutual understanding and friendship between peoples. An idea is widely propagated that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries should open wide the doors to all western information media, any publications etc., because only then, so they claim, will the idea of a free exchange of ideas and information become a reality.

It is easy to see that demagogic statements of this sort conceal direct interference into internal affairs of the other countries. That this is precisely so, can be shown, at least in the case of the "Liberty" and "Free Europe" radio stations.

Financed by the United States, and located in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, these stations have for many years been conducting the most virulent propaganda, as well as calling for the overthrow of the social system existing in the socialist countries.

The personnel of these organizations according to the American "Washington Post", consist of the most inveterate emigrés, who are responsible for instigation of riots and other excesses. I may add, that the term "emigrés" is used by the newspaper in describing the traitors who collaborated with the nazi occupationists during the war years, fled from the just anger of their people and were taken under the wing of western intelligence services.

That the continuation of activities by these radio stations does not meet the spirit of the time and the interests of détente at all, was stated most definitely by William Fullbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the U. S. Congress. Interference in the affairs of the communist communities, he noted, is among the legitimate aims of American foreign policy. There cannot be a more important goal for the United States in the world than to fully overcome the hostility which has badly poisoned the international relations for 25 years, said Mr W. Fullbright.

The activity of the "Liberty" and "Free Europe" radio stations, in his view only perpetuates the structure of mutual

mistrust.

In other words as we see, the "free information" concept is openly and crudely extended to include overt interference in domestic affairs of other countries, subversive activities against the system which exists in these countries. Judging by everything, one is invited to see examples of this kind of "free information" in those subversive books and pamphlets that citizens of western states occasionally try to smuggle into the Soviet Union - citizens acting on the instructions of the anti-Soviet centres still existing in Western Europe.

Quite a sufficient number of such facts were mentioned during the recent Moscow trial of Vakir and Krasin. Clearly this kind of "information", far from having anything in common with spiritual mutual enrichment and growth of mutual understanding, is actually their polar opposite.

It is well-known that the word "culture" embraces not only the treasure-house of human genius, not only book collections, works of art, monuments of antiquity and contemporary architecture, the works of scientists and peoples' creative traditions. Culture is also the sphere of peoples' intellectual intercourse, the continuous process of their mutual, spiritual enrichment. But the sphere of culture is at the same time, the arena of ideological struggle, an inevitable struggle proceeding from the historical fact of the existence of two different social systems.

Those political opponents who put the sign of equality between the struggle of ideas and the "cold war", naturally want to use the sphere of culture as a kind of mine-field, turn it from a means of intercourse into a weapon of dissociation.

As in every war, they resort to camouflage and smoke-screens, trying to force upon us anti-humanistic views, alien to socialism, and the produce of bourgeois pseudo-culture under the pretext of the so-called "free exchange of ideas", or "an unrestricted flow of information" etc. Unfortunately, those who call upon the Soviet Union from different rostrums to practice "free exchanges", "tolerance", and an increased flow of information, consider it, to all appearances, flowing in one direction.

These "tolerance" champions spare no efforts and means for the most unbridled anti-Soviet propaganda. One should note with regret that a stepping-up of such a 'flow' of information, or rather misinformation, accompanied by declarations on an exchange of ideas is observed lately in many West European

countries.

It is common knowledge that along with genuine cultural value in any developed capitalist society there exists a mighty dark force-pseudo-culture. The power of this force is considerable and dangerous, not only because it stems from the base instincts of man who is constantly being depraved, but also because it has at its disposal all available means of mass communication, such as television, cinema, radio, cheap book editions of specific content, etc.

There is an opposition in every capitalist country composed, not only of intellectuals, but simple honest thinking people, who observe with alarm and frequently unconcealed horror, how the mass production of "ideas" of violence, eroticism, racial discord and the cult of money are corrupting human souls. These "ideas" do not merely oppose humanism. They mould monstrous Hitchcock-type characters, monsters resembling men, who out of the need for self-expression, so to say, shoot down peaceful citizens from sub-machine guns and sniper rifles, turning entire cities into besieged fortresses where it is even dangerous to walk the streets; where doors and windows have to be barricaded at night.

The "free information" thesis as understood very often in the West, is modified to suit practical anti-Soviet goals, and they then start "teaching" Soviet people whom to consider a real artist in the Soviet Union and whom not, whom to publish and encourage, and whom not to print at all.

The Soviet Union will of course never agree to the conversion of the sphere of culture into a futile tickling of nerves. We have no intention of giving up argumented criticism of everything that opposes humanism, that corrupts peoples' souls. We want no "exchange" with the representatives of soul-corrupting pseudo-culture, with people who exploit the noble concept of "culture" for their own unseemly political gains. But we are always ready to maintain contacts to exchange genuine artistic values, on the condition that every country, all people, enjoy the inalienable right to defend its own political and moral principles.

I would say that the sooner all people, in speaking of "spiritual exchange" or "free information" mean genuine spiritual values and information, promoting friendship of peoples and cooperation among states, the sooner these concepts disappear

completely from the "cold war's" arsenal.

If culture divorced from politics is a utopia, then it is even a greater utopia to try to view cultural contacts away from the political atmosphere in which they are to develop. The "cold war", inseparably associated with the period of the aggravated confrontation of states, with the period of "brinkmanship", "intimidation" and "repulsion", looks like an anachronism today when relaxation of international tension has become an unquestionable fact. And therefore now, more than ever, it is profoundly wrong to expect the Soviet Union to open doors for interference in their internal affairs, for encroachments on their internal system and the social gains of the Soviet peoples.

This is no subject for discussion, nor can be that. Nor must anyone expect the Soviet Union to welcome books, films, etc., propagandizing enmity among peoples, violence, racism, chauvinism and glorifying the cult of the sex and drug addiction.

We have in our country quite clear-cut laws and regulations and, naturally, no one is going to abrogate or revise them. Just as every state is fully entitled to take restrictive and protective measures on its borders against epidemics of dangerous diseases spreading into its territory, so the Soviet society has erected a barrier against epidemics of moral and spiritual degradations. This is a purely internal matter for the Soviet country and no amount of moaning about "violation of freedom" can alter anything here.

Every society solves such questions in its own way, and, if someone considers the abundance of pornographic literature in the Scandinavian countries, for instance, an expression of "spiritual freedom", let it be so and we do not intend to give any advice, nor for that reason to make demands for changing the way of things.

The right of every state to decide its attitude to problems of this kind, and take appropriate measures, cannot be questioned by anyone.

There are international recommendations to that effect. It will be recalled for example, that in 1972 an international conference at ministerial level was held at the initiative of UNESCO, to discuss questions of state cultural policies. The documents it adopted, contained in particular, a recommendation to European UNESCO members, states that if necessary,

they may take appropriate measures to protect their national cultures against works fostering the ideas of enmity and hatred among nations. war violence racism. especially bearing in mind. the adverse effects of their corrupting influence on the young generation. So there can be no question of the Soviet Union departing from the accepted international standards and infringing on intellectual freedom.

The Soviet Union is striving to exclude the possibility of using the noble idea of intellectual exchange and mutual enrichment for encroachments on the social system and the spiritual health of Soviet society.

Soviet policy in this field is consistent and gives no grounds for misinterpretation. It is aimed at the development of international cultural co-operation which, as Secretary General of the CPSU Central Committee - Leonid Brezhnev said, will be carried "with every respect for the sovereignty, laws and customs of each country and will serve to promote the mutual spiritual enrichment of nations, growth of confidence among them and the assertion of the ideas of peace and good neighbour relations".

