

GEHEIM

1030/AP/69

3 juli 1969

k
B

Land: Communistisch China

Onderwerp: LIAO HO-SHU's Study of Life in the chinese Communist Party.

Referenties:

Datum van waarneming: 1953 - 1968

Bron: LIAO HO-SHU, former Chinese Communist Charge d'Affaires in the Hague.

Opmerkingen: Dit bericht is uitsluitend bestemd voor gebruik ten Departemente.

Bijlagen:

Mede Verzonden aan: De Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken

Zijner Excellentie
de Minister-President
Plein 1813, no.4
's-GRAVENHAGE

GEHEIM

GEHEIM

LIAO Ho-shu, former Chinese Communist Charge d'Affaires in The Hague. Comment: LIAO Ho-shu joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1953. Owing to the party's rapid expansion during this period, he was quickly accepted as a member despite his status as an intellectual. Subsequently he participated in party activities in Peking and abroad and eventually occupied the highest party post in the Mission in The Hague. Throughout LIAO considered himself to be an average party member, neither particularly enthusiastic nor apathetic, but always doing what was expected of him. However, like many of his colleagues, he did not join the party out of ideological conviction, but because it might advance his career. From the outset, although he was careful to keep his opinions to himself, he objected to many of the party's policies and to much of its political style. Except where noted, LIAO's views as set forth in this report predate the Cultural Revolution.

Summary. The highest form of political participation in China is membership in the Communist Party. Although selection for membership depends on many factors, the procedure always begins with an application ostensibly put forward on the initiative of the applicant. Thereafter the application may be discussed for years before being acted on. Formerly, work performance

GEHEIM

was the most important qualification discussed, but since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, ideology has been stressed. In joining the party, workers and peasants are favored, while the party views intellectuals with suspicion. As a consequence, many intellectuals harbor feelings of resentment and frustration toward the party. But like other groups in the society, they know that party membership confers attractive benefits. These include intangible rewards for the sincere believer in Chinese Communism, the chance to acquire prestige and participate in important events, and the rapid promotions often given to party members. For the majority practical motives outweigh a sincere belief in communism as the reason for seeking membership. Once accepted into the party, the new member is exposed to the process of political education with its special techniques of study sessions and criticism and self-criticism meetings. Underlying these techniques are a handful of political ideas rooted in essays written by MAO and LIU Shao-ch'i between 1929 and 1945. These ideas, without exception, are ingrained in the memory of every party member. Moreover, there is no disagreement about meaning - the party tolerates only a single interpretation. First among these ideas is the injunction to eradicate selfishness and serve the masses. The second overriding idea of political education is to "oppose liberalism", defined as conflicting viewpoints, and submit to criticism. Both points are further refined in MAO's five principal essays on political education, but since many of them fly in the face of traditional Chinese ideas of correct behavior, party members sometimes find both the content and technique of political education an unpleasant but unavoidable aspect of party life. Many Chinese, for example, resist study sessions, for they are time-consuming and boring, and everyone has reservations about criticism and self-criticism meetings, where ideological problems are aired in face to face confrontation, thus introducing an element of fear for the mock believer. In a party short on formal rules and regulations, the use of political education to force acceptance of a single ideological view provides another road to effective control. Indeed rule by ideology is a central feature of life in China today. The Chinese Communists make a clear distinction between MAO's writings on political education and his philosophical thought. The essay "On Contradiction", the centerpiece of his philosophical thought, presents a concept known to millions of Chinese. In every situation opposing points of view, or contradictions, are manifest, and forward movement takes place only when they are resolved through criticism or struggle. Not lost on many party members is the clear fact that here is another justification for their already heavy burden of criticism and struggle sessions. They also understand that the theory is a practical instrument for rooting out dogmatists in the party - those who make subjective, one-sided, or superficial decisions. Many Chinese consider MAO's philosophical thought well-written and clearly presented, but not so effective when applied to daily problems. More seriously, it is thought to lack originality. Yet it certainly influences decision-making in China, leading policymakers to see contradictions where they may not exist and to react with bellicose propaganda which in fact often conceals a realistic appraisal of the situation. The history of the Chinese Communist Party is a chronology of mass movements. Innovation is a principal

characteristic, and it often goes astray. But the most universally disliked feature of a mass movement is the struggle session. It is impossible to survive these confrontations with reputations and face intact, and many commit suicide in the face of harsh criticism. The "down to the countryside" program is also unpopular, and intellectuals are especially susceptible, and especially resistant, to this kind of punishment. Indeed most Chinese harbor special objections to mass movements. Against this background many older intellectuals and older party members cope by participating without genuine conviction. Compliance becomes a pantomime. A tendency toward pantomime also characterizes many aspects of the party at work. Older party members participate without conviction, forcing the party to depend on constant transfusions of new blood. Further, problems in the party's relations with the masses often arise because some party members have neither heart nor talent for the undertaking and because the masses are frequently not receptive. Nor are they always receptive to the mass line, the party's principal means of governing. Moreover, party meetings also meet with resistance, and it is not unusual during party meetings for older members to attend to other business, read, chat with friends, or even sleep. Another important task facing the party at work is its need to communicate, but the party's ability to communicate is only as good as the receptivity of the audience, and this does not always measure up to expectations. Standing at the twilight of his long career, MAO finds his philosophy everywhere under sharp attack. The tendency toward modern revisionism, that is the revision of the concepts of violent revolution and struggle, is evident in every communist state and inside China as well. The Cultural Revolution confirms that MAO holds older government and party bureaucrats responsible for the revisionist view that class struggle vanished with the KMT and continuous revolution is not so much help as hindrance on the road to reconstruction. Thus MAO turns his attention to China's youth, hoping to educate them in the Cultural Revolution. The future for a living communist party hangs in the balance. The most likely outcome is that the disillusioned among youth and their disillusioned elders will combine in support of the now established tradition whereby a majority of party members and the masses pay lip-service to the demands of life in the Chinese Communist Party without wholeheartedly supporting it. End of Summary

Table of Contents

| | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------|
| Joining the Party | paragraphs 1 - 13 |
| Serve the People | paragraphs 14 - 28 |
| Techniques of Political Education | paragraphs 29 - 38 |
| MAO's Philosophical Thought | paragraphs 39 - 49 |
| Mass Movements | paragraphs 50 - 58 |
| The Party at Work | paragraphs 59 - 74 |
| Problems of Communism | paragraphs 75 - 78 |

GEHEIM

1. The highest form of political participation in China is membership in the Communist Party. However, selection procedures, dependent on years of searching investigation and insistence on qualifications few can satisfy, prevent all but a small elite from ever gaining admission. The reluctance of many Chinese to apply in the first place, a result both of indifference to politics and suspicions about dealing with authority as represented by the party, is another factor limiting membership. As a consequence, successful applicants are usually carefully selected, well qualified, and more willing than most Chinese to become involved in political life.