It is quite clear that co-operation in cultural fields, further development of contacts and exchange of information, should be realized with due attention to the principles that are regulating relations between states - participants of the All-European conference. First of all there should be respected, the principles of sovereignty and non-interference. If these principles are forgotten one will judge rightly about it as an attempt to intrude into the affairs of others. We should at last put an end to the psychological consequence of the ill-famed "cold war". This means strict observance of laws customs and traditions by all of us. The Soviet Union will always adhere to this.

In the West one can hear sometimes, for example, such an opinion. It is a well-known fact that the USSR, as well as other countries of a socialist community, express great interest in settlement of problems of security in Europe in development of both political and economic co-operation. Is it not possible then, to exercise due pressure on these countries to try to bargain some concessions? At this point, I can only answer that it is a rather naïve, foundationless, and

I would say a shopkeeper's presentation of a problem. Détente in Europe is a common problem of all Europeans. Peace is needed by all the peoples of the continent and, therefore, its preservation and consolidation should be a common purpose of all the participants of the Conference on Security and Co-operation. We do believe that it is necessary to speak not about some sort of diplomatic "commodity circulation", but about joint, multilateral efforts aimed in the long run at creating an effective system that would, primarily, ensure security for every European nation and mutually advantageous co-operation. That is why the Soviet Union is against narrow and egoistic calculation against artificial over-stresses of private issues to the prejudices of the main aims of the All-European conference. We believe that both problems related to security in Europe and the problems of co-operation in the fields of economy, science, technology, culture and in the humanitarian field should have the due place in the work of the conference. But we always remember and hope, that others also should remember, that wide and fruitful development of economic and cultural ties, effective solution of humanitarian problems could be achieved only in the case when the threat of war is removed for ever. The paramount importance of the cause of consolidation of peace for all nations, for their progress, for their future - that is the only scale suitable nowadays for problems of world politics.

Summary of comment by Dr. J. van der Valk on the final recommendations of the Helsinki consultations on the question of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in regard to the freer movement between East and West.

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After tracing the origin of the mandate on "Co-operation in humanitarian and other fields", now being worked out in Geneva by a commission and four sub-commissions, the question was just what aims should be pursued in CSCE.

CSCE should mark a step in the process of rapprochement, resulting in bridging contradictions which have divided the European continent for such a long time. This may eventually lead to new forms of co-operation among the participants. It would be too ambitious to expect from CSCE a new security system for Europe. Those who do, underestimate the real significance of the existing contradictions.

In order not to have CSCE result in apparent solutions, representatives from many countries successfully insisted on a thorough preparation for the Conference. It is to be hoped that thus the basis for a realistic approach, and concrete results has been laid.

The process of rapprochement is dynamic in character, it presupposes movement and change, also on the level of the people themselves. Meaningful co-operation of states has to be based on mutual trust, and co-operation on all levels. Such trust and co-operation is unthinkable without freer movement of people, ideas and information.

Yet, we should not expect all barriers to disappear immediately. We shall need patience and perseverance. We should make sure that "détente" acquires a real meaning.

From the Final Recommendations  
of the Helsinki Consultations

(The participants expressed their collective agreement to these recommendations on June 8, 1973)

2. AGENDA AND THE RELATED INSTRUCTIONS

I. QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY IN EUROPE

In carrying out the instructions set out below, the Committee will bear in mind the wider objective of promoting better relations among participating States and ensuring conditions in which their people can live in peace free from any threat to or attempt against their security.

In its work the Committee will proceed from the premise that the strengthening of security in Europe is not directed against any State or continent and should constitute an important contribution to world peace and security.

In considering questions relating to security in Europe, the Committee will bear in mind the broader context of world security and in particular the relationship which exists between security in Europe and in the Mediterranean area.

The Committee will be assisted in its tasks by the appropriate Sub-Committees.

1.

(a) The Committee / Sub-Committee is charged with the task of considering and stating in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations those basic principles which each participating State is to respect and apply in its relations with all other participating States, irrespective of their political, economic or social systems, in order to ensure the peace and security of all participating States.

The principles to be stated shall be included in a document of appropriate form to be submitted by the Committee for adoption by the Conference. It shall express the determination of the participating States to respect and apply the

principles equally and unreservedly in all aspects to their mutual relations and co-operation, in order to ensure to all participating States the benefits resulting from the application of these principles by all.

The reaffirmation, with such clarifications and additions as may be deemed desirable, and the precise statement, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, of the following principles of primary significance guiding the mutual relations of the participating States, are deemed to be of particular importance :

- sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty;
- refraining from the threat or use of force;
- inviolability of frontiers;
- territorial integrity of States;
- peaceful settlement of disputes;
- non-intervention in internal affairs;
- respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief;
- equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
- co-operation among States;
- fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.

In discharging itself of these tasks, the Committee / Sub-Committee shall take into account in particular the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

(b) The Committee / Sub-Committee shall give expression to the idea that respect for the above-listed principles will encourage the development of normal and friendly relations among the participating States as well as of their political contacts which, in turn, would contribute to the furthering of their co-operation. It shall also consider proposals designed to give effect to refraining from the threat or use of force. In this context, it shall study proposals for and undertake the elaboration of a method for the peaceful settlement of disputes

among participating States.

The Committee / Sub-Committee shall have regard to the fact that the participating States are desirous of eliminating any causes of tension that may exist among them and of contributing to the strengthening of peace and security in the world, bearing in mind the fact that efforts aimed at disarmament complement political détente and are essential elements in a process in which all participating States have a vital interest. In order to strengthen confidence and to increase stability and security, the Committee / Sub-Committee shall submit to the Conference appropriate proposals on confidence-building measures such as the prior notification of major military manoeuvres on a basis to be specified by the Conference, and the exchange of observers by invitation at military manoeuvres under mutually acceptable conditions. The Committee / Sub-Committee will also study the question of prior notification of major military movements and submit its conclusions.

The Committee / Sub-Committee shall pay due attention to the views expressed by participating States on the various subjects mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, on the particular interest they attach thereto, especially from the point of view of their own security and of their desire to be informed about the relevant developments.

## II. CO-OPERATION IN THE FIELDS OF ECONOMICS, OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND OF THE ENVIRONMENT

### Introduction

The Committee shall be responsible for drawing up a draft final document / documents containing guidelines and concrete recommendations which could stimulate common efforts for increased co-operation in the fields of economics, science and technology and environment, which might guide the participating States in their mutual relations in these areas and which they might utilize in the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements, as well as recommendations on specific measures for the development of co-operation which could be agreed by participating States.

The Committee will bear in mind the contribution which such co-operation could make to the reinforcement of peace and security in Europe. It will also bear in mind the interests of developing countries and regions and the positive effects which the broadening of co-operations among participating States could have in world economic relations.

The Committee, having in mind the foregoing, shall study ways and means that would make it possible, by mutual agreement among participating States, to facilitate, with due regard for the diversity of economic and social systems and under conditions of reciprocity of advantages and obligations, the development of trade and co-operation in the various fields of economic activity, science, technology and in the field of the environment. In this regard, it will in particular take account of the work of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.

In considering questions relating to co-operation in Europe covered by this mandate, the Committee will bear in mind the relationship which exists between such co-operation in Europe and in the Mediterranean area.

The Committee in its final draft/drafts will formulate relevant proposals, based on full respect for the principles guiding

relations among the participating States enumerated in the terms of reference for the Committee on item I of the agenda. The Committee, assisted by the appropriate Sub-Committees, will examine the following questions :

### 1. Commercial Exchanges

The Committee / Sub-Committee will examine general provisions designed to promote trade and the exchange of services between participating States. It could discuss general problems relating to most favoured nation treatment. It could also examine measures aiming at the reduction or progressive elimination of all kinds of obstacles to the development of trade.