2. Although selection for membership in the Communist Party depends on many factors, the procedure always begins with an application ostensibly put forward on the sole initiative of the applicant. The application may be written or oral, or it may be prepared in response to a hint from a party member that an application will be favorably received, but in all cases the applicant must take the first formal step himself. Many party members believe this method guarantees that membership will be voluntary; others think it provides the party with a mandate to recruit, for a hint from the party is sometimes equivalent to a command. Whether written or oral (in the case of illiterate applicants), the application put forward contains a brief statement of the applicant's desire to join the party, his belief that he is qualified, and his reasons for seeking membership. Thus from the outset the applicant becomes his own principal advocate for admission. Many Chinese find this difficult.

3. Thereafter, the prospective applicant must continue to speak on his own behalf for up to 10 years, although only rarely would discussions stretch on this long. During this time the point of contact between applicant and party is usually a single party cell, and contact between the two becomes progressively closer. The applicant not only must claim the capacity to perform useful work and understand party philosophy, but he is also required to elaborate his position in countless discussions with members of the cell. There are three reasons for this requirement. In the first place, party doctrine, as noted, demands that the applicant make his own case and defend his own position, and it is during these discussions that this is done. Second, the countless discussions introduce the applicant to the educational process known as thought reform. This process continues to occupy the successful applicant throughout his party career, for thought reform is an activity without end. Finally, the discussions provide an ideal opportunity to investigate painstakingly every aspect and episode of the applicant's background and ideological position.

4. Although an apparatus exists for checking on backgrounds independently, it is rarely used. Instead the cells rely almost exclusively on their long discussions with the applicant. In an exchange lasting up to 10 years, the cell members believe no detail can be hidden, no inconsistency concealed. Moreover, only a cell, not an independent investigative apparatus, can

propose that an applicant be admitted to the party. To be sure, party organs at the next higher level retain the right to approve or disapprove, but only the cell proposes. How many years these discussions last is largely determined by the applicant's qualifications for party membership. The better his qualification, the shorter the discussions.

5. Until the advent of the Cultural Revolution, more time was spent in the cells discussing an applicant's work performance than his ideological viewpoint. Indeed, outstanding work performance, whether as factory worker, peasant, or scientist, was the single most important qualification for party membership, provided class background created no special problems. This order of priorities held a certain attraction for the cells. Work performance was easily judged. Since cell members invariably worked in the same enterprise as the applicant, they had little difficulty in assessing his ability. And once the cell proposed admission to the party, they could rest assured that no higher party organ was likely to find their assessment seriously in error.

6. Ideological attitudes were always far more difficult to assess. All serious applicants were students of MAO's thought and party doctrine; they all alleged understanding and showed keen interest. How were the cell members to distinguish pretense from sincerity and knowledge? Better to concentrate on judging work performance, where the risk of miscalculation was reduced. But the Cultural Revolution reversed this order of priorities. Now ideological attitudes outweigh work performance, and the risk of miscalculating has increased accordingly.

7. Ideological attitudes and work performance are not the only qualifications examined for party membership. Cell members also consider family and class backgrounds and educational level. Ostensibly, no background, whether landlord, national capitalist, or counterrevolutionary, provides grounds for exclusion, but in practice such applicants either are rebuffed outright or required to endure year after year of discussions prior to admission. Moreover, the well educated face special problems, for college graduates are classed as intellectuals regardless of their ideological viewpoint. Like applicants from landlord, national capitalist, and counterrevolutionary families, intellectuals find it difficult to join the party. Delays of five or more years are common. If the intellectual is also burdened with an undesirable class background, his chances are further reduced. Nonetheless, intellectuals and the children of undesirable elements can and do join the party.

8. Overseas Chinese who return to China and Chinese who have close relatives abroad are not wholly barred from membership. But admission is difficult. In discussions stretching out through the years, every aspect of these ties and relationships must be explored, explained, and elucidated. Surprisingly, ties outside China need not be severed. Cell members believe that undesirable aspects of foreign ties will be forced into the open during the discussions. Workers, poor peasants, and lower-middle peasants, on the other hand, confront few difficulties in applying for party membership. It is usual for them to be granted approval

GEHEIM

after only a year or two of discussion. Equally important, hints from party members that an application for membership will be well received are most often bestowed on prospective applicants from these groups.

9. Thus while workers and peasants are favored, the cards are stacked against the intellectuals. Outstanding work performance and sound ideological views notwithstanding, the party considers the intellectual to be weighted down with the same undesirable baggage as enemies of the revolution like landlords and counterrevolutionaries. It follows that many intellectuals view the party with a mixture of fear and suspicion. Denied an equal opportunity to become communists and thereby increase their power and prestige, yet called upon to contribute the fruits of their education to the socialist reconstruction of China, many intellectuals harbor feelings of resentment and frustration towards a political system which thus condemns them. The party has never been able to resolve this dilemma.

10. Why join the party? What are the motives? Not many Chinese can speak out on their own behalf without effort, and few find the endless discussions with cell members an enjoyable experience. Yet party membership confers so many attractive benefits that these often outweigh the hardships of the selection and qualification process. Foremost among the benefits are intangible rewards reaped by the sincere believer in Chinese Communism. These include satisfaction at helping to lead the revolution and redeem China from a century of humiliation at the hands of foreign colonialists and imperialists.

11. But because all party members profess sincere belief in communism--signs of doubt spell ruin for any promising career--it is not possible to distinguish clearly between sincerity and mere lip-service. Even members of a single cell are often unable to judge the sincerity of other cell members. This confusion owes in part to the required use by believers and non-believers alike of the same fixed fund of quotations, articles, and examples from party ideology to express their beliefs. Early in the careers of all party members, essential principles derived from this fixed fund of material are committed to memory, with the result that the only subsequent distinction between believers and non-believers is the enthusiasm and understanding with which they quote from the fund. Such distinctions are easily disguised. In addition, the style of political participation varies little from believer to non-believer. The penalty for straying from accepted norms is simply too great.

12. In many cases, more practical motives provide additional reasons for joining the party. First among these is the desire to acquire prestige. Owing to the small size of the party and its preponderant share of power, party membership confers prestige which can be acquired in no other way. Another motive is the desire to participate in important events and gain access to classified information explaining them. Party members are in the know. Yet another is the desire for the rapid promotions often given to Communist Party members. Work performance is still a factor, but given equal performance among co-workers, the party member gets the nod.

GENEIM

13. Rapid promotion as a motive for joining the party is more widespread among intellectuals than among workers and peasants. The latter have little to gain through promotions, while intellectuals have everything to gain by rising within the large organizations where they are most often employed. Indeed many intellectuals view party membership as the one sure road to bureaucratic power. Many join largely for this reason, using their wits to see them through the endless investigations and discussions, which, fortunately, are often conducted by like-minded cell members. One consequence is that suspicion of the ideological reliability of the intellectuals is heightened. This explains in part why intellectuals are so often openly attacked. Their sincerity is found wanting. Although the discussions leading up to party membership are designed to ferret out these attitudes, the system does not always work. As many as half the intellectuals in the party have joined for reasons other than a sincere belief in Chinese Communism.