The Committee / Sub-Committee will examine specific measures designed to facilitate commercial transactions and the exchange of services, such as measures aiming at the improvement of

- business contacts and facilities
- the exchange of information on commercial opportunities and specific trading conditions
- provisions for the settlement of commercial disputes including various forms of arbitration

### 2. Industrial Co-operation and Projects of Common Interest

The Committee / Sub-Committee will study the forms and modalities of industrial co-operation and will examine the various measures by which participating States could encourage the development of this co-operation using, as appropriate, the framework of bilateral or multilateral intergovernmental agreements.

The Committee / Sub-Committee will examine, in particular, the measures which governments could take to create conditions favourable to this co-operation between competent organizations, firms and enterprises of participating States. It will bear in mind that the specific forms of such co-operation should be settled bilaterally unless otherwise agreed upon by the participants. This examination could bear on the various forms of co-operation, such as co-operation in

production and sales, on the exchange of information concerning the possibilities of industrial co-operation, on the improvement of conditions for setting up projects, and on other measures which could develop and facilitate various forms of industrial co-operation.

The Committee/Sub-Committee will also examine the possibilities of encouraging projects of common interest and of working out, where relevant, recommendations in this respect.

This examination could bear on the possibilities of implementing projects of common interest in the fields of energy resources, exploitation of raw materials and, when appropriate, of transport and communications.

### 3. Science and Technology

The Committee/Sub-Committee shall consider proposals for development of co-operation in the field of science and technology, taking into account already existing or planned co-operation in this field, with a view to facilitating, through such means as the improvement of contacts and information, access to new developments in science and technology, and to contributing to the most effective solution of problems of common interest and to the betterment of the conditions of human life.

These proposals, in particular, shall be concerned with the areas where there are the most favourable prerequisites for such co-operation, the forms and methods for its implementation, as well as with the obstacles that hinder such co-operation and measures for their removal.

In consideration of these questions, the Committee/Sub-Committee will seek to build on existing practices and take into account the possibilities and capabilities of relevant existing international organizations.

### 4. Environment

The Committee/Sub-Committee shall be responsible for discussing questions of environmental protection and improvement and in particular for determining the fields that are important for the participating States and can best lend themselves to the development of co-operation between them, such as : protection of the seas surrounding Europe, of the waters and of the atmosphere; improvement of environmental and living conditions, especially in towns; protection of nature and of

its resources.

The Committee / Sub-Committee shall examine and put forward the most appropriate bilateral and multilateral forms and methods of co-operation, including co-operation on a regional and subregional basis, for the various fields that have been determined. In the consideration of these questions, the Committee / Sub-Committee will seek to build on existing practices and take into account the possibilities and capabilities of the relevant existing international organizations.

### 5. Co-operation in Other Areas

The Committee / Sub-Committee could examine the following questions :

- problems relating to the development of transport and communications between participating States;
- promotion of tourism by the exchange of information, techniques and the results of practical experience and by the study of appropriate measures;
- economic and social aspects of migrant labour;
- training of personnel in various fields of economic activity
- such other questions as may be decided by common agreement.

### III. CO-OPERATION IN HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER FIELDS

With the aim of contributing the strengthening of peace and understanding among the peoples of the participating States and to the spiritual enrichment of the human personality, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion and irrespective of their political, economic and social systems, the Committee, assisted by the appropriate Sub-Committees, shall be charged with examining all possibilities of co-operation conducive to creating better conditions for increased cultural and educational exchanges, for broader dissemination of information, for contacts between people, and for the solution of humanitarian problems. In this connection, it shall not only draw upon existing forms of co-operation, but shall also



work out new ways and means appropriate to these aims. The Committee in its final document will formulate relevant proposals, based on full respect for the principles guiding relations among the participating States enumerated in the terms of reference for the Committee on item I of the agenda. The Committee shall also consider to what extent existing institutions could be used to achieve these aims.

#### Human Contacts

The Committee / Sub-Committee shall prepare proposals to facilitate freer movement and contacts, individually or collectively, privately or officially, among persons, institutions and organizations of the participating States. With a view to contributing to the favourable examination and settlement of relevant matters by the States concerned under mutually acceptable conditions, it shall pay particular attention to :

- (a) contacts and regular meetings on a basis of family ties; reunification of families; marriage between nationals of different States;
- (b) travel for personal or professional reasons; improvement of conditions for tourism, on an individual or collective basis;
- (c) meetings among young people; expansion of contacts and competition, particularly in the field of sport.

#### Information

The Committee / Sub-Committee shall prepare proposals to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds.

In doing so it shall pay particular attention to :

- (a) improving the circulation of, and access to, oral printed, filmed and broadcast information and extending the exchange of information;
- (b) encouraging co-operation in these fields of information on a basis of short or long term agreements;
- (c) improving conditions under which journalists from one

participating State exercise their profession in another participating State.

#### Co-operation and exchanges in the field of culture

The Committee / Sub-Committee shall prepare proposals aimed at extending and improving co-operation and exchanges in the various fields of culture and shall indicate the components and objectives of a consistent long-term development of such exchanges. In its work, it shall bear in mind the results of the Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies in Europe, Helsinki, June 1972, including the broader concept of culture outlined by that Conference.

The Committee / Sub-Committee shall consider in particular:

- (a) Extension of relations among competent government agencies and non-governmental bodies dealing with matters of culture;
- (b) Promotion of fuller mutual knowledge of and access to achievements in literature, art and other fields of cultural activity;
- (c) Improvement of facilities for contacts and exchanges in the above-mentioned spheres;
- (d) Extension of contacts and co-operation among creative artists and people engaged in cultural activities;
- (e) Common search for new fields and forms of co-operation; co-operation in the investigation of the social aspects of culture;
- (f) Encouragement of such forms of cultural co-operation as: international events in the fields of art, film, theatre, music, folklore, etc.; book fairs and exhibitions; joint projects in the field of protection of monuments and sites; co-production and exchange of films and of radio and television programmes.

The Committee / Sub-Committee while considering the role of States in co-operation in the field of culture will bear in mind the contribution that national minorities or regional cultures could make to it within the framework of respect for principles referred to above.

Co-operation and exchanges in the field of education

The Committee / Sub-Committee shall prepare proposals aimed at broadening co-operation and exchanges in the field of education and science on a short or long-term basis. These proposals shall be carried out bilaterally and multilaterally as appropriate, between participating States and non-governmental bodies. The Committee / Sub-Committee shall consider in particular:

- (a) Expansion of links between State institutions and non-governmental bodies whose activities are concerned with questions of education and science.
- (b) Improved access, under mutually acceptable conditions, for students, teachers and scholars from the participating States to each other's educational, cultural and scientific institutions, and a more exact assessment of the problems of comparison and equivalence between academic degrees and diplomas.
- (c) Encouragement of the study of the languages and civilizations of other peoples for the purpose of creating favourable conditions for promoting wider acquaintance with the culture of each country.
- (d) Exchange of experience in teaching methods in various fields including those used in adult education and exchanges in the field of teaching materials.

The Committee / Sub-Committee while considering the role of States in co-operation in the field of education will bear in mind the contribution that national minorities or regional culture could make to it within the framework of respect for principles referred to above.

SOVIET CONCEPTION OF COEXISTENCE  
AND  
THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY & COOPERATION  
IN EUROPE

by Professor Dr Boris Meissner \*

In the second phase of the Conference on Security & Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) principles should be laid down which should be the foundation for future relations between states and which for the Soviet Union would be based on the concept of "peaceful coexistence". As the conclusions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (April 1973) stated: the Soviet Union "strives for the establishment of a stable system of security and cooperation in Europe" which should be a lively and an attractive example of peaceful coexistence.

"Peaceful coexistence" therefore turns out to be a key principle of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and of central significance for the future construction of East-West relations.

"Peaceful coexistence" is regarded by the Soviet Union on the one hand as the guiding principle for Soviet foreign policy, and on the other, as the basic rule for modern international law.

The Western states often fail to perceive the important distinction between a political-ideological principle and a principle of international law. This often causes them to misinterpret the Soviet concept of "peaceful coexistence" and this confusion is often magnified by Soviet distortion of facts.

Molotov rightly pointed out in a letter to the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1961) that Lenin never used the present concept of "peaceful coexistence" and that he understood by this situation only an armistice conditioned by tactical considerations.

Stalin held the same views until the beginning of the Cold War. He saw coexistence in terms of the actual state of the world revolutionary process in which times of revolutionary high tide and low tide interchanged. Coexistence was seen to shield the Soviet Union which is the "base for world revolution" in

the dangerous time of low tide; at the same time preparing the ground for a change of tide. In the last years of Stalin's regime the concept of coexistence became more important. Since the Soviet Union had successfully tested its first atomic bomb in 1949, the view of coexistence as a form of world revolutionary tactics gradually made way for the view of coexistence as a form of world revolutionary strategy.

The strategic concept of long-term "peaceful coexistence" was continued by Khrushchev after the Geneva Summit Conference in July 1955. Particularly the danger of a thermo-nuclear world war which prompted the revision of the prevailing war doctrine, made a further extension of the concept of coexistence necessary. During the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956, the process of destalinization was set going; Khrushchev expounded the thesis that nuclear wars can be avoided and accepted the "peaceful transition to socialism", whilst he laid down the "Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems" as the general line of Soviet foreign policy. No essential changes have taken place in the Soviet concept of coexistence since the 20th Congress.

"Peaceful coexistence", as is sometimes assumed in the West, does not postpone world revolution. "Peaceful coexistence" is a component of world revolution. In the Soviet view it is the best strategy to follow in order to attain the ultimate goal of world revolution.

Since the Khrushchev era, nuclear world war and limited war which can easily lead to nuclear world war, are no longer seen as being political factors in the strategy of class struggle. But "national wars of liberation" and civil wars are still recognized as being admissible ways of stimulating the world revolutionary process.

To characterize long-term coexistence as "peaceful" is to imply that the extension of communism in the world should take place without international wars and, if possible, through peaceful means, in order to bring about a painless transition from capitalism to socialism.

According to the Soviet view, the class struggle in the framework of "peaceful coexistence", is waged at the political, the economic and the ideological level. The "ideological struggle"

is regarded as being the chief means of changing the status quo into socialism-communism; thus, there can never be peaceful ideological coexistence. This means that the ideological struggle, which has both an offensive and a defensive aspect, will be waged until victory, without armistices or compromises. Agreements and compromises are possible in political and economic relations, but not in the domain of ideology.

Proletarian-socialist internationalism in the form of the Brezhnev doctrine is first of all directed at the maintenance of the social and political status quo in Eastern Europe. It reveals that for the Soviet Union the protection of its hegemony in Eastern Europe is more important than the interests of the communist world movement. The Brezhnev doctrine, which defines the interventionist policy of the USSR, shows that the world revolutionary purpose, in which the class struggle aspect of the coexistence concept is predominant, has been largely replaced by a foreign policy based on ethical and imperial nationalism.

"Peaceful coexistence" has two faces. If it shows the face of preparedness for cooperation, it contributes to détente and therewith to rapprochement between the two opposing systems. If it takes the shape of a "special form of class struggle" it increases tension and confrontation. In the latter case it is often difficult to distinguish this "coexistence to the knife" (Khrushchev) from "cold war", which like "export of revolution" is theoretically rejected by the USSR at the present time.

Basically long-term "peaceful coexistence" means the establishment of a relatively stable, at the same time however, very uncertain equilibrium based on the nuclear position of both world powers. This new principle of balance is of a world-wide character and permits increasing cooperation. It cannot, however, fundamentally contribute to more stability in the international order, as Soviet power, for ideological and power-political reasons, is not prepared to abandon its present concept of peaceful coexistence and to engage its opponent in a fair and equal contest in the psychological-ideological confrontation. Long-term "peaceful coexistence" is therefore the expression of an "antagonistic

cooperation" (von Bredow) which does not exclude the danger of reversion to "cold war".

\* Extracts from a paper in german:  
'Sowjetische Koexistenzkonzeption und Europäische Sicherheitskonferenz.'

THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLES IN EUROPE  
EAST-WEST CONTACT AND THE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES

by

Michael Bourdeaux

Just as the Soviet population at large in recent times has begun to feel the need for increased contact with the outside world, so in the past 15 years the Russian Christian has become more aware of the fact that he is a member of a world-wide community. This is an awareness which began in the last century, and although effectively stifled for a while, was never completely rooted out by the Stalin period of complete isolation. The Christian now wants to take this to its logical conclusion: to enter into both spiritual and physical contact with other Christians, corresponding with them and exchanging ideas, travelling to meet and in his turn receiving them.

To a very limited extent the situation has shown some improvement since the death of Stalin. Individuals from certain denominations have been able to travel abroad and receive foreign visitors. In 1961 the Russian Orthodox Church and others became members of the World Council of Churches. Representatives have been present at meetings of this body and thus able to make some contact with Church people from all over the world and to keep in touch with some of the activities of world Christianity, not to say influence their course. Likewise delegations have been exchanged with member Churches, and the Russian Church has been able to share something of its heritage with an increasing number of friends from abroad. Similarly, the Baptist Church has since 1955 taken an active part in the Baptist World Alliance and been visited by Baptist delegations from all over the world.

A small number of theological students have been sent to Western Europe for the training they are not able to have inside the Soviet Union. The Soviet Baptist Church, for example, now sends a handful of students abroad each year to several colleges in Western Europe (notably Spurgeon's College near London). The Armenian Orthodox Church, little known in the

West until a few years ago, has developed considerable ecumenical contacts through its head, the Catholicos Vazgen I, who has made numerous trips abroad since 1956, including a visit to the Pope in 1970. Again, many Western visitors have returned the compliment and been able to see for themselves the vitality of this small national Church.

Whatever encouragement these growing contacts may give, however, they are of course limited in the extreme and do not approach a "free movement of peoples". The individuals who have been allowed to represent their Churches are hand-picked as being either politically reliable or at least discreet. Their itineraries may be dictated more by the needs of Soviet diplomacy than their own preference. (1) The Church does not in any case consist of its leaders but of the mass of its members, to whom the free movement they are beginning to want has by no means been granted. Nor have all the distinct groups, let alone the currents of opinion within the Church in the USSR, been represented in these limited exchanges of ideas. There is no sign that the present "détente" between the great powers is doing anything to make the concept of "free movement" a reality. Indeed, some evidence may be adduced of the opposite: greater internal control over religious life and freedom in recent years.

Since the early 1960's, Orthodox, Baptists and Catholics have in increasing numbers been vocal about their lack of freedom to worship and practise their beliefs without interference from the state. Disillusioned with their attempts to register their protests with their own governments, they have turned in desperation to the outside world. Their attempts at making contact have, however, been largely futile: the bodies to whom they have made their appeals have in the main refused to respond. Except for radio broadcasts from some Western Christian organisations, the flow of information has been a one-way traffic - but nevertheless represents the desire of the Christians in the Soviet Union to form links with the Western world.