Serve the People

14. The medium of political education is thought reform. Once accepted into the party, the candidate member's exposure to thought reform intensifies. The relaxed pace of earlier discussions gives way to an often antagonistic mood in which cell members freely criticize each other. Using MAO's principal writings on political education as a guide, party members and non-members alike join together in small group study sessions where study, criticism, and self-criticism become devices for forging conformity to a single accepted view. During mass movements the introduction of struggle sessions further intensifies thought reform. And the process is without end, for political education is never completed. It is as if the party cannot rely on the ideological purity of anyone, but by repetition seeks to force acceptance of ideas only half believed.

15. Underlying the techniques of political education are a handful of political ideas rooted in essays written by MAO and LIU Shao-chi between 1929 and 1945. This small group of essays is set apart from MAO's and LIN's other works because they are specifically addressed to party members. Before the Cultural Revolution LIU's How to Be a Good Communist received as much attention from party members as what are referred to as MAO's writings on political education. LIU's book not only was more readily available in bookshops, but it was also considered the most specific available guide and to correct conduct and reward in the party. Yet because the essential points of How to Be a Good Communist and MAO's writings on political education are similar, the reversals of the Cultural Revolution probably have had only a limited effect on ideas stressed in political education. Study sessions have no doubt been intensified, but the ideas are the same. And these ideas, without exception, are already ingrained in the memory of every party member as a result of years and decades of constant repetition. There is no disagreement about their meaning. The party tolerates only a single interpretation.

16. First among the ideas of political education is the injunction to eradicate selfishness. Serve the masses. Work for communism, not for selfish ends. An example of the kind of selfishness MAO wants to eradicate is shown in the case of a staff member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who made known his wish to transfer to another government ministry where he could pursue research in subjects more congenial to him. The staff member was criticized on grounds that he was guilty of individualism. He wanted to pursue his own interests, forgetting that the objective of all labor was to serve the masses. Where one worked and what one did was of little importance, for any occupation offered unlimited opportunities for service.

17. The second overriding idea of political education is to "oppose liberalism" and submit to criticism. These concepts are at once a demand for party loyalty and the explanation of techniques for achieving it, for liberalism is defined as tolerance of conflicting viewpoints, while criticism is the accepted method for rooting them out. Thus party members are enjoined to contend against conflicting views wherever they encounter them.

18. Both these concepts of political education fly in the face of traditional Chinese ideas of correct behavior. Although selfishness has never been a virtue in Chinese society, selfless conduct was traditionally directed first toward family and friends and next toward obligational relationships with government. The concept of a selfless attitude toward the broad masses begins with MAO. Similarly, many Chinese find it difficult to engage in direct, face to face criticism of peers who express conflicting viewpoints. Direct confrontations are impolite, upsetting, and lead to loss of face. As a result of these paradoxes, party members sometimes find that both the content and technique of political education is an unpleasant but unavoidable aspect of party life.

19. Serve the People,¹ written in 1944, is the most important of MAO's five principal essays on political education. MAO uses the occasion of a memorial service honoring a fallen comrade in arms to illustrate the principle of sacrificing life itself for the good of the party. SZUMA Chien, the military strategist, wrote more than 2000 years ago that death "may be heavier than Mount Tai or lighter than a feather."² The fallen soldier devoted his life to the people, and his death is heavier than Mount Tai. MAO continues that party members who serve the people are not afraid to undergo criticism: "Anyone, no matter who, may point out our shortcomings."³ Thus MAO extolls self-sacrifice in the interests of the party and encourages criticism of shortcomings as the path toward improvement.

20. The party considers Serve the People MAO's clearest and most basic statement of his twin injunctions to eradicate selfishness and submit to criticism. It came as no surprise then when Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution seized on three famous passages in the essay to express their fundamental goals. All three appeared and reappeared in countless documents in 1966 and 1967. Vigorous criticism and self-criticism the Red

GEHEIM

Guards justifies with MAO's view that "If we have shortcomings, we are not afraid to have them pointed out and criticized, because we serve the people."⁴ Tenacity in the face of great odds was expressed with "In times of difficulty we must not lose sight of our achievements, must see the bright future, and must pluck up our courage."⁵ Violence and struggle were inevitable, for MAO wrote that "Wherever there is struggle there is sacrifice, and death is a common occurrence."⁶

21. MAO's essay Combat Liberalism,⁷ another basic document in political education, restates many of the same principles. Equally important, Combat Liberalism describes the principles of party discipline and explains how to implement them. Owing to the importance of this subject, scarcely any other essay of MAO's is studied with greater frequency or care. On the other hand, hardly any meets with as much inner resistance from party members, for Combat Liberalism also presents the rationale for self-criticism and struggle sessions within the party, and only the most dedicated communists look forward to these with pleasure. Furthermore, the command to criticize liberalism directly wherever it is found, whether among friends, family, or party members, runs contrary to traditional face-saving conduct which holds, as noted, that vigorous, open criticism is improper. Especially is this so where family relationships are involved. Many intellectuals among party members believe that all this explains why the party insists that Combat Liberalism be studied so frequently. Otherwise, its injunctions would go unheeded.

22. MAO begins his essay on discipline with the assertion that "We stand for active ideological struggle for it is the weapon for ensuring unity within the party."⁸ Liberalism undercuts unity because it tends "To let things slide for the sake of peace and friendship when a person has clearly gone wrong, and refrain from principled argument because he is an old acquaintance, a fellow townsman, a schoolmate, a close friend, a loved one, an old colleague, or old subordinate."⁹ Liberalism "is a corrosive which eats away unity, undermines cohesion, causes apathy and creates dissension."¹⁰ Thus liberalism, or tolerance for conflicting viewpoints, must be smashed through self-criticism and struggle; no friend or relative is exempt; and the unity and cohesion of the party based on a single point of view is preserved.

23. MAO wrote In Memory of Norman Bethune¹¹ in 1939 in commemoration of the Canadian surgeon who died in Hopei while working for the Chinese Communist Army. Two points are made in this brief essay. Bethune's sacrifice in the service of another country is an example of "the spirit of internationalism, the spirit of communism, from which every Chinese Communist must learn,"¹² for it is this spirit which "is the only way to overthrow imperialism, to liberate our nation and people and to liberate the other nations and peoples of the world."¹³ Self-sacrifice in the service of international communism must be a guiding principle of Chinese Communism. In making this point MAO quotes Lenin to give added weight to his argument.

GEHEIM

24. The second point in the essay on Bethune concerns the concept of individualism, or the tendency to look after one's own interests first. Bethune, to the contrary, demonstrated "utter devotion to others without any thought of self, was shown in his great sense of responsibility in his work and his great warm-heartedness towards all comrades and the people."¹⁴ MAO follows praise of Bethune with a slashing attack on selfishness in the party, especially toward those who "feel no warmth towards comrades and the people but are cold, indifferent, and apathetic."¹⁵ Although MAO understands that it is not easy to be selfless, he demands that party members strive toward this goal.