International and ecumenical religious bodies have been, not surprisingly, the recipients of a large number of these communications. The World Council of Churches has

received a significant number of appeals from Russian Orthodox Christians. This ecumenical consciousness is in itself surprising, since the W.C.C. has received publicity in the Soviet Union only in the two church publications Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate (Orthodox) and Fraternal Herald (Baptist) which have an extremely limited circulation.

These appeals began very soon after the Russian Orthodox Church joined the W.C.C. in 1961. An anonymous group of believers signed the first one at the time of the very first W.C.C. meeting ever to take place on Soviet soil (Odessa, February 1964). In an unprecedented move, they brought forward a series of facts about the life of the Russian Orthodox Church which were astonishing in their frankness: restrictions imposed by the state on entry into theological seminaries, undermining of the priest's authority by illegal state interference in parish life. (2) These points have been made many times since, proved and reproved in various types of documentation. The letter also contained an extraordinary warning about the dangers of foreigners' accepting official invitations to the Russian Church:

We cannot keep silent over the way foreign guests are hoaxed in the Academies. All are lavishly treated, regaled with very strong wine so that they will ask fewer questions, think and observe less. They are given valuable presents and those whom they especially wish to flatter are made honorary members of the Academy or given some diploma. Thus by pandering to the vanity of certain individuals, our people achieve their goal. They are good at pulling the wool over the eyes of foreigners. (3)

In 1968, 36 workers from the city of Gorky wrote to Dr. Eugene Carson Blake, then General Secretary of the W.C.C., begging his intervention with the Soviet Government. They were pleading for the opening of more churches in this city to relieve the severe congestion during the celebration of the liturgy. The three "working" churches remaining in Gorky could contain a maximum of 14,000 people together, while an estimated 10% of the 1,200,000 inhabitants were believers. Concerted attempts by the believers to have the situation re-

viewed had encountered total failure. The appeal ends:

We are anxious that this letter should not be brought to the attention of the public at large, especially journalists, unless your efforts on our behalf prove unsuccessful, and the weighty intervention of the organisation over which you preside goes unheeded. Only then do we ask you to bring our request to the attention of the whole world. (4)

Associated appeals were also sent to the United Nations and they were published only late in 1969, when it became clear that there would be no satisfactory outcome.

Also in 1968 an individual Russian Orthodox priest, Fr. Sergi Zheludkov, addressed a letter to Dr. Blake on the case of Anatoli Marchenko. (5) He sent identical letters to a remarkably diversified group of addressees: the Patriarch of Constantinople, Cardinal Bea (Rome), Cardinal Wyszynski, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Bishop Robinson (then of Woolwich), Professor Hromadka (Prague), Fr. Vladimir Rodzianko (BBC) and Professor Alexander Schmemmann (New York).

Fr. Zheludkov begged the attention of world Christianity towards a Soviet citizen who did not even proclaim himself a Christian, but who had been unjustly imprisoned in the Soviet Union and had written a manuscript account of his experiences, My Testimony. (6) He suggested that the detailed evidence presented by Marchenko should cause concern to the Christian conscience both in East and West, and its expression would demonstrate the "sincerity" and "spiritual power" of that Christianity.

In September 1969 the Soviet authorities arrested Anatoli Levitin, one of the outstanding lay figures of the Russian Orthodox Church. This occasioned a letter to the World Council of Churches from Yulia Vishnevskaya, Yelena Stroyeva, Yuri Titov and four other Orthodox believers, with copies to the Patriarch of Constantinople and Pope Paul VI, in which they asked the addressees to intercede with the Soviet authorities for the release of Levitin and for the "normalisation" of religious life in the USSR. (7)

In 1967 Levitin had written an extended letter to Pope Paul VI on the occasion of his 70th birthday. This is a quite re-

markable document. It shows an ecumenical and international awareness to a degree unusual for a Soviet Christian, and indeed the document aroused concern among some of Levitin's more conservative friends. The letter is interesting both for its penetrating analysis of the situation of the Church in Russia today, especially with regard to young people, and also for its mode of appeal to an international Church leader. Levitin states at the outset:

I of course know very well and understand the gulf which separates the Father of princes and kings from an ordinary person, a schoolteacher who, because of his religious convictions, is deprived of work in his profession. However, much is written in the West about our Church, and in this connection the writers analyse articles I have written dedicated to church subjects and published under the pseudonym "Krasnov". The fact that so much regarding the Russian Church has been published recently in the West by Catholic as well as non-Catholic authors, especially émigrés, witnesses not only to interest in our Church, for which we can only be thankful, but also to the fact that in the West they very poorly grasp the psychology of the modern Russian person and the position of the Russian Church. This is evident in the daily broadcasts of Vatican Radio in the Russian language. So let there be heard the voice of a person who never in his life has thought of anything but the welfare of the Church. (8)

Levitin goes on to describe the life of his Church as he sees it; he is deeply committed to the propagation of the faith and to the renewal of Church life. Finally he appeals again to Pope Paul in these words:

Your Holiness, Mighty Teacher and Father! I began this letter by saying that already in my youth I dreamed of the union of the Orthodox and Catholic Churches. Later, in prison camps, where I spent most of the time in prayer, I constantly prayed to the Lord for the Catholic Church, her leading pastors and for you personally, whom I have known from the press to be the leader of the foreign policy of the Vatican and later Archbishop of Milan. . . . Even now I daily remember you in my prayers. . . .

Your Holiness! I turn to you as one coming from the Russian land. I am a hot-blooded person, not used to compromise, one who has lived a very difficult and hard life, one who at times fell into error but who always above all loved truth. To reveal the truth, to tell the West about the life of our Church, that is what I have tried to do in this letter. I beg for your Holy Prayers and Apostolic Benediction!

The text of this appeal was printed by the W. C. C. in German, French and English as their "Monthly Letter about Evangelism", April 1971.

The Russian Baptists, as far as is known, have never addressed an appeal to the W. C. C., but when they have wished to bring the denial of religious freedom to the attention of the Church as a whole they tend to write to "All Christians of the World" or, in one notable document, to "All Christian Mothers". Many such letters circulated in the Soviet Union from 1969 and a number of them reached the West, after which they were given, through press and radio, something of the publicity which the authors longed for. For example, the London Times published an article on 6 November 1969 based on the appeal of 1,453 Baptist mothers to end discrimination against those families where the parents wished to bring up their children in their own faith. On 2 December 1973 the Sunday Telegraph published a front-page article based on a set of new documents from the Soviet Baptists, including a fresh list of 186 persons imprisoned for their faith, with exact prison camp addresses. Materials such as these are invaluable to students of contemporary social conditions in the USSR.

Roman Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant bodies have featured prominently among the international denominational organisations addressed. The Vatican, perhaps for obvious historical reasons, has figured less systematically in the appeals to the West than have a number of other bodies, yet it has not been ignored. Most important, perhaps, is the letter to Pope Paul VI from Anatoli Levitin, from which I have quoted above. The seven Moscow Orthodox Christians who appealed to the Pope to intercede on Levitin's behalf probably did so because they hoped this letter would make a profound impression in Rome.

Petitions from Feodosia Varavva and other Orthodox Christians of the Western Ukraine occupy an important place in the history of attempts by Soviet believers to contact the outside world. Addressed to the Eastern Patriarchs of Jerusalem, Antioch, Constantinople, as well as to the United Nations, they show an astonishing determination on the part of a group of ordinary, humble people, with no particular educational qualifications, to contact the world outside. Their objectivity set a standard in 1964 that many were to follow later.

Varavva's main purpose in one letter was to show the extreme difficulties she faced in her attempt to bring up her children as Christians, because of the pressures of the atheist regime. She demonstrates that no consideration was shown to her by the authorities despite her impeccable patriotic record during the war and after. (9)

She concluded her letter with the following personal appeal:

I do not know what awaits me, now that I have exposed the whole truth in this letter. It could be prison or banishment to the far north, or perhaps martyrdom for the truth. I beg and entreat everyone who will read it or listen to it, everyone who believes in the triune God - raise your humble prayers to the Holy Trinity and our great Protectress of Christendom, the Mother of God, who is our intercessor before the throne of the Most High . . . . (10)

There has been no subsequent evidence as to whether or not these fears were realised, after the action Varavva had taken became known. Certainly she was bitterly attacked in the atheist press in 1964 and 1965, (11) but even the latest of the articles gave no indication other than that she was still at liberty, defending her beliefs as strongly as ever.

A second letter, signed by others as well as Varavva, set out more generally, but with a wealth of specific detail, the situation of the Church in the Western Ukraine, concentrating especially on the attempt of the authorities to disband the Pochaev and other monasteries. (12)

The text of these documents was quickly published. (13) Although no reply, as far as is known, came from the addressees, a committee in Paris did give the situation publicity through various press conferences and by publishing the documents on

the situation of Russian Christians which were then known. (14) The Soviet authorities were clearly embarrassed and took the opportunity in September 1966 of encouraging a foreign delegation to visit Pochaev for a demonstration that it was still open and occupied by monks. (15)

It is impossible to analyse precisely the effect of public opinion in keeping the Pochaev Monastery open, but monks there gained inspiration from the foreign reactions to their case and believed that the publicity had helped. Two of them, Sergi Solomko and Apelli Stankevich, wrote in 1967, also to the Patriarch of Constantinople:

Thanks only to the energetic protests of the local population and of world opinion have the authorities not succeeded in completely closing our ancient monastery, so that worship continues there up to the present. However, the local authorities, in the person of KGB collaborators and the police, still persecute with great bitterness those of us monks who have refused to submit to their illegal and unjust demands and quit the monastery . . . .

In connection with this, Your Holiness, we appeal to you, our Universal Teacher, appointed by our Lord Jesus Christ, as our last hope to watch over the interests of and sustain the Church. Help us by your holy prayers before the throne of God and come to our defence as representative of the Universal Orthodox Church; petition the competent authorities for permission for us to leave for the Holy Mount Athos, or to some other monastery where we might completely fulfil our monastic vows which we have made to our Lord Jesus Christ and to our Mother, the Church. (16)

Naturally, the Russian Baptists have on a number of occasions appealed to the Baptist World Alliance. The significant and unified group which tried to initiate important reforms and to exclude state influence from the running of Baptist affairs (17) put its case to the Baptist World Alliance at a very early stage. On 19 September 1963 G.K. Kryuchkov, G.P. Vins and A.A. Shalashov, representing the Organising Committee, wrote to Joao Soren and Josef Nordenhaug, then President and General Secretary respectively of the Baptist World Alliance.

The aim of this letter was to inform the B.W.A. of the incipient schism among Russian Baptists and the reasons for it, and to list those officials of the officially-recognised Baptist Church in the USSR whom the reform group no longer recognised as in fellowship with them. (18)

This same group of Baptists, still highly organised, despite years of open repression by the Soviet authorities, addressed further appeals in December 1970 to the B.W.A., in the person of Dr. W. R. Tolbert, Jr. He had visited the Soviet Union in May of that year in his capacity as President of the B.W.A., although his term of office expired later in the year. The writers express some sorrow that Dr. Tolbert was not able to visit any of the persecuted congregations in the Soviet Union, but had to spend his time with those who stated that there was freedom of religion in the Soviet Union. They said that statements of his published in Fraternal Herald, the one official Baptist journal, had said nothing of the sufferings so many were undergoing. However, they realised how difficult it was for a foreigner coming in from the outside to be informed about all these things, because the visit had been so carefully prepared by the government Council for Religious Affairs, which aimed to present a facade of religious freedom:

On 22 May you arrived in Leningrad, while the previous day Kuroyedov, President of the Council for Religious Affairs, had come and held a consultation with the municipal authorities, the aim of which was to prepare your visit. On 24 May you attended a Baptist service in Leningrad, while on that very day 150 members of the persecuted church in that city were dispersed by the militia and other officials, after being searched and having religious literature confiscated. They could not come into the church. (19)

The next year the Baptist Council of Prisoners' Relatives sent a further appeal to Dr. Tolbert's successor as President of the B.W.A., Dr. Carney Hargroves. 18 people signed on 11 April on behalf of the Council, sending congratulations on his election and continuing:

We very much regret that our prisoner-representatives do not have the opportunity to take part in Baptist world con-



gresses. We imagine that a sharing in the work of the congresses by representatives of Christian prisoners could bring abundant blessings and encouragement in the work for the brotherhood of Evangelical Baptists, for we are trying with the Lord's help to preserve and defend our precious spiritual heritage, though we are subject to persecution and slander for this.

We ask you to join our prayers that the Lord should make it possible for us to have Christian fellowship with you and with all Christians of the Evangelical and Baptist confession.

Dear Brother Hargroves! We suppose that the defence of religious freedom in the whole world and the gathering of data about the situation of Baptists throughout the world enter into the duties of the Baptist World Alliance, and so we ask you to acquaint yourself with the documents of the 2nd All-Union Congress of Baptist Prisoners' Relatives which took place on 12-13 December 1970 in Kiev, and also with the documents of the present conference of the Council.

The conference expresses the hope that you will take an appropriate part in the resolution of the problems raised at the 2nd Congress and we ask that you visit our country for a meeting with the Council of Prisoners' Relatives. (20)

This appeal concluded with requests for further specific initiatives on behalf of those in prison. Possibly it was because of the silence of the Baptist World Alliance that no further appeals were addressed to it for some time. On 15 October 1972 the reform Baptist congregation of Frunze, Kirgizia, appealed to Dr. Hargroves again, but this time only as one addressee out of several (chiefly the United Nations) - but on this occasion the signatories revealed a growing disillusionment about the possibility of aid from such international organisations.

Not only religious bodies have been the recipients of such cries for help. The sending of appeals to international secular bodies has been almost entirely a Baptist initiative. However, there are notable instances where Orthodox believers have addressed U Thant, General Secretary of the United Nations and, most importantly, the petition of over 17,000 Lithuanian

Catholics to Kurt Waldheim in 1972.

The basic text in this instance was actually a "Memorandum of Lithuanian Catholics" dated December 1971 and addressed to Mr Brezhnev. The Memorandum spoke of persecution and discrimination against Catholic believers in this small republic of strong religious and national character. The Memorandum itself was one link in a chain of events and documents bearing witness to a tension that exploded in the self-immolations and street riots which hit world headlines later that spring (1972).

Signatures for the Memorandum were canvassed throughout the republic. Only a few were unwilling to sign - many added their names willingly. The final total was 17,054 - there would have been many more but for KGB (security police) interference, says an Addendum to the Memorandum.

Its organisers had learned from experience that petitions to the Kremlin never reached their destination, but simply ended on the desk of J. Rugienis, the Lithuanian representative of the Council for Religious Affairs. So they added a covering letter dated February 1972 and sent it to Dr. Kurt Waldheim, General Secretary of the United Nations, asking him to bring it to the attention of the Soviet Government. They said:

Taking into consideration that Lithuania is not represented in the United Nations Organisation, we, Catholics of Lithuania, must address ourselves to you, Mr Secretary-General, through appropriate channels. Our appeal was caused by the fact that religious believers in our republic cannot enjoy the rights set out in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. On these grounds our clergy, groups of believers and individual Catholics have repeatedly addressed themselves to the highest state organs of the Soviet Union, demanding that the violations of the rights of the believers be stopped . . .