25. The fourth basic document in communist political education in MAO's concluding speech to the Seventh Party Congress in 1945. MAO makes the point in The Foolish Old Man who Removed the Mountains¹⁶ that obstacles, no matter how great, can be overcome with patience and persistence. Relating the fable of the peasant who attempted to dig up two mountains which obstructed the view from his house, MAO praised the old man's persistence. "High as they are, the mountains cannot grow any higher and with every bit we dig, they will be that much lower."¹⁷ The two mountains then weighing on China's future are described as imperialism, or Western political and economic influence on China and China's neighbors, and feudalism, or the presence of landlords in many parts of the country. MAO goes on to link the U.S. with imperialism by noting its support for CHIANG Kai-shek against the Communists. However, he distinguishes between the U.S. government and the American people, and further between the policymakers in the U.S. government and those who serve them. Only the policymakers are China's enemies.

26. The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains was another of the essays frequently quoted by Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution: "We must first raise the political consciousness of the vanguard so that, resolute and unafraid of sacrifice, they will surmount every difficulty to win victory."¹⁸ Although the obstacles to putting the thoughts of MAO into practice are great, the persistent will overcome but only so long as they intensify their political consciousness through understanding MAO.

27. The final essay in MAO's series on political education is On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party,¹⁹ written in 1929 following the collapse of the first period of collaboration with the KMT. In what is essentially a code of conduct and strategy for the Chinese Communist Army, MAO offers up a catalogue of possible errors. To adopt the "purely military viewpoint"²⁰ demonstrates the error of failing to fight and make propaganda among the people simultaneously. Practitioners of ultra-democracy err by refusing to abandon personal points of view once an issue has been discussed and decided, while the error of "disregard of organizational discipline"²¹ arises when the minority not only refuse to acquiesce in the views of the majority but also decline to uphold the majority view enthusiastically as the only correct position. Those who commit the error of absolute equalitarianism expect that young and old soldiers must carry the same loads, or that the wounded, serious and mild cases alide, should be equally compensated.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

28. MAO continues his catalogue. The error of subjectivism leads to decisions based on emotional factors rather than realistic appraisal. Individualism, the next error, is selfishness. The error of adopting the "ideology of roving bands"²² is committed when soldiers act like bandits. They fight and move on, rather than fighting and making propaganda simultaneously. The catalogue ends with the error of putschism, describing soldiers who agree to fight against impossible odds rather than waiting for more favorable opportunities.

Techniques of Political Education

29. Taken together, these five essays on political education are the building blocks of the ideological structure within which the Chinese Communist Party has developed. Special techniques of political education cement the blocks together. Small group study sessions, criticism and self-criticism meetings, and party schools all guarantee undivided attention to the party's ideological message. Partly they transmit MAO's message, partly they embody his method of control. For in a party short on formal rules and regulations, forced acceptance of a single ideological view provides another road to effective control. Perhaps this explains why party members are required to spend so much time discussing ideology. That many of them begrudge the effort results from the requirement for endless repetition of the same fixed fund of ideological material. It is plainly a dull undertaking.

30. The small group study session stands at the heart of the political education process. Both party members and non-members participate on a generally equal footing. On the other hand, power to fix time and agenda resides with higher party organizations, thus providing the party with a high degree of control. Once the employees of an organizational unit, such as a section in a government department, or the younger, literate members of a production brigade, join together to form a small group study session, they agree on the selection of a leader who thereafter guides discussion and acts as contact point with the party branch. No vote is taken in selecting a leader; nor are nominations called for, but usually little difficulty is encountered in reaching agreement. The leader is not necessarily a party member.

31. Small group study sessions are usually convened for one two-hour session each week. In practice these sessions take place in the evenings in the office where the employee works. More recently, the frequency and length of the sessions have been sharply increased as a consequence of the Cultural Revolution. In either case, however, copies of the speech or article heading the agenda are passed around at the beginning of each session. A reading period follows. Considerably more time is allotted to this than would ordinarily be required, for the reader is expected to use the time to read the article and formulate his view on it as well. The view he arrives at and the way he later presents it publicly to the group is of great importance. In effect it is a test of his ability to interpret the article in the light of MAO's writings on political education.

GEHEIM

32. No matter whether the party has ordered study of a current editorial from People's Daily, a directive from the Central Committee, or an essay by MAO, the new material is always compared to some portion of the party's fixed fund of ideology, most frequently MAO's writings on political education. The crucial point here is that the material is never judged as to whether it embodies the truth - no one would ever openly question this - but solely as to how it further supports, defines, or draws on ideology already laid down. Thus the study session does not so much discuss the new article as compare and interpret it against the background of established ideology. The result is that small group study sessions are usually given over to recalling and restating ideology from the past rather than focusing primarily on new material in hand.

33. Many Chinese resist these sessions. They are time-consuming. They are highly repetitious and boring. Moreover, they expose participants to the risk of misinterpreting past ideology or displaying an unenthusiastic attitude. Something like a small majority find this kind of pressure difficult to endure. Not that they resist, but their display of enthusiasm becomes little more than a mask concealing more genuine feelings of distaste. This is especially the case with intellectuals. They find onerous the constant study of a small body of material which they readily understood the first time around.

34. Although only a narrow majority oppose small group study sessions, everyone has reservations about criticism and self-criticism meetings, which comprise the second major technique of political education. Determination of content and scheduling also resides with higher party organizations. Sometimes the meetings are convened to criticize a specific error that has been committed, but as often their purpose is to give party and non-party members alike a chance to criticize themselves for their own failings. Although any forum is suitable, the meetings are often held during small group study sessions, or at party meetings, or at special meetings called for that purpose alone.

35. A handful of established ground rules govern the conduct of criticism meetings. First, the atmosphere is generally orderly. Discussions are polite within the context of dwelling on a co-worker's mistakes. Second, meetings devoted to self-criticism are milder than those concerned with specific criticism ordered by the party. Everyone is expected to indulge in self-criticism several times each year, and frequently this kind of undirected self-criticism is general, non-specific, and restrained. Third, opposition to criticism is rare. Regardless of whether the point at issue is raised by the individual, the group, or the party, the accused must accept the accusation, expand on it, and explain his error in terms of established ideology. This is the only way he can save face. Under no circumstances is he permitted to put up a defense.

36. Examples of subjects exposed to criticism and self-criticism are serious office quarrels, poor morale, important decisions made incorrectly, and lack of enthusiasm on the part of party members. These are not the kinds of subjects ordinarily

GEHEIM

aired in face to face confrontation; hence the widespread distaste for criticism meetings. Especially difficult is the requirement for a display of enthusiasm toward subjects which so many find unpleasant. And after meeting together for months, even years, the attitudes of the participants, no matter how skillfully disguised, begin to show through. Thus the criticism meetings introduce an element of fear for the mock believer. Will he be discovered and himself criticized?

37. Though criticism meetings differ from small group study sessions in many respects, both techniques depend on the same fixed fund of established ideology. All criticism and self-criticism, like the articles discussed in study sessions; is rooted in MAO's writings on political education. It follows that the objective of the technique is the objective of political education: eradicate selfishness, oppose liberalism, submit to party discipline. Conform to the agreed upon position, the participant learns, and as if to underscore the point, the message is repeated again, again, and again. Indeed rule by ideology is a central feature of life in China today.

38. Yet another technique of political education is the party school. Located in major cities and provincial capitals throughout the country, party schools are intended to provide older members with educational opportunities previously unavailable to them. These are the dedicated party members who joined up in the early days, later fought in the PLA, and now hold positions of leadership and power. Yet many are illiterate and ill-equipped to lead the young intellectuals who have joined the party in the last 20 years. Mutual suspicion often divides them. The party schools attempt to close this gap. Programs of up to six months include both literacy training and ideology. Despite the remedial nature of some of the training, attendance at a party school is usually considered a mark of prestige.

MAO's Philosophical Thought

39. The Chinese Communists make a clear distinction between MAO's writings on political education and his philosophical thought. While the former are required reading for most literate Chinese, only intellectuals, meaning college graduates, must master the more difficult essays on philosophical themes. Plainly, for the overwhelming majority this material plays only a limited role in everyday contact with ideology. Even so, MAO's essay On Contradiction,²³ the centerpiece of his philosophical thought, is a concept known to millions of Chinese, and represents for many a way of thinking which relates directly to how problems are identified, dissected, and solved. This theory has its genesis in Lenin, from whom MAO quotes liberally, partly to establish the legitimacy of his own theory, but also to demonstrate that he is taking Lenin a step further. Indeed MAO's slender claim to theoretical originality rests to a large degree on his further development of Lenin's study of contradictions.

40. In every situation, opposing points of view, or contradictions, are manifest, whether between two countries, two armies, two people, or within a single entity, such as one epoch in

history, one person, or one communist party. But forward movement only takes place when contradictions are intensified, then reconciled and resolved. New contradictions may arise, and these too must be resolved to maintain forward momentum. Resolution is seen as the final state of a process that begins with identifying the contradiction and ends after criticism, self-criticism, or struggle have been brought into play. The more vigorous the criticism, the more rapid the resolution and pronounced the forward movement. Here is an explanation for backwardness (progress impeded by unresolved contradictions), a justification for heavy demands on the citizenry (struggle as the resolution of contradictions), and a positive presentation of the concept of progress over the long run (history as advancing from one newly resolved contradiction to another). It is also dialectical materialism stated in a different way.

41. Not lost on many party members is the clear fact that MAO's theory of contradictions offers another justification for maintaining their already heavy burden of criticism, self-criticism, and struggle sessions. Moreover, it is precisely this characteristic which is most in evidence, for in addition to giving structure to MAO's ideology, the theory of contradictions is also a practical instrument for utilizing criticism and struggle to root out dogmatists in the party. Those who make subjective, one-side, or superficial decisions are the dogmatists. They must be identified and their mistakes corrected.

42. Thus in practice MAO's theory is often used to attack decision-making which does not conform to established party viewpoints. It comes as no surprise then that the most frequently discussed portions of the essay On Contradiction deal not with lofty philosophical issues but with more concrete questions of subjectivism, one-sidedness, and superficiality. Here is MAO as quoted in party meetings: "In studying a problem, we must shun subjectivity, one-sidedness and superficiality. To be subjective means not to look at problems objectively; that is, not to use the materialist viewpoint in looking at problems... To be one-sided means not to look at problems all-sidedly; for example, to understand only China but not Japan, only the Communist Party but not the Kuomintang, only the proletariat but not the bourgeoisie... To be superficial means to consider neither the characteristics of a contradiction in its totality nor the characteristics of each of its aspects..."²⁴

43. Among intellectuals these words are most often quoted in cell meetings. Here they confront daily problems of working relationships and policy, and using MAO's theory, they search for contradictions and attempt to resolve them through criticism. What they principally criticize is faulty decision-making or conduct which violates MAO's injunctions against subjectivism, one-sidedness, or superficiality, all three of which, in addition, are failings thought to be especially characteristic of intellectuals. Although any opposing view, or contradiction, is considered susceptible to this kind of analysis, the cells usually apply it only to problems within the competence of the organizational unit in which the cell is located.

44. Another of MAO's philosophical concepts discussed in cell meetings, but largely confined to intellectuals among party members, is the idea that practice and experience can separate the useful from the irrelevant, turn failure into success, and differentiate right from wrong. This idea is especially useful in cell discussions concerning problems in an organizational unit, for practice and experience are believed to be at the heart of effective performance there. In his essay On Practice,²⁵ MAO describes the Marxist who "After he fails, he draws his lessons, corrects his ideas to make them correspond to the ideas of the external world, and can thus turn failure into success...".²⁶

45. Does MAO's philosophical thought influence decision-making in China? Central to MAO's theories are the concepts of contradiction, struggle, and resolution, as well as the notion that practice and experience can turn failure to success. Implicit also is the conviction that analysis must be penetrating and thorough - not subjective, one-sided, or superficial - and that a single correct view will in time emerge. It follows that Chinese policymakers expect, even demand that contradictions be identified in every situation, whether the situation is peaceful or hostile. Once isolated, contradictions must be resolved by criticism or struggle, thus encouraging the policymaker to create policy which on one level is antagonistic and bellicose, but in deference to the injunction against subjectivism, one-sidedness, and superficiality, on another level is founded on a realistic appreciation of the situation. After a single correct view has been adopted, however, it is very difficult to change. If the view is wrong, there is no ready way to adjust it.

46. Political analysis as practiced by Chinese officials, by way of example, always begins with a statement pointing out the contradictions inherent in the question as issue. This may be China's foreign relations with friend or foe, the reaction to party policy within a given organization, or a question of planning propaganda programs, but in each case the contradiction must first be identified. Thus there develops a search for opposing viewpoints where they may not actually exist. Next, some form of criticism and struggle, moderate or belligerent as the case demands, is proposed as the logical way to resolve the contradiction. Usually this encourages the Chinese to sharpen propaganda toward the foreign state, party organization, or individual. This constitutes criticism and struggle. Underlying the propaganda, no matter how bellicose, is a careful appreciation of the realities of the situation. Where the realities have been misinterpreted, however, there is a reluctance to admit it. To summarize, the most apparent characteristics of analysis based on MAO's philosophical thought are a tendency to see contradictions where they may not exist and to react with bellicose propaganda which in fact often conceals a realistic appraisal of the situation. But the appraisal, once adopted, is not easily changed.

47. It is this method of analysis which permits China to trade insults - criticism and struggle - with the USSR while demonstrating a keen appreciation of Soviet military superiority. Furthermore, it permits tactical shifts - the process of resolving minor contradictions within a major contradiction - as part

CONFIDENTIAL

of a broad strategy which itself does not change until the major contradiction is resolved. To be sure, criticism and struggle must be shaped to fit the contradiction. Between socialist states direct criticism (overt propaganda attacks) is usually sufficient, but the Chinese frequently resort to struggle (Wars of National Liberation) when resolving contradictions with hostile non-communist states.

48. An estimate of attitudes towards MAO's philosophical thought is difficult to come by. Chinese in general, and intellectuals, party members, and others under scrutiny in particular, are reluctant to express views which might get them into deep trouble. On the other hand, there is apparent, especially among intellectuals, widespread objection to concentration on a very small portion of MAO's total output. Rather than investigating the full range of his writings, literate Chinese spend a lifetime studying only a fraction. Often the net result is acute boredom. Especially is this the case with older intellectuals who have already passed a decade or two in such efforts.

49. With regard to attitudes toward the content of MAO's philosophical thought, many Chinese find it useful in the abstract, and especially well written and clearly presented, but not so effective when applied to daily problems. More serious, it is thought to lack originality. Thus it is considered helpful to utilize the search for contradictions as a framework within which to analyze a problem. What is more difficult, however, is to make use of criticism and struggle or the identification of dogmatists in solving problems at hand. As a result, problems are sometimes looked at in terms of their contradictions, but little else of MAO's theory is used. The more serious charge of being unoriginal stems from the Western origin of communism. MAO does not claim to have improved the product significantly since its importation. Moreover, he freely credits many of his own ideas to Chinese sages from the past. In consequence, until the Cultural Revolution at least, MAO was thought of as a master strategist and tactician, but not as an original theorist.

Mass Movements

50. The history of the Chinese Communist Party is a chronology of mass movements. Politically, these divide into production movements, or attempts at using massed labor power to achieve rapid technological advance, and thought movements, or propaganda campaigns aimed at ideological purity. The former movements have their greatest impact in the farms and villages where ample labor power is to be found, the latter on institutions of city and government where ideological zeal often lags. Although open resistance to either kind of mass movement is rare, there is plenty of controversy about methods. The intellectuals believe the movements seek to accomplish too much too fast, and the peasants find them an added burden on their already busy lives. Neither group cares for two of the unique features of mass movements, the struggle session and the "down to the countryside" program.

51. Innovation is a principal characteristic of production movements, and sometimes it goes astray. The backyard furnaces of the Great Leap Forward provide a good example. Although ill-conceived from the outset, party members at every level forced implementation of the policy despite early indications that it was failing. Furnaces were even erected in the courtyards of ministries in Peking. Government employees, none of whom had the slightest idea of how to make iron, gathered to watch as party leaders fired up the furnaces. A festive spirit prevailed: here was an opportunity to interrupt office routine and at the same time observe the comic results such paltry efforts produced.

52. Another of the characteristics of production movements is the age-old Chinese practice of relying on corvée labor for public works. Here MAO's faith in the powers of massed labor meets the ancient Chinese practice of organizing the peasantry to undertake large-scale projects not otherwise feasible. It is widely believed that the party has made wise and efficient use of this policy. A final characteristic differentiating production movements from thought movements is the general absence in the former of struggle sessions.

53. Since thought movements have the aim of purifying ideology, it follows that discussion, that is criticism and struggle, is the hallmark of the method. Usually the new movement is announced by the Central Committee simultaneously to the press and major party organizations. Customarily a leadership group is formed under the Central Committee to provide guidance. The leadership group, its membership appointed by the Politburo, issues statements in the name of the Central Committee, and at the conclusion of the movement it is disbanded. Somewhat different procedures have been followed during the Cultural Revolution, however, for the leadership group has issued statements in its own name and exercised command responsibilities going far beyond mere guidance.

54. Next, a well-established procedure unfolds. Higher party organizations direct lower-level organizations on how the movement is to be carried out: what documents to use, how to interpret them, how often to schedule study sessions, criticism meetings, and struggle sessions, when to start. The party leader at the lower level passes this information along, makes out schedules, and by his own example sets the pace and style for the movement. There follows a cycle of sessions and meetings which continues without interruption until the movement ends.

55. The most universally disliked feature of a mass movement is the struggle session. (These are usually but not always confined to mass movements.) Here dogmatists, counterrevolutionaries, and others who deviate from accepted norms are subjected to violent, open criticism. The atmosphere is no longer polite. Nor is it possible to survive these confrontations with reputations and face intact. The party holds all the cards, for the struggle session is the ultimate weapon in the drive toward ideological conformity among party members and non-members. Thus the party decides on time, target, method, and punishment. The latter run the gambit from demotion, through transfer, to enforced

participation in the "down to the countryside" program. Many of the victims commit suicide in the face of such harsh criticism.

56. Participants in the "down to the countryside" program are not solely the victims of struggle sessions, for many intellectuals who have been the target of moderate criticism also find themselves assigned to hard work among the peasants for a span of 6 months to two years. Intellectuals are especially susceptible, and especially resistant, to this kind of punishment. They are sent to the countryside because the party considers them selfish - they resist the injunction to Serve the People - but in practice exposure to the rigors of peasant life is just as likely to encourage these notions. At best they gain understanding and develop sympathy for the peasants, but seldom does the experience engender a measurable change in attitude. Moreover, for many urban intellectuals back-breaking toil in the fields is simply beyond their physical capacities. They also resent the family separation which is an inevitable adjunct of the program. Where assignments to the countryside exceed one year, open opposition is not unknown, and passive resistance is the norm.

57. Indeed every segment of Chinese society seems to harbor its special objections to mass movements. The peasants, who bear the brunt of production movements, often object that younger party leaders are forcing ill-conceived policies on them. And they resent inroads on their already limited time made by the requirement for repetitious study sessions, which for the older peasants, largely illiterate and unable to comprehend MAO's thought, are something of a sham. Zealous younger party leaders, in their rush to implement policies of the new movement, frequently commit the error of "left commandism" in that they either misunderstand Peking's intentions altogether or distort them in their haste. Thus for peasant and younger party member alike, mass movements bring special risks and strains. But since it is not possible to resist, an attitude of unenthusiastic resignation frequently prevails.

58. Mass movements are particularly hard on intellectuals. They are expected to undergo criticism and self-criticism in each succeeding thought movement, and for the older ones among them, the prospect of facing this treatment again and again is distasteful. Against this background many older intellectuals and older party members cope by participating without genuine conviction. Compliance becomes a pantomime, with the actors playing their assigned roles but doing so without enthusiasm. Yet they perform with considerable skill, for over them looms the threat of struggle sessions or assignment "down to the countryside." As a consequence, the actors take their cue from the party leader who first explains the script. Thereafter they echo his explanation, thus avoiding unnecessary risks by repeating what the party has already sanctioned.

The Party at Work

CLASSIFIED

59. No task confronting the party is more pressing than the effort to expand membership. It is a crucial topic at party meetings, a constant requirement in contacts with the

masses, and increasingly since the 1950's, a problem for the party. Not that applications have fallen off. On the contrary, the problem is that the qualifications of a majority of the applicants are unacceptable, not because qualified Chinese are reluctant to apply, but because the party needs more vigorous, aggressive leaders than the society can supply. This is so because in the past party members have often lost their zeal, and no amount of study or exhortation has succeeded in rekindling it. Hence the party must depend on constant transfusions of new blood.

60. Party members act to expand the party through daily contacts with the masses. They propagandize, they proselytize, they explain party policy, and they do all this to encourage acceptance of policy and to spot potential new members. The term masses as used in communist parlance takes on a special meaning, for the masses are composed of non-party members at the next subordinate organizational level. The masses among whom MAO works, for example, are the highest levels of government and military. For a department director in a government ministry the masses are his immediate subordinates; for the leader of a production brigade the masses are the workers in the brigade; and so on down the line. Therefore, when a party member sets out to propagandize the masses, what he is really doing is propagandizing his co-workers. They may add up to 5, 10, or 100, but only rarely would their numbers be great enough to be considered masses in the Western sense.

61. Furthermore, propagandizing the masses also takes on special meaning, for the relationship is a two-way affair. On the one hand, party members propagandize by discussing ideology and policy with the masses in order to find out whether they believe and understand. Though friendly, these discussions have an unrelenting quality in that the party member is frequently in the position of a salesman in a buyer's market. On the other hand, the party member is directed to learn from the masses in order to understand their problems, aspirations, and outlook. The party must not remain aloof, and the individual party member is urged to mix with the masses to keep his fingers on the pulse.

62. Problems in relations with the masses often arise both because some party members have neither heart nor talent for the undertaking and because the masses are frequently not receptive. Some Chinese feel uncomfortable in the role of propagandist urging their views on reluctant co-workers who have little interest in politics. At the other end of the spectrum are those who exploit the authority of their position in the party to force propaganda on the intimidated masses. In both cases the undertaking fails for lack of meaningful understanding between the two sides.

63. The Communist Party governs through the mass line. Commands issue "from the people to the people", filtering through the party in between. What this means in practical terms is that the party either persuades the masses of the utility of a new policy - this is "to the people" - or it reviews alternate courses of action suggested by the masses, decides among them, and then

GEHEIM

persuades the masses to support the party's choice - this is "from the people to the people." More often than not, however, only the first method is applied. Although the party is not quite in the position of issuing arbitrary commands, only a fine distinction separates this from the accepted practice of issuing the command and then persuading, rather than ordering, the masses to support it. Much depends on the capacity of the party member in charge.

64. Since the party confronts the masses at each subordinate organizational level, it follows that the mass line must be implemented according to the same pattern. MAO does not deliver the mass line to the nation, although he may define it for general use, but he does implement it at the highest levels of government and military. The Central Committee implements it among higher party organizations who in turn act on the masses at the next subordinate level and so on until each and every layer of the society has been directed and persuaded to support the new mass line. However, this orderly arrangement often meets with resistance. On some occasions the mass line is obscure, and otherwise cooperative party members are simply unable to understand it; at other times there is so much command and so little persuasion that the masses resist. Particularly is this true when doubts exist concerning the wisdom of the policy.

65. All these matters, expansion of the party, contact with the masses, and the mass line, are topics considered at endless meetings going on at all levels in the party. If the matter at hand is new and interesting, the meeting will be lively, but more often party meetings are convened in response to fixed schedules rather than to pressing problems which have arisen. In addition, party meetings are but one of a whole series of time-consuming meetings which, as already noted, include study sessions, criticism and self-criticism meetings, and struggle sessions, not to mention the ordinary business meetings which are a matter of routine in most non-party organizations. In practical terms rule by ideology is equivalent to rule by meeting.

66. Reaction to this regimen is not favorable. Few look forward to party meetings. Especially those members occupied with outside responsibilities and older party members who have attended countless meetings in their day are inclined to adopt a hostile attitude toward proceedings which waste valuable time, bore them, and contribute little that is new. As a consequence, it is not unusual during party meetings for members to attend to other business, read, chat with friends, or even sleep. Generally this lackadaisical attitude is tolerated on the part of busy or older members, but younger ones are expected to participate with greater vigor. Criticism meetings, however, provide an exception to the general laxity, for all party members must participate actively. If they decline to do so, the party leader singles them out for criticism.

67. Another important task facing the party at work is its need to communicate. Secret documents circulated from higher to lower party organizations supply some of this need, but there are not nearly enough of them making the rounds to tell party

GEHEIM

members all they need to know. For this they rely on the public media. It is not that the party declines to inform them, but rather that the highest party organizations, which must lead both the party and the people, have no choice but to pronounce less secret matters through all available media. Even then they have difficulty making themselves heard. Rule by ideology is also rule by words, and many Chinese cannot distinguish which words to credit and which to disregard. Early in their careers therefore, party members learn to pierce through the standard phrases and concentrate on what is new. This also is a useful talent for all Chinese to cultivate, for the party leadership often communicates with party and people simultaneously.

68. By a wide margin People's Daily is the most important of all the public media. Like most Chinese Communist newspapers, it is printed with the intention that when opened double and pasted on a wall, the key articles face the reader. Page four, therefore follows page one in importance, since the inside pages, two and three, are pasted to the wall. A single page, printed on both sides, which usually accompanies this double spread, but is inserted behind it instead of inside it, is similarly arranged for pasting. Page five faces the wall, page six the reader. In order of importance, then, page one and four are followed by page six. Beyond this party members attach importance to the type of article, its placement, and the content.

69. Nor surprisingly, editorials rank first. If located on page one, they are thought to carry the weight of the Central Committee, and where MAO's thought is mentioned in the headline, they take on added importance. Content is nearly always abstract and usually concerns politics, but the main point is that the careful readers know that a new Central Committee view is generally to be found there. Following editorials in importance are reports from party organizations below the Central Committee level. Here concrete examples are given of policies newly implemented or put back on the tracks. Naturally the importance of a report is enhanced if it appears on page one and is graced by a brief commentary explaining its significance. Page one reports, especially when preceded by commentaries, are also considered to bear the stamp of approval of the Central Committee.

70. After the abstractions and concrete examples of editorials and reports come the unsigned commentaries. This vehicle is used to comment on existing policy, not to announce something new. The absence of a signature means that it represents the concerted view of the People's Daily, while the signed commentary, similar in most other respects, allegedly represents the view of only one writer. Actually both kinds of commentary are the work of the People's Daily staff with the Central Committee standing in the wings, but in the second instance the article is downgraded slightly by adding a writer's name, even though the name is always a false one. Like editorials and reports, commentaries increase in importance according to their placement.

71. Party members do not read all editorials, reports, and commentaries which come before them, since many articles merely rehash old material and are intrinsically dull, while others

SECRET

discuss subjects of no concern to a particular party member. But where the article is pertinent and contains something new, it is given a close reading, and the reader is careful to recall all previous pronouncements on the same subject. This is the only way to grasp subtle changes of emphasis which provide clues to the meaning. Apart from these articles relating to policy, the People's Daily also reprints many columns taken from MAO's thoughts, but except for eager new members, few in the party pay them much attention.

72. Red Flag, the party's theoretical journal, is presented in much the same manner as People's Daily, except that it emphasizes editorials and reports at the expense of commentaries. These editorials carry great weight, giving Red Flag pre-eminence in the field of theory, while People's Daily reigns over politics. By comparison, at least until the Cultural Revolution gave it added stature, the provincial press was little more than an obedient step-child of these two major publications. Even Radio Peking rarely initiated new material, but merely rebroadcast what was deemed significant from the columns of its weightier parents. Song and dance troops, films, and wired broadcasts available in rural communes also draw their material from the same sources.

73. The party's ability to communicate is only as good as the receptivity of the audience, and this does not always measure up to expectations. One of the most troublesome limitations arises from the inability of words, especially when they articulate unpopular policies, to galvanize the people into action. Where the policy is wrong or where it fails, the problem of communicating becomes acute. One of the most striking problems is that no ready way exists for reaching so many millions of people. Newspapers appeal only to the literate, radios can be readily switched off, and many wired broadcast systems lack enough speakers to insure wide coverage. Even when the message gets through, the party must contend with a widespread belief that the media exaggerate. Overcoming this resistance requires great effort, more words, and policies which are not fundamentally unpopular. This is another way of saying that the party communicates most effectively when it has a useful product to sell; otherwise, no one listens.

74. No account of the party at work is complete without an estimate of attitudes toward party membership. These attitudes seem to vary according to age. Younger members are generally enthusiastic. They believe in party ideology, support the party's pre-eminent position, and give every indication of dedication and drive. Hence MAO's efforts to bring them to the forefront. But this is not always the case with older party members. Although many remain dedicated, a lukewarm attitude toward ordinary party matters is very common. Interest in politics wanes with advancing age, yet the party offers no provisions for retirement or resignation. There is no way out. Older members face two alternatives: either cling to a degree of participation in party matters which, if hypocritical, is also within acceptable limits; or withdraw completely at the risk of criticism or struggle. Most obviously, virtually everyone chooses the first option; with

the result that participation in party affairs, except for the young, becomes little more than a charade. Party members go through the required motions, voice the required arguments, but they do not believe it. Indeed for older members prestige and personal power remain the principal attractions of long-term membership.

Problems of Communism

75. Standing at the twilight of his long career, MAO finds his philosophy everywhere under sharp attack. The USSR, once China's friend and socialist ally, has traded in the old model of violent revolution for a new one based on peaceful competition in the parliaments of the non-communist world. Gone too is the concept of proletarian internationalism under which communist states faced the world in concert and acted together to speed the growth of kindred movements everywhere. Internally, the Soviets downplay contradictions, deny class struggle, and evolve like a modern Western state. Thus MAO in 1964 branded them modern revisionists, meaning that they have revised the concept of violent revolution and struggle, and he added modern to the epitaph to distinguish Soviet deviations from the original revisionism of Kautsky.

76. MAO believes the same trends evident inside China. Standing up against his theory that class struggle and continuous revolution provide the shortest road to socialist reconstruction, or, to state it in another way, that politics must take command, is the opposite contention that class struggle vanished with the KMT and continuous revolution is not so much help as hindrance on the road to reconstruction. The Cultural Revolution confirms that MAO holds older government and party bureaucrats responsible for this view, with LIU Shao-ch'i cast in the role of leader. These are the leaders who resist the idea of resolving contradictions through violent struggle, who wince at the rigors of political education and mass movements. To be sure, there is no argument about ultimate aims - the reconstruction of a strong and prosperous nation led by the Chinese Communist Party - but the argument over means already seems beyond all but temporary solution. The plain fact is that many in the older generation no longer support the concept of politics in command. Too much ideology, too many meetings, and excessive pressure have caused them to go sour.

77. Having written off most of the older generation, probably even before the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, MAO now turns his attention to China's youth. Do they believe in his theory of continuous revolution and struggle? Concluding that they lack commitment, MAO assigns them a central role in the Cultural Revolution, partly in hopes of reforming their thought through immersion in revolutionary struggle. The Long March educated one generation, the Cultural Revolution will educate another. But the undertaking calls for gigantic measures. Modern revisionism has penetrated deeply into the thinking of the younger generation. LIU Shao-ch'i's idea of tangible rewards resulting from ideological self-cultivation without violent class struggle is closer to Horatio Alger than MAO.

78. Once immersed in the Cultural Revolution, China's supposedly revisionist youth seem to follow MAO blindly, creating turmoil and dissension in their path. Older party members, well aware that policies of the leadership can and do err, wonder whether the present blind commitment of youth to MAO will not one day backfire, giving way to disillusionment at the many compromises, even failures which they are certain to confront. These older party members understand that MAO shapes his policies like the tides, advancing and retreating endlessly, but many in the younger generation lack this knowledge. As a consequence, they are ill-equipped to accept disappointments their present adulation of MAO may lead to. The future for a living communist party hangs in the balance. Still ardent radicals among youth might join with the minority of the older party members who remain sincere believers. A vigorous new party could emerge. But a more likely prospect is that the disillusioned among youth and their disillusioned elders will combine in support of the new established tradition whereby a majority of party members and masses pay lip-service to the demands of life in the Chinese Communist Party without wholeheartedly supporting it.

79. Comment: The following footnotes are keyed to numbered passages in the text:

1. Selected Works of MAO Tse-tung, Peking, 1965, Volume III, pp. 227-228.
2. Ibid, p. 227
3. Ibid, p. 227
4. Ibid, p. 227
5. Ibid, p. 227-228
6. Ibid, p. 228
7. Selected Works of MAO Tse-tung, Peking, 1965, Volume II, pp. 31-33.
8. Ibid, p. 31
9. Ibid, p. 31
10. Ibid, p. 32
11. Selected Works of MAO Tse-tung, Peking, 1965, Volume II, pp. 337-338.
12. Ibid, p. 337
13. Ibid, p. 337
14. Ibid, p. 337
15. Ibid, p. 338
16. Selected Works of MAO Tse-tung, Peking, 1965, Volume III, pp. 321-323.
17. Ibid, p. 322
18. Ibid, p. 321
19. Selected Works of MAO Tse-tung, Peking, 1965, Volume I, pp. 105-115.
20. Ibid, p. 105
21. Ibid, p. 109
22. Ibid, p. 114
23. Selected Works of MAO Tse-tung, Peking, 1965, Volume I, pp. 311-346.
24. Ibid, pp. 323, 324
25. Selected Works of MAO Tse-tung, Peking, 1965, Volume I, pp. 295-309
26. Ibid, p. 297

GENE