Action by the authorities has prompted the conviction that the present memorandum will not attain its aim if it is sent by the same means as previous collective documents. Therefore we, Catholics of Lithuania, are addressing ourselves to you, Honourable Secretary-General, and are asking that you relay the said memorandum, signatures included, to the Secretary-General of the Communist Party,

Mr Brezhnev. (21)

The Catholic Church in the USSR, centred in Lithuania, is in a special situation demanding separate analysis. Soviet Catholics have been slower than their Baptist and Orthodox counterparts in finding a voice - or at least a voice that is audible in the West. But now that the dam has been pierced, a stream of information is appearing. The Lithuanian Catholics now produce a regular Chronicle about the problems of their religious and national life. So far, only the Waldheim appeal cited above has been specifically directed abroad, and then only as a tactic to redirect it to the Soviet leadership. However there is no reason to suppose that the Catholics will not, like other Christians before them, address further appeals to outside individuals and bodies.

Even for the Baptists and Orthodox, turning to secular bodies outside the Soviet Union seems to be a comparatively new development, perhaps born of the frustration of receiving no replies to repeated appeals to the Soviet government and to religious bodies overseas.

This new development began with the first of many important appeals to the United Nations in 1967, but later ones were sent to the International Red Cross, the International Parliamentary Union, the International Commission of Jurists and Amnesty International. Most of these are unpublished, except for the more important ones to the U.N. As their content does not vary according to the addressees, there is no need to consider them separately. Clearly the writers are attempting to contact any international body concerned with human rights from which they might reasonably hope to elicit a response and some supporting action - though, so far as is known, only Amnesty International from among this group replied and took positive action.

In August 1967, for example, the Baptists sent a long and detailed letter to U Thant protesting at the contradictions between the declared religious freedom of the Constitution and the actual practice of the law, giving numerous examples of the deprivation of religious rights and appending five separate documents as additional evidence for their case. (22) The appeal ends with a request for a reply, giving a return address.

No more cogent evidence could be given of the desire of the rank and file of Soviet churches to have the same right of access to international organisations enjoyed by their Western brethren, and for the facts of their situation to become known. So far they have largely been denied the right even to this minimal degree of contact and "free movement" - not only by the restrictions applied by their own government, but by the failure of such bodies as they have addressed to make any response to their appeals.

In the present atmosphere of "détente" it would seem not unreasonable for these agencies which have been addressed - especially the Christian ones - to bring pressure upon the governments of the non-Communist world to make the "free movement of peoples" and the cessation of religious persecution a condition for political rapprochement and trade agreements. The fact is that after years of neglect, the Western church leaders are beginning to wake up to the facts of religious life in the Soviet Union and other communist countries and to feel their responsibility. This seems likely to be a growing trend.

FOOTNOTES

1. For a fuller discussion of this question, see W. C. Fletcher, Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy, published for the Royal Institute of International Affairs by Oxford University Press, London, 1973.
2. English translation in M. A. Bourdeaux, Patriarch and Prophets, Macmillan, London, 1970, pp. 117-8, 160-1.
3. *Ibid*, p. 59.
4. English in Eastern Churches Review, (Oxford) Vol. II, No. 4, pp. 419-422.
5. English in Religion in Communist Dominated Areas (R. C. D. A.), New York, Vol. VIII, Nos. 21-2, pp. 201-2.
6. A. Marchenko, My Testimony, Pall Mall Press, London, 1969.
7. English in R. C. D. A., Vol. VIII, Nos. 23-4, pp. 219-221.
8. English in G. Simon, Church, State and Opposition in the U. S. S. R., C. Hurst, London, 1974, pp. 188-201.
9. English in Bourdeaux, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-170.
10. *Ibid*, p. 170.
11. Lvovskaya pravda 18 August 1964 and 18 November 1964; Nauka i religiya No. 6, 1965, pp. 43-5, quoted in Bourdeaux *op. cit.*, pp. 177-182.
12. English in Bourdeaux, *op. cit.*, pp. 170-7.
13. Possev (Frankfurt), 7 January 1965, pp. 4-9.
14. Situation des Chrétiens en Union Soviétique II: Documents (Comité d'Information sur la Situation des Chrétiens en Union Soviétique), Paris, 1965.
15. This was a working group of the W. C. C. Commission on Faith and Order, which was meeting near Moscow at the time.

16. Russian in Vestnik Russkogo Studencheskogo Khristianskogo Dvizheniya (Paris), Nos. 89-90, pp. 46-8.
17. For a detailed account of this movement, see M. A. Bourdeaux, Religious Ferment in Russia, Macmillan, London, 1968.
18. Full Russian text in unpublished "Documents of the Action Group and Organising Committee, August 1961-May 1966", pp. 254-6. Extract in Bourdeaux, Religious Ferment in Russia, p. 65.
19. English in Evangelical Times (London), May 1971, pp. 1-3.
20. Text to be published in English and French as part of a special report on restrictions against religion in the Soviet Union, International Committee for the Defence of Human Rights in the U. S. S. R., Brussels.
21. English in Simon, *op. cit.*, pp. 235-7.
22. English in R. Harris, X. Howard-Johnston, Christian Appeals from Russia, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1969, pp. 33-62.

COMMITTEE  
ON  
FREER MOVEMENT AND "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE"

I The following views represent a variety of opinions which were put forward during the discussion.

- 1) The struggle of ideologies will go on; we must insist that this struggle offers equal chances to both sides (i. e. access to each others mass media). We have not got an ideology, only a common standard of values and behaviour.
- 2) The Soviet Union's interest in the Conference on European Security and Co-operation (CSCE) seems to be decreasing, however, her interest in an Asian security system seems to be increasing.
- 3) The scientific technological co-operation with the Soviet Union has proved to be extremely difficult, in any case more difficult than the co-operation with Hungary, Rumania and Yugoslavia.
- 4) The communist parties of Eastern Europe have already created new ways for co-operation with the Western world in research. These parties reached agreements which would achieve higher standards of research into the development of individual Western countries. A division of labour within this field has led to a new form of internal co-operation within the East.

II Suggestions

- 1) If the Soviet Union makes genuine offers of co-operation, these offers should be reciprocated.
- 2) It is most important to define specifically what is meant by the term "co-operation". The range of possible definitions varies between "exchange of scientific literature" (minimum) and "projects which

involve the co-operation between men, the flow of ideas and information", the results of which will be open and unknown at the start of the co-operation. Co-operation and the exchange of men, ideas and information must, in any case, be regarded as an entity. Our offers of co-operation and exchanges may be put forward separately, but the interactions of these must always be borne in mind.

- 3) Co-operation should consider the plurality pattern of our society. Therefore co-operation should take place at all levels, i. e.
  - between the systems
  - between governments
  - between non-governmental bodies
  - between individuals
- 4) Our negotiating position should start with maximum claims.
- 5) The Soviet proposal that a permanent office be set up to serve a consultative committee on questions of European Security and Co-operation should only be entertained if the Soviet Union makes important concessions.
- 6) The United States should refrain from any move which gives either Moscow or Peking the impression that they are being used against each other.
- 7) The Conference on European Security and Co-operation must be seen as fitting into a contributing towards a World Security System.
- 8) We should be prepared for the assumed Soviet aim to create between international law and the socialist international law, a special arrangement for Europe.

### III Possible testing-grounds for Soviet credibility

- 1) A possible testing-ground could lie in the Soviet Union's willingness to co-operate in projects which are labour intensive and involve a wide exchange and co-operation of men. These projects would be quite different from the selling of pipe-lines for use in the remoteness of Siberia involving only a few people.
- 2) The basic treaty between the two German states might develop into a model for détente and peaceful coexistence. But there are difficulties in looking to this political field as a testing-ground for co-operation:
  - the degree of the GDR's dependence on the Soviet Union
  - the results of the "scientific-technical revolution" within the GDR are increasingly connected with ideology.

### COMMITTEE ON FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION

1. The rapporteur of this committee started by saying that the reason why the West attached so much importance to this subject was because it was their trump card in the negotiations in Geneva. The Soviet bloc held the initiative in the areas of strategy and defence. The Soviet Union being a closed society where the ruling group hold power through total control of all information and media, could in no circumstances admit a free flow of information to reach its population, for this would undermine the very foundation on which its power rested. So that when Mr Kuznetsov said that "culture is a minefield" he was accurately describing how the Kremlin view this threat to its authority. Hence the internal campaign to depict the East and West as being locked in an implacable ideological struggle. Humanitarian measures, in Soviet terms, would be allowed only for the advancement of the "workers". The definition of humanism would be made by the Kremlin and it would have to conform to the existing laws and customs of the country. The West, by stressing third item on the Geneva agenda was thus, as Kuznetsov said, deliberately trying to change Soviet society. Consequently, there is little chance of any special agreement on these matters being reached in Geneva.
2. The committee agreed with this assessment and a number of suggestions were made with regard to the conduct of negotiations. As a first principle, as there was little prospect of agreement being made, the Western powers should put forward maximum demands. This would have the effect of testing Soviet intentions on the defence and strategic implications of the Security Conference. The key concept in the demands to be tabled should be "reciprocity", implying that the West wanted the same facilities in the Eastern bloc as were accorded to the East in Western countries. "Reciprocity" itself could not be labelled an anti-Soviet concept. The one caveat should be

that such maximum demands should not restrict private initiatives in information exchanges. A particular example is the fact that with the Soviet signature to the International Copyright Agreement, there is now a danger that the Kremlin could prevent publication of texts abroad which it itself had not accepted. This would be a blow to writers such as Solzhenitsyn.

## PROPOSALS

### Journalism

Total freedom of movement and of interview for journalists is vital. There could also be joint ventures such as publication of an "International Affairs" journal with a Board of editors chosen from leading publications of both sides. This could be published in all countries in the local language. Newspapers themselves should be made more freely available and in some cases more freely translatable. Such translations should be approved by the editors of the paper.

### Literature etc.

Cultural centres should be established in each capital and major city where exhibitions might be held without restriction and where visitors might circulate and meet freely. There should be established an East-West educational commission which would promote the publication of agreed textbooks for use in schools and colleges. Great importance should be attached to increasing the number of academic exchanges. This should also extend to lawyers, professional specialists and members of learned systems. In fact, all categories of people who share interests or hobbies. However, care should be taken not to make such exchanges too institutionalised as this is exactly what the Soviet Union would want.

### Broadcasting

There should be no further interference with broadcasting. A broadcasting commission should be established to

examine complaints about programmes which were deemed offensive to particular countries. There should be encouragement of joint East-West radio and television productions about non-political subjects.

## UNOFFICIAL ACTIVITIES

While negotiations for maximum demands take place in Geneva, there should be no halt in unofficial activity which seeks to increase the flow of information between the two societies and to stimulate curiosity. Needless to say, information is more effective when it is objective rather than propaganda. Booklets containing objective and critical information about Western political systems country by country should be published in all Soviet and Eastern European languages. These booklets should be of the size which would permit them to be carried in the pocket of tourists or industrial workers carrying out projects in the East. As much encouragement as possible should be given to unofficial bodies in the Western world anxious to help the free flow of information, and they should be encouraged to cooperate with each other as much as possible.

## CONCLUSION

Fifty-five years after the Revolution the appetite for knowledge and information about other societies is very much alive in the USSR. By the very complexity of society it is difficult for Eastern and Soviet governments to prevent everything from getting through. The object of unofficial activity is to use ingenuity to satisfy the desire for information existing in the East and to keep alive hopes that the system will change. On the official level demands are designed to encourage the East to make concessions which will lead to the possibility of more stable relationships; failing that, it will be made clear in the West by any Soviet rejections exactly what the policy towards humanitarian issues of the Soviet Union is.

COMMITTEE  
ON  
FREER MOVEMENT AND DISSENTERS

The Committee defined dissenters as people who express views prohibited and repressed by a government, although such an expression is guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The Committee has been aware of the fact that an apparent contradiction does exist between the concern for human rights and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of another country. This contradiction has not discouraged the Soviet Union from commenting on the internal situation of Western countries from the Soviet point of view. The Committee recommends, therefore, as operational guide :

- (1) It is entirely justified for Western governments and citizens to interpret developments in the Soviet Union and in other Eastern countries from our point of view, emphasizing the values of a pluralistic society and expressing sympathy for people supporting similar values.

The Committee has noticed that official spokesmen of Western governments have made conflicting statements of attitudes towards Soviet dissent (e. g. the differences between the Brandt and Kreiskey statements). It is the Committee's opinion that:

- (2) A variety of interpretations of the dissent problem is inherent in the nature of a pluralistic society and that the Soviet Union should be made aware of the fact that such a variety is to be expected from the West.

Turning specifically to the problem of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Committee has noted that the problem of dissenters and of liberties denied Soviet citizens is not per se a subject of the Conference, yet the Committee suggests that :

- (3) Free movement of people and respect for human rights should be used as a maximum demand by the Western

governments during the negotiations with the East.

Doubts were expressed whether a coupling of these ideas with economic and political negotiation items was at all possible and even desirable, and whether the dissenters would be at all assisted by such a coupling. Instead of it, the Committee suggests that the Western powers suggest in Geneva that :

- (4) A Permanent Commission on Human Rights in Europe (parallel to the existing Strasbourg Commission) be established. Cases of violations of human rights would be reported to and publicized by this Commission; they would not be treated as internal affairs, but as common European human concerns.

It should be noted that a vocal minority of the Committee expressed doubts about the advisability of such a Commission, especially in view of its possible use or misuse by Soviet foreign policy and of the possible weakening of existing Western institutions.

The Committee turned to non-governmental approaches dealing with the dissent problem and arrived at two additional recommendations in this regard :

- (5) Although ideological anti-Soviet propaganda is not the purpose of Western institutions, the function of a free press which can give voice to the dissenters should be continued by the mass media and be increasingly assumed by the conventional European broadcasting systems, not only by Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.
- (6) Academic institutions in Europe should increasingly emphasize the study of the Soviet Union, including the dissent phenomena, with a view to developing awareness of the situation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The Committee recognized the fact that there are religious dissenters in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but noted that the approach towards these dissenters should not differ from the approach to other forms of dissent.

Not related to the issues of dissent, the Committee has arrived at the following recommendations concerning church problems :

- (1) The Western governments have to be made aware of the fact that the term culture used in various cultural agreements should be interpreted broadly to include scientific issues, humanitarian problems, and spiritual enrichment. With such a broad interpretation, theological exchanges could be brought into the scope of these agreements.
- (2) Western representatives in the East, and particularly cultural attachés, should become theologically literate, so that they may be able to interpret church developments in the East as a part of the cultural changes in these countries.
- (3) The Western churches have to be made aware of the need to utilize the existing opportunities to speak to the Eastern churches through the mass media, especially the radio, on issues confronting the churches